Chang v. So. Cal. Permanente Medical Group

Filed 4/9/26; Certified for Publication 4/28/26 (order attached)




IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                 DIVISION ONE


 KAI-LIN CHANG,                                            B340770

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. 22CHCV01194)
         v.

 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
 PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP,

         Defendant and Respondent.


      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gary I. Micon, Judge. Affirmed.
      Alexander & Yong, Jeffrey S. Yong; The Arkin Law Firm
and Sharon J. Arkin, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Manning Gross + Massenburg, Brent M. Karren,
Carrie S. Lin and Eli J. Drummond for Defendant and
Respondent.
                  ____________________________
       Plaintiff Kai-Lin Chang appeals from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Southern
California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG). Chang sued
SCPMG over a vehicular accident allegedly caused by SCPMG
employee Brittany A. Doremus while she was driving to work in
the morning. The trial court ruled SCPMG was entitled to
summary judgment under the “going and coming rule,” which
exempts employers from liability for employee torts committed
while commuting to and from work.
       On appeal, Chang contends the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because SCPMG failed to offer admissible
evidence negating the possibility Doremus was talking or texting
with coworkers on her employer-issued cell phone at the time of
the accident. Alternatively, Chang argues the going and coming
rule should not apply because SCPMG allowed Doremus to work
from home as well as at her office, and thus she was not
commuting but traveling between job sites.
       It was not SCPMG’s burden to negate all possibility
Doremus was working at the time of the accident. It was
sufficient that SCPMG made a prima facie showing Doremus
was not working, a burden SCPMG met through Doremus’s
deposition testimony. The burden then shifted to Chang to
provide contradictory evidence demonstrating a triable issue.
Chang did not meet this burden.
       We disagree that Doremus sometimes working from home
converted her home to a second worksite for all purposes. Her
uncontradicted testimony established that on Mondays, the day
of the week the accident occurred, she did not work from home
but at her office. Thus, at the time of the accident, she was




                                   2
engaged in an ordinary morning commute, not transitioning
between worksites.
     Accordingly, we affirm.

                        BACKGROUND

1.    Complaint and motion for summary judgment
       Chang filed a complaint for negligence against Doremus
and SCPMG.1 The complaint alleged that on Monday, September
12, 2022, at approximately 8:40 a.m., Chang was riding his
bicycle on Victory Boulevard in West Hills.2 As Chang turned
onto Valley Circle, Doremus suddenly made a left turn in her
vehicle, crossing directly into Chang’s path. Chang collided with
Doremus’s vehicle, suffering injuries requiring hospitalization.
The complaint alleged Doremus was operating her vehicle in the
course of her employment at the time of the accident, and
therefore SCPMG was liable under the principle of respondeat
superior.
       SCPMG moved for summary judgment, contending
Doremus was commuting to work at the time of the accident, and
therefore, under the “going and coming rule,” was not acting
within the course and scope of her employment. SCPMG argued
it therefore was not liable for Doremus’s alleged tort.
       In support, SCPMG offered excerpts from Doremus’s
deposition transcript. Doremus testified she was a palliative care


      1 The complaint named a third defendant later dismissed
from the action.
      2 The complaint does not expressly state September 12,
2022 was a Monday, but we take judicial notice of that fact.
(Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (f), 459, subd. (a).)




                                   3
doctor employed by SCPMG at the Woodland Hills Medical
Center of Southern California. On Mondays and Tuesdays she
worked in her office at the medical center. SCPMG permitted her
to work from home half of the day on Wednesdays. Thursdays
and Fridays she worked with patients at the medical center’s
hospital. When she was on call on nights or weekends, she would
work from home.
       Doremus testified that on the day of the accident, she left
home around 8:30 a.m. to drive to her office at the medical center.
At the moment of the accident, she was turning into a shopping
center’s parking lot to drop off her children’s Halloween costumes
at a dry cleaner. This was a personal errand unrelated to her
work. Following the accident, she called 911, then sent a group
text message to the nurse and social worker she worked with
telling them she had been in an accident and requesting that
they cancel her appointments for the day.
       Doremus did not recall participating in any telephone calls
the morning of September 12 before the accident. She testified
she was not doing anything work-related at the time of the
accident. The vehicle she was driving was a personal vehicle
unrelated to her employment, and SCPMG never directed her to
use the vehicle as opposed to another mode of transportation.
       In further support of its summary judgment motion,
SCPMG provided a text message log from Doremus’s wireless
carrier covering activity between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. on the day of
the accident. The log indicated no text messages between 8:30
and 8:44 a.m. Between 8:44:17 and 8:44:55, Doremus sent or
received 11 text messages, although the timestamps suggest that
number might double-count single messages sent to multiple




