Shear Development Co. v. Cal. Coastal Com.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
               CALIFORNIA

            SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC,
                Plaintiff and Appellant,
                            v.
          CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,
               Defendant and Respondent.

                           S284378

            Second Appellate District, Division Six
                          B319895

           San Luis Obispo County Superior Court
                        20CV-0431



                        April 23, 2026

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Stone* concurred.




*
      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA
              COASTAL COMMISSION
                            S284378


            Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


       In 2017, Shear Development Co., LLC (Shear), applied to
the County of San Luis Obispo (County) for a coastal
development permit to build single family homes in a developed
part of Los Osos, an unincorporated town in the County. The
County ultimately granted the permit in 2019. The California
Coastal Commission (Commission) appealed the County’s
decision to itself and denied the permit in 2020.             The
Commission concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction because
the proposed development was in a sensitive coastal resource
area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP)
and because there was more than one principal permitted use of
the proposed development site under the County’s LCP. Shear
filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in superior
court, arguing that the Commission had no appellate
jurisdiction on either basis. The trial court denied the petition,
finding for the Commission on the SCRA issue. Shear appealed,
and the County, as amicus curiae, agreed with Shear’s positions.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
      We granted review to decide the standard of review a court
should apply when determining whether the Commission’s
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a coastal development
permit was proper and, when the Commission and a local
government offer conflicting interpretations of an LCP, whether
deference is due to either entity’s interpretation. To clarify how

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these principles should be applied, we further decide whether
the proposed development is in an SCRA based on the LCP.
After argument, we requested supplemental briefing on the
Commission’s alternative asserted basis for jurisdiction;
namely, whether the Commission has appellate jurisdiction over
a development that is not designated as the only principal
permitted use in a county’s LCP.
      We hold, first, that a court should exercise its independent
judgment in determining the Commission’s appellate
jurisdiction when that jurisdiction depends primarily on
interpretation of an LCP rather than factual matters. An LCP
is enacted law, and the independent judgment standard is well
established as the standard of review for an agency’s
interpretation of the law. Second, where two entities offer
incompatible interpretations of a law that both administer, a
court should apply the traditional Yamaha factors regarding
agency deference to each entity’s interpretation. (See Yamaha
Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th
1, 12–13 (Yamaha).) When the factors do not clearly favor either
interpretation, as here, no deference is due to either. Third, the
proposed development is not in an SCRA because the LCP does
not designate it so. The Commission relies primarily on a single
figure in the LCP, captioned “Figure 6-3” (see pt. II.E.1., post),
but this figure does not support the Commission’s reading, and
the LCP as a whole supports the opposite reading. The
Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction on this basis.
Fourth, and finally, the Commission does not have appellate
jurisdiction solely because a site has multiple principal
permitted uses.       Rather, the Commission has appellate
jurisdiction when the proposed development is not designated


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as the principal permitted use — or one of several principal
permitted uses — of the site under the local government’s LCP.
Since Shear’s proposed development is for one of several
principal permitted uses, the Commission does not have
appellate jurisdiction on this basis. Thus, we conclude that the
Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction over Shear’s
permit application and therefore reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeal.
                        I. BACKGROUND
     A. The California Coastal Act
       In 1972, due to “[g]rowing public consciousness of the
finite quantity and fragile nature of the coastal environment,”
California voters passed Proposition 20 (as approved by voters,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972)), which “created the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Commission and directed it to oversee the
orderly process of planning for the future development of the
California coastline.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California
Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 162.) The Legislature then
passed the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act) (Pub.
Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.),1 which created the current
Commission as the successor to the California Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission.         (Pacific Legal Foundation, at
pp. 162–163.) The Legislature declared that the basic goals for
the coastal zone were, among other things, to: “(a) Protect,
maintain, and, where feasible, enhance and restore the overall
quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and
artificial resources. [¶] (b) Ensure orderly, balanced utilization


1
     Further statutory references are to the Public Resources
Code unless otherwise noted.


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and conservation of coastal zone resources taking into account
the social and economic needs of the people of the state. [¶]
(c) Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize
public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent
with    sound    resources     conservation    principles   and
constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.”
(§ 30001.5, subds. (a)–(c).)
       The Commission and local governments share
responsibility for planning coastal development. Every city and
county in the coastal zone must “prepare a local coastal program
for that portion of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction” or ask
the Commission to prepare one. (§ 30500, subd. (a).) “The
precise content of each local coastal program shall be
determined by the local government . . . in full consultation with
the commission and with full public participation.” (Id.,
subd. (c).) The city or county must then submit the LCP to the
Commission, which will certify the LCP if it complies with
statutory requirements. (See § 30512.) Once an LCP is
certified, the city or county generally has responsibility for
reviewing coastal development permit applications to ensure
consistency with the LCP. (See ibid.) However, in certain
instances specified by statute, the Commission may exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the city’s or county’s permit decisions.
(§ 30603, subd. (a).)2


2
       The Commission’s statutory appellate jurisdiction is
limited to five types of developments, which may be briefly
summarized as those: (1) between the sea and the first public
road paralleling the sea or near the inland extent of any beach
or of the mean high tideline of the sea where there is no beach;



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     B. The Adoption of the Los Osos LCP and Other
        Environmental Efforts
      Los Osos is an unincorporated coastal community of about
15,000 residents located in central San Luis Obispo County near
the south end of Morro Bay, which is connected to the much
larger Estero Bay. Since at least the early 1970’s, state
environmental agencies have raised health and safety concerns
regarding septic tank discharges adversely affecting ground and
surface water in Los Osos.
      After the Coastal Act was passed in 1976, the County
began to draft its LCP. The Commission certified the LCP in
pieces in the 1980’s. One portion of the LCP is the “Estero Area
Plan,” which covers the region of Estero Bay, including Los
Osos, and was certified in 1984.
      The County’s LCP designates certain areas as sensitive
resource areas (SRA), which are defined as “areas with special
environmental qualities, or areas containing unique or
endangered vegetation or habitat resources.” (San Luis Obispo
County Code, § 23.07.160.)       The LCP also defines an
environmentally sensitive habitat or environmentally sensitive
habitat area (ESHA) as “[a] type of Sensitive Resource Area
where plant or animal life or their habitats are either rare or


(2) in tidelands, submerged lands, or public trust lands or near
wetlands, estuaries, streams, or the top of the seaward face of
any coastal bluff; (3) in an SCRA; (4) for a use that is not the
principal permitted use under applicable zoning laws; or (5) a
major public works project or a major energy facility. (§ 30603,
subd. (a).) Even in these five instances, the Commission will not
exercise jurisdiction unless the potential appeal raises a
“substantial issue.”      (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13115,
subds. (b)–(c).)


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especially valuable because of their special nature or role in an
ecosystem and which could easily [be] disturbed or degraded by
human activities and development.” (San Luis Obispo County
Code, § 23.11.030; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 30107.5
[defining “ ‘[e]nvironmentally sensitive area’ ”].) The Estero
Area Plan does not use the term SCRA. The parties dispute the
relationship between an SRA and an SCRA, but they agree that
at least some SRAs, particularly those that contain an ESHA,
are also SCRAs.
      In 1988, in response to the water quality issues in Los
Osos, the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board
established a discharge moratorium that effectively halted most
construction and expansions of existing development in Los
Osos until the problem of septic tank discharges was solved.
     C. Shear’s Initial Development
      In 2003, Shear purchased eight residential lots in Los
Osos. The lots were zoned as “Residential Single-Family,” for
which there are three principal permitted uses, including
“Single-Family Dwellings.” The lots were in an existing
developed area that was bound on three sides by residential
development.
      In 2004, the County approved a coastal development
permit authorizing Shear to build one residence on each lot in
two phases. In the first phase, Shear could build a total of four
homes on lots 2, 4, 6, and 8, and in the second, which would occur
only after completion of the Los Osos community sewer, the
remaining residences could be built. The Regional Water
Quality Control Board exempted the project from the existing
septic system prohibition because, as the Commission later



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summarized, “the phasing allows the project to maintain one-
acre minimums for septic tank disposals.”
       Two members of the Commission appealed Shear’s
application to the Commission. At the time, the Commission
justified its appellate jurisdiction on the basis that the proposed
development was “between the first public road and the sea.”
(See § 30603, subd. (a)(1).) The Commission approved the first
phase of development and denied approval of the second phase
because it was “uncertain when a community sewer system will
be online” and “the details of anticipated community buildout,
treatment plant capacity, and schedules of service remain
uncertain.” Shear built the residences approved for the first
phase.
      D. Changes to Los Osos’s LCP and Wastewater
         Facilities
     In 2008, the Commission certified an amendment to the
County’s LCP. Among other things, this amendment added the
SRA at issue here, the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat.3
      In 2010, the Commission approved a coastal development
permit for the Los Osos Wastewater Project, an infrastructure
project consisting of “[c]onstruction and operation of a
community sewer system, including a treatment plant,
collection/disposal/reuse    facilities,  and    all    associated
development and infrastructure.” This approval included nine
special conditions, of which only Special Condition 6 is pertinent


3
      For clarity, we refer to the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat
SRA as the “Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat” or the “LODS SRA”
and to the geographical feature of dune sands near Los Osos and
Morro Bay as the “Los Osos dune sands.”


