People v. Mohammed

Filed 4/29/26
                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                             SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


 THE PEOPLE,                                        H052908
                                                   (Santa Clara County
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                  Super. Ct. Nos. C2210384,
                                                    C2100250)
         v.

 SAMI WAYNE MOHAMMED,

         Defendant and Appellant.



       In In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119 (G.C.), the Supreme Court addressed the
unauthorized sentence rule. The Court stated that, while this rule permits courts to
correct unlawful sentences even though they were not timely challenged, “to invoke this
rule the court must have jurisdiction over the judgment.” (Id. at p. 1130.) Since the
Supreme Court made this statement, the clear majority of published decisions considering
the issue have held that trial courts lack inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized
sentences. Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt—G.C. involved appellate
rather than trial court jurisdiction—we see no good reason to depart from the literal
implication of the Supreme Court’s statement and join the majority view in holding that
trial courts lack inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences. Accordingly,
even though the trial court’s initial sentence of defendant Sami Wayne Mohammed
contained unauthorized terms, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
resentence Mohammed and increase his sentence.
       Because the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction, we lack appellate
jurisdiction as well. As it would be manifestly unjust to leave the resentencing order
intact, we treat this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, grant the petition, and
direct the trial court to vacate Mohammed’s October 21, 2024 sentence and enter his
original January 12, 2024 sentence.
                                      I. BACKGROUND
       Because the facts underlying Mohammed’s offenses are not relevant to this appeal,
we omit them and only recount the relevant proceedings. (See, e.g., People v. Mendez
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 347, 351, fn. 2.)
   A. Case No. C2210384
       In the lead case against Mohammed, he was charged with committing 16 offenses
on three separate days.
       1. The August 12, 2022 Offenses
       Mohammed was charged with committing five felonies and two misdemeanors on
August 12, 2022. The four felonies committed on that day were: (1) possession for sale
of a controlled substance (fentanyl) (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11351);
(2) transportation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (fentanyl) (count 2;
Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); (3) possession for sale of a designated substance
(Alprazolam) (count 3; Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(1)); (4) transportation,
sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (count 4; Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and (5) possession for sale of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) (count 5; Health & Saf. Code, § 11378)).
       The two misdemeanors committed on that day were: (1) possession for sale of
cannabis (count 6; Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (b)), and (2) resisting an officer
(count 7; Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)).




                                               2
       2. The July 28, 2022 Offenses
       In the lead case, Mohammed also was charged with committing four felonies on
July 28, 2022: (1) maintaining a place for unlawful activities involving controlled
substances (Oxycodone) (count 8; Health & Saf. Code, § 11366); (2) sale or possession
for sale of designated substances (Alprazolam) (count 9; Health & Saf. Code, § 11375,
subd. (b)(1)); (3) owning, purchasing, receiving, and possession of a firearm by a felon
(count 10; Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and (4) possession of ammunition by a
felon (count 11; Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)).
       3. The August 16, 2022 Offenses
       Finally, in the lead case, Mohammed was charged with committing five
misdemeanors on August 16, 2022: (1) resisting an officer (count 12; Pen. Code, § 148,
subd. (a)(1)); (2) possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl) (count 13; (3) Health &
Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), (3) possession of a designated substance (Alprazolam)
without a prescription (count 14; Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2));
(4) possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (count 15; Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11364, subd. (a)); and (5) possession of a specific controlled substance
(methamphetamine) (count 16; Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)).
       The second amended complaint filed against Mohammed in the lead case also
alleged various aggravating circumstances and sentencing enhancements. Most
important for this appeal, the amended complaint alleged that Mohammed had prior
convictions for two violent or serious felonies. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).)
   B. Case No. C2100250
       In the second case, which was brought before the lead case, Mohammed was
charged with committing five felonies on two separate days.
       1. The January 6, 2021 Offenses
       Mohammed was charged with committing three felonies on January 6, 2021:
(1) possession for sale of a controlled substance (fentanyl) (count 1; Health & Saf. Code,

