P. ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist.

Filed 4/27/26
                           CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION


                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         (Yolo)


THE PEOPLE ex rel. YOLO-SOLANO AIR                    C102574
QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,
     Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant,        (Super. Ct. No. CV20241095)

        v.

SPENCER DEFTY et al.,
      Defendants, Cross-complainants and
Appellants.



      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County, Timothy L. Fall,
Judge. Affirmed.
       Matthew C. Maclear, Jason R. Flanders, Kenya S. Rothstein, and Aqua Terra
Aeris Law Group for Defendant, Cross-defendant, and Appellant.
      Klaus J. Kolb and Klaus J. Kolb, LC for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and
Respondent Spencer Defty.
     Ameet O’Rattan Sharma for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent
Diamond D General Engineering, Inc.
      Air Coalition Team and Ann M. Grottveit, Jeremy A. McLinden, and Kahn,
Soares & Conway, LLP as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants, Cross-complainants,
and Respondents.
      Pacific Legal Foundation and California Farm Bureau Federation and Caitlyn
Kinard, Louis Villacci, Damien M. Schiff as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants,
Cross-complainants, and Respondents.
        California Air Pollution Control Officers Association and Piero C. Dallarda, Chad
Colton, and Best Best & Krieger LLP as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff, Cross-
defendant, and Appellant.


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       Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management District (district) sued Diamond D General
Engineering, Inc. (Diamond), its chief executive officer Spencer Defty doing business as
Defty Farms (Defty), and Knotty Wood Barbecue Company, LLC (together with Defty
and Diamond, defendants) for statutory and regulatory violations. The complaint alleges
defendants failed to correct their conduct despite receiving notices of violation stemming
from their business and agricultural operations.
       Diamond and Defty filed a cross-complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging the notices of violation were based on an internal district policy that had not
gone through proper rulemaking procedures. The trial court denied district’s anti-SLAPP
(strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike the cross-complaint.
       On appeal, district contends: (1) the causes of action alleged in the cross-
complaint arise from district’s protected activities of investigating defendants’ violations,
issuing the notices of violation, settlement offering, and filing the underlying lawsuit;
(2) the public interest exemption does not apply; and (3) Defty and Diamond cannot
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of the causes of action alleged in the
cross-complaint.
       We conclude the causes of action alleged in the cross-complaint do not arise from
district’s protected activities because they challenge the validity of the policy upon which
the activities were purportedly based. Having reached this conclusion, we need not
discuss the likelihood of success on the merits of these causes of action. We publish to
clarify that where, as here, it is easier to dispose of an anti-SLAPP motion on its merits, it
is unnecessary to address the public interest exemption.
       Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Diamond provides agricultural services to farmers and ranchers, and Defty is
Diamond’s chief executive officer. Defty is also the sole manager of Knotty Wood
Barbecue Company, LLC.

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        Between 2023 and 2024, district issued three notices of violation to Diamond for
operating an equipment unit without a permit, failing to install proper emission controls,
and failing to minimize smoke in an agricultural burn.
       In an April 2024 initial meeting, defendants’ counsel met with district’s
representatives to discuss the notices of violation. At the meeting, district’s
representatives did not address the notices of violation but instead stated an independent
contractor such as Diamond was not entitled to agricultural exemptions under Farmers
Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb (1949) 337 U.S. 755 (Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co.) and Julius Goldman’s Egg City v. Air Pollution Control Dist. (1981)
116 Cal.App.3d 741 (Julius Goldman’s Egg City). No resolution was reached at the
meeting.
       After the meeting, Defty’s counsel emailed district to inquire whether the notices
of violation were subject to review by district’s hearing board. Defty’s counsel stated
that if administrative review was unavailable or would be futile, Diamond and Defty
would seek judicial review. District’s counsel confirmed the notices of violation were
not appealable.
       Several days later, one of Diamond’s clients forwarded to Defty an email
exchange he had with district’s representatives. In the email exchange, one of district’s
representative stated “[o]ur policy on this agricultural exemption issue has been
consistent for the last 24 years. If you were to operate a grinder as a service for other
farmers, you would be an agricultural service … thereby making the exemption
unavailable to you” based on Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. and Julius Goldman’s
Egg City.
       A week after the initial meeting, district sued defendants for various statutory and
regulatory violations, seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties. In the “Permitting
Requirements” section, the complaint recites multiple district rules, sections from the
Code of Regulations, and a “District Policy 24” (policy 24). Specifically, the complaint