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here.    It provides:    “Wastewater service to undeveloped
properties within the service area shall be prohibited unless and
until the Estero Area Plan is amended to identify appropriate
and sustainable buildout limits,” including proof that “adequate
water is available to support development.” The Los Osos
Wastewater Project was completed in 2016.
     E. Shear’s Second Permit Application
      In August 2017, Shear applied for a coastal development
permit to build the four homes planned for the second phase of
development. These homes would be located between the homes
built during the first phase of development. In December 2017,
the San Luis Obispo County department hearing officer denied
the application because the homes were not eligible to connect
to the Los Osos wastewater treatment plant, and they were
located within an area where a prohibition on new septic
systems was in place. Shear appealed that decision to the San
Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors (Board). At a hearing
on July 10, 2018, the Board considered the appeal, including
Special Condition 6, and voted to tentatively uphold the appeal.
The Board directed staff to return to the Board with an
environmental determination, findings for approval, and
conditions for approval.
      Related to the environmental determination, then-
endangered (now reclassified as threatened) Morro
shoulderband snails were found on one lot, so Shear modified its
application to seek approval of residences only on the other
three lots. After a further hearing in July 2019, the Board
upheld Shear’s appeal as to the three lots where no Morro
shoulderband snails were found. The Board found that “[t]he
capacities of available water supply and sewage disposal


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services are sufficient to accommodate both existing
development and allowed development” because Shear was
required to retrofit existing development to save more water
than the new homes were expected to consume.
      In August 2019, two members of the Commission appealed
the Board’s determination to the Commission for de novo
review. Shear not only defended the County’s decision on the
merits but also challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction. After
a hearing in July 2020, the Commission denied the permit. The
Commission identified two bases for the Commission’s appellate
jurisdiction. First, the Commission concluded that the proposed
residences were in an SCRA based on Figure 6-3 in the Estero
Area Plan. (See § 30603, subd. (a)(3).) Second, the Commission
found that the proposed development was not for the (sole)
principal permitted use for the area; it was for one of several
principal permitted uses.4 (See § 30603, subd. (a)(4).) On the
merits, the Commission concluded that no adequate wastewater
service was available due to Special Condition 6, and the
development did not adequately protect the ESHA and thus
violated ESHA policies.
     In February 2021, Shear filed a petition for a writ of
administrative mandate in superior court. Shear argued that

4
      As mentioned above, for the first phase of development in
2004, the Commission based its jurisdiction on section 30603,
subdivision (a)(1), which provides the Commission appellate
jurisdiction over “[d]evelopments approved by the local
government between the sea and the first public road
paralleling the sea.” For the second phase of development, the
Commission expressly concluded, “This project is not located
between the nearest public road and the sea,” and it has not
relied on subdivision (a)(1) in this case.


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the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction and abused its
discretion in denying the coastal development permit. In
November 2021, the trial court denied the petition. The trial
court concluded that the Commission had appellate jurisdiction
because the proposed development was in an SCRA based on
Figure 6-3, but it rejected the Commission’s argument that
appellate jurisdiction was proper because the development was
not for the sole principal permitted use. On the merits, the trial
court found that there was not substantial evidence to support
the Commission’s denial of the permit based on ESHA policies,
but the court upheld the Commission’s denial of the permit
because there was substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s finding that the lots did not have sufficient access
to water and wastewater disposal.
      Shear and the Commission both appealed. The County
submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing that the Commission
did not have appellate jurisdiction because, under the County’s
reading of the LCP, the proposed development site was not in an
SCRA. In an unpublished opinion filed in February 2024, the
Court of Appeal affirmed. It “concluded that the Commission
properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the project’s
location in an SCRA” and thus it was “not necessary for [the
court] to consider whether, as the Commission contends in its
cross-appeal, it also has appellate jurisdiction because the
project does not fall within the principal permitted use for its
zoning category.” (Shear Development Co., LLC v. California
Coastal Commission (Feb. 21, 2024, B319895) [nonpub. opn.]
(Shear).) The Court of Appeal also held that, on the merits, “the
Commission did not abuse its discretion because its factual
findings relating to water and wastewater access are supported


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by substantial evidence.” Shear filed a petition for rehearing,
which was denied.
       We granted Shear’s petition for review in June 2024. On
December 11, 2024, the day before the Commission’s answer
brief was due, a new San Luis Obispo County LCP became
effective. According to the Commission, “Shear could apply for
and likely obtain a development permit” under the new LCP.
Specifically, the Commission reasons that there is no longer any
obstacle to Shear connecting its properties to the Los Osos sewer
system, and Shear can satisfy the LCP’s environmental
conditions by paying a mitigation fee. Also, the Commission
concedes that the proposed development is not within an SCRA
under the new LCP.
      After oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing
on whether the Commission properly exercised appellate
jurisdiction over Shear’s coastal development permit on the
ground that the development was not designated as the
principal permitted use, both under the LCP in effect at the time
the Commission exercised appellate jurisdiction and under the
current LCP.
                        II. DISCUSSION
     A. The New LCP
      As an initial matter, the parties dispute the impact of the
new LCP on the issues in this case. Shear argues that the LCP
in place at the time the County approved the development
permit in 2019 governs here. The Commission argues that the
new LCP applies.
     We need not resolve this dispute because the result is the
same either way. The parties agree that under the new LCP,


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the Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction on the basis that
the proposed development is in an SCRA. The parties dispute
whether the same was true under the LCP in place in 2019, but
for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the old LCP also
did not designate the development site as an SCRA. Thus,
regardless of whether the LCP in place now or in 2019 governs,
the Commission did not and cannot properly exercise
jurisdiction on this basis.
      Also, regarding the issue of whether the proposed
development is for the principal permitted use under the LCP,
the parties have not identified, and we have not found, any
pertinent changes in law between 2019 and now. Thus, whether
we apply the LCP from 2019 or the current LCP does not affect
our analysis.
      B. The Applicable Standard of Review
      Shear claims that the Commission “has proceeded
without, or in excess of, jurisdiction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5,
subd. (b).) For such a claim, the standard of review depends on
whether the issue is legal, factual, or both. Here, the only
disputed issue is legal. Shear claims that the Commission
misinterpreted the old LCP’s provisions regarding whether the
proposed development site is in an SCRA. Interpretation of an
LCP is a legal issue, not a factual one, because it concerns
interpretation of enacted law rather than “the establishment of
historical or physical facts.” (Crocker National Bank v. City and
County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 (Crocker
National Bank); see also Schneider v. California Coastal
Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343–1344 [“Where
jurisdiction involves the interpretation of a statute, regulation,
or ordinance, the issue of whether the agency proceeded in


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excess of its jurisdiction is a question of law”].) A court exercises
its independent judgment reviewing an agency’s interpretation
of the law, applying any appropriate deference to the agency’s
legal interpretation. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 8.)
Therefore, the independent judgment standard applies to
Shear’s claim that the Commission misread the LCP.5
       The Commission argues that its decision should be
reviewed for substantial evidence because whether the site is in
an SCRA is predominantly factual and the Commission
“weighed site-specific factual evidence relevant to the SCRA
determination.” For example, the Commission contends that
the fact that a specific type of sandy soil, called “Baywood Fine
Sands,” lies under the development site supports the conclusion
that the site is in an SCRA. But Shear does not dispute any of
this site-specific factual evidence. Shear does not argue that the
ground characteristics of the development site differ from the
Commission’s description. Nor is any other relevant factual
dispute apparent from the record or briefing. When “the
material facts in the present case are largely undisputed,” the
disputed issue is likely to be legal. (Connerly v. State Personnel
Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175; Boling v. Public Employment
Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912 [“the application of law
to undisputed facts ordinarily presents a legal question that is



5
      We emphasize that we apply independent judgment
because the dispute is legal, not because the dispute concerns
jurisdiction. Jurisdictional issues may involve disputed facts.
(See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Eureka v. California Coastal
Com. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1583–1584 (Citizens for a
Better Eureka).) For such disputes, a different standard of
review may apply.