                                   4
recipients.3 Between 8:45:01 and 9:21:52 she sent or received
another 30 text messages, some of which again might be double-
counts of group texts. SCPMG provided a screenshot of a text
chain of eight messages beginning at 8:44 in which Doremus
informed her coworkers she was in an accident and would not be
coming in.
       SCPMG also provided a call log for Doremus’s cellular
phone. The log lists a call to 911 at 7:39:42 AM on September 12,
2022,4 followed by an incoming call from her husband at 8:44:14
and a series of calls from Doremus to her husband from 9:10:30 to
9:32:30. Doremus testified after her husband called her, she had
to call him back several times because the cellular reception was
poor.

2.    Opposition
      Chang opposed the summary judgment motion, arguing
there was evidence Doremus was texting with coworkers “mere


      3  For example, the log lists four messages all sent at
8:44:17, with two of the messages sent to one number and two to
another. Given the unlikelihood that Doremus sent four separate
text messages in the span of a second, it may be the log counted a
single text sent to two recipients as two separate texts. This
conclusion is supported by the screenshot of Doremus’s text chain
indicating two recipients, as well as her deposition, in which she
testified she initiated a group text with two coworkers after the
accident.
      4 The record does not reveal why the call log indicated
Doremus placed the 911 call an hour before the accident. In its
order granting summary judgment, the trial court said the time
stamp on the 911 call “is unexplained and has not been tied to
the accident, which occurred an hour later.”




                                   5
seconds before the collision,” and thus there was a triable issue
whether Doremus was acting within the scope of her employment
at the time of the accident. Chang offered what he identified as a
“template” of Doremus’s work schedule, which listed on several
mornings at 8:30 a.m. a “Team Patient Conference,” including the
morning of September 12. In a footnote, Chang distinguished the
“template” of Doremus’s schedule from Doremus’s “actual work
schedule”; the latter would include patient names and summaries
of their conditions. Chang complained that SCPMG had never
produced the “actual schedule” despite Chang’s discovery
requests. Chang nonetheless contended the template created a
triable issue whether Doremus was participating in a “Team
Patient Conference” at the time of the accident. Chang also
pointed to the text message log indicating the “flurry” of texts
between Doremus and her coworkers at 8:44 a.m., which Chang
argued raised questions about whether Doremus was texting
with coworkers before the accident.
       In further support, Chang contended the evidence indicated
Doremus could perform her work remotely. Chang interpreted
Doremus’s employment agreement, which Chang provided as an
exhibit, to not limit her to particular work hours, and to
“financially incentivize[ ] her . . . to work more than the ‘full-time
schedule.’ ” The agreement also did not restrict where Doremus
could work, and Doremus testified she performed work both at
her office and at home. Chang offered evidence SCPMG provided
its physicians with cellular phones, on which special SCPMG
communication software was installed.
       Chang argued some of the case law offered by SCPMG
regarding the going and coming rule was inapposite because the
cases concerned workers’ compensation, “and thus has no




