People v. The North River Ins. Co.

Filed 4/28/26


                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA


 THE PEOPLE,                                  D085358

         Plaintiff and Respondent,            (Super. Ct. No. SCE411972)

         v.

 THE NORTH RIVER INS. CO. et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.


       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Danna W. Nicholas and Frank L. Birchak, Judges. Affirmed.
       Jefferson T. Stamp, for Defendants and Appellants.
       David J. Smith, Acting County Counsel, and Thomas Deak,
Supervising Deputy, for the Plaintiff and Respondent.


       The North River Insurance Company (North River) was the surety on a
$180,000 bail bond issued for the release of defendant Torian Bramlett. After
Bramlett failed to appear in court, the trial court declared the bond forfeited.
Thereafter, Bramlett was located in the Fort Bend County Jail in Texas and
extradited to the San Diego County Jail by the district attorney. The bond
was exonerated and North River was ordered to pay the costs of extradition.
      On appeal from that order, North River asserts the trial court failed to
properly exonerate the bond because Bramlett was not physically present in
the courtroom at the time of the order, which it contends was required by

Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (c)(1).1 Further, North River argues the
trial court erred by awarding extradition costs to the district attorney
because the court did not have jurisdiction over the bond at the time of the
cost award. The People respond that because Bramlett appeared in court
through his counsel in accordance with section 977, the court was required
to—and did—exonerate the bond at that time and appropriately awarded
extradition costs in favor of the People thereafter. As we shall explain, we
agree with the People and affirm the order.
              PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      On April 20, 2022, North River, through its bail agent, Bad Boys Bail

Bonds (Bad Boys),2 posted a $180,000 bond for the release of Bramlett. On
August 3, 2023, Bramlett failed to appear and the court declared the bond
forfeited. The court clerk mailed the notice of forfeiture to North River the
same day, setting the expiration of the appearance period for February 4,
2024. On January 31, 2024, North River filed a motion to extend the
appearance period to August 21, 2024, and the court granted the motion on
February 23, 2024.
      On June 6, 2024, North River sent an email to the San Diego County
District Attorney’s Office stating Bad Boys had located Bramlett in custody



1     Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2    North River and Bad Boys are hereafter referred to collectively as
North River.

                                       2
at the Fort Bend County Jail in Texas. North River asked the district
attorney to advise whether it would seek to extradite Bramlett from Texas.
The district attorney responded by email the same day, stating: “Our office
will be extraditing this fugitive from Texas. Please see the attached letter.”
The letter explained the district attorney was in the process of extraditing
Bramlett from Texas and, “[u]pon the return of the defendant, the San Diego
District Attorney’s Office will seek reimbursement from Bad Boy[s] Bail
Bonds for the actual costs incurred in extraditing the defendant as a
condition to relief from bail forfeiture and exoneration of the bail bond,
pursuant to … section 1306[, subdivision] (b).”
      On July 9, 2024, two San Diego County Deputy Sheriffs travelled to
Texas to retrieve Bramlett. The deputies returned to San Diego County with
Bramlett in custody the following day and he was jailed. On July 17, 2024,
the People filed a notice of motion and “Motion Re: Exoneration of Bail and
Request to Calendar Hearing on Reimbursement of Extradition Costs
Pursuant to … Section 1306[, subdivision] (b).” The notice set a hearing date
for August 16, 2024. The People asserted Bramlett had been returned to
custody in San Diego County and the People did not oppose exoneration of
the bond, but requested exoneration be conditioned on the surety and bond
agent’s payment of extradition costs.
      On July 18, 2024, the trial court called Bramlett’s case on the record.
Bramlett’s defense counsel stated, “Mr. Bramlett is in custody. I am
appearing 977. This is an appearance on a warrant.” The trial court ordered
the bond exonerated, conditioned on payment of the district attorney’s
extradition costs. At the district attorney’s request, the court also stated, “I
will have that appear on the minute order, that [the bond] is exonerated