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reviewed de novo”]; see also Skidgel v. California Unemployment
Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 10 [“ ‘[S]tatutory
construction is a matter of law’ ”].) The disputed issue here is
the interpretation of the LCP, a legal issue. (Cf. Hirschfield v.
Cohen (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 648, 660 [treating statutory
construction as a question of law while considering extrinsic
evidence].) For Shear’s jurisdictional claim, then, the proper
standard is the court’s independent judgment.
       The Commission relies on four cases applying a
deferential standard of review to an agency determination. But
all four cases concerned predominantly factual questions. (See
Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516;
Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1086, 1114; Crocker National Bank, supra, 49 Cal.3d
at p. 889; Citizens for a Better Eureka, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1584.) These cases did not apply substantial evidence
review to a pure question of law.
      The Commission also relies on Charles A. Pratt
Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 1068. In Pratt, the Court of Appeal treated
whether the plaintiff’s land was designated as an ESHA as a
question of fact to which substantial evidence review applied.
(Id. at pp. 1076–1077.) Pratt was mistaken on this point
because, as discussed above, whether an LCP designates land as
an ESHA is a question of law. This error may not have affected
the outcome in Pratt because the vast majority of the property
at issue in that case was designated as a “ ‘terrestrial habitat,’ ”
which the LCP explicitly designated as an ESHA. (Id. at
p. 1077.) Such an unambiguous designation may have led to the
same result under any standard. Nonetheless, we hold that the


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correct standard here is the court’s independent judgment and
disapprove Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California
Coastal Com., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 1068 to the extent its
analysis is inconsistent with our opinion.6
      C. Deference When Agencies Disagree
      The next question before us is whether a court should
afford any deference to the County’s or the Commission’s view
of the law. The County contends that its interpretation of its
LCP is entitled to deference and the Commission’s
interpretation is not, while the Commission argues the reverse.
We hold that neither is entitled to any deference here.
       In general, when an agency “interpret[s] a statute within
its administrative jurisdiction,” a court may defer to the
agency’s interpretation of the law. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th
at p. 11.) Similar deference applies to “a city’s interpretation of
its own ordinance.”      (Harrington v. City of Davis (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 420, 434.) But deference is not automatic.
“Whether judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation is
appropriate and, if so, its extent — the ‘weight’ it should be
given — is . . . fundamentally situational.” (Yamaha, at p. 12.)
The deference due to agency interpretations “turns on a legally
informed, commonsense assessment of their contextual merit.”
(Id. at p. 14.) In Yamaha, we articulated several factors
relevant to such an assessment. (Id. at p. 12.) Those factors,
explored at greater length below, generally assess whether “ ‘the

6
      Pratt was decided by the same division of the same district
as decided the present appeal. The parties have not cited, and
we have not found, any other Court of Appeal opinion that has
applied the substantial evidence standard of review to an agency
determination in the absence of disputed questions of fact.


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agency has a comparative interpretive advantage over the
courts’ ” and whether “ ‘the interpretation in question is
probably correct.’ ” (Ibid.)7
       When multiple agencies that administer a statute have
provided conflicting interpretations, a court should apply the
Yamaha factors to each agency to determine not only whether
either would be entitled to deference, but also whether either
has a stronger claim to deference than the other. If one agency
is better situated than the other to provide a definitive statutory
interpretation to which a court should defer, then the court may
assign greater weight to that agency’s interpretation. If not, and
the agencies offer incompatible interpretations, then the court
should perform its interpretive task without deference to either
agency.
      This approach is consistent with the rationales underlying
Yamaha. An agency interpreting a statute that it administers
“may possess special familiarity with satellite legal and
regulatory issues.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 11.) An
agency may have “expertise and technical knowledge, especially
where the legal text to be interpreted is technical, obscure,
complex, open-ended, or entwined with issues of fact, policy, and
discretion.” (Id. at p. 12.) An agency may have followed
procedures that “enhance the accuracy and reliability of the
resulting administrative ‘product.’ ” (Id. at p. 13.) These
considerations may give the agency’s interpretation



7
      Yamaha also discussed quasi-legislative rules, which are
generally afforded a greater degree of deference. (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 10.) Here, we are analyzing agency
interpretations, not quasi-legislative rules.


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“presumptive value.” (Id. at p. 11.) If they apply to only one
agency — for example, if only one of the agencies has pertinent
expertise, or only one of the agencies has followed reliable
procedures to develop its interpretation — that agency’s
interpretation is likely to have more weight. But if both
agencies are on equal footing, “the fact that the two agencies”
that share roughly equal responsibility to administer the same
statute “fundamentally disagree on its interpretation argues
against the existence of any consistent administrative
construction to which we should defer.” (Department of
Industrial Relations v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals
Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 93, 106, fn. 6.) Applying the Yamaha
factors to both agencies that have offered conflicting
interpretations thus provides an appropriate means to
determine whether either agency’s interpretation should receive
any deference.8




8
       We are not confronted here with a situation in which more
than one agency administers a statute, but not all pertinent
agencies have provided an interpretation. (See, e.g., California
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 488,
501; Purifoy v. Howell (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 166, 182–183.)
“Absent agency” cases involve different considerations, such as
the risk of “a regulatory regime in which either the same statute
is interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one
agency that happens to reach the courthouse first is allowed to
fix the meaning of the text for all.” (Rapaport v. U.S. Dept. of
Treasury (D.C. Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 212, 216–217; see also Chao v.
Community Trust Co. (3d Cir. 2007) 474 F.3d 75, 85; U.S. Dept.
of the Interior v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com. (1st Cir. 2015)
876 F.3d 360, 364–366.)



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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


     D. Applying the Yamaha Factors
      There are “two broad categories of factors relevant to a
court’s assessment of the weight due an agency’s interpretation:
Those ‘indicating that the agency has a comparative interpretive
advantage over the courts,’ and those ‘indicating that the
interpretation in question is probably correct.’ ” (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.) When two entities disagree, the
questions are whether either entity has a comparative
interpretive advantage not only over the courts but also over the
other entity, and whether the factors indicating correctness are
stronger for one entity than for the other.9
        1. Comparative interpretive advantage
      The factors relevant to an agency’s interpretive advantage
include whether (1) the agency has relevant “expertise and


       Also, we do not face a situation in which agencies
administer different statutes and disagree about their interplay.
For example, in Department of Finance v. Commission on State
Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, a regional water quality control
board disagreed with a legal interpretation by the Commission
on State Mandates. Each agency administered different
statutory schemes, and one question presented was whether to
classify an issue as falling into one agency’s purview such that
deference might be appropriate. (Id. at pp. 768–769; see also id.
at pp. 777–778 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) In contrast,
here we are concerned with two agencies that administer the
same statutory scheme.
9
       Courts have deferred to the Commission’s interpretation
of law and to a county’s when there was no disagreement. (See,
e.g., Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th
1281, 1289 [deferring to a county’s interpretation]; Alberstone v.
California Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 859, 866
[deferring to the Commission’s interpretation].) We express no
opinion about the analyses in those cases.


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technical knowledge”; (2) “the legal text to be interpreted is
technical, obscure, complex, open-ended, or entwined with
issues of fact, policy, and discretion”; and (3) the agency
authored and enforces the language in dispute. (Yamaha,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.) The parties focus on the first and
third factors, addressing them in an order that reflects their
relative importance in this case. We do the same and conclude
that these factors do not weigh in favor of deference to either the
County’s or the Commission’s interpretation.
       First, regarding authorship and enforcement, an “ ‘agency
is likely to be intimately familiar with regulations it authored
and sensitive to the practical implications of one interpretation
over another.’ ”      (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.)
Ordinarily, we “ ‘accord significant weight and respect to the
long-standing construction of a law by the agency charged with
its enforcement.’ ” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1155.)
       Here, the County and the Commission both engage in
extensive work to draft, edit, and enforce the County’s LCP. In
accordance with the Coastal Act, the County “prepare[d] a local
coastal program for that portion of the coastal zone within its
jurisdiction” and determined “[t]he precise content” of the LCP
“in full consultation” with the Commission. (§ 30500, subds. (a),
(c).) According to the County, its Board’s agenda included
“approximately 179 separate agenda items concerning the LCP
between 1978 and 2009.” The Commission reviewed the
County’s LCP and amendments, held public hearings, and
suggested edits, as it does with LCPs statewide. (§§ 30500,
30512, 30513, 30514.)