                                     6
applicability in tort cases.” Noting case law requiring evidence
such as phone records to establish a defendant motorist was
engaged in work at the time of an accident, Chang argued
Doremus’s text log satisfied this requirement because it showed
Doremus and her coworkers were sending each other text
messages around the time of the accident.
       Chang additionally argued the going and coming rule
did not apply because SCPMG “derived an incidental benefit from
Dr. Doremus’ use of her personal vehicle because it allowed her to
commute seamlessly from her two primary locations where she
conducted work — her home office, and her office at Kaiser
Woodland Hills.” Chang contended Doremus could do her job
anywhere, but SCPMG required her to “take on the risk of
traveling” by commuting to work.
       Chang also contended SCPMG’s evidence was inadmissible
because the attorney declaration to which SCPMG’s evidence was
attached failed to authenticate the evidence properly. Chang
filed evidentiary objections to all of SCPMG’s evidence as hearsay
and as lacking foundation, authentication, and personal
knowledge. The evidence to which Chang objected included
Chang’s complaint, Doremus’s deposition transcript excerpts, the
screenshot of Doremus’s text chain with her coworkers,
Doremus’s telephone call and text logs, Doremus’s employment
contract, and SCPMG’s benefits handbook.

3.    Trial court’s ruling
       Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment. The court found, “There is no dispute in this
case that Doremus was commuting to work. In fact, when the
accident occurred, she was turning into a dry cleaner’s parking
lot to take care of a personal errand unrelated to work.



                                   7
[Citation.] It is clear that the going and coming rule would apply
in this case, and Doremus was not acting in the scope of her
employment.”
       The court further found no exception to the going and
coming rule applied. Doremus was not driving a vehicle provided
or required by SCPMG, nor did the vehicle provide an incidental
benefit to SCPMG. Doremus was not running a special errand
for her employer, but running a personal errand during her
commute to work.
       The court found the evidence did not support Chang’s
contention Doremus was engaged in work at the time of the
collision. The court noted the call and text logs did not reveal the
content of the communications, only that they occurred, and the
screenshot SCPMG provided indicated Doremus sent the text
messages after the accident to inform her coworkers she would
not be in that day.
       The court overruled Chang’s evidentiary objections, noting
Chang himself relied on the call and text logs in making his
arguments, and thus “agreed to the accuracy of those
documents.”
       The court entered judgment in SCPMG’s favor. Chang
timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.    Principles of Summary Judgment
      “ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate only “where no triable
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’ ” [Citation.]” (Barenborg v. Sigma
Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 70, 76
(Barenborg).) A defendant moving for summary judgment has




                                    8
“ ‘an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing
of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.’
[Citation.] . . . ‘Once the defendant meets the foregoing [initial]
burden [of production], “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to
that cause of action . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See Stokes v.
Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1213–1214.)
       “ ‘We review the ruling on a motion for summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.’
[Citation.]” (Barenborg, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.) “ ‘[T]he
weight of authority holds that an appellate court reviews a
court’s final rulings on evidentiary objections by applying an
abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Michaels
v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 512, 521.)

B.    Respondeat Superior and the Going and Coming
      Rule
       “ ‘Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of
their employment. [Citation.] . . . . ’ [Citations.]” (Feltham v.
Universal Protection Service, LP (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1062,
1068 (Feltham).)
       “An employee ‘is generally not considered to be acting
within the scope of [her] employment when going to or coming
from . . . her regular place of work.’ [Citation.] Under this rule
— known as the going and coming rule — ‘ “ ‘employers are
generally exempt from liability for tortious acts committed by
employees while on their way to and from work because
employees are said to be outside of the course and scope of
employment during their daily commute.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The



                                     9
theory behind the going and coming rule is that the employment
relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves
work until she returns or, put another way, that in commuting,
the employee is not rendering service to the employer. [Citation.]
“Normally the going and coming rule applies in cases where an
employee ordinarily works at a particular location and the job
duties do not ordinarily include driving on the job.’ [Citation.]”
(Feltham, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1068–1069.)
       Courts have recognized exceptions to the going and coming
rule “ ‘where the trip involves an incidental benefit to the
employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of
the work force.’ [Citation.]” (Jeewarat v. Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 427, 435–436.) For
example, the rule does not apply if “ ‘use of a personally owned
vehicle is either an express or implied condition of employment,’ ”
or the employee “ ‘make[s] the vehicle available as an
accommodation to the employer and the employer has
“reasonably come to rely upon its use . . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Moradi
v. Marsh USA, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 886, 895.) It does not
apply if the employee “is engaged in a ‘special errand’ or a ‘special
mission’ for the employer.” (Jeewarat, at p. 436.) To the extent
an employee combines personal business with work duties while
driving, or “ ‘attend[s] to both at substantially the same time, no
nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually
engaged in at the time of injury, unless it clearly appears that
neither directly or indirectly could he have been serving his
employer.’ [Citations.]” (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc.
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 970.)




