People v. Morris

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
                CALIFORNIA

                      THE PEOPLE,
                 Plaintiff and Respondent,
                             v.
              RICHARD CURTIS MORRIS, JR.,
                 Defendant and Appellant.

                            S284751

           Fourth Appellate District, Division Three
                          G061916

                Orange County Superior Court
                         08CF1591



                          May 4, 2026

Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, and Evans concurred.

Chief Justice Guerrero filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Yegan* filed a dissenting opinion.




*
      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
                     PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                            S284751


              Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


      Defendant Richard Morris, Jr., appeals the denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6,1
seeking to vacate his murder conviction under Senate Bill No.
1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015).    Under the former felony-murder rule, when the
defendant killed someone while committing an “ ‘inherently
dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found guilty of the
crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill, or
even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the
underlying felony.’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
704 (Strong).) In an attempt “to more equitably sentence
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b)), Senate Bill 1437 “significantly
narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (Strong, at
p. 703.)
     Under section 187, the mens rea required for murder is
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be either
express or implied. A deliberate intent to kill constitutes
express malice. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Implied malice is defined
as acting without provocation or with an “abandoned and
malignant heart” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)), which a long line of cases


1
     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.



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                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


has interpreted as acting with a conscious disregard for life.
(See People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 974; People v. Chun
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1181.) Before Senate Bill 1437’s
amendment, in the case of a felony murder, the malice element
could be supplied by proof of an intent to commit one of a subset
of underlying felonies designated by statute. The amendment
explicitly stated that malice “shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2), clarifying that
the mere intent to commit one of those felonies was not, in itself,
sufficient to establish that a nonkiller acted with malice.
       Murder also requires an actus reus. (People v. Concha
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660.) The record of conviction here does
not establish whether Morris or his codefendant was the actual
killer of the decedent. Rather, the issue in this case is whether
Morris is precluded from making a prima facie showing for
resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a nonkiller aider or
abettor of robbery and rape with intent to kill.
       As relevant to this aider or abettor theory of liability, the
amended felony-murder rule now states that when a person was
not the actual killer, that person must have, “with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) Morris claims
that, when a nonkiller acts with an intent to kill, the nonkiller
must aid the actual killer in the lethal act. The Attorney
General contends, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that when a
nonkiller acts with an intent to kill, the nonkiller need only aid
in the underlying felony. We interpret the statutory language
to mean just what it says: the phrase “aided . . . or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree”

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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


(ibid.) requires proof the defendant aided or abetted the actual
killer in the lethal act itself, and not just the underlying felony.
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeal and remand for
reconsideration in light of our opinion.
                        I.     BACKGROUND
      On January 1, 1987, Stockwell returned to his
condominium with his girlfriend S.F. As they entered the
condominium, they were attacked by a man carrying a gun who
was accompanied by another man. Stockwell was handcuffed
and Stockwell and S.F. offered the men money and jewelry. One
of the men took Stockwell upstairs. The other man then took
S.F. upstairs. S.F. saw Stockwell facedown at the top of the
stairs, where he was negotiating with the men. The men took
S.F. into a bedroom where they raped her. After the men left in
Stockwell’s car, S.F. saw Stockwell on the floor, and realized he
had been shot. Swab samples were recovered from S.F. during
a rape examination but the science of DNA matching for forensic
use was just being developed at that time. Later, retesting
revealed that Morris’s DNA was present in the swabs taken
from S.F.2
     In 2013, some 27 years after the crimes, a jury found
Morris guilty of the first degree murder of Stockwell (§ 187,
subd. (a)). It also found true special circumstances for rape (§


2
      This brief summary of the case is drawn from the Court of
Appeal’s opinion. We rely on that opinion solely for the purpose
of summarizing the background of this case; our consideration
of whether Morris is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 is
based on our review of the record of conviction. (See, e.g., People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, fn. 2.)