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alleges district rule 3.2, section 107 provides that certain equipment may be exempt from
permitting requirement if the “ ‘[e]quipment [is] used exclusively in the growing of
agricultural crops or in the commercial raising of fowl or other animals.’ ” The
paragraph immediately following the discussion of district rule 3.2, section 107 states that
under policy 24, the exemption in district rule 3.2, section 107 does not apply “ ‘if those
activities are not performed on the farm where the crops are grown, by the farmer (or the
farmer[’]s employees) who owns or operates the farm where the crops are grown; if the
farmer is processing commodities produced by other farmers, as this is not “incidental to
or in conjunction with” the farming operation of the farmer on whose premises the
processing is done; or to equipment used in activities that are carried on to produce a
separate valuable commercial product.’ ” The paragraph cites Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. and Julius Goldman’s Egg City to support policy 24.
       Defendants answered. Diamond and Defty also filed a cross-complaint “for
declaratory and injunctive relief because [district] ha[s] issued, and/or threatened to issue,
Notices of Violation to [defendants] based on secret regulations or ‘policies’ adopted by
[district] without complying with the express rule making procedures set forth in the
applicable statutes that authorize [district]’s actions.” According to the cross-complaint,
Diamond and Defty first learned of policy 24 from the complaint. District did not make
policy 24 available on its website, did not provide Diamond or Defty with a copy of
policy 24, and did not inform them of the existence of policy 24. But district “threatened
to enforce a series of [notices of violation] [it] ha[d] issued to [Diamond] … , based on
[district’s] illegal and invalid secret rules or regulations, including the alleged [policy 24],
and, threaten[ed] to issue further [notices of violation] to [Diamond] and [Defty Farms]
based on the same secret rules.” The cross-complaint sought “an order declaring
[district’s] secret rules or regulations void and unenforceable” and “a temporary
restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, all enjoining
[district] from enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the illegal and void secret rules or

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regulations that effectively amend or repeal the agricultural operations exemptions in the
Health and Safety Code, the Right to Farm Act, and [district’s] own published Rules, at
least until [district] complies with the statutorily required procedures for amending or
repealing those published Rules.”
         District filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint under section
425.16. The anti-SLAPP motion contends: (1) the public interest exemption does not
apply; (2) the causes of action alleged in the cross-complaint arise from district’s
activities protected by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), including the investigation, the
issuance of the notices of violation, and the filing of the underlying lawsuit; and
(3) Diamond and Defty are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.
         A district employee stated in his declaration supporting the anti-SLAPP motion
that policy 24 was created “to assist [district] with exercising discretion in permitting and
enforcement. Policy 24 is a summary of applicable law and is consistent with the
language and rationale dating back over 70 years. Policy 24 was originally developed in
2000 based on advice of counsel to align permitting and enforcement with controlling
case law.” He further stated that Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., Julius Goldman’s
Egg City, and a 1953 Ninth Circuit case form the bases of policy 24. According to the
employee, district does not consider acts inconsistent with policy 24 as violations and its
staff are not required to reference policy 24 in issuing permits or enforcing compliance.
         The trial court denied the motion, finding the cross-complaint is not a challenge to
the notices of violation but rather a challenge to the law upon which the notices are
based.
         District timely appeals.
                                        DISCUSSION
         District contends the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion because
the cross-complaint challenges protected activities, including district’s investigation, the
issuance of notices of violation, the settlement attempt, and the filing of the lawsuit. We

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disagree. The cross-complaint challenges the validity of policy 24. District’s regulatory
activities were mere evidence related to its liability premised on policy 24.
                                    I.   Anti-SLAPP Laws
          Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) (the anti-SLAPP statute) provides: “A cause of
action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” An “act in furtherance of a
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution
in connection with a public issue” includes “any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
          “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant
must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.
[Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
          Our review is de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) We consider “the pleadings[] and supporting and
opposing affidavits.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) “We exercise independent judgment in
determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise
from protected activity.” (Park, at p. 1067.) “We do not, however, weigh the evidence,
but accept the plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary
evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.”
(Ibid.)



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                              II. Public Interest Exemption
       In 2003, the Legislature enacted section 425.17 to curb the “disturbing abuse” of
the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.17, subd. (a).) It provides in part that the anti-SLAPP
statute does not apply to “any action brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of
the general public” if certain conditions are met. (§ 425.17, subd. (b).)
       Defty contends “[b]efore engaging in the two-step anti-SLAPP analysis, ‘a court
must consider any claims by the plaintiff that a statutory exemption contained in section
425.17 applies,’ ” citing Takhar v. People ex rel. Feather River Air Quality Management
Dist. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 15 (Takhar). Takhar in turn quotes San Diegans for Open
Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611. (Takhar, at p. 24.)
But the public interest exemption discussion was necessary to the disposition in both
cases. Takhar concluded the causes of action in the challenged cross-complaint arose
from protected activity and the cross-complainant failed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits of those claims (Takhar, at p. 18) and San Diegans for Open
Government concluded that the challenged complaint fell under the public interest
exemption (San Diegans for Open Government, at pp. 616-617).
       San Diegans for Open Government also cited a series of cases holding that the
public interest exemption is a threshold issue that we address prior to examining the
applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute. (San Diegans for Open Government v. Har
Construction, Inc., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) But again, the public interest
exemption discussion was necessary to the disposition in those cases because they either
concluded the exemption applied or the anti-SLAPP statute applied. (Navarro v. IHOP
Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 837 [the challenged complaint arose from
protected litigation activity, and the plaintiff could not prevail on the merits]; Save
Westwood Village v. Luskin (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 135, 146 [the challenged claims
arose from protected activity, and the petitioners could not establish a likelihood of