                                    10
C.    The Going and Coming Rule Applies In This Case
       Chang raises two claims of error. First, he argues SCPMG
did not make a sufficient prima facie showing below of the
nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact, and therefore the
trial court should have denied summary judgment rather than
shifting the burden of production to Chang. Second, he argues
the going and coming rule should not apply in this case because
Doremus was not a typical commuter traveling each day from
home to office, but rather was a “hybrid” worker who performed
her work outside normal business hours at different locations
including her home.

      1.    The trial court properly shifted the burden to
            Chang, and Chang did not meet his burden
      Chang asserts that to prevail on summary judgment,
SCPMG must “negate any possibility that Doremus was not
functioning in the scope of her employment” at the time of the
accident. Chang contends SCPMG’s attempt to do so through
Doremus’s call and text logs and the screenshot of Doremus’s text
chain with her coworkers fails because that evidence was
unauthenticated and hearsay, and the trial court erred in
admitting it. If arguendo that evidence was admissible, Chang
argues it nonetheless fails to eliminate the possibility Doremus
was communicating with coworkers at the time of the accident.
      Chang misconstrues the parties’ respective burdens.
Instructive is Miller v. American Greetings Corp. (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 1055 (Miller), which similarly concerned
whether a driver was acting in the scope of his employment when
he struck someone with his vehicle. (See id. at p. 1062.)




                                   11
       In Miller, the tortfeasor driver, as part of his job for the
defendant employer, visited stores throughout Los Angeles
County to inspect the installation of greeting card stands, and
“spent much of his time talking on his cell phone” coordinating
installation projects. (Miller, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.)
The driver testified at deposition, however, that on the morning
of the accident he had taken the day off and was on a personal
errand. (Id. at p. 1061.) The Court of Appeal affirmed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer because the
plaintiffs “had no evidence to contradict” the driver’s testimony.
(Id. at p. 1062.) Although the plaintiffs proffered a cell phone
record indicating the driver had spoken by phone with a coworker
for one minute at 9:26 a.m., the evidence indicated the accident
took place at 9:35 a.m. (Ibid.)
       Also instructive is Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions,
LLC (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 487, in which an auto accident
plaintiff sued the tortfeasor’s employer. The plaintiff’s only
theory of respondeat superior liability was that the tortfeasor and
a coworker were discussing a scheduling issue for work on the
phone at the time of the accident. (Id. at p. 495.) In moving for
summary judgment, the employer offered testimony from the
tortfeasor and the coworker in which they denied they were
discussing work. (Ibid.) The testimony also established the
tortfeasor only rarely made work calls outside of working hours
and was social friends with the coworker. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal stated, “The issue, therefore, is whether plaintiff
presented substantial evidence to dispute their testimony.”
(Ibid.) The court held the plaintiff’s contention that the
tortfeasor had an incentive to lie to please her employer, without
more, was insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact on