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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C)), robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), and
murder for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court
found true a prior serious felony conviction and sentenced
Morris to life without the possibility of parole, plus five years.
In 2015, the judgment was affirmed on appeal.
      Based upon the felony-murder special-circumstance jury
instructions given in this case, the parties agree that the record
of conviction establishes as a matter of law that Morris acted
with the intent to kill. There is also no real dispute that, based
upon the aiding and abetting for first degree felony-murder jury
instruction given in this case, the record of conviction also
establishes that, even if Morris did not fire the fatal shot, he
aided and abetted the actual killer in the underlying felonies.
       At the time of Morris’s trial, under the former felony-
murder rule, “ ‘when the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed]
someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an
inherently dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found
guilty of the crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent
to kill, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit
the underlying felony.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 704.)
      After Morris’s trial, with the passage of Senate Bill 1437,
“the Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-
murder rule.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.) As amended
by Senate Bill 1437, section 189, subdivision (e) now provides as
follows: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:




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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


      “(1) The person was the actual killer.
       “(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree.
      “(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e);
see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 3–4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
       In this way, the new felony-murder rule sets forth three
theories of liability. In this case, we address only the second
theory of liability concerning a nonkiller who, with intent to kill,
aids or abets “the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2).)
      “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708; see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
959 (Lewis).) Pursuant to section 1172.6, when a petition
complies with the statutory requirements, the court assesses
whether the petitioner has made “a prima facie case for relief.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, at p. 708.)
However, if the trial court determines that a prima facie
showing for relief has been made, the trial court issues an order
to show cause, and then must hold a hearing to determine
whether to vacate the conviction and resentence the petitioner.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)



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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


      In 2022, Morris filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel. After
briefing and oral argument, the trial court summarily denied
the petition at the prima facie stage. The court reasoned that
the special circumstances jury instructions established that
Morris acted with an intent to kill and so he was statutorily
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief.
      In a split decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The
majority (Delaney, J., joined by O’Leary, P. J.) relied upon a
different rationale than the trial court and concluded that
Morris was precluded as a matter of law from obtaining section
1172.6 relief because the jury found Morris acted with an intent
to kill and that Morris was engaged in committing the
underlying felonies with the killer at the time the homicidal act
took place. (People v. Morris (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1016,
1029–1030 (Morris).) The majority rejected Morris’s argument
that the actus reus required under section 189, subdivision (e)(2)
requires aiding and abetting the actual killer in the lethal act,
and not just the underlying felonies. (Morris, at pp. 1025–1029.)
Justice Moore dissented, concluding that in a felony-murder
prosecution of a nonkiller participant, the People are required
to prove that the defendant aided the actual killer in the
commission of first degree murder. (Id. at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of
Moore, J.).)
      The Courts of Appeal are in conflict on this issue. People
v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162, review granted November
26, 2024, S287341 (Kelly) and People v. Jackson (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 128, review granted June 11, 2025, S290457
(Jackson) found that section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires
proof the defendant aided the actual killer in the lethal act.
People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566 (Lopez), People v.

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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


Lopez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 616, review granted November 13,
2024, S287162, People v. Taito (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 694,
review granted January 28, 2026, S294105, and the Court of
Appeal below found that proof the defendant aided the
underlying felony is sufficient.
      We granted review.
                         II.    DISCUSSION
      There is no disagreement about the mens rea required
under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), as both sides agree that
the jury found that Morris acted with intent to kill. The
disagreement involves the actus reus requirement, specifically,
what acts are required to prove the actus reus under section 189,
subdivision (e)(2). For the reasons explained below, we interpret
the phrase “in the commission of murder in the first degree”
consistent with its natural meaning to require proof the
defendant aided or abetted the actual killer in the lethal act.3


3
       In dissent, Justice Yegan relies upon several “facts of the
instant case” originally drawn from the Court of Appeal opinion
and trial testimony to conclude that Morris “did assist even
under the new majority ‘interpretation’ of the felony-murder
rule.” (Dis. opn. of Yegan, J., post, at p. 4.) The dissent departs
from the issue presented here. First, this opinion only addresses
a discrete legal issue surrounding section 189, subdivision (e)(2)
to determine whether Morris is precluded by the jury’s factual
findings in making a prima facie case for resentencing relief. At
the prima facie stage, the inquiry is limited. “A court giving
effect to” the jury’s factual findings “does not engage in
‘ “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 465
(Curiel).) Second, as noted in footnote 10 below, on remand the
Court of Appeal may address other legal issues surrounding this
case to determine whether Morris is precluded from making a



