Bobo v. Appellate Division of Super. Ct.

Filed 4/22/26
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                   DIVISION ONE

                            STATE OF CALIFORNIA



 AIMEE BOBO,                              D087393

         Petitioner,

         v.                               (San Diego County
                                          Super. Ct. No. M298511;
 APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE                Appellate Division No.
 SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN                    25MW000137C)
 DIEGO COUNTY,

         Respondent;

 THE PEOPLE,

         Real Party in Interest.


       ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate challenging a judgment of the
Appellate Division of Superior Court of San Diego County, Presiding Judge
Albert T. Harutunian III and Judges Frank L. Birchak and Maryann
D’Addezio. Petition granted.
       Jo E. Super, Chief Deputy Public Defender and Ryan M. Ahern, Deputy
Public Defender, for Petitioner.
       No appearance for Respondent.
      Heather Ferbert, City Attorney, Paige E. Folkman and Karen S. Li,
Assistant City Attorneys, and Michael E. Cosgrove, Deputy City Attorney, for
Real Party in Interest.
      Aimee Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter

(Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (c)(2)) after running a red light, colliding with
another vehicle, and killing the other driver, Mary Donato. Before trial, she
requested misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95. The trial court
found Bobo eligible for misdemeanor diversion but not suitable on the ground
that her negligent conduct caused the death of another person. Bobo filed a
petition for writ of mandate in the appellate division of superior court. The
appellate division summarily denied the petition. She then filed another
petition for writ of mandate in this court challenging the appellate division’s
ruling. After requesting an informal response from the People, we issued an
order to show cause.
      We now conclude Bobo is entitled to relief. A defendant charged with
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter is eligible for misdemeanor diversion
because it is not one of the excluded offenses specifically listed in the statute.
(§ 1001.95, subd. (e).) This offense necessarily requires criminally negligent
conduct resulting in the death of another person. By relying solely on facts
inherent in the qualifying offense and failing to connect them to the
underlying purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, the trial court
abused its discretion in deciding Bobo was not suitable for diversion. On this
record, Bobo has also demonstrated the absence of an adequate legal remedy
and irreparable harm if relief were denied. We will therefore issue a writ of
mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order summarily
denying Bobo’s petition for writ of mandate and issue a new order (1) issuing


1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                        2
a peremptory writ in the first instance, and (2) directing the superior court to
vacate its order denying misdemeanor diversion and reconsider Bobo’s
suitability in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      We take the facts from the allegations of the petition and return and
the exhibits attached to both. These facts are essentially undisputed because
neither party has contested the factual allegations of the other.
      On the evening of November 11, 2024, Bobo was driving a Ford F-450
truck southbound on Kearny Villa Road approaching the signal-controlled
intersection with an off-ramp from Route 163. A few seconds after Bobo’s
light turned red, she went through the intersection. Bobo’s vehicle struck the
driver’s side of a Toyota Highlander that was turning left on a green light
from the off-ramp onto northbound Kearny Villa Road. The speed limit on
Kearny Villa Road at the intersection was 50 miles per hour. Bobo and other
witnesses later estimated she was going 55 to 60 miles per hour, but one
witness estimated she was traveling up to 80 miles per hour. The impact
from the collision killed Donato, the driver of the Toyota. Bobo’s truck struck
a light pole and stopped.
      Bobo appeared to be in shock at the scene. She told law enforcement
she thought she had the green light but seemed unsure. Police saw no signs
of intoxication. Bobo was 50 years old and had never been arrested or
charged with a criminal offense.
      Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. (Pen.
Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2).) She was arraigned in May 2025 and released on
her own recognizance with an order not to drive.
      Before trial, Bobo filed an “invitation” for the court to grant
misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95, with multiple supporting