                                   12
respondeat superior liability. (Id. at p. 496.) The court thus
affirmed the grant of summary judgment. (Id. at p. 499.)
       In Miller and Ayon, the defendant employer did not have to
negate all possibility the driver was acting in the scope of
employment to shift the burden of production to the plaintiffs. It
was sufficient the drivers provided testimony that established
they were not acting in the scope of employment. The burden
then shifted to the plaintiffs to dispute the testimony, which they
failed to do.
       The question before us, therefore, is whether SCPMG made
a prima facie showing that Doremus was not acting in the scope
of her employment at the time of the accident, and if so, whether
plaintiff offered contrary evidence demonstrating triable issues.
       SCPMG met its initial burden. Contrary to his position
below, on appeal Chang concedes the excerpts from Doremus’s
deposition were admissible. As in Miller and Ayon, those
excerpts alone satisfied SCPMG’s prima facie showing. Doremus
testified she was driving from her home to her office at the time
of the accident, and apart from the commute was not doing
anything work-related. She did not recall participating in any
telephone calls prior to the accident. She was driving a personal
vehicle unrelated to her employment. This evidence, if credited
by a finder of fact at trial, would establish Doremus was engaged
in an ordinary morning commute, and therefore the going and
coming rule applies. Thus, SCPMG met its initial burden, even if
arguendo SCPMG’s other evidence was inadmissible as Chang
contends.
       The burden therefore shifted to Chang to demonstrate a
triable issue. Below, Chang primarily relied on Doremus’s
calendar template listing a meeting at 8:30 a.m. the day of the




                                   13
accident. Chang acknowledged in his opposition, however, that
the calendar template is not the same as Doremus’s actual work
calendar, and therefore does not establish that Doremus, in fact,
attended or planned to attend a meeting at 8:30 a.m. Chang
does not identify any deposition testimony contradicting
Doremus’s claim she was not working at the time of the accident.
Although on appeal Chang claims the call and text log evidence
supports his position, he has maintained throughout this case
that evidence is inadmissible. Chang cannot have it both ways.
To meet his burden, Chang cannot rely on the call and text
evidence he asserts is inadmissible.
       We observe that, to the extent the call and text evidence
was admissible, it does not advance Chang’s claim. The call log
indicates Doremus was not on a call at the time of the accident,
and while the text log lists text messages with coworkers at 8:44,
the screenshot indicates those texts occurred after the accident,
when Doremus informed her coworkers she would not be coming
in. In other words, the documentary evidence does not contradict
Doremus’s testimony that when the accident occurred, she
was not communicating with coworkers or otherwise working.
       Chang argues the evidence does not necessarily show
Doremus was not working at the time of the accident. He
criticizes the text log as too narrow, covering only the 8:30 to 9:30
time period, which he claims leaves open the possibility Doremus
texted her coworkers before 8:30.5 He argues the call and text
logs do not eliminate the possibility Doremus had a second phone
with which she communicated with coworkers.

      5  Chang’s criticism of the text log is not well taken when it
was his counsel who requested the log from Doremus’s cellular
carrier via subpoena.




                                    14
      We reiterate it was not SCPMG’s burden to eliminate all
possibility Doremus was not working at the time of the accident.
Rather, it was Chang’s burden to offer admissible evidence
contradicting Doremus’s testimony that she was not working.
Although he speculates she might have been texting coworkers
before 8:30, or calling from a second phone, he offers no evidence
to support this speculation.

      2.    Uncontradicted evidence demonstrates the
            accident occurred during an ordinary commute
            subject to the going and coming rule
       Alternatively, Chang argues the going and coming rule
should not apply to Doremus’s commute because much of her
work was remote or virtual and she could perform it equally well
at home or at the office. Chang argues this “creates triable issues
of fact as to whether [SCPMG] obtained at least an ‘incidental’
benefit from literally everything Doremus did that was anything
other than purely personal.” Chang continues, “[SCPMG] could
reach Doremus on her phone any time of the day or night, could
demand her ‘presence’ at work even when she was at home and
obtained what amounted to a 24-hour, seven day per week
employee.” “Doremus’ scope of employment extended well beyond
a ‘typical’ employee who goes to the employer’s workplace, on a
defined schedule, does their work and leaves, with no on-going
obligations to the employer until the next working day.” Chang
contends, “[T]he hybrid nature of Doremus’ work situation is
more akin to traveling between worksites than it is to a ‘common
commute.’ ”
       That Doremus might have sometimes worked outside of
normal working hours or from home does not change the fact that
at the time of the accident, Doremus’s uncontradicted testimony