                                        3
subject to the District Attorney’s costs.” The minute order likewise stated the
bail bond was exonerated, “subject to DA costs.”
      On August 15, 2024, Bramlett appeared in court for a trial readiness
conference. At the conference, Bramlett waived his appearance for the
hearing set the following day for the People’s bond motion. On August 16,
2024, the court continued the hearing on the bond motion to October 4, 2024.
On August 21, 2024, North River filed a competing motion to vacate bond
forfeiture and exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (a).
Therein, the surety argued the court lost jurisdiction over the bond because
there had been “no declaration of forfeiture when [Bramlett] failed to appear
on November 17, 2022 and August 2, 2023.” North River asserted that since
Bramlett failed to appear “without sufficient excuse, the Court was required
to declare a forfeiture of the bond” and its “omission in this regard resulted in
a loss of jurisdiction which exonerates the bond.”
      On September 26, 2024, North River filed an opposition to the district
attorney’s motion on the bond for extradition costs, asserting that because
the court did not address the bond at Bramlett’s first appearance in court on
August 15, 2024, the bond was exonerated by operation of law on that date
and the court did not retain jurisdiction thereafter to order payment of the
extradition costs. Further, North River argued that because Bramlett did not
appear in person on July 18, 2024, the court’s order that day exonerating the
bond conditioned on the payment of extradition costs was ineffectual.
      The hearing on the competing bond motions was continued to
November 22, 2024. Before the hearing, the People filed an opposition to
North River’s motion. The People asserted defense counsel’s appearance for
Bramlett under section 977 on July 18, 2024, was sufficient for the court to
exonerate the bond and that the court did not lose jurisdiction to award

                                        4
extradition costs thereafter. On November 18, 2024, the district attorney
filed a new motion to recover the specific costs of extradition under
section 1306, subdivision (b). The motion set forth costs of extradition of
$7,492.40 and supporting documentation for the expenses.
      On November 22, 2024, the trial court granted the People’s motions for
extradition costs in the amount of $7,492.40 and denied North River’s motion
to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The court issued an order
corresponding to its oral decision and ordering payment of the costs within
60 days pursuant to section 1305.2. North River filed a timely notice of
appeal from the order.
                                DISCUSSION
      As stated, North River asserts that the trial court could not exonerate
the bond on July 18, 2024, because Bramlett was not physically present in
court. North River further argues that the bail bond was exonerated by
operation of law on August 15, 2024, when Bramlett physically appeared in
court for the first time following his extradition from Texas, which it argues
removed the trial court’s jurisdiction to order the payment of extradition
costs. Alternatively, North River asserts the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction because the costs of extradition were incurred after Bramlett was
“returned to ‘custody beyond the jurisdiction of the court’ pursuant to
[section] 1305[, subdivision] (f).” Finally, North River contends the bond was
exonerated under section 1306, subdivision (c), because the court did not
enter summary judgment of the forfeiture.
      The People respond that the trial court exonerated the bond on July 18,
2024, and appropriately conditioned the exoneration on payment of
extradition costs, which the court properly ordered thereafter.



                                       5
      We agree with the People that under the plain language of
section 1305, subdivision (c)(1), the bond was conditionally exonerated on
July 18, 2024, and the costs of extradition were properly awarded on
November 22, 2024. We also reject North River’s assertion, which relies on
an appellate division decision, People v. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds, Inc. (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th Supp. 12 (Bail Hotline), that the cost award was improper
because the costs were incurred after Bramlett was in custody in Texas.
Lastly, we hold North River’s argument under section 1306, subdivision (c) is
meritless.
                                         I
                                Legal Standards
      “Although bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal
prosecutions, they are civil in nature. (People v. American Contractors
Indemnity Co. [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [653,] 657.) The object of bail and its
forfeiture is to insure the defendant’s attendance and his or her obedience to
the orders and judgment of the court. (Ibid.) The purpose is not to either
provide revenue to the state or punish the surety. (Ibid.) The law’s
traditional disfavor of forfeitures extends to forfeiture of bail.” (People v.
Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 617, 621,
disapproved on other grounds by County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty
& Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309.)
      “The statutory scheme governing bail is found in … section 1268 et seq.
When a defendant released on bail fails to appear as required without
sufficient excuse, the court must declare the bond forfeited. (§ 1305,
subd. (a).) If the defendant appears in court or is returned to custody within
180 days [(known as the appearance period)], the forfeiture must be vacated
and the bond exonerated. (§ 1305, subd. (c).)” (People v. Indiana