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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


       While the jury found that Morris acted with the intent to
kill, we are called upon to interpret the meaning of the amended
language in the context of section 189, subdivision (e) as a whole.
As we explain, the narrowed scope of the felony-murder rule
applies in the following fashion. In the absence of proof that a
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)), liability
under a felony-murder theory can only attach under two
circumstances (§ 189, subds. (e)(2) & (e)(3)). First, liability can
attach to a participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of an enumerated felony in which a death occurs
when that individual, with the intent to kill, aided or abetted
the actual killer in commission of the lethal act. (§ 189, subd.
(e)(2).) Second, liability can attach to a participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of an enumerated felony
in which a death occurs when that individual “was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) To clarify, an
actual killer may still be liable for his murderous conduct if he
committed the lethal act during commission of the underlying
felony. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) An actual killer’s intent to commit
the felony establishes his malice, even if his lethal actus reus
was accidental or if he did not intend to cause the victim’s death.




prima facie case for resentencing relief. Then, even if Morris
establishes a prima facie case on remand, there will be an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Morris is actually
entitled to relief under the amended felony-murder rule, which
extends to consideration of whether Morris was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d), referenced in § 189, subd. (e)(3).)


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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


      A. The Plain Language of the Statute, when
         Viewed in Context, Requires a Nonkiller To Aid
         the Actual Killer in the Lethal Act
      “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law
we review de novo. [Citations] ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving
statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words,
giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” ’ . . . ‘ “We
must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . .
by considering the particular clause or section in the context of
the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 961.) “ ‘ “If the language is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend. If the statutory language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such
as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public
policy.” ’ ” (People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975–976
(Prudholme).)
      First, the plain language of the statute supports Morris’s
argument that section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires a
nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act. As noted
above, the relevant statutory language states: “The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree.” (Ibid.) Here, aiding “the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree” means just that. The
commonsense meaning of aiding or abetting “the actual killer in
the commission of murder in the first degree,” involves aiding or


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                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


abetting the killing of a human being, and not just aiding
another in the commission of an enumerated felony by an act
that does not aid in the killing.            (See Jackson, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166–167, review granted [collecting
dictionary definitions of “murder”].) “When the words ‘actual
killer’ are included in the phrase, so that it reads, ‘aided, abetted
. . . or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree,’ the ordinary meaning of the statutory language
is inescapable: assisting the killer in killing.” (Id. at p. 168.) A
person is not “the actual killer” unless they directly cause a
death. To aid “the actual killer” is to aid the very act that defines
that individual — the lethal act itself. The most natural reading
therefore is that aiding “the actual killer” with the commission
of murder implies aiding with the lethal act rather than aiding
the person (who ends up committing the lethal act) with some
felonious act. In this way, the language of section 189,
subdivision (e) is “plain and unambiguous.” (Morris, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.).)
      Second, reading section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in context
with the remainder of subdivision (e) reinforces that the
provision requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the
lethal act itself.4 The fact that the Legislature used the phrase

4
      The cases Justice Yegan relies upon for a contrary reading
of the statute (e.g., People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465;
People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781) are of little aid
because they all interpret the prior felony-murder rule. (Dis.
opn. of Yegan, J., post, at pp. 1, 3.) Though the dissent is of the
view that “the traditional felony-murder rule has served
California well” (id. at p. 1), the Legislature made clear that it
wished to alter the prior felony-murder rule. (See, e.g., Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b)) [“There is a need for statutory changes to



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                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