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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


      The County argues that it has a higher claim to
authorship because there are restrictions on the Commission’s
review of a proposed LCP. For example, regarding land use
plans, the Commission’s review is “limited to its administrative
determination that the land use plan submitted by the local
government does, or does not, conform with the requirements of”
the Coastal Act.       (§ 30512.2, subd. (a); see also § 30513,
subds. (b)–(c) [similar restrictions apply to review of zoning
ordinances, zoning district maps, and other implementing
actions].) This provision expressly preserves local authority by
providing, “In making this review, the commission is not
authorized by any provision of this division to diminish or
abridge the authority of a local government to adopt and
establish, by ordinance, the precise content of its land use plan.”
(§ 30512.2, subd. (a).) Nonetheless, the Commission retains the
ability to disapprove and, in effect, to edit land use plans
proposed by local governments because the Commission can
decline to approve a land use plan without a particular
component or provision. This framework provides for a division
of authority between the County and the Commission, with
neither having the unilateral ability to decide the content of the
LCP. The County authored the initial text of the LCP, but the
Commission’s      comprehensive      reviewing       and   editing
responsibilities are sufficiently comparable to authorship for
deference purposes to put the two entities on equal footing here.
      The Commission’s and the County’s responsibilities
continue to be divided similarly after an LCP is certified. The
County may propose amendments to be submitted to the
Commission for certification. (§ 30514.) As mentioned ante, the
LODS SRA was added to the County’s LCP by such an


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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


amendment in 2008. The Commission reviews amendments
following similar procedures to those for reviewing a new LCP,
namely that it may approve or disapprove and may suggest
edits, but it does not edit the LCP directly. (§ 30514, subd. (b).)
The Commission also reviews LCP implementation and may
recommend corrective actions to the local government or
legislative action to the Legislature, but it cannot change a
certified LCP without the involvement of the County.
(§ 30519.5.) Again, the amendment and review processes
suggest that both the County and the Commission are authors
of the LCP.10
      Also, the County and the Commission both work to
administer the LCP. The County makes initial decisions
regarding permit applications and handles appeals. (San Luis
Obispo County Code, §§ 23.01.042, 23.01.043.) The Commission
handles appeals for a subset of permitting decisions, as
discussed ante. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30603, subd. (a); see
also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13115, subds. (b)–(c).) For all
other permitting decisions, there is no provision allowing appeal
from the County’s determination to any other agency; the
County’s determination is final, unless mandamus is sought.11


10
      Until 1977, the Commission had the power to designate
SCRAs unilaterally. (See § 30502, subd. (a).) It did not do so for
the LODS SRA, and it no longer has that power. Thus, whether
an area is an SCRA is no longer an issue committed solely to the
Commission.
11
      Our conclusion might be different if the Commission had
plenary authority to review everything the County did to
implement the LCP, for example by handling appeals from any
permitting decision by the County. But here, the Commission’s
reviewing authority is limited.


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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


      Second, regarding the agency’s expertise and technical
knowledge, the County states that its planning department,
which handles local land use issues, includes 115 positions
allocated countywide. The Commission asserts that its staff
consists of about 182 people, including environmental scientists,
geologists, engineers, and planning managers. Assuming
without deciding that we may consider these facts,12 they
suggest that both the County and the Commission have
expertise and technical knowledge beyond those ordinarily
possessed by a court, but not clearly greater than the other.
      None of the foregoing suggests that either entity has a
clear interpretive advantage over the other regarding the LCP.
Overall, these factors do not weigh in favor of deference to either
interpretation in these circumstances.
         2. Indications of correctness
       The     factors    relating    to    correctness    include:
(1) “indications of careful consideration by senior agency
officials” such as “ ‘an interpretation of a statute contained in a
regulation adopted after public notice and comment’ ”;
(2) “evidence that the agency ‘has consistently maintained the
interpretation in question, especially if [it] is long-standing’ ”;
and (3) “indications that the agency’s interpretation was
contemporaneous with legislative enactment of the statute
being interpreted.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13.) The
principal factor that the parties address is whether either the

12
      These facts do not appear in the record, and the parties
have not cited a basis for this court to consider them, such as
judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.) If we disregarded these
assertions as unsupported by record facts, we would come to the
same conclusions.


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County’s or the Commission’s interpretation is long standing
and consistent. We hold that this factor does not weigh in favor
of either party because the support they have provided is murky
at best.
      The Commission points to three purported examples of the
Commission interpreting urban Los Osos to fall within an
SCRA: (1) a comment in a staff report on an appeal of a coastal
development permit from 1999, (2) a 2001 memorandum from
the executive director of the Commission, and (3) a 2004 staff
report. (Cal. Coastal Com., Staff Report: Regular Calendar
Coastal Development Permit (Aug. 30, 1999) <https://
tinyurl.com/7xc2j6mm> [as of Apr. 23, 2026] (1999 Staff
Report); Cal. Coastal Com., San Luis Obispo County LCP 13569
Determination: Schoenfield Certificates of Compliance (May 30,
2001) p. 12 <https://tinyurl.com/4ckfyevx> [as of Apr. 23, 2026];
Cal. Coastal Com., Appeal Staff Report — Substantial Issue
Determination (Mar. 5, 2004) p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/
3htdw25h> [as of Apr. 23, 2026].)13 Based on these examples,
the Commission asserts that it has held a consistent
interpretation of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat for two
decades.
     However, the first example does not purport to interpret
whether the pertinent part of Los Osos is within an SRA, SCRA,
or ESHA and ultimately finds jurisdiction on another basis.
(1999 Staff Report, supra, at pp. 14–15.) The second and third
examples conclude that parts of urban Los Osos were part of


13
      All internet citations in this opinion are archived by year,
docket number, and case name at <https://courts.ca.gov/opinion/
cited-supreme-court-opinions>.


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different SRAs than the one at issue here. These areas were
designated as SRAs in 1984, but the LODS SRA was not
designated until 2008. (See San Luis Obispo County Planning
Dept., Land Use Element and Local Coastal Plan, Estero
Planning Area, South Bay Combining Designation (Apr. 12,
1984) p. 039364 <https://tinyurl.com/mvu4vmp8> [as of Apr. 23,
2026].)
      There is also some evidence that the Commission’s current
interpretation may be inconsistent with its interpretation at the
time the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat was created in 2008. At
that time, the Commission recognized that the Estero Area Plan
amendment that added the SRA “does not change existing
standards or programs applicable to the urban area of Los Osos”
and “leaves in place the existing Area Plan language applicable
to the Los Osos urban area.” (Cal. Coastal Com., San Luis
Obispo County Local Coastal Program Major Amendment No. 2-
04 (Part 2) Estero Area Plan (June 27, 2008) pp. A20-10, A20-29
<https://tinyurl.com/5esae4nh> [as of Apr. 23, 2026]; see also id.
at p. A20-32 [“the urban area of Los Osos was bifurcated from
this submittal and the urban area development standards for
Los Osos are not proposed to be changed”].) Because the urban
area of Los Osos was outside the scope of the amendment, the
Commission rejected portions of the amendment that would
apply to the Los Osos urban area. (See id. at p. A20-43.) These
comments suggest that when the SRA was originally adopted in
2008, the Commission interpreted the SRA as not including the
urban part of Los Osos.
     Thus, the Commission has not cited anything
demonstrating that it considered urban Los Osos to be part of
the LODS SRA at any time before the Commission took the


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appeal of Shear’s development permit, and there is evidence it
viewed the LODS SRA differently in 2008. We cannot conclude
on this record that the Commission’s view is long standing or
consistent.
      The County also argues that its view is long standing and
consistent, but its evidence is similarly inconclusive. Planning
Commission meeting minutes from 2004 show that a staff
member explained that “outside the U[rban] R[eserve] L[ine] is
almost exactly the same boundary as the Los Osos Dune Sands
ESHA.” (San Luis Obispo County Planning Com., Draft
Minutes for Commissioner Review of Estero Plan Update
(May 13, 2004) p. 2 <https://tinyurl.com/mr9tzssn> [as of
Apr. 23, 2026].) Later in 2004, a staff member stated that the
Los Osos Dune Sands ESHA “generally applies to the periphery
of Los Osos, not the entire community.” (San Luis Obispo
County Dept. of Planning and Building, Continued Hearing on
Estero Area Plan Update: Response to Comments on Chapter 7
and Land Use Changes (Oct. 19, 2004) p. 7 <https://tinyurl.com/
4wbn3764> [as of Apr. 23, 2026].) It is not clear that these
comments represent the view of the County rather than those of
individual staff. Also, these comments concern a Los Osos Dune
Sands ESHA, but the parties agree that the proposed
development site is not in ESHA. These comments do not
explicitly interpret the boundaries of the SRA at issue here and
thus are not directly on point.
      Bearing in mind that the County and the Commission
disagree, we explained ante, that the pertinent question for
deference is whether either entity’s position bears clearly
superior indicia of being correct compared to the other. Here,
neither does.