                                        3
character references and attached family photos. She argued she was eligible
for diversion because the charged crime was not one of the specifically
excluded offenses. Her diversion request provided a lengthy background of
her upbringing as an adopted child in San Diego, education, employment
history, community ties, relationship with her adoptive parents, history as a
single mother, relationship with her daughter and grandson, and service as a
caretaker for 19 years after her mother was diagnosed with cancer.
      The supporting character references described Bobo as a kind, caring,
selfless, honest, generous, reliable, and compassionate person. One long-time
friend reported that after the accident, Bobo called her “devastated and
sobbing that she couldn’t live with herself.” According to the friend, the
accident “weighed heavily” on Bobo, she sought counseling, and she “has
never stopped grieving that moment.” Another friend similarly reported that
the accident “ha[d] deeply affected [Bobo], as she is someone who would never
intentionally hurt anyone.”
      Bobo requested diversion for a period of 18 months on the following
conditions: (1) she complete an in-person traffic course; (2) she complete 150
hours of volunteer service; (3) she write a letter to the victim’s family;
(4) payment of restitution be reserved; (5) she remain law-abiding and “not
pick up any new criminal cases”; and (6) any other terms the court deemed
appropriate.
      The People opposed the diversion request. They asserted the
“circumstances of this offense as well as Mrs. Donato’s family’s strong
opposition to diversion” supported denial. The People argued the court
should weigh the “societal interests in prosecuting this conduct, protection of
the public, and the wishes of Mrs. Donato’s family.” The People asserted:
“While no outcome in this case would truly be fair to them, the most just


                                        4
outcome would be for the family to hear [Bobo] say the most powerful words
family could hear in a case like this: guilty. To grant diversion would be to
take that necessary closure away from the family. . . . [¶] Diversion does not
adequately address [Bobo]’s conduct and the loss of life in this case. [Bobo]’s
conduct demands accountability by way of a conviction.”
      The People submitted letters from two of Donato’s family members
describing the devastating impact of her death, opposing Bobo’s request for
diversion, and expressing the view that Bobo should not be able to get away
with only community service. The letters described Donato as a 66-year-old
grandmother and mother of two adult children, including a son with autism
who experienced deep confusion and pain from her death. Donato
immigrated from the Philippines and was the anchor of her family. She and
her husband lived frugally, but she supported extended family members
financially and emotionally, including putting some through college. She was
active in her local church and community, compassionate, and generous to
others. She was deeply loved and her family suffered tremendously from her
death.
      The court held a hearing on the request for diversion. After an
unreported discussion in chambers, the court ruled that Bobo “was not
suitable for diversion, although she is eligible[,] given the severe
consequences that resulted from her decision to . . . run a red light,
which resulted in Ms. Donato[’s] death.” However, the court modified the
driving restriction to permit Bobo to drive for employment purposes and to

attend medical appointments and religious services.2
      The defense requested reconsideration of the court’s ruling. At another
hearing on this request, the prosecutor acknowledged that Bobo “is


2     For the two hearings at issue, Bobo has submitted transcripts with
                                        5
dependable at work,” “has good standing in the community,” “helps provide
for her family,” has “upstanding character,” and “goes above and beyond [for]
her family.” But the prosecutor argued: “It is still true that . . . she ran a red
light in a . . . truck, and because she did that, crashed into the victim Mary
Donato, and killed her. . . . If diversion is granted in this case, it takes away
from the most powerful words a family of a victim in these situations could
hear, and that’s the words guilty. And that is why it is not in the interest of
justice to grant diversion in this case.”
      The court denied the request for reconsideration as follows: “We all
recognize that it seems uncontroverted, that Ms. Bobo has overcome a
number of . . . very difficult challenges in her life. She’s shown her resilience,
she’s shown her concern and care for other people, which are all very
commendable attributes. . . . Ms. Bobo has a very wide group of supporters,
community supporters, people who are grateful to her, people who admire
her, and have only good things to say about Ms. Bobo, and the court certainly
takes that into consideration. [¶] However, because of the alleged negligence
of Ms. Bobo . . . , in November of 2024, another member of our community, a
beloved family member, lost her life . . . . [T]he court must consider the
consequences of Ms. Bobo’s actions, and as I found when I first considered
Ms. Bobo’s invitation to make a judicial diversion, the court again finds that