                                              7
prevailing on the claims]; Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1447, 1452 [the challenged complaint fell under the public interest exemption].)
       But in cases where it is easier to dispose of the anti-SLAPP motion on the merits,
we conclude it is unnecessary to address the public interest exemption. (See Antounian v.
Louis Vuitton Malletier (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 438, 455 [“we generally do not address
issues whose resolution is unnecessary to the disposition of an appeal”]; see also
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697 [“if it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, … that course should
be followed”].) Thus, because we conclude below that the causes of action alleged in the
cross-complaint do not arise from district’s protected activities, we do not reach the
public interest exemption. District’s anti-SLAPP motion fails regardless of whether the
public interest exemption applies.
                            III. Arises from Protected Activity
       “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the
basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s
cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free
speech.’ … [T]he focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives
rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech
or petitioning.’ ” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062-1063.) “In deciding whether an
action is a SLAPP, the trial court should distinguish between (1) speech or petitioning
activity that is mere evidence related to liability and (2) liability that is based on speech
or petitioning activity.” (Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214-1215.)
       Here, the causes of action alleged in the cross-complaint arise from the validity of
policy 24. The cross-complaint claims district issued or had threatened to issue notices of
violation under policy 24 even though policy 24 was not properly adopted under the
rulemaking procedures set forth in the Health and Safety Code. It sought an order

                                               8
declaring district’s secret rules and regulations void and unenforceable and enjoining
district from enforcing the secret rules and regulations until they comply with the
rulemaking procedures. Such declaratory and injunctive relief is an “appropriate means
to determine whether [district] complied with” the Health and Safety Code. (Graffiti
Protective Coating, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215;
accord, Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Department of Industrial
Relations (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 243, 264.) Unlike the complaint in CKE Restaurants
Inc. v. Moore (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 262, the cross-complaint does not directly
challenge the merits of the notices of violation. (Id., at p. 271 [finding the complaint
arose from protected regulatory activity when it “directly challenged the merits of” the
violation notice “by referring to and quoting from” the notice].) It is also different from
the petition in Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health
Division (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1082. The gravamen of the petition there “d[id] not
involve a challenge to or enforcement of an ordinance, regulation or statute” but instead
challenged the right of a county environmental health division to declare a chemical as
hazardous waste and to cooperate with district attorney. (Id. at p. 1090.)
       Moreover, at the meeting that was supposed to resolve the notices of violation,
district did not address the notices but merely stated that Diamond was not entitled to
agricultural exemptions under Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. and Julius Goldman’s
Egg City. It cited the same cases in its email to Diamond’s client on agricultural
exemptions and stated district’s “policy on this agricultural exemption issue has been
consistent for the last 24 years.” District’s employee declared that these two cases form
the basis of policy 24 and that policy 24 was created 24 years ago. And district’s
complaint lists policy 24 along with other district rules and statutes under its “Permitting
Requirements” section. The pleadings and affidavits are sufficient to show district may
have followed policy 24 and applied policy 24’s summary and interpretation of case law
in its regulatory activities.

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          The investigation, the issuance of notices of violation, the settlement attempt, and
the filing of the underlying lawsuit are “mere evidence related to” district’s allegedly
improper adoption and enforcement of policy 24. They demonstrate the influence policy
24 potentially has on district’s regulatory activities. This is distinguishable from Takhar
where the cross-complainant was seeking “a judicial determination that he is exempt
from [a district rule], and thereby challenging the District’s protected enforcement
activities, including issuance of the notice of violation and commencement and
prosecution of the civil enforcement action itself.” (Takhar, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
p. 32.)
          We recognize that Diamond states the cross-complaint is compulsory and section
426.10, subdivision (c) provides a compulsory cross-complaint “arises out of the same
transaction, … as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” But
just because the causes of action in the cross-complaint arise out of the same transaction
as the causes of action in the complaint does not mean the complaint forms the basis for
district’s liability in the cross-complaint. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 [a claim
arises from protected activity when the defendant’s protected activity forms the basis for
its liability]; see Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
515, 538 [“in the breach of contract context, the [compulsory cross-complaint] rule
means any claims the defendant has against the plaintiff based on the same contract
generally must be asserted in a cross-complaint, even if the claims are unrelated to the
specific breach or breaches that underlie the plaintiff’s complaint”].)
          District contends Diamond and Defty misstate the facts by claiming district
“adopted” policy 24 as a rule when policy 24 is merely an internal summary of applicable
law. But we must “accept the plaintiff’s submissions as true” in determining whether the
challenged claims arise from protected activity. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
Merely alleging policy 24 is a summary of laws does not entitle district to prevail as a
matter of law. (See ibid.) We express no opinion as to the nature or validity of policy 24.

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       Because district has failed to demonstrate the causes of action in the cross-
complaint arise from protected activity, we need not consider the probability of success
of these claims.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order is affirmed. Diamond and Defty shall recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)




                                                  /s/
                                                  MESIWALA, J.

We concur:




/s/
EARL, P. J.




/s/
ROBIE, J.




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