                                             3
§ 11351); (2) owning, purchasing, receiving, and possession of a firearm by a felon
(count 2; Pen. Code, § 28900, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) possession of ammunition by a felon
(count 3; Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)).
       2. The December 12, 2020 Offenses
       In the second case, Mohammed also was charged with two committing two
felonies on December 12, 2020: (1) possession for sale of a controlled substance
(fentanyl) (count 4; Health & Saf. Code, § 11351); and (2) sale or possession for sale of a
designated substance (Alprazolam) (count 5; Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(1)).
       The amended complaint in the second case also alleged one prior serious or
violent felony conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).)
   C. The Pleas
       Mohammed pleaded no contest to all of the charges against him and admitted that
most of the alleged sentencing enhancements and aggravating circumstances were true—
including the strike priors.
   D. The Initial Sentencing
       Although these pleas subjected Mohammed to more than 34 years in prison, on
January 12, 2024 the trial court sentenced him to a total aggregate term of seven years,
four months.
       1. Case No. C2210384
       In the lead case, the trial court sentenced Mohammed to six years in prison: the
lower term of three years for the August 12, 2020 offense in count 2, doubled under the
Three Strikes law. The trial court either imposed the remaining sentences concurrently—
not only for additional offenses on August 12, 2022, but also for offenses on
July 28, 2022—or stayed them under Penal Code section 654. The court also dismissed
the enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.




                                               4
       2. Case No. C2100250
       In the second case, the court sentenced Mohammed to one year, four months: the
middle term of two years for the January 6, 2021 offense in count 2, doubled under the
Three Strikes law to four years, and then reduced to one-third of that amount, running
consecutively to the term in the first case. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences
on the remaining counts, including those concerning the offenses committed on
December 12, 2020.
       Mohammed did not appeal from these sentences or the judgment against him.
   D. The CDCR Letter and Resentencing
       Mohammed was initially arrested in January 2021, and he accumulated sufficient
credits that, by the time that he was sentenced in January 2024 to seven years and
four months in prison, he was scheduled to complete that term by October 23, 2024.
       Sometime shortly before this date, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter, which is not included in the record on appeal, to the
trial court, the defendant, and the prosecutor stating that Mohammed’s sentence was
unauthorized. In particular, the letter pointed out, the sentence violated the Three Strikes
law by imposing concurrent sentences for the felonies that were committed on
July 28, 2022 and December 12, 2020 and thus on different occasions than the other
offenses.
       On Friday, October 18, 2025, the trial court sent out a notice of resentencing on
October 21, 2025, the following Monday. Although defense counsel protested that he had
not been given sufficient time to prepare, the trial court proceeded with the hearing.
Defense counsel asked the trial court to dismiss under Penal Code section 1385 the
counts whose sentences the CDCR contended must be imposed concurrently. The trial
court denied the request, stating that it was “not granting a Romero [People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497]. The Romero was already denied . . . .” Defense



                                             5
counsel objected that “the circumstances have changed,” but the trial court did not give
defense counsel an opportunity to explain how.
       Instead, the trial court proceeded with the resentencing. In the lead case, the trial
court again sentenced Mohammed to six years on count 2. The court also imposed a
consecutive sentence of one year four months on count 8, one of the offenses committed
on July 28, 2022—the middle term of two years, doubled under the Three Strikes law,
and then reduced to one-third as a subordinate term—in place of the concurrent sentence
previously imposed. The trial court either stayed the remaining counts under Penal Code
section 654 or imposed concurrent sentences on them. As a consequence, the aggregate
term for the lead case increased from six years to seven years, four months.
       In the second case, the trial court once again sentenced Mohammed on count 2 to
one year, four months consecutive to the terms in the lead case. The court also once
again imposed concurrent terms for the two other January 6, 2021 felonies. However, for
count 4, the December 12, 2020 offense for possessing a controlled substance for sale, the
trial court selected the middle term of three years, doubled that sentence under the Three
Strikes law, and, treating it as a subordinate term, reduced the term to two years, to be
served consecutively. The sentence for the final December 12, 2020 offense remained at
32 months, running concurrently. As a result, the aggregate term for the second case
increased to three years, four months, and the overall aggregate increased to 10 years,
eight months.
   E. The Appeal
       Mohammed filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court granted a certificate
of probable cause. After the briefing was concluded, we requested additional briefing on
whether Mohammed remained in custody, and the parties informed us that he did and was
still subject to habeas corpus relief.