declarations stating that they are true and correct transcriptions of the court
proceedings. Her petition and the minute orders indicate the proceedings
were recorded electronically. The People have not objected to the transcripts.
In the absence of any objection, we will consider these declarations and
transcripts under rule 8.486(b)(3)(A) of the California Rules of Court. (See
also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.864(a)(1) [permitting transcript of official
electronic recording in misdemeanor appeals]; 8.868(b) [governing transcripts
from official electronic recordings]; 8.931(b)(1)(D) & 8.932(a) [permitting
transcript of electronic recording for misdemeanor writs in appellate
division].)
                                            6
Ms. Bobo is not suitable for judicial diversion given the severe consequences
of her actions, the . . . loss of human life. . . . Ms. Bobo is charged with
vehicular manslaughter, which is [a] charge of negligence. I understand that,
and it’s charged as a misdemeanor, but the court also must consider that
Ms. Donato is no longer walking the face of the Earth with us because, and
solely because, of Ms. Bobo’s actions. So for those reasons, the court must
again [decline] the [invitation] to admittance over to judicial diversion.”
      Bobo filed a petition for writ of mandate in the appellate division of
superior court challenging the court’s denial of misdemeanor diversion. The
appellate division summarily denied the petition as follows: “A sufficient
basis for a writ of mandate, which is discretionary, has not been shown and is
therefore DENIED.”
      Bobo then filed another petition for writ of mandate in this court
challenging the appellate division’s denial of writ relief. The petition
requests that we direct the appellate division to vacate its summary denial
and issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the superior court to either
place Bobo on diversion or reconsider whether she is a suitable candidate for
diversion. After requesting and receiving an informal response from the
People, we issued an order to show cause.
                                  DISCUSSION
                                         I
                               Standard of Review
      Bobo’s petition for writ of mandate in this court challenges the
appellate division’s denial of her petition for writ of mandate below. The
appellate division’s denial of writ relief is not appealable but is subject to
discretionary review by way of a petition for writ of mandate in this court.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 904.3 [“An appeal shall not be taken from a judgment of


                                         7
the appellate division of a superior court granting or denying a petition for
issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition directed to the superior court,
or a judge thereof, in a limited civil case or a misdemeanor or infraction case.
An appellate court may, in its discretion, upon petition for extraordinary
writ, review the judgment.”].)
       We review the appellate division’s denial of writ relief for abuse of
discretion. (Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 246; Dews v.
Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 660, 664, 669.) However, we
independently review its rulings on issues of law. (See, e.g., Tan v. Appellate
Division of Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130, 136 [statutory
interpretation]; Wolf v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 699, 702 [right to appointment of counsel based on undisputed
facts].)
       “The appellate division of the superior court has original jurisdiction in
proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari,
and prohibition directed to the superior court in causes subject to its
appellate jurisdiction.” (Cal. Const., art. 6, § 10.) The causes subject to its
appellate jurisdiction are misdemeanors, infractions, and limited civil cases.
(Pen. Code, § 1466; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.2.) In these categories of cases, the
appellate division has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandate directed to the
superior court as an “inferior tribunal.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (b).)
       A writ of mandate must be issued to correct a lower court’s error when
“there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of
law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086) and the petitioner will suffer irreparable injury
if relief is not granted. (Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center v. Superior Court
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 288, 299–300.) These requirements are interrelated
because irreparable injury in this context refers to harm or prejudice “that


                                        8
cannot be corrected on appeal” from the final judgment. (Omaha Indemnity
Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1274.) If the error and
resulting injury can be corrected on appeal from the final judgment, this is
usually an adequate remedy. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior
Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 912–913.) But “various factors, such as expense
of proceeding with a trial and prejudice resulting from delay, may operate to
make that remedy inadequate.” (Phelan v. Superior Court of San Francisco
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370.)
      “Although appellate review by extraordinary writ petition is said to be
discretionary, a court must exercise its discretion ‘within reasonable bounds
and for a proper reason.’ ” (Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85,
113.) “The discretionary aspect of writ review comes into play primarily
when the petitioner has another remedy by appeal and the issue is whether
the alternative remedy is adequate.” (Ibid.) “But if the court finds no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the court
‘must’ issue the writ.” (Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 433, 453
(Eshagian).)
      In a petition for writ of mandate filed in the Court of Appeal under
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.3 challenging the appellate division’s
denial of a petition for writ of mandate, the petition and any relief granted by
the Court of Appeal should be directed to the appellate division rather than
the trial court. (Kuhnel v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa County (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 174, 179, fn. 2 & 184.)
                                       II
  The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying Misdemeanor Diversion
      Bobo argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying
misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95. If we were to conclude that