“underlying felony” elsewhere in section 189, but did not do so
in subdivision (e)(2), shows that the Legislature knows how to
use the term “underlying felony” in section 189 when that is the
intent. Subdivision (e)(3) provides for felony-murder liability
when the defendant “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§
189, subd. (e)(3); see also id., subd. (e) [“a felony”].) Thus, the
actus reus in subdivision (e)(3) clearly specifies the “underlying
felony,” while the language in subdivision (e)(2) merely refers to
aiding or abetting “the commission of murder in the first
degree.” The use of different phrases signals the Legislature
intended to define different acts necessary to prove guilt under
each theory.5 (See People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242


more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides”].) And while the dissent prefers that
we should not have to “ ‘interpret’ ” what the Legislature
intended (dis. opn. of Yegan, J., post, at p. 4), that is a task that
our court routinely performs. (See, e.g., In re Ja.O. (2025)
18 Cal.5th 271, 283; Gutierrez v. Tostado (2025) 18 Cal.5th 222,
231; People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)

5
      The concurrence notes that we should not rely on the
Legislature’s use of the phrase “underlying felony” elsewhere in
section 189 because the Legislature also used the word “killing”
elsewhere in the Penal Code and therefore the Legislature
might have used that word here as well if that were its intended
meaning. (See conc. opn. of Guerrero, C. J., post, at p. 9.) But
the use of the phrase “underlying felony” was deployed as part
of the same amendments to the same subdivision of the same
code provision (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3) that produced the
operative language here, thus providing a clear signal that the
Legislature knew how to use the phrase “underlying felony”
when it wanted to. The examples provided by the concurrence



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                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


[“When the Legislature uses materially different language in
statutory provisions addressing the same subject or related
subjects, the normal inference is that the Legislature intended
a difference in meaning”]; Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 172, review granted [“The use of different wording to convey
the actus reus requirements for these subparagraphs is
significant”].) “Looking at section 189, subdivision (e) in its
entirety, ‘it is clear the Legislature intended to draw a
distinction between assisting first degree murder and assisting
the underlying felony.’ ” (Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 168, review granted, quoting Kelly, at p. 172.)
       Furthermore, the language of section 189, subdivision (e),
which functions as a preamble that introduces the three
subparts that follow, further supports Morris’s interpretation.
Specifically, subdivision (e) introduces the three theories of
liability that follow by stating: “A participant in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in
which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: . . .” (§ 189, subd. (e), italics added.) In this
way, subdivision (e)’s preamble already requires participation in
a qualifying felony and it then lists three subparts with
additional requirements for establishing felony-murder
liability. Consequently, it follows that subdivision (e)(2) does
not require merely “aiding” in the underlying felony because


are more tangential, involving different subdivisions and code
sections than the one at issue here and, in some instances, they
relate to language that was enacted decades before the
enactment of Senate Bill 1437. (See, e.g., Code Amends. 1873–
1874, ch. 614, § 16, p. 427; Prop. 115, as approved by voters,
Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) § 9, eff. June 6, 1990 [amending §
189].)


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                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
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then it would be redundant of subdivision (e)’s “participation”
requirement.
      The Attorney General’s reading would mean that section
189, subdivision (e)(2)’s intent to kill requirement is the only
way that subdivision (e)(2) differs from the preamble in
subdivision (e). However, “the subdivision proceeds for another
21 words, stating ‘... with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 585 (dis. opn. of
Raphael, J.); see also Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 173,
review granted.) Under the Attorney General’s theory, those 21
words are given no meaning if they mean the same as what was
required to make the defendant a participant in the crime.6 (See
Lopez, at p. 585 (dis. opn. of Raphael, J.).) This further supports

6
       The concurring opinion endeavors to ascribe additional
meaning to these 21 words — an effort that the Attorney
General wisely does not attempt. (Conc. opn. of Guerrero, C. J.,
post, at pp. 10–11.) The concurrence suggests that the language
may exist in order to cover a seemingly limited and obscure
circumstance, i.e., the “actual killer” language is perhaps not
surplusage because it establishes that in cases where the
defendant had: (1) the intent to kill and (2) aided a participant
in an underlying felony that is logically and transactionally
related to the killing (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187,
193), but (3) somehow did so without aiding the actual killer,
then the defendant would not be liable for murder under this
subdivision. It is hard to imagine such a fact pattern —
intending to kill and also aiding a crime partner in an act related
to killing, but doing so without aiding the actual killing — and
we do not view this as the most “ ‘ “ ‘ “plain and commonsense
meaning” ’ ” ’ ” of the phrase. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 961.)