                                   15
established she was driving from her home to her medical center
office at the beginning of the workday as she did every Monday.
Doremus was not driving at an unusual time, or providing a
benefit to her employer beyond traveling to the office. Assuming
arguendo her home at times could be deemed a worksite, that
was not the case on the day of the accident, on which she was
scheduled to work at her medical center office and not at home.
Doremus was not shuttling between worksites but simply driving
to work in the morning.
       Chang’s cited cases discuss the going and coming rule in
the context of workers’ compensation. The rule “provides that
workers’ compensation does not ordinarily compensate injuries
sustained while the employee travels to or from work.” (Wilson v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 181, 184 (Wilson).)
       We first observe that “workers’ compensation cases
awarding coverage do not necessarily provide reliable precedent
for tort cases because the version of the [going and coming] rule
applied in tort cases is more restrictive.” (Pierson v. Helmerich &
Payne Internat. Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 619, italics
omitted.) “Workers’ compensation cases take a more expansive
view of the test for course of employment than tort cases because
the policies underlying the workers’ compensation statute favor
granting employee’s coverage.” (Ibid.) In the context of workers’
compensation coverage, “ ‘any reasonable doubt as to the
applicability of the going and coming doctrine must be resolved in
the employee’s favor.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Thus, “the analysis




                                   16
used in workers’ compensation cases should not be applied in tort
cases as though it was controlling.” (Id. at p. 620.)6
      Even if arguendo workers’ compensation case law were
applicable in this case, our holding is not in tension with Chang’s
cited authority. In Wilson, our Supreme Court acknowledged the
following exception to the going and coming rule for purposes of
workers’ compensation: “Work done at home may exempt an
injury occurring during a regular commute from the going and
coming rule if circumstances of the employment — and not mere
dictates of convenience to the employee — make the home a
second jobsite. If the home becomes a second business situs, the
familiar rule applies that injury sustained while traveling
between jobsites is compensable.” (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at
p. 184.) Wilson continued, “However, if work is performed at
home for the employee's convenience, the commute does not
constitute a business trip, since serving the employee’s own
convenience in selecting an off-premise place to work is a
personal and not a business purpose.” (Ibid.) Applying these
principles, the Supreme Court held a teacher was not exempt
from the going and coming rule simply because she brought work
home with her after school, “[b]ecause [the teacher] performed
work at home for her own convenience,” and her school “did not
require labor at home.” (Id. at p. 185.) The teacher therefore was
not entitled to workers’ compensation for injuries sustained in an
accident as she drove to school. (Id. at p. 183.)
      In Bramall v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978)
78 Cal.App.3d 151, a secretary argued the going and coming rule


      6Indeed, in his opposition below Chang argued workers’
compensation cases had “no applicability in tort cases.”




                                   17
did not bar compensation for injuries she sustained in an
accident during her evening commute because she was bringing
deposition transcripts home to translate them from Spanish to
English for her employer. (Id. at p. 154.) The Court of Appeal
agreed. (Id. at p. 160.) Although the employer did not
specifically instruct the secretary to perform the translations at
home, her doing so was an implied condition of her employment.
(Id. at p. 158.) This is because uncontradicted evidence
demonstrated an implied requirement the secretary work at
home beyond normal working hours: “[T]he work could not be
properly performed in the after-hours environment of the office
and [the] translation work at home was the normal practice
approved by the employer.” (Id. at p. 160.)
       In Zhu v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 1031, the Court of Appeal held the going and
coming rule did not preclude workers’ compensation to an in-
home caretaker injured while bicycling between two private
homes in which she worked. (Id. at pp. 1035, 1041.) The court
reasoned the caretaker “was not commuting between her home
and the workplace at a fixed time,” and her “transit bestowed a
direct benefit on [her employer], as [her employer] knew that [the
caretaker] had to transit between homes to service more than one
home a day.” (Id. at p. 1041.) The court also noted the employer
“was a direct beneficiary of [the caretaker’s travel] since it
allowed [the caretaker] to service more than one home per day.”
(Id. at pp. 1040–1041.)
       Chang also relies on a Utah Supreme Court case, State Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Commission (Ut. 1964) 15 Utah 2d 363 (State
Ins. Fund), cited in Wilson for the proposition that the going and
coming rule does not apply “[i]f the home becomes a second