                                       9
the trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion, it would necessarily
follow that the appellate division’s summary denial of writ relief would not
be either. A reviewing court does not abuse its discretion by denying
extraordinary relief when no error was committed by the lower court. We
therefore begin by considering whether the trial court abused its discretion
by declining Bobo’s invitation to grant misdemeanor diversion.
A.    Statutory Background
      Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted a new form of
misdemeanor pretrial diversion by adding sections 1001.95 to 1001.97 to the
Penal Code. Section 1001.95, subdivision (a) provides: “A judge in the
superior court in which a misdemeanor is being prosecuted may, at the
judge’s discretion, and over the objection of a prosecuting attorney, offer
diversion to a defendant pursuant to these provisions.” Subdivision (b)
states: “A judge may continue a diverted case for a period not to exceed 24
months and order the defendant to comply with terms, conditions, or
programs that the judge deems appropriate based on the defendant’s specific
situation.”
      The statute specifies several charged offenses that are categorically
excluded from the diversion program: registrable sex offenses (Pen. Code,
§ 290), certain domestic violence offenses (Pen. Code, § 13700; Fam. Code,
§ 6211) and stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9). (Pen. Code, § 1001.95, subd. (e).)
Misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2)) is not
one of the excluded offenses.
      A defendant who is diverted under this program must complete all
conditions ordered by the court, make full restitution unless indigent, and
comply with any protective order, stay-away order, or order prohibiting
firearm possession. (§ 1001.96.) “If the defendant has complied with the


                                       10
imposed terms and conditions, at the end of the period of diversion, the judge
shall dismiss the action against the defendant.” (§ 1001.95, subd. (c).) If the
defendant does not comply, the court may “end the diversion and order
resumption of the criminal proceedings.” (Id., subd. (d).)
      “Upon successful completion of the terms, conditions, or programs
ordered by the court pursuant to Section 1001.95, the arrest upon which
diversion was imposed shall be deemed to have never occurred. The
defendant may indicate in response to any question concerning their prior
criminal record that they were not arrested. A record pertaining to an arrest
for successful completion of the terms, conditions, or programs ordered by the
court shall not, without the defendant’s consent, be used in any way that
could result in a denial of any employment, benefit, license, or certificate.”
(§ 1001.97, subd. (a).) However, an exception to this provision requires
disclosure of the arrest in response to a direct question in an application for a
position as a peace officer. (Id., subd. (b).)
      “The Legislature’s purpose in enacting section 1001.95 was to treat,
restore, and rehabilitate. A Senate Floor Analysis makes this point.
‘Diversion programs that are successfully completed allow a person to avoid
the lifelong collateral consequences associated with a criminal record when
they are seeking employment or housing. Diversion programs typically
require individuals to fulfill strict requirements, including participating in a
rehabilitation program. This proactive approach has shown to yield better
recidivism rates than merely prosecuting and jailing an individual.’ ” (Grassi
v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 283, 292, fn. 4 (Grassi) [quoting Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 3234 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 24, 2020, p. 2 (Sen. floor
analysis)].)