                                              6
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       On appeal, Mohammed does not dispute that his original sentence was
unauthorized; instead, he argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to apply the
unauthorized sentence rule and resentence him. As explained below, we agree.
       The Supreme Court repeatedly has said that an unauthorized sentence “is subject
to correction at any time.” (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 127, fn. 22.)
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that an unauthorized sentence may be corrected
even when the legality of the sentence was not challenged in the trial court (ibid; People
v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338) or in either the trial court or the Court of
Appeal (People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13), and, indeed, that a trial
court may correct an unauthorized sentence while the case is on appeal (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044). Moreover, this rule applies where a sentence
is less than authorized. Consequently, “where the court is required to impose a certain
minimum term but imposes a lesser term instead, the unauthorized sentence is considered
invalid or ‘unlawful’ and may be increased even after execution of the sentence has
begun.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 349, fn. 15 (Karaman); see People v.
Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 763-764, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1.)
       Mohammed’s original sentence was unauthorized. Under the Three Strikes law,
where a defendant has a prior serious or violent felony conviction, “[i]f there is a current
conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not
arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant
consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (e).” (Pen. Code, § 667,
subd. (c)(6); see also § 667, subd. (e)(1) [requiring sentences for felony convictions to be
doubled where a defendant has a prior serious or violent felony conviction].) In the lead
case, Mohammed’s August 12, 2022 felonies did not arise from the same set of operative
facts as his July 28, 2022 felonies. And in the second case, Mohammed’s January 6, 2021

                                              7
felonies did not arise from the same set of operative facts as his December 12, 2020
felonies. Consequently, as the CDCR informed the trial court, under the Three Strikes
law, Mohammed could not lawfully have been sentenced to concurrent terms for all his
July 28, 2022 and December 12, 2020 felonies.
       Before the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in G.C., most trial courts would have
resentenced Mohammed under the unauthorized sentence rule without considering
whether they had jurisdiction to do so. However, in G.C., the Supreme Court stated that
the rule does not create an exception to the requirement that the trial court must have
jurisdiction: “An unauthorized sentence ‘ “do[es] not become irremediable when a
judgment of conviction becomes final, even after affirmance on appeal.” ’ [Citations.]
But to invoke this rule the court must have jurisdiction over the judgment.” (G.C., supra,
8 Cal.5th at p 1130, italics omitted).) As the Court of Appeal decision in that case
explained, and the Supreme Court agreed, the unauthorized sentence rule “ ‘is an
exception to the waiver doctrine [citation], not to the jurisdictional requirement of a
timely notice of appeal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1129.) Accordingly, G.C. held that the defendant in
that case could not challenge a juvenile court’s failure to designate charges in a
dispositional order on an appeal from a later, unrelated order. (Id. at pp. 1122-1123.)
       In light of G.C.’s reasoning, People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 633 (King)
held that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate an unauthorized sentence imposed
decades earlier. King began by noting that “[t]he general rule is that ‘once a judgment is
rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.’ ” (Id. at p. 634; see Karaman, supra, 4
Cal.4th at p. 344 (Karaman) [“Under the general common law rule, a trial court is
deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence
has commenced.”].) Moreover, according to G.C., “the ‘unauthorized sentence’ rule is an
exception to the waiver doctrine, not to the requirement that a court must have
jurisdiction before it may act.” (King, at p. 635.) Accordingly, “the unauthorized