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         3. Other considerations
      The goal of the Yamaha analysis is to arrive at a “legally
informed, commonsense assessment of [the] contextual merit” of
an agency’s interpretation of law. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th
at p. 14.) In support of their respective positions, the County
and the Commission also both suggest that courts should
consider the overarching goals of the Coastal Act. Individual
provisions of the Coastal Act alternately favor the County and
the Commission, depending on which portion is quoted. We
conclude that the stated goals of the Coastal Act, considered as
a whole, do not favor either the County or the Commission.
       For example, the County relies on the Legislature’s
declaration, “To achieve maximum responsiveness to local
conditions, accountability, and public accessibility, it is
necessary to rely heavily on local government and local land use
planning procedures and enforcement.” (§ 30004, subd. (a),
italics added.) This provision emphasizes local control and could
be read to favor the County.
      But, as the Commission points out, the Legislature also
declared that for other goals, including “to provide maximum
state involvement in federal activities allowable under federal
law or regulations or the United States Constitution which
affect California’s coastal resources,” “it is necessary to provide
for continued state coastal planning and management through a
state coastal commission.” (§ 30004, subd. (b), italics added.)
This provision emphasizes state control and could be read to
favor the Commission.
      To determine legislative intent, however, we do not read
isolated provisions. (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
183, 190.) Read as a whole, the Coastal Act communicates that

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both local and state goals are important, and neither the County
nor the Commission, as local and state entities respectively,
should have greater deference accorded to their interpretations
of the Coastal Act. For example, the Legislature also declared
that one “basic goal[] of the state for the coastal zone” is to
“[e]ncourage state and local initiatives and cooperation in
preparing procedures to implement coordinated planning and
development for mutually beneficial uses, including educational
uses, in the coastal zone.” (§ 30001.5, subd. (e), italics added.)
This provision is consistent with the overall structure of the
Coastal Act, which encourages both state and local involvement.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that neither the
County’s nor the Commission’s interpretation is entitled to
deference here. Neither entity has demonstrated a clear
interpretive advantage over the other, a significantly stronger
showing of factors indicating rightness, or any other reason for
deference. The Commission concedes that “de novo judicial
review of legal questions without deference to any party’s
interpretation would also be a defensible approach,” and we
conclude that this approach is appropriate in this situation.
     E. The Proposed Development Is Not in the Los
        Osos Dune Sands Habitat
      The Court of Appeal correctly stated, “We independently
review the question whether the Commission’s exercise of
jurisdiction here is consistent with the Coastal Act.” (Shear,
supra, B319895.) But the Court of Appeal described Figure 6-3
in the Estero Area Plan as “substantial evidence” supporting the
Commission and affirmed without more. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal’s opinion reflects substantial evidence review, not the
court’s independent judgment.         To clarify, we conduct


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independent judgment review and conclude that the proposed
development is not in an SCRA under the old LCP.
       The Commission argues that the proposed development is
in an SCRA because it is in an SRA — specifically, the Los Osos
Dune Sands Habitat.14 Determining whether this is so requires
construing the LCP’s description of the LODS SRA. Many parts
of the LCP are relevant to this issue, so we must construe the
text “ ‘in context, keeping in mind [its] purpose, and . . . sections
relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both
internally and with each other, to the extent possible.’ ” (People
v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357.)
         1. The text of the LCP
      The Estero Area Plan mentions the Los Osos Dune Sands
Habitat in chapters 6 and 7. The only explicit description of the
boundaries of the LODS SRA in chapter 6 states, “The areas
underlain by these sands outside of Los Osos are included in the
Sensitive Resource Area combining designation.” This sentence
does not clarify whether the proposed development site is part
of the LODS SRA. It states that the LODS SRA includes the
dune sands outside of Los Osos, but the proposed development
is in Los Osos, and the term “included,” by itself, is ambiguous


14
      Shear contends that “this argument represents a
significant departure from the Commission’s position during the
administrative proceedings, where it relied exclusively on the
assertion that the project site was in ‘mapped and designated
ESHA.’ ” It is true that the Commission originally argued that
the site was mapped ESHA and has now abandoned that
argument. But the Commission also has consistently, albeit
sometimes with less than perfect clarity, taken the position that
it had appellate jurisdiction because the development site is in
the LODS SRA.


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about whether the enumerated item or items are exhaustive.
(Compare Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 774
[“The ‘statutory definition of a thing as “including” certain
things does not necessarily place thereon a meaning limited to
the inclusions’ ”] with Television Transmission v. Public Util.
Com. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 82, 85 [“a legislative declaration that
‘public utility’ includes those performing certain enumerated
services is not a declaration that those performing other
services, not encompassed by the services enumerated, are
public utilities”].) Hence, we must look elsewhere to determine
whether urban Los Osos is part of the LODS SRA.
      The rest of chapter 6 is suggestive, though not definitive.
The text states, “The southern shore of the Morro Bay estuary,
extending to the southern slopes of the first range of the Irish
Hills and to Los Osos Creek, is comprised of sandy soils —
primarily ‘Baywood fine sands,’ as identified by the Natural
Resources Conservation Service in the Soil Survey of San Luis
Obispo County, Coastal Part (see Figure 6-3). These sands also
underlie some areas outside of Los Osos, and occur in the city of
Morro Bay.” These two sentences explain where “sandy soils”
are found, summarizing the results of a soil survey by the
Natural Resources Conservation Service (a federal agency
within the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture). The area described
includes urban Los Osos, rural Los Osos, and other locations
entirely, such as the City of Morro Bay.15 Figure 6-3 (see below),



15
     The description of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat SRA
appears in the section related to “Cayucos and Vicinity,” not
“Los Osos and Vicinity.” No compelling explanation of this
placement is apparent from the record.


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with the title “LOHCP Area and Los Osos Dune Sands”16 and
the caption “Los Osos Dune Sands,” matches this description,
showing the Los Osos dune sands as present in rural Los Osos,
urban Los Osos, and elsewhere, including Morro Bay. But the
text acknowledges that “the most valuable habitat surrounds
the more developed portion of Los Osos,” suggesting that the
dune sands may not be coextensive with the Los Osos Dune
Sands Habitat.




16
     LOHCP refers to the Los Osos Habitat Conservation Plan,
a separate Los Osos planning document. It is unclear why
Figure 6-3 bears a title from another document.