                                         11
      The Assembly third reading analysis of the bill quoted a proponent’s
argument in favor as follows: “ ‘Incarceration and prosecution are intensely
traumatic and damaging processes that harm individuals, families and
communities, and often increase recidivism and exacerbate the underlying
causes of crime. Judge-granted diversion is a tool that can reduce the direct
and collateral consequences of mass incarceration and prosecution and
promote racial justice in our criminal legal system. AB 3234 also decreases
the taxpayer cost of traditional criminal case proceedings, while increasing
accountability through rigorous rehabilitative programming, encouraging
familial relationships and growth by avoiding familial separation that occurs
with incarceration, and making us all safer by reducing recidivism.’ ”
(Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3234 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
as amended Aug. 3, 2020, p. 4 (Assem. 3d reading analysis).)
      Before this new law went into effect in 2021, misdemeanor diversion
could only be granted with the approval of the prosecution. (§ 1001.2, subd.
(b).) The Legislature intended to eliminate this approval requirement. As
explained in the Assembly third reading analysis: “This bill would create a
court-initiated misdemeanor diversion program. A superior court judge
would be authorized to divert a misdemeanor defendant over the objection of
the prosecution. . . . Whether or not to divert a misdemeanor defendant
would be in the trial court’s discretion. However, judicial discretion is not
without limits. ‘[A]ll exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in
reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to
the particular matter at issue.’ ” (Assem. 3d reading analysis, supra, at p. 3.)
B.    Standard of Review for Denial of Misdemeanor Diversion
      A trial court’s denial of pretrial diversion is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 708 (Wade).)


                                       12
“It is commonly said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it ‘ “exceeds
the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered” ’
[citation] or its decision is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.’ [Citation.] But judicial discretion must also be
‘ “guided and controlled by fixed legal principles, to be exercised in conformity
with the spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or
defeat the ends of substantial justice.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 708–709.) “Where the
source of discretion is statutory, we measure the trial court’s exercise of
judicial discretion ‘against the general rules of law and . . . against the
specific law that grants the discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 709.)
      In determining suitability for pretrial diversion, the trial court’s
exercise of discretion “must be informed by the legal principles and purpose of
the statute guiding the court’s actions.” (Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
p. 710.) Even when the diversion statute contains no specific criteria for
determining suitability, this “does not alter the fundamental duty to exercise
discretion consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.”
(Ibid.) The court’s discretion must be guided by “the underlying purposes” of
the statute and “an understanding of the findings that prompted the
Legislature to create the diversion program.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 895–896 (Sarmiento); see also People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 886–892 (Qualkinbush) [trial court
abused its discretion by relying on general sentencing objectives and failing
to consider primary purposes of diversion statute in denying motion for
diversion].)
C.    Analysis of Trial Court’s Denial of Misdemeanor Diversion
      Bobo argues that the trial court abused its discretion by relying solely
on the circumstances of the offense to deny diversion, rather than analyzing


                                        13
her suitability for treatment and rehabilitation. She contends the trial
court’s ruling was antithetical to the Legislature’s purpose in making
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter a qualifying offense for misdemeanor
diversion. We agree the trial court abused its discretion by relying solely on
facts inherent in Bobo’s commission of the charged offense without connecting
them to the underlying principles and purpose of the misdemeanor diversion
statute.
      In Wade, the court decided a similar issue under a pretrial diversion
statute for military defendants (§ 1001.80). The trial court there denied a
pretrial diversion request made by a military defendant with no criminal
record who was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence
(DUI). The trial court explained its ruling as follows: “ ‘[L]ook[ing] at the
nature of the charge, . . . driving under the influence while impaired is an
inherently dangerous type of offense, especially when we’re talking about
blood alcohols that are double the legal limit. . . . [T]his was a .16. The
driving was bad driving in this particular case . . . . Also the fact that the
defendant was not a passive participant . . . . He decided to drink alcohol and
decided to drive a motor vehicle. So that being said, in this particular case,
the Court believes that public safety would dictate that this particular case
not come within [section] 1001.8[0], respectfully.’ ” (Wade, supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at p. 704, footnote omitted.)
      In granting writ relief, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court’s
denial of diversion based primarily on the nature of the charged offense
conflicted with the Legislature’s express intent to include DUI offenses
within the scope of the diversion statute. (Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 714–718.) “Simply put, the trial court in this case did not have discretion
to deny Wade’s request based on the inherently dangerous nature of driving