                                              8
sentence doctrine . . . does not itself create jurisdiction for the trial court to rule on a
motion challenging the legality of a sentence” (id. at p. 637), and “a defendant who
wishes to challenge a sentence as unlawful after the defendant’s conviction is final and
after the defendant has begun serving the sentence must do more than simply file a
motion in the trial court making an allegation that the sentence is legally infirm.” (Id. at
p. 640.)
       Most subsequent published decisions have agreed with King and held that courts
“ ‘do not have inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences where judgment is
final and execution of sentence has begun.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th
139, 146 (Garcia); see People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 797 (Singleton)
[“[a]lthough Singleton’s 2018 sentence was unauthorized, that does not mean the trial
court in 2023 had jurisdiction to correct the sentencing error”]; People v. Hernandez
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123 (Hernandez) [“trial courts and, for that matter,
appellate courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences where
judgment is final and execution of sentence has begun”]; People v. Boyd (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 56, 66-67 (Boyd) [following King].)
       One published decision expressly disagreed with this line of cases: People v.
Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976 (Codinha). (See also People v. Cervantes (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 825, 830-831, 833 [following Codinha but not considering King and the
cases supporting it].) Codinha held that “[a] trial court that imposes a sentence
unauthorized by law retains jurisdiction (or has inherent power) to correct the sentence at
any time the error comes to its attention . . . .” (Codinha, at p. 990.) Codinha did not
attempt to reconcile this conclusion with G.C.’s statement that the unauthorized sentence
rule is an exception to the waiver doctrine, not the requirement for jurisdiction. Instead,
Codinha noted that the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that “an unauthorized
sentence is subject to correction ‘at any time.’ ” (Id. at p. 988.) It also noted that the
jurisdiction at issue in G.C. “was that of the appellate court” and concluded that “the line

                                                9
of Supreme Court cases recognizing an unauthorized sentence is a void judgment that
may be vacated or corrected whenever it is brought to the trial court’s attention . . .
remains valid.” (Id. at p. 993.)
       Codinha had a point. G.C. did not consider whether trial courts have inherent
jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences, and it did not explicitly reject the prior
Supreme Court decisions suggesting that trial courts may correct unauthorized sentences
at any time. However, as subsequent Court of Appeal decisions have pointed out,
Codinha’s reasoning is subject to a similar objection. “[I]n none of the case that Codinha
cites was jurisdiction based on the unauthorized sentence doctrine.” (Boyd, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 67.) Instead, the doctrine has been applied in direct appeals from
judgments, habeas proceedings and other situations in which courts independently had
jurisdiction to correct unauthorized sentences. (Id. at pp. 67-68; see Singleton, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 796; Hernandez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123.) In addition,
treating the unauthorized sentence rule as conferring inherent jurisdiction on trial courts
to correct sentences is in tension with habeas corpus, which is expressly intended to deal
with illegal sentences, because recognizing such inherent jurisdiction would allow parties
to evade the procedural limitations imposed on habeas corpus petitions. (Boyd, at p. 68;
see Garcia, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 145 [“ ‘habeas corpus relief would be
superfluous if a freestanding trial court motion could at any time achieve the same result
without the procedural limitations that habeas corpus law imposes’ ”]; Hernandez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123 [same].)
       This case highlights another problem with Codinha: The unfairness of using the
unauthorized sentence rule to increase a defendant’s sentence long after the sentence was
issued and the defendant has begun serving it. In this case, after apparently accumulating
a large number of good time and work credits, Mohammed was on the verge of release,
but days before the release, his sentence was increased by more than three years. This is
a harsh, if not cruel, outcome. Far from explaining why the unauthorized sentence rule

                                              10
should be applied in this manner, Codinha recognized that the rule has not been applied
where its application “could produce harsh outcomes” or “ ‘work a serious injustice.’ ”
(Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, fn. 6.) However, whether or not there is
inherent jurisdiction to correct unlawful sentences, unlawfully excessive sentences may
be challenged on habeas corpus, and unauthorized sentences may be challenged within
120 days after sentencing (Pen. Code, § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)) and while an appeal is
pending. As a consequence, it is unclear whether recognizing inherent jurisdiction to
correct unauthorized sentences would have any significant practical consequence.
       In short, we see no good reason to depart from King and the decisions following it.
We recognize that G.C. did not have the question of trial court jurisdiction before it and
that King departs from previous understanding and application of the unauthorized
sentence rule. However, G.C. states without caveat that “to invoke this rule the court
must have jurisdiction over the judgment” (G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1130), and there is
no compelling reason to read into this statement an implicit restriction for trial court
jurisdiction, especially in light of the availability of habeas corpus relief and the potential
unfairness of applying the unauthorized sentence rule long after a defendant has been
sentenced. However, we agree with Codinha that “it would be helpful [for] the lower
courts for the Supreme Court definitively to decide the jurisdictional issue.” (Codinha,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
       Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to increase
Mohammed’s sentence. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, its October 12, 2024
resentencing order is not appealable. (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797-798;
Hernandez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124; King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.)
However, it would be manifestly unjust to leave Mohammed with a sentence imposing
three additional years without jurisdiction. Consequently, we will treat Mohammed’s
appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, grant the petition, and direct the trial