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      The Commission argues that the phrase, “southern shore
of the Morro Bay estuary, extending to the southern slopes of


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the first range of the Irish Hills and to Los Osos Creek,”
describes the location of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat, but
the sentence does not mention an SRA.              This sentence
immediately follows the section title, which is “Los Osos Dune
Sands Habitat (SRA),” but this placement is inconclusive. Much
of the text after the title provides background information, such
as the sentence, “Coastal foredune communities usually occur
adjacent to open, sandy beaches and barren active dunes near
the coast.” This sentence does not designate all coastal foredune
communities (or all land adjacent to open, sandy beaches) as an
SRA. The only part of this text that directly states where an
SRA is found says that it includes the dune sands “outside of Los
Osos.”
      Overall, the pertinent excerpts from chapter 6 do not
squarely answer whether urban Los Osos is part of the LODS
SRA, but they suggest that it is not. Next, we consider
chapter 7, which chapter 6 cross-references by saying, “In order
to protect the Los Osos Dune Sands, planning area standards
are included in Chapter 7 of this plan.”
      The primary discussion of the Los Osos dune sands in
chapter 7 appears in a portion titled “Los Osos Dune Sands
Habitat (SRA).” Notably, this discussion is within the section of
chapter 7 describing planning area standards for rural areas,
not the section describing standards for the Los Osos urban
area. This placement suggests that the LODS SRA is located in
or at least primarily focused on the rural areas, not urban Los
Osos.
     The textual description of the Los Osos Dune Sands
Habitat is as follows: “In order to ensure the long-term
preservation of the rare and sensitive Los Osos Dune Sands


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habitat in the rural areas (an Environmentally Sensitive
Habitat), new development within this SRA (see Figure 6-3 for
location) shall comply with” certain standards that follow. The
reference to “the rural areas” again suggests that the LODS SRA
is not in urban Los Osos.
      The parenthetical remark “see Figure 6-3 for location” is
ambiguous. This phrasing suggests that Figure 6-3 depicts the
location of the LODS SRA, but it does not explain exactly how
Figure 6-3 depicts the LODS SRA. Figure 6-3 depicts the Los
Osos dune sands and shows a Los Osos urban reserve line
(which it does not otherwise describe). All of urban Los Osos,
including the proposed development, is within the urban reserve
line. Under Shear and the County’s interpretation, Figure 6-3
depicts the LODS SRA as primarily the dune sands outside the
urban reserve line. The Commission, on the other hand, argues
that Figure 6-3 depicts the LODS SRA as the entire dune sands,
without regard to the urban reserve line. Both interpretations
are consistent with chapter 7 because under either
interpretation, Figure 6-3 depicts the location of the LODS SRA.
We again must look elsewhere to choose between the two
interpretations.
      While Figure 6-3 does not define the Los Osos urban
reserve line, the Estero Area Plan does elsewhere, and other
uses of the phrase also provide useful context. The primary
function of an urban reserve line is to divide land between rural
and urban. Appendix C to the Estero Area Plan contains a
glossary of terms that defines an “Urban reserve line (URL)” as
follows: “The boundary around an urban area that separates
urban land uses from the adjacent rural area, defining land that
is planned for urban growth within the next 20 years.” Other


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uses of the term are consistent with this definition. Similarly,
for the “South Bay” area, which includes Los Osos and the
proposed development area, the Estero Area Plan provides, “The
urban reserve line encompasses approximately 2,590 acres (four
square miles) and allows for future growth through in-filling of
existing developed areas and expansion onto adjacent vacant
lands.”17 Designating land for urban growth in the near future
does not seem consistent with designating it as an SRA — which
the LCP defines as an area “with special environmental
qualities, or areas containing unique or endangered vegetation
or habitat.”
      Taken together, these definitions and uses of the term
“urban reserve line” suggest that the Los Osos Dune Sands
Habitat SRA is more likely outside the urban reserve line than
both outside and in. Thus, Figure 6-3 illustrates the location of
the LODS SRA as primarily the portion of the dune sands
outside the urban reserve line.
       Text appearing later in chapter 7 is consistent with this
interpretation. It provides, “The following provisions are
intended to ensure the long-term preservation of the rare and
sensitive Los Osos Dune Sands habitat (which is an
Environmentally Sensitive Habitat). Such habitat is of relative
high quality compared to that on smaller, isolated, undeveloped
lots.” This description equates the Los Osos Dune Sands habitat
with an ESHA, which again suggests that the habitat in



17
      The proposed development here is infill, which the LCP
defines as “[d]evelopment of vacant land (usually individual lots
or left-over properties) within areas which are already largely
developed.”


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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


question is not in urban Los Osos because not all of urban Los
Osos is an ESHA. While this portion of chapter 7 does not
explicitly say that the “habitat” to which it refers is coextensive
with the LODS SRA, the identity of words between “Los Osos
Dune Sands habitat” (a recurring phrase in the rest of this
portion of the Estero Area Plan) and the name of the LODS SRA
(“Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat”) suggests that they are the
same. Similarly, the requirement that private owners of land in
the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat enter into an agreement that
provides for the “ongoing maintenance of remaining Los Osos
Dune Sands habitat in a natural state” tends to suggest that the
habitat is not already developed and thus does not include urban
Los Osos.
      The LCP also includes combining designation maps, which
depict areas designated as SRAs. Both the rural and urban
combining designation maps for the Estero planning area have
some ambiguities. The maps do not label the individual SRAs,
and the SRAs abut each other without clear boundaries.
Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn. First, the entire
Los Osos dune sands area outside of the developed part of Los
Osos is depicted as an SRA. But the maps do not depict all of
urban Los Osos as an SRA. In other words, they support the
conclusion that Figure 6-3 should be interpreted to depict the
Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat as the portion of the Los Osos
dune sands outside the Los Osos urban reserve line.18


18
      A small area of dune sands mapped as SRA lies within the
urban reserve line. The proposed development is not within or
near this area. We need not decide here whether the Los Osos
Dune Sands Habitat extends within the urban reserve line to
this small area (or, perhaps, whether this is some other SRA).


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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


       The Commission argues that these maps are not
dispositive because SRAs can be designated outside these
official maps. Assuming that the Commission is correct,
something still must designate them. The Commission has not
cited anything in the LCP that designates the proposed
development site as part of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat.
        2. Extrinsic evidence
       Beyond the text, the Commission invokes extrinsic
evidence about the dune sands. Such considerations may be
relevant to the interpretation of an LCP. (See, e.g., People v.
Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975 (Prudholme) [explaining
that extrinsic aids may provide insight into the intent behind an
ambiguous law].) While the text of the LCP suggests that the
proposed development is not in the LODS SRA, the text is also
sufficiently ambiguous that considering extrinsic evidence is
appropriate.
      The Commission notes that the proposed development
contains Baywood fine sands and that then-endangered Morro
shoulderband snails were found nearby. According to the LCP,
Baywood fine sands and other sandy soils “provide the soil
characteristics that support globally rare habitat” and “support
a diversity of native plant species and a number of rare,
endangered or threatened species of plants and animals,
including the Morro manzanita, Indian Knob mountainbalm,
Morro shoulderband snail, and perhaps the last known
population of the endangered Morro Bay kangaroo rat.” Morro
shoulderband snails were found on a nearby lot that is not part
of this permit application. Based on the properties of the land,
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service inferred that the
lots on which Shear seeks to develop “likely” support the Morro


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     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


shoulderband snail as well, though site visits have not actually
found any. In short, record evidence suggests that some
undeveloped spaces in urban Los Osos, particularly the more
open spaces, provide habitat for some native species.
       But the Commission is not arguing that only these lots, or
the open spaces inside the urban reserve line, are designated as
an SRA. Rather, the Commission is arguing that all of urban
Los Osos is part of the LODS SRA. However, much of urban Los
Osos is developed. It seems unlikely that all of it is “of vital
interest and sensitivity.” (§ 30116 [defining SCRAs].) The
Estero Area Plan says that “the most valuable habitat
surrounds the more developed portion of Los Osos.” The purpose
of the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat is “to ensure the long-term
preservation of the rare and sensitive Los Osos Dune Sands
habitat in the rural areas.” The fact that a few parts, but not
all, of urban Los Osos provide habitat for rare species does not
clearly weigh in favor of concluding that all of urban Los Osos is
included in the LODS SRA.
      Finally, extrinsic evidence includes not only the facts
about the land, but also the legislative history of the Estero Area
Plan. (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 975.) As described
ante, in 2008, when the County proposed amendments to the
Estero Area Plan that included adding the Los Osos Dune Sands
Habitat, the Commission recognized that the amendments did
not affect urban Los Osos. This history suggests that the
contemporaneous intent of the enactors of the LCP was that the
LODS SRA would not include much, if any, of urban Los Osos.
     Overall, the extrinsic evidence suggests that some of
urban Los Osos may provide a habitat for rare, local species, but
the most valuable habitat is in the rural areas. Also, the


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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


legislative history suggests that at the time that the Los Osos
Dune Sands Habitat was added to the LCP, neither the County
nor the Commission intended for the LODS SRA to include
urban Los Osos. Both of these points tend to confirm the likely
meaning of the LCP’s text: the Los Osos Dune Sands Habitat
does not include the proposed development. Thus, the proposed
development is not in an SCRA.19
     We conclude that the proposed development is not in an
SCRA under the old LCP, and the parties agree that the
proposed development is not in an SCRA under the new LCP.
Under either LCP, the Commission did not properly exercise
appellate jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(3) of section 30603.
     F. Principal Permitted Use
      The Commission also asserted a second basis for its
appellate jurisdiction: its appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ny
development approved by a coastal county that is not designated
as the principal permitted use.” (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A).) The
County designates three principal permitted uses for the
proposed development site:        passive recreation, coastal
accessways, and single-family dwellings. Shear proposed to
build single-family dwellings, one of the three principal
permitted uses. The Commission argues, however, that this is
not “the” principal permitted use — that is, the sole principal




19
      The parties dispute whether all SRAs are SCRAs and thus
all permits for development in SRAs are within the
Commission’s appellate jurisdiction, but we need not express an
opinion on this point because the proposed development is not
within an SRA.