                                        14
while intoxicated, because the Legislature implicitly considered the
commonly occurring features of DUI offenses but nevertheless elected to
include them in the statutory program without restriction.” (Id. at p. 717.)
“[T]he court’s discretionary determinations about who is suitable to
participate in pretrial diversion and how to evaluate suitability may not
ignore or contravene the legislative intent to include misdemeanor driving
under the influence offenses within the scope of section 1001.80. Because the
determination that Wade’s case did ‘not come within [section] 1001.8[0]’ was
antithetical to the Legislature’s purposeful inclusion of DUI offenses in the
statute, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Wade’s diversion request on that basis.” (Id. at p. 718.)
      Another court reached a similar conclusion in People v. K.D. (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 1 (K.D.). The defendant in K.D. was charged with kidnapping a
17-month-old child, child abduction, and vehicle theft. (Id. at pp. 8–9, 20.)
The trial court denied her pretrial request for developmental disability
diversion under section 1001.21 et seq. (K.D., at pp. 10–14.) The court relied
on a variety of factors, including the serious and violent nature of the charged
offenses and their lasting impact on the victims. (Id. at pp. 26–27.) The trial
court commented, “ ‘I can’t overlook how serious this offense was taking a 17-
month-old child from her mother in her mother’s car and driving away.’ ” (Id.
at p. 20.)
      Following Wade, the Court of Appeal in K.D. concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion by relying on the circumstances of the charged
offenses without connecting them to the basic purposes of the diversion
statute. (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 26–27.) The court explained:
“As the People concede, and similar to Wade, the record shows that the
court’s consideration of the charged offenses was not an exercise of informed


                                       15
discretion because there is no basis on which to infer that the court
considered the charged crimes as they relate to the only relevant question the
court had to assess after determining that defendant was eligible and would
not present an unreasonable risk to public safety: whether, in light of the
purposes of the disability diversion scheme, defendant would benefit from
diversion-related treatment. Although we recognize the serious and
frightening nature of the crimes in this case, the trial court erred in denying
diversion on that basis without linking the facts of the charged offenses to the
fundamental question of whether defendant would benefit from diversion.”
(Id. at p. 27; see also Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 885, 890–892
[court abused its discretion in denying mental health diversion based on use
of force in charged crimes and general sentencing objectives without
considering primary purpose of mental health diversion statute].)
      Although these cases did not involve misdemeanor diversion, their
reasoning applies here as well. In denying diversion, the trial court relied
solely on the fact that Bobo’s negligent conduct caused the death of another
person. But the death of another person is a necessary element of the
charged crime of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. Any form of
manslaughter requires “the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice.” (§ 192.) Criminal negligence is also a required element of all forms
of involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998,
1006–1008.) Criminal negligence proximately causing another person’s death
is therefore inherent in the commission of misdemeanor vehicular
manslaughter. Yet the Legislature decided not to make misdemeanor
vehicular manslaughter one of the specifically excluded offenses listed in
section 1001.95, subdivision (e). As in Wade, the trial court’s determination
that Bobo was not suitable for diversion based solely on facts inherent in the


                                       16
commission of the charged crime is at odds with the Legislature’s intent to
include misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter within the scope of the
diversion statute. (Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 714–718.)
      The trial court also failed to link the facts of the charged offense to the
aims of the statute. (K.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 27.) The court made
no connection between the victim’s death from Bobo’s negligent driving and
the goals of the misdemeanor diversion statute: to treat, restore, and
rehabilitate the defendant; prevent the trauma, family harm, and other
collateral consequences of a criminal prosecution, conviction, and
incarceration; achieve lower recidivism rates; promote racial justice; and
decrease the cost of traditional criminal proceedings while increasing
accountability through rehabilitative programming. (Grassi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 292, fn. 4; Sen. floor analysis, supra, at p. 2; Assem. 3d
reading analysis, supra, at p. 4.) The trial court therefore abused its
discretion by denying diversion based solely on facts inherent in the charged
crime without connecting those circumstances to the purposes of the statute.
(K.D., at p. 27.)
      The People offer an alternative reason why we should conclude the trial
court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Specifically, they contend it
was proper for the court to rely on the Donato family’s opposition to
diversion. Although the trial court did not cite this as a reason for denying
diversion, the People argued it below and we will assume without deciding
that the court did rely on it. The People contend it was proper to rely on the
family’s opposition to diversion because crime victims have “a constitutional
right to finality of the criminal case and to have the person convicted of the