                                              11
court to vacate the December 12, 2024 judgment. (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 799-800.)
       In doing so, we do not mean to question the usefulness of the CDCR’s practice of
reviewing sentences and informing the trial courts where an illegal sentence has been
imposed. This practice is helpful to the courts, defendants, and the People alike, and if
the Department had completed its review while the trial court still had jurisdiction, the
court would have been able to correct the error in Mohammed’s sentence. However, in
this case, the defendant did not appeal his sentence, and it took the Department more than
four months to conduct its review. As a consequence, the Department’s letter was not
received while the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the sentence in this case. We
hope that in the future the CDCR will be able to expedite its review of sentences in cases
such as this one.
                                     III. DISPOSITION
       The appeal from the October 21, 2024 resentencing order is dismissed. However,
we deem the appeal from the order as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and we grant
habeas relief. On remand, we direct the trial court to vacate the December 12, 2024
resentencing and to enter the original sentence imposed on January 12, 2024. The trial
court is also directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a copy of
the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.




                                             12
                                       ____________________________
                                       BROMBERG, J.




I CONCUR:




____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P.J.




People v. Mohammed
H052908
       Danner, J., concurring in the judgment.
       I agree with the majority that the trial court’s October 21, 2024 resentencing order
should be vacated and Mohammed’s original sentence reinstated. Because my reasoning
differs from that of the majority, I respectfully concur in the judgment only.
At the time of his October 2024 resentencing hearing, the unauthorized terms of
Mohammed’s sentence were apparent from the face of the record. I would therefore
conclude that, under current case law, the trial court had the power to correct them. (See
People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990 (Codinha); see also People v.
Cervantes (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 825, 830–831, 833.)
       Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, I would vacate the trial court’s
resentencing order as entered in violation of Mohammed’s due process rights. “After
conviction, a defendant’s due process right to liberty, while diminished, is still present.
He retains an interest in a sentencing proceeding that is fundamentally fair.” (Betterman
v. Montana (2016) 578 U.S. 437, 448; see also People v. Arbee (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d
351, 355.) A defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at
resentencing, a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. (See People v. Velasco (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 663, 673; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508; Pen. Code, §§ 977,
subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)(A), 1043, 1193.) Moreover, a trial court may not exercise its
discretion to proceed with a sentencing hearing in a manner that deprives the defendant or
his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare. (See People v. Snow (2003) 30
Cal.4th 43, 70, 76–77 [addressing the denial of defense continuance requests]; People v.
Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646.)
       Mohammed’s defense counsel received notice on Friday, October 18, 2024, that
the trial court would hold a resentencing hearing for Mohammed three days later. When
the court convened the hearing on October 21, 2024, Mohammed was not physically
present. He instead was in prison and “on the phone, not on Teams.”
Mohammed’s counsel protested that Mohammed “has a right to be here in person or at
least via Teams” and explained that he (counsel) had not had enough time to review the
basis for the sentencing error stated in the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR)’s letter. Mohammed similarly protested his absence from the
hearing, stating: “I need to be there. That’s why I’ve been doing everything I’m
supposed to do to get out.” Mohammed added, “My release date is in two days, two days
before I get out to say my sentence is -- it doesn’t make sense.”
       The trial court stated that it understood Mohammed’s position and explained that
the CDCR’s letter described a failure to impose consecutive sentences as required by the
Three Strikes law. The court also appeared to believe that it was legally required to
correct the sentence, stating “we have to increase the sentence,” and “it’s an illegal
sentence and, therefore, it cannot stand.”
       Mohammed’s counsel asserted that the court “can grant a Romero [People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497] and strike” the prior strikes. The court
rejected that option, stating it had already denied a Romero motion (presumably
referencing its January 2024 ruling).
       After the trial court noted that Mohammed had entered an “open plea” and been
advised of a potential maximum sentence greater than the sentence that would result upon
correction of the Three Strikes sentencing error, the court proceeded to orally pronounce
new sentences in Mohammed’s two cases. 1
       Because the trial court conducted a full resentencing, the court should have
acceded to Mohammed’s request to be personally present. (See People v. Cutting (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347–350.) The court should also have provided Mohammed and his
defense counsel a full and fair opportunity to prepare arguments addressing the court’s