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     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
                     COMMISSION
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


permitted use — so the Commission has appellate jurisdiction
under subdivision (a)(4)(A).20
      We apply well-established principles to this question of
statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur
fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the
statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If
the statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’
[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative
purpose.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–
990.)
        1. Statutory text
      The statute is framed in the singular: “[a]ny development
approved by a coastal county that is not designated as the
principal permitted use.” (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A).) But, as
mentioned ante, we read this subdivision in the context of the
entire statutory scheme. Thus, in construing section 30603, we

20
      Section 30603, subdivision (a)(4)(B) exempts a “residential
development project,” which is defined as “a multifamily
housing project that consists exclusively of residential uses and
includes four or more units.” (§ 30114.5.) This exemption does
not apply to Shear’s proposed development.


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     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
                     COMMISSION
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


must bear in mind that another provision of the Public
Resources Code provides, “The singular number includes the
plural, and the plural the singular.” (§ 13.) For convenience, we
refer to this and similar provisions as “number inclusivity”
provisions.
      Many other codes contain number inclusivity provisions.
(See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 14, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (a);
Code Civ. Proc., § 17, subd. (a); Evid. Code, § 10; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 13; Veh. Code, § 14.) We have held that a number
inclusivity provision “is no mere rubric — it is the law.” (People
v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 593.) For over a century, we have
applied such provisions to avoid overly wooden interpretations
of statutes. For example, when an ordinance’s text allowed
construction of a tunnel “ ‘for public uses,’ ” we held that this
ordinance also allowed construction of a tunnel for a single
public use. (Larsen v. San Francisco (1920) 182 Cal. 1, 10
(Larsen).) When an ordinance declared it unlawful for “ ‘any
person’ ” to keep goats within specified distances of some houses,
we held that the ordinance “cover[s] a case where the goats are
owned by several persons in common.” (In re Mathews (1923)
191 Cal. 35, 37, 43 (Mathews).) In the former case, the plural
included the singular. In the latter, the singular included the
plural, even in the absence of an express provision about
number inclusivity. (Id. at p. 43.)
      The Courts of Appeal have applied number inclusivity
provisions similarly.    (See, e.g., People v. Killian (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 191, 211 [“We decide that notwithstanding the
plural language stated in [Vehicle Code] section 10802, that
section may be violated by tampering with a single VIN”]; Del
Cerro Mobile Estates v. City of Placentia (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th


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     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
                     COMMISSION
                 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


173, 183 [rejecting the argument that “because the terms ‘grade
crossing’ and ‘grade separation’ are singular, the CEQA
exemption in section 21080.13 does not apply to projects
eliminating more than one grade crossing or reconstructing
more than one existing grade separation”]; Hurley v.
Rubis (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 95, 97 [“[T]he mere use of the
singular does not of itself indicate an intent to restrict the School
Boards and County Superintendents power to calling but one
election on the subject”].)
      As a Court of Appeal has explained, the use of only one
number in statutory text, whether singular or plural, may
“simply [be] ascribable to a means for simplifying legislative
drafting rather than a substantive numerical restriction.”
(River Trails Ranch Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d
562, 565.) The alternative is to litter the codes with language
like “any person or persons,” which would diminish readability.
       Together with the number inclusivity provision, the plain
text suggests that the Commission has jurisdiction over a
development that is not designated as the principal permitted
use or uses. (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A); see also § 13.) That is, if
a local government designates several uses, the Commission has
appellate jurisdiction under section 30603, subdivision (a)(4)(A)
only when the development is not for any of them. This
conclusion is consistent with the only Court of Appeal decision
of which we are aware that has addressed this issue, albeit in
dicta.      (DeCicco v. California Coastal Com. (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 947, 951.)
      The Commission also relies on the use of the word “the”
preceding the phrase “principal permitted use.” (§ 30603,
subd. (a)(4)(A).) The Commission notes that we have said,


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     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
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                 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


“[U]se of the definite article ‘the’ . . . refers to a specific person,
place, or thing.” (Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010)
50 Cal.4th 1389, 1396.) Thus, the Commission argues that the
phrase “the principal permitted use” (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(A)),
means that there must be only one principal permitted use,
whereas “a principal permitted use” would have indicated that
there could be several.
      Notably, the appellate court in People v. Watson (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 474 has rejected substantially the same
argument as the Commission makes here. In another context,
the court held, “[T]he statute’s use of ‘the’ . . . does not mandate
the singular.” (Id. at p. 485.) In general, we agree that a
statute’s use of “the” does not mandate the singular. The
County’s LCP designates three specific things as principal
permitted uses for the proposed development site, and referring
to “the” principal permitted use invokes those three specific
things. We need not strain to read the text as only singular
because the word “the” particularizes; “the” can particularize to
three specific things just as well as to one.21 The plain text
suggests that the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction is limited




21
      Nor does the word “principal” necessarily imply the
singular. The Legislature has used the word “principal” to
modify plural nouns in the Public Resources Code. (E.g., §§ 2740
[“principal mineral commodities”], 520, subd. (a)(2) [“principal
purposes”], 32310, subd. (f) [“principal charitable purposes”];
see also Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1444, col. 1
[defining “principal” as “[c]hief; primary; most important”];
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2012) p. 987, col. 2
[defining “principal” as, among other things, “a matter or thing
of primary importance”].)


                                   42
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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


to developments that are not designated as any of the principal
permitted uses.
        2. Extratextual considerations
      The parties make arguments regarding indicia of
legislative intent beyond the plain text of the statute. To the
extent that we consider these other indicia, we are not
persuaded that they should change our interpretation of section
30603, subdivision (a)(4)(A).
      The Commission relies on the legislative history of section
30603 and its own interpretation now, which it claims is entitled
to deference.22 But we conclude that the legislative history does
not clearly support the Commission’s argument, and even giving
the Commission’s interpretation its due weight, the statutory
text, which is contrary to the Commission’s interpretation,
controls here.
      Regarding the legislative history, the text that became
subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603 was originally drafted to
refer to “a principal permitted use” and later amended to refer
to “the principal permitted use.” (See Assem. Amend. to Sen.
Bill. No. 1277 (1975–1976 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 5, 1976, p. 59
(August 5, 1976 Amendment to Senate Bill No. 1277).) The
Commission has not cited, and we have not identified, anything
in the legislative history that explains this change, but the
committee analysis accompanying the change describes the


22
      We afforded no weight to the Commission’s interpretation
of the County’s LCP ante, because of the conflict between the
County and the Commission. However, the County does not
argue that it directly administers the Coastal Act (unlike the
LCP). Hence, there is no pertinent conflict for the Coastal Act.