                                  18
business situs.” (See Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 184.) The
question in State Ins. Fund was whether a widow was entitled to
workers’ compensation for the death of her husband while he was
traveling from his apartment building to his office across town.
(State Ins. Fund, at pp. 363–364.)
       The evidence showed that in addition to the office to which
the husband was traveling at the time of the accident, he
maintained an office in another apartment within his apartment
building. (State Ins. Fund, supra, 15 Utah 2d at p. 364.)
Witnesses testified the husband’s custom was to go to his
apartment-building office every morning, and to make “frequent
and periodic visits” to the office across town. (Ibid.) The morning
of the accident he went to his apartment-building office, then
returned to his home apartment half an hour later for breakfast.
(Ibid.) At 8:00 a.m. he left for his office across town, and the
accident occurred during that trip. (Ibid.)
       The Utah high court acknowledged that had the husband
“merely arisen that fatal morning, had his breakfast, and then
left his apartment to drive to the [office across town], . . . his
death would not be compensable.” (State Ins. Fund, supra,
15 Utah 2d at pp. 364–365.) In this case, however, the husband
was “going from one office to another,” and “the mere fact that he
made a stop to have breakfast would not necessarily take him out
of the course of his employment.” (Id. at p. 365.) Accordingly, the
widow was entitled to workers’ compensation for her husband’s
death. (Id. at pp. 363, 365.)
       Our holding does not conflict with these authorities, all of
which concern transit between worksites. As we have explained,
Doremus worked at the medical center on Mondays, and
therefore her home, to the extent arguendo it could ever be




                                   19
deemed a worksite, was not a worksite the morning of the
accident. None of Chang’s cited authorities suggests that, if an
employee sometimes works from home, the home becomes a
second worksite for all purposes, even when the employee is not
working from home. Even in State Ins. Fund, in which the
husband worked every day in an office in the very apartment
building where he lived, the Utah Supreme Court noted his
widow would not be entitled to workers’ compensation had he
gone directly from his home to his across-town office rather than
first working for a time in his apartment-building office. Thus,
Chang’s comparison between Doremus’s Monday commute and
cases concerning travel between worksites is inapt.
       Chang argues allowing employees to work both from home
and at the office provides a benefit to employers, such as
increased productivity and employee satisfaction, and therefore it
makes sense to hold employers liable when such “hybrid”
employees move between their homes and offices. The question
for respondeat superior liability is whether the employee
committed the tort within the scope of employment. A hybrid
worker who works both in-office and at home is no more acting
within the scope of employment when driving to and from work
on in-office days than is a nonhybrid worker who drives to and
from work every day. In either case the employee is providing no
benefit to the employer apart from traveling to work, a benefit
that under the going and coming rule does not trigger respondeat
superior liability. To conclude otherwise would eviscerate the
going and coming rule for employees who sometimes work from
home, thereby discouraging employers from allowing employees
that flexibility. We fail to see what policy this serves.




                                  20
                          DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Southern California
Permanente Medical Group is awarded its costs on appeal.




                                        BENDIX, J.


We concur:




             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.




             M. KIM, J.




                                 21
Filed 4/28/26
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION ONE


 KAI-LIN CHANG,                              B340770

         Plaintiff and Appellant,            (Los Angeles County
                                             Super. Ct. No. 22CHCV01194)
         v.
                                             CERTIFICATION AND
 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA                         ORDER FOR PUBLICATION
 PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP,
                                             [NO CHANGE IN
         Defendant and Respondent.           JUDGMENT]


      The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on April 9,
2026, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published
in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.
      There is no change in the judgment.
      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.




____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.           BENDIX, J.            M. KIM, J.