       1 The corresponding clerk’s minute orders state, for each case, that the
“[p]reviously imposed illegal sentence is now set aside.”

                                              2
discretionary sentencing choices, including whether to grant relief under Romero based
on changed circumstances. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v.
Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 258–260; see also People v. Penoli (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 298, 306.) The court’s failure to afford Mohammed these fundamental
protections warrants a vacatur of the resentencing order.
       Mohammed is no longer in CDCR custody and is now on postrelease community
supervision. I therefore conclude that it would be fundamentally unfair to increase
Mohammed’s original sentence, which would likely return him to custody. (See
Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, fn. 6.) Like the majority, I agree that on
remand the trial court should reinstate Mohammed’s original sentence.
       This case illustrates the unfortunate consequences of the ongoing uncertainty over
whether a trial court has the inherent power—or even the obligation—to correct an
unauthorized sentence. Our Supreme Court’s decisions include seemingly conflicting
statements on this point of law. (Compare In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129–1130
[describing the unauthorized sentence rule as an exception to the waiver doctrine that
cannot be invoked absent jurisdiction over the judgment] with People v. Picklesimer
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338 [referencing an “unauthorized sentence, which the trial court
would have had jurisdiction to correct at any time”]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25
Cal.4th 926, 1044–1045 [“Although, as a general rule, ‘an appeal from an order in a
criminal case removes the subject matter of that order from the jurisdiction of the trial
court’ [citation], it is settled that an unauthorized sentence is subject to correction despite
the circumstance that an appeal is pending. Because the trial court was not authorized
simply to waive sentencing on these counts, any error in failing to impose sentence in this
regard would have been subject to judicial correction when it ultimately came to the
attention of the trial court or this court.”].)



                                                  3
Absent further clarification from our Supreme Court, I agree with the Codinha court’s
view that our high court’s decision in G.C. examined a different issue and the relevant
passage of the opinion was dicta that did not clearly disapprove of the high court’s prior
case law acknowledging the existence of jurisdiction. (See Codinha, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
       California’s sentencing laws are complex. Sentencing errors—even obvious
ones—occasionally occur. When CDCR discovers such an error, it informs the superior
court by letter that an illegal sentence has been imposed and should be corrected. And,
for years, superior court judges have duly done so. (See, e.g., People v. Mora (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 397, 398–399; People v. Shabazz (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 468, 474.) Until
our Supreme Court clarifies whether this longstanding practice is itself illegal, superior
courts will continue to receive such letters without clear guidance about what to do.
The transcript of Mohammed’s resentencing hearing conveys the significant stress
experienced by the attorneys, Mohammed, and the trial court itself about the appropriate
course of action following the receipt of CDCR’s letter. I urge the Supreme Court to
clarify whether and under what circumstances trial courts have the authority to correct
criminal sentences whose errors are apparent from the face of the record.




                                             4
                     _____________________________
                           Danner, J.




H052908
People v. Mohammed
Trial Court:                             Santa Clara CountySuperior Court
                                         Nos.: C2210384, C2100250

Trial Judge:                             The Honorable Nona L. Klippen




Attorney for Defendant and Appellant     Robert L.S. Angress
Sami Wayne Mohammed:                     under appointment by the Court
                                         of Appeal for Appellant



Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent   Rob Bonta
The People:                              Attorney General

                                         Charles C. Ragland,
                                         Chief Assistant Attorney General

                                         Jeffrey M. Laurence,
                                         Senior Assistant Attorney General

                                         Eric D. Share,
                                         Supervising Deputy Attorney General

                                         Shannon Chase,
                                         Deputy Attorney General




People v. Mohammed
H052908