                                       17
crime sufficiently punished” under article I, section 28, subdivisions (a)(5)

and (a)(6) of the California Constitution.3
      While we sympathize with the views of the Donato family, we reject the
People’s contention as a legal matter. Article I, section 28, subdivision (a)(3)
of the California Constitution guarantees to crime victims certain “personally
held and enforceable rights described in paragraphs (1) through (17) of
subdivision (b).” (Italics added.) In contrast to the enforceable rights listed
in subdivision (b), the more general provisions of subdivision (a) cited and
relied on by the People do not create any enforceable rights. The findings and
declarations in subdivision (a) “represent only a general statement of a
problem identified by [the] Legislature, and the goal the Legislature hoped to
achieve,” not an independent source of enforceable rights. (People v. Superior
Court (Johnson) (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 950, 956; accord People v. Lombardo
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 553, 563; People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1072–1073.) The People do not cite or invoke any of the enforceable rights
listed in subdivision (b).
      We agree that in deciding whether to grant diversion, the court should
consider the victims’ views to the extent they are in harmony with the
provisions and purposes of the applicable diversion statute. But nothing in
the California Constitution allows a court to give weight to the preferences of


3      Article I, section 28, subdivision (a)(5) provides in relevant part:
“Victims of crime have a collectively shared right to expect that persons
convicted of committing criminal acts are sufficiently punished in both the
manner and the length of the sentences imposed by the courts of the State of
California.” Subdivision (a)(6) says in relevant part: “Victims of crime are
entitled to finality in their criminal cases.” As used in section 28, the term
“victim” includes both the direct victim and “the person’s spouse, parents,
children, siblings, or guardian, and includes a lawful representative of a
crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically or psychologically
incapacitated.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (e).)
                                       18
crime victims when they clash with the legislative policy of the diversion law
the court is bound to apply.
      Specifically, it would not have been proper for the court to deny
diversion based on the prosecutor’s argument that the victim’s family would
otherwise never hear “the most powerful words family could hear in a case
like this: guilty.” The whole purpose of the misdemeanor diversion statute is
to provide an alternative resolution that avoids prosecution, conviction, and a
potential jail sentence. (Grassi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 292, fn. 4.) It is
always true that successful completion of a misdemeanor diversion program
will result in a dismissal of the charges and no proclamation of guilt in court.
(§ 1001.95, subd. (c).) But that is the scheme our Legislature has chosen as a
matter of policy. Courts are bound to honor this choice. Although Donato’s
family members understandably prefer a guilty plea or verdict and a criminal
sentence, their preferences do not override the controlling legislative policy.
The court’s discretion must instead be guided “by an appreciation for the
crucial role of the Legislature in setting criminal justice policy.” (Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) We therefore conclude it would have been
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny diversion based on the
preferences of the victim’s family for criminal prosecution and a guilty plea or
verdict.
                                       III
             Bobo Demonstrated Entitlement to Mandamus Relief
      The People also argue that writ relief is not warranted because Bobo
has an adequate remedy at law by way of “an appeal after conviction.” “Our
issuance of the order to show cause operates as a conclusive finding that any
remedy by way of eventual appeal is not adequate here.” (State of California
v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London)


                                       19
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1023, fn. 3.) “Accordingly, we [need] not revisit
the issue.” (Ibid.; see also Ingram v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d
483, 489–490 [same].) We will nevertheless explain why we have concluded
that an appeal after conviction is not an adequate remedy in the context
before us.
      We are guided by the court’s decision in Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671 (Gomez), which involved a petition for writ of mandate
challenging an order denying pretrial mental health diversion (§ 1001.36).
Vacating the order, the Court of Appeal explained why mandamus review
was appropriate. (Gomez, at pp. 686–687.) The court said: “Pretrial
diversion allows for postponement of prosecution to allow the defendant to
undergo mental health treatment and dismissal of the criminal charges if the
defendant performs satisfactorily in diversion. . . . [¶] Requiring Gomez to
wait until resolution of an appeal following her potential conviction to correct
the trial court’s alleged abuse of discretion would be contrary to the purposes
of section 1001.36 and preclude Gomez from receiving the timely mental
health treatment intended by the Legislature. It could further entail a waste
of time and funds through trial should she perform satisfactorily in diversion.
Accordingly, in light of the statutory aims of the diversion statute and the
potential prejudice Gomez may suffer in the absence of a prompt resolution of
her claim, we conclude mandamus review is appropriate.” (Id. at p. 687.)
      Similar reasoning applies here. Although the misdemeanor diversion
statute does not necessarily require any specific form of treatment, its
structure and purpose are similar to other forms of pretrial diversion. It
effectively suspends the criminal proceedings and offers the defendant an
opportunity to fulfill suitable conditions for rehabilitation and accountability
as an alternative to criminal prosecution, conviction, and sentence. These