                                         6
Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 304 (Indiana).) “The
180–day period is extended by five days when notice of forfeiture is required
to be mailed, and in that event the period begins to run from the date of
mailing.” (Id. at p. 305, fn. 2.) “Section 1305.4 allows the surety to move for
an extension of the 180–day period, upon a showing of good cause.” (Id. at
p. 305, fn. 3.)
      “Section 1305 next addresses exoneration of the bond in different
factual contexts.” (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1495 (Accredited Surety).) Relevant here, under
section 1305, subdivision (c)(1), “If the defendant appears either voluntarily
or in custody after surrender or arrest in court within [the appearance
period], the court shall, on its own motion at the time the defendant first
appears in court on the case in which the forfeiture was entered, direct the
order of forfeiture to be vacated and the bond exonerated.” Further, “[i]f the
court fails to so act on its own motion, then the surety’s ... obligations under
the bond shall be immediately vacated and the bond exonerated.’ ” (§ 1305,
subd. (c)(1).) Finally, “[a]n order vacating the forfeiture and exonerating the
bond may be made on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms
imposed in similar situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release.”
(Ibid.)
      “[S]ection 1306, subdivision (b), which governs compensation to the
government for the costs of extradition, states, ‘[i]f a court grants relief from
bail forfeiture, it shall impose a monetary payment as a condition of relief to
compensate the people for the costs of returning a defendant to custody
pursuant to Section 1305 …’.” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2018) 31
Cal.App.5th 797, 804–805 (North River).) The provision further provides,
“The amount imposed shall reflect the actual costs of returning the defendant

                                        7
to custody. Failure to act within the required time to make the payment
imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall not be the basis for a summary
judgment against any or all of the underlying amount of the bail.” (§ 1306,
subd. (b).)
      “We review the denial of a motion to vacate a bond forfeiture and to
exonerate the bond for an abuse of discretion.” (North River, supra, 31
Cal.App.5th at p. 804.) However, “ ‘[w]hen the appellate court is deciding
only legal issues …, such as jurisdictional questions and matters of statutory
interpretation, the abuse of discretion standard does not apply. [Citation.]
When the facts are undisputed and only legal issues are involved, appellate
courts conduct an independent review.’ ” (Ibid.)
                                        II
              The Bond Was Conditionally Exonerated on July 18, 2024
      As the parties agree, under section 1305, subdivision (c)(1), if Bramlett
appeared in court on July 18, 2024, then the court was required to exonerate
the bond it had previously forfeited. North River argues that Bramlett did
not appear because he was not physically present in the courtroom, while the
People contend Bramlett did appear through his counsel in accordance with
section 977.
      Section 977 states in relevant part, “in all cases in which a felony is
charged, the accused shall be physically present at the arraignment, at the
time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the
trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the
imposition of sentence. The accused shall be physically or remotely present
at all other proceedings unless they waive their right to be physically or
remotely present, with leave of court and with approval by defendant’s
counsel.” (§ 977, subd. (b)(1).) In addition, the statute provides that “[t]he

                                        8
waiver of a defendant’s right to be physically or remotely present may be in
writing and filed with the court or, with the court’s consent, may be entered
personally by the defendant or by the defendant’s counsel of record.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(2).)
      As noted, at the hearing on July 18, 2024, Bramlett’s counsel indicated
that she was appearing on his behalf in accordance with section 977. The
court accepted the waiver of appearance and North River does not dispute
that Bramlett was in the custody of the San Diego County Sheriff’s
Department at that time. Accordingly, as required by section 1305,
subdivision (c)(1), the court exonerated the bond on the condition that North
River pay the costs of extradition, which were to be determined at a later
time. (See Indiana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 304–305 [“If the defendant
appears in court or is returned to custody within 180 days, the forfeiture
must be vacated and the bond exonerated. (§ 1305, subd. (c).)”]; and People v.
American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1044 [“If
the surety produces the defendant in court or shows evidence he or she is
otherwise in custody, the trial court must set aside the forfeiture and
exonerate the bond.”].) Contrary to North River’s assertion, there is no
reason to require Bramlett to personally appear at the time the bond is
exonerated. Rather, his appearance by counsel was sufficient to invoke the
requirement for the trial court to exonerate the bond subject to reasonable
conditions. (See, e.g., People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 1049, 1052 [because defendant may waive “his personal presence
at a trial readiness conference … the trial court was not required to forfeit
the bond” when he “appeared through his counsel pursuant to a …
section 977 waiver”].)



                                        9
      North River asserts that the defendant’s physical appearance is
required by the “plain language” of the statute, and that Bramlett’s
appearance by counsel was insufficient to invoke the exoneration
requirement of section 1305, subdivision (c)(1). In support of this assertion,
North River looks to People v. Ranger (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1000
(Ranger II). In Ranger II, after the defendant failed to appear in court on
January 14, 2004, the court declared the bond forfeited and issued a warrant
for the defendant’s arrest. The court issued the notice of the forfeiture the
following day. (Id. at p. 1001.) The next day, on January 16th, “the clerk of
the court recalendared [the defendant’s] appearance for January 20, 2004. A
note in the court’s docket report state[d]: ‘Case on calendar at request of the
defendant who appeared at the counter.’ ” (Ibid.) After the defendant failed
to appear on January 20, 2004, and made no other appearance, the trial court
entered “summary judgment against Ranger on August 13, 2004, more than
185 days after the mailing of the notice of forfeiture.” (Ibid.)
      On appeal from the summary judgment, Ranger asserted the
defendant’s appearance at the clerk’s counter was sufficient to trigger the
requirement of section 1305, subdivision (c)(1) that the court exonerate the
bond. (Ranger II, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002.) The Court of Appeal
rejected this argument, stating “[a]n appearance in the courthouse vestibule,
hallway, restroom, or clerk’s office is not an appearance in court. We
presume that had the Legislature intended an appearance in the clerk’s office
to suffice, it would have said so. We have no power to add language to the
statute. The defendant’s appearance in the clerk’s office is simply not
sufficient.” (Ibid.)
      North River argues this language required Bramlett to personally
appear in court to trigger the bond exoneration requirement. We disagree.