                                  43
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                     COMMISSION
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


provision as follows: “After certification, only the following
actions are appealable to the Commission: [¶] . . . [¶] 4. Coastal
county approved development not shown as principal permitted
use in local coastal program.” (Assem. Com. on Resources, Land
Use, and Energy, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1277 (1975–1976 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Aug. 5, 1976, p. 8.) It seems less likely that
the Legislature intended the change from “a” to “the” in the bill
text to have significant meaning when the committee analysis
accompanying this change uses neither.
      Moreover, in 1976, section 13 was already part of the
Public Resources Code, and settled law established our
interpretation of number inclusivity provisions. (E.g., Larsen,
supra, 182 Cal. at p. 10; Mathews, supra, 191 Cal. at pp. 37, 43.)
We generally assume that the Legislature is aware of pertinent
judicial decisions when it drafts and amends statutes. (In re
Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 588.) Changing “a”
to “the,” given the background of section 13 and our decisions,
would be a remarkably obscure and unlikely way of restricting
the number of principal permitted uses.
      Viewed in context, we interpret the change from “a” to
“the” as stylistic rather than substantive. Before August 5,
1976, section 30603 did not specify whether one or all the
subdivisions must be satisfied before the Commission has
appellate jurisdiction. The August 5 amendment clarified that
the Commission has appellate jurisdiction “for any of the
following,” referring to the subdivisions of section 30603.
(Aug. 5, 1976 Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1277, supra, at p. 59.) As
part of that change, the sentence structure of the subdivisions
was changed from “if: [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he development is approved”
to “Any development approved” (id., at pp. 58–59), which


                                  44
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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


necessitated various conforming edits. The change from “a” to
“the” appears to be an editorial modification made as part of this
set of edits.
      The Commission also notes that the Legislature recently
considered a bill that, as initially drafted, would have changed
the phrase “the principal permitted use” to “a principal
permitted use.” (Sen. Bill No. 951 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Jan. 18, 2024, § 3.) The bill was later amended to
keep the phrase “the principal permitted use” and, instead,
exempt “a local government that is both a city and county”
(currently only San Francisco) from the Commission’s appellate
jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603. (Sen.
Bill No. 951 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 3, 2024,
§ 2.) That form of the bill passed. (See § 30603, subd. (a)(4)(C),
as amended by Stats. 2024, ch. 775, § 1.)23 The Commission
describes this history as ratifying the Commission’s
interpretation, but we would not go quite so far.




23
       The Commission also cites various statements made by
the bill’s author. But “We have frequently stated . . . that the
statements of an individual legislator, including the author of a
bill, are generally not considered in construing a statute, as the
court’s task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as a
whole in adopting a piece of legislation.” (Quintano v. Mercury
Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062.) Various exceptions
exist, such as, “ ‘[S]tatements about pending legislation are
entitled to consideration to the extent they constitute “a
reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to
adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an
expression of personal opinion.” ’ ” (Naranjo v. Spectrum
Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1085.) But the
cited statements do not fit within any exception.


                                  45
      SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
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                  Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


      The Commission is correct that we may afford more
weight to the Commission’s interpretation because of the
Legislature’s recent actions. We “particularly” give weight to an
agency interpretation of a statute “when the Legislature,
presumably aware of the established administrative
construction, has implied its acquiescence therein by amending
the governing statute in ways that do not disturb the agency’s
policy.” (In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1082.)
Hence, we may give additional weight to the Commission’s
interpretation because the Legislature amended section 30603
without changing the phrase “the principal permitted use” in a
way that affects the Commission’s interpretation.
       However, the Commission’s view has not been consistent,
which reduces its weight. (See Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 13 [“ ‘[A] vacillating position . . . is entitled to no deference’ ”].)
The Commission cites examples in which it has interpreted the
phrase “the principal permitted use” as meaning only a single
use, but these examples start in 2003. In contrast, in the late
1980’s, the Commission certified the County’s LCP. To do so, it
had to find that the County’s LCP conformed to the policies of
the Coastal Act. (See § 30512, subd. (a).) The County’s LCP
provides that “[a]ny approved development not listed in Coastal
Table O, Part I of the Land Use Element as a Principal
Permitted (P) Use” is appealable to the Commission. (San Luis
Obispo County Code, § 23.01.043, subd. (c)(4).) This provision
refers to a principal permitted use, not the principal permitted
use. Therefore, in the late 1980’s, the Commission seems to
have interpreted “the” in subdivision (a)(4)(A) of Public
Resources Code section 30603 as consistent with “a” in
subdivision (c)(4) of San Luis Obispo County Code section


                                    46
     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


23.01.043. The Commission’s interpretations from 2003 and
later only show that the Commission changed its interpretation
of section 30603 at some point between the late 1980’s and 2003.
      As explained ante, we agree with the Commission’s former
position: the LCP, which refers to “a principal permitted use,”
is consistent with the Coastal Act, which refers to “the principal
permitted use.”24 (§ 30603, subd. (a)(4)(C).) After examining
the legislative history and affording the Commission’s
interpretation its due weight, we adhere to our interpretation of
the plain text.
        3. Policy arguments
      Finally, the parties make policy arguments.            The
Commission argues that it must have appellate jurisdiction over
developments in the primarily rural counties along the coast
unless they designate a single principal permitted use because
a wider range of uses increases the likelihood that any given
development will cause environmental harm. The County notes
that its entire coastal zone is designated for more than one
principal permitted use, meaning that all development near the
coast in the County would be subject to the Commission’s
appellate review. The County argues that this result would be
practically absurd. Also, while the other provisions regarding
the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction would not be solely
surplusage, they would not have any significance in entire
counties in the coastal zone, a result the Legislature likely did


24
      The parties dispute whether the LCP or the Coastal Act
defines the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction, but because we
read them as consistent, we need not express any opinion on this
point.


                                  47
     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
                     COMMISSION
               Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


not intend. (Cf. Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v.
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1038 [“It is a maxim of
statutory interpretation that courts should give meaning to
every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that
would render any word or provision surplusage”].) And to the
extent the Commission is concerned about a county’s over-
designation of principal permitted uses, it may express those
concerns in its review of the county’s LCP and make
recommendations to the local government or the Legislature.
(§ 30519.5.)
      The Commission also points out that most local
governments have acquiesced to the Commission’s
interpretation and designated only one principal permitted use
for each zoning type in their LCPs, though it concedes that some
have not. This fact provides little support for the Commission’s
position, though, because local governments need the
Commission’s approval to amend their LCPs. Hence, they may
have acquiesced to the Commission’s interpretation simply out
of expediency. No record evidence suggests that environmental
harm followed from any local government’s choice to acquiesce
or not acquiesce to the Commission’s interpretation, so we find
this point inconclusive.
      Ultimately, the policy arguments that the parties make
are not so decisive that we are persuaded to deviate from the
plain text. Under the plain text, the Commission has appellate
jurisdiction under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603 only
when the development is not designated as the principal
permitted use — or uses — under the local government’s LCP.
     Shear’s proposed development is for one of the principal
permitted uses of the site. The Commission has no appellate


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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


jurisdiction   over     Shear’s    permit        application   under
subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 30603.
                       III. DISPOSITION
      We conclude that:         (1) a court must exercise its
independent judgment to decide whether the Commission
properly exercised jurisdiction on the ground that the
development is in an SCRA; (2) no deference to the
Commission’s or the County’s interpretation of the LCP is
warranted on this record; (3) the proposed development is not in
an SCRA; and (4) the Commission does not have appellate
jurisdiction on the ground that the site is designated with
several principal permitted uses.         Consistent with these
conclusions, we hold that the Commission had no appellate
jurisdiction over Shear’s permit application. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with
directions. The Court of Appeal is directed to reverse the order
of the trial court denying the petition for writ of administrative
mandate and remand with directions to issue the writ of
administrative mandate. The writ shall direct the Commission




                                  49
     SHEAR DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
                     COMMISSION
               Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.


to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

                                             GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
STONE, J.*




*
      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


                                 50
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Shear Development Company, LLC v. California
Coastal Commission
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 2/21/24 – 2d Dist.,
Div. 6
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S284378
Date Filed: April 23, 2026
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: San Luis Obispo
Judge: Rita Federman
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

FisherBroyles, Pierson Ferdinand, Paul J. Beard II; Pacific Legal
Foundation, Jeremy Talcott and Lawrence Salzman for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Jon Ansolabehere and Rita L. Neal, County Counsel (San Luis Obispo),
and Daniel P. Solish, Chief Deputy County Counsel, for the County of
San Luis Obispo as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Best Best & Krieger, Amy E. Hoyt, Gregg W. Kettles, Trevor L. Rusin,
Patrick T. Donegan and Antoinette Ranit-Mauro for the League of
California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Matthew Gelfand, Allyson Richman; and Brian A. Manson for
Californians for Homeownership and the California Association of
REALTORS® as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt and Michael J.
Mongan, State Solicitors General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant Attorney
General, Cara M. Newlon and Joshua Patashnik, Deputy State
Solicitors General, Hallie E. Kutak, Christina Bull Arndt and Mitchell
E. Rishe, Deputy Attorneys General, and Helen H. Hong, Principal
Deputy State Solicitor General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Jeremy Talcott
Pacific Legal Foundation
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1290
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 419-7111

Cara M. Newlon
Deputy State Solicitor General
300 Spring Street, Suite 7500
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 269-6529