                                       20
conditions may include treatment, counseling, therapy, classes, community
service, or any other “terms, conditions, or programs that the judge deems
appropriate based on the defendant’s specific situation.” (§ 1001.95, subd.
(b).) As noted, successful completion of a diversion program results in
dismissal of the charges. (Id., subd. (c).)
      Under the circumstances before us, requiring Bobo to wait until an
appeal from a final judgment of conviction to challenge the erroneous order
denying pretrial diversion would deprive her of the intended benefits of the
misdemeanor diversion statute by forcing her to undergo criminal
prosecution and a possible conviction and jail sentence, with the associated
trauma and other collateral consequences the diversion law was designed to
prevent. (See Grassi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 292, fn. 4; Sen. floor
analysis, supra, at p. 2; Assem. 3d reading analysis, supra, at p. 4.) Bobo also
would not receive the immediate benefits of a diversion program as the
statute contemplates. Moreover, time and resources would be consumed
conducting trial and sentencing proceedings, followed by an appeal, all of
which would be avoided through successful diversion. (Gomez, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 687.) Because an eventual reversal on appeal could not
undo much of the harm caused by the erroneous denial of pretrial diversion,
we conclude Bobo has demonstrated the absence of an adequate remedy by

way of appeal.4 There being “no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in


4      We assume without deciding that Bobo would be permitted to appeal
the diversion ruling even if she were to plead guilty to the charge. Although
a misdemeanor defendant need not obtain a certificate of probable cause to
appeal after a guilty plea, as does a defendant convicted of a felony (§ 1237.5),
such misdemeanor appeals are “similarly restricted to those that raise
‘reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the
legality of the proceedings.’ ” (People v. Egbert (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 503,
508–509 [quoting § 1237.5].) We have discovered no authority directly
                                        21
the ordinary course of law, the court ‘must’ issue the writ.” (Eshagian, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.)
      Accordingly, we will issue a writ of mandate directing the appellate
division to vacate its order summarily denying Bobo’s petition for writ of
mandate and enter a new order (1) issuing a peremptory writ in the first
instance, and (2) directing the superior court to vacate its order denying
misdemeanor diversion and reconsider Bobo’s suitability in conformity with
the views expressed in this opinion. (See Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
p. 718 [issuing peremptory writ of mandate directing superior court to vacate
order denying diversion and “exercise its discretion in conformity with the
principles articulated here to decide whether Wade is a suitable candidate
for pretrial diversion, treatment, and rehabilitation”]; see also Qualkinbush,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 895 [remanding for superior court to conduct
another diversion hearing “and exercise its discretion in conformity with the
principles articulated herein”].)
                                    DISPOSITION
      Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent
appellate division to vacate its order summarily denying Bobo’s petition
for writ of mandate and issue a peremptory writ in the first instance
directing the superior court to vacate its order denying misdemeanor
diversion and reconsider Bobo’s suitability in conformity with the views




deciding whether an appeal from a denial of misdemeanor diversion would be
permitted after a guilty plea to a misdemeanor. In the context of felony
appeals, however, one court has ruled that although a wrongful denial of
pretrial diversion is not jurisdictional “in the fundamental sense,” it does
constitute “ ‘other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.’ ” (People
v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 227–228.)
                                        22
expressed in this opinion. The stay of trial court proceedings issued by this
court on January 14, 2026 is hereby vacated.



                                                              BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:


MCCONNELL, P. J.


DATO, J.




                                      23