                                       10
Unlike Bramlett, the defendant in Ranger was not in custody, did not appear
before the judge, and did not appear again in the case after his appearance at
the clerk’s counter. The situation has no relevance to the case at bar. Here,
Bramlett had been taken into custody in Texas, extradited to San Diego, and
appeared via his counsel before the trial judge. This was sufficient to trigger
the exoneration of forfeiture requirement of section 1305, subdivision (c)(1).
      North River also cites Accredited Surety, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 1490
in support of its assertion that Bramlett’s appearance by his counsel under
section 977 was insufficient to require exoneration of the bond forfeiture. In
Accredited Surety, the defendant was arrested during the 180-day
exoneration period in Merced County. After his arrest, the trial court signed
an order transferring the defendant to Stanislaus County where the charges
underlying the bond at issue were filed. (Id. at p. 1493.) The surety,
however, failed to file a motion to exonerate the bond before the expiration of
the exoneration period and the court subsequently entered summary
judgment on the forfeited bond. (Ibid.) On appeal, the surety argued the
exoneration period had been tolled as a matter of law, and that reversal of
summary judgment and exoneration of the bond was required. (Id. at
p. 1494.)
      The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, concluding the trial court
properly entered summary judgment after the forfeiture because the
provision of section 1305 that applied to the situation where the defendant is
arrested in another county, subdivision (c)(3), did not mandate the court to
act on its own motion. Thus, in order to obtain exoneration of the forfeiture,




                                       11
the surety was required to make a motion.3 Because it had failed to do so,
the summary judgment was proper. Accredited Surety, which stated (as
North River asserts), that the defendant “did not appear in court until after
the exoneration period expired,” is not relevant to the case at bar.
      In sum, we reject North River’s assertion that the trial court erred by
exonerating the forfeiture on July 18, 2024, and conditioning the exoneration
on the payment of extradition costs. For this reason, we have no reason to
reach North River’s assertion that the court’s subsequent order requiring
payment of extradition costs was void because the court lost jurisdiction over
the exonerated bond by operation of law thereafter.
                                       III
   The Costs of Extradition Were Properly Awarded Under Section 1306(b)
      As discussed, North River, relying on Bail Hotline, asserts that the
court erred by awarding the costs of extradition because Bramlett was in
custody at the time he was extradited. This argument is without merit. In
Bail Hotline, the defendant was taken into custody in Las Vegas, Nevada,
and extradited to San Diego. The appellate division of the superior court held
that the People’s extradition costs were not recoverable because the
defendant was in custody in Las Vegas when he was extradited.
      The division inexplicably based its decision on section 1305,
subdivision (f), which states: “In all cases where a defendant is in custody


3     The provision applicable here, section 1305, subdivision (c)(1), “is
worded different[ly]” than subdivision (c)(3) and requires the trial court “to
vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond if the stated conditions are met”
and “provide[s] that if the trial court fails to do so, the forfeiture is vacated
and the bond exonerated by operation of law.” (Accredited Surety, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 1500.)

                                       12
beyond the jurisdiction of the court that ordered the bail forfeited, and the
prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the
location of the defendant, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate
the bond on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in
similar situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release.” (Bail
Hotline, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at Supp. 15.) The court held that because “[a]
return to ‘custody’ is clearly not synonymous with ‘extradition’ as both terms
are used separately in subdivision (f) of … section 1305 and ‘custody’
expressly relates to ‘custody beyond the jurisdiction,’ ” that the People were
not entitled to reimbursement for their costs of extradition. (Ibid.) This

holding is not supported by the statute and is wrong.4




4      Bail Hotline seemed to rely on People v. Ranger (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th
1302 (Ranger I). Ranger I, however, did not concern the costs of extradition.
Rather, the defendant in that case was returned to custody unbeknownst to
the bail bond agent and surety after the bond was forfeited. Because the
defendant’s sentencing hearing was postponed for failure to appear, the trial
court conditioned exoneration of the bond on the surety’s payment of the costs
of housing the defendant for the period between the original and postponed
sentencing hearings. When the surety failed to pay the costs, the trial court
entered summary judgment on the forfeiture and the surety appealed. The
Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment, holding both that (1) the
trial court failed to adhere to the notice requirements for the forfeiture; and
(2) the costs of housing the defendant were not properly awarded because
section 1306, subdivision (b) allows recovery for the costs of returning the
defendant to custody in the county in which the defendant faces charges. (Id.
at pp. 1305–1306.) The court correctly held that section 1306, subdivision (b),
provided no authority for the trial court to award the costs of housing the
defendant where she faced charges after she was taken into custody there.
(Id. at pp. 1308–1309.) Nothing in Ranger I supported the appellate
division’s decision in Bail Hotline to deny the People’s request for an award of
extradition costs.

                                       13
      As the People note, section 1305, subdivision (f) does not apply when
the district attorney elects to extradite the defendant. Rather, that provision
governs exoneration of the bond if the officials elect not to extradite the
fugitive defendant. In that case, the court must “vacate the forfeiture and
exonerate the bond on terms that are just.” (§ 1305, subd. (f).) Here, as
discussed, the exoneration of the bond is governed by section 1305,
subdivision (c)(1). Under that provision, the trial court properly exonerated
the bond after Bramlett was extradited to San Diego County and thereafter
awarded the costs of the extradition to the People in accordance with
section 1306, subdivision (b).
      Further, and contrary to North River’s assertion, the bail agent here
did not surrender Bramlett to custody in Texas. Rather, North River’s agent
notified the district attorney that Bramlett was located in the Texas jail and
inquired whether the district attorney would elect to extradite Bramlett,
which would trigger exoneration under section 1305, subdivision (f). In these
circumstances, where the People elected to extradite the defendant, the court
properly awarded the People their costs of extradition under the authority of

section 1306, subdivision (b).5
                                       IV
               The Bond Was Not Exonerated By Section 1306(c)
      North River’s final argument is that the bond was “exonerated under
[section] 1306[, subdivision] (c) because no summary judgment was ever


5      North River also asserts that the Fifth District’s decision in North
River, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 797 is not applicable because the bail agent in
that case “did not prompt the fugitive defendant’s extradition pursuant to
[section] 1305[, subdivision] (f).” In North River, the trial court ordered
payment of extradition costs for the defendant, who was returned from
Washington state to California, including the salary and benefits of the law
                                       14
entered for the unpaid extradition costs. The People respond that this
provision does not require summary judgment on an award of extradition
costs.
         North River’s argument lacks merit. Section 1306, subdivision (c),
provides: “If, because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the
duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not
entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the
right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.” Here, the court was not
required to enter summary judgment before North River appealed the order
denying its motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bond, and granting
the district attorney’s motion for costs of extradition. For this reason, the
provision is inapplicable on its face and did not operate to exonerate the bond
entirely.
         As the People point out, the extradition costs order is not a forfeiture of
the bond. In this case, the forfeiture was exonerated on July 18, 2024,
conditioned on payment of extradition costs and, on November 22, 2024, the


enforcement officers for their time to travel to extradite the defendant. The
surety argued on appeal that those costs were not recoverable (and also that
the county was not eligible for an award of extradition costs, only “the
People”). (Id. at p. 801.) The Fifth District disagreed, holding the costs of
extradition recoverable under section 1306, subdivision (b), included “the
wages of the officers,” which “directly relate[d] to costs County incurred to
extradite defendant.” (Id. at p. 808.) The court explained that “[i]n order to
extradite defendant, County lost the use of the officers to their regular law
enforcement duties. However, County was still required to pay those officers
and facilitate their absence. The payment of wages and benefits of the
officers is a cost directly related to extraditing defendant that it would not
have incurred had appellants returned defendant to custody.” (Id. at
pp. 808–809.) North River, if anything, supports affirmance of the award of
extradition costs in this case.

                                          15
court ordered payment of those costs by North River. Section 1306,
subdivision (c), thus did not mandate the imposition of summary judgment
based on the court’s failure to perform a duty required under section 1306.
Accordingly, the provision has no application in this situation and does not
operate to exonerate a forfeiture or eliminate North River’s obligation to
comply with the cost award.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. The People shall recover costs on appeal.



                                                           MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:


DATO, J.


CASTILLO, J.




                                      16