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Morris’s position that a nonkiller defendant must aid or abet the
actual killer in the lethal act, and not just the underlying felony,
as the Attorney General’s position would turn much of
subdivision (e)(2) into surplusage. (See People v. Griffin (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1015, 1027 [“ ‘the Legislature is not presumed to use
statutory language in a sense which would render nugatory or
redundant important provisions of a statute’ ”].)
       Finally, our interpretation of the language in a different
but related context provides further support for Morris’s
interpretation.       The financial-gain special circumstance
contains similar phrasing as section 189, subdivision (e)(2) in
that it applies to “[e]very person, not the actual killer, who, with
the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of
murder in the first degree . . . .” (§ 190.2, subd. (c), italics added.)
When construing this language in the financial-gain special
circumstance, this court held that “ ‘one who intentionally aids
or encourages a person in the deliberate killing of another for
the killer’s own financial gain is subject to the special
circumstance punishment.’ ” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th
147, 202, quoting People v. Freeman (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 337,
339.) In other words, though the concurrence is correct that the
issue arose in the context of a financial-gain special-
circumstance finding, it is nonetheless significant that this court
construed the same “in the commission of murder in the first
degree” (§ 190.2, subd. (c)) language in precisely the way we now
read it — i.e., to require that one must aid the lethal act itself,
and not just the underlying felony.




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      B. The Attorney General’s Reliance on People v.
         Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884 and the Felony-
         murder Special Circumstance Is Misplaced
       The Attorney General relies upon People v. Dickey (2005)
35 Cal.4th 884, 900–901 (Dickey), where long before Senate Bill
1437, we interpreted “in the commission of murder in the first
degree” language found in the felony-murder special
circumstance. In Dickey, the court interpreted the felony-
murder special circumstance in section 190.2, former
subdivision (b), which applied to “[e]very person . . . found guilty
of intentionally aiding, abetting . . . or assisting any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree . . . .” (§ 190.2, former
subd. (b); see now § 190.2, subd. (c).) We interpreted this
language to only require aiding or abetting the underlying
felony and not the lethal act itself. (Dickey, at pp. 900–903.) The
Attorney General now argues that the term “murder in the first
degree” includes felony murder and the Legislature intended to
import the meaning of the felony-murder special circumstance,
as interpreted in Dickey, into the amended section 189,
subdivision (e)(2). The Attorney General further argues the
Legislature’s adoption of the felony-murder special-
circumstance language explains the surplusage and the
phrasing “commission of murder in the first degree” in
subdivision (e)(2). As discussed above, the Attorney General’s
interpretation would mean that the latter portion of subdivision
(e)(2) — i.e., that the defendant “aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree” — would
be redundant of what is already in the preamble in subdivision
(e). The Attorney General contends this surplusage is present
in subdivision (e)(2) because the Legislature used the language


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                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


from the felony-murder special circumstance (“commission of
murder in the first degree”) as a way to signal that it was
importing the same (broad) meaning that had been assigned to
the phrase in the felony-murder special-circumstance context.
However, the Attorney General’s reliance on Dickey and the
felony-murder special circumstance is misplaced because Dickey
did not turn on any parsing of the language of section 190.2,
subdivision (c), but on application of a background legal
principle that is no longer good law.7
      Specifically, Senate Bill 1437 abrogated the premise of
Dickey by substantially changing the felony-murder rule. Our
holding in Dickey relied upon the principle that “[a]ll persons
aiding or abetting the commission of burglary or robbery are
guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills while acting


7
       The Attorney General also relies upon language in Strong
where we said section 189, subdivision (e)(3) “repurposes
preexisting law governing felony-murder special-circumstance
findings . . . to define eligibility for sentencing relief.” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703; accord, People v. Vang (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 64, 90 [interpreting the term “actual killer” in
subd. (e)(1)].) However, Strong was interpreting subdivision
(e)(3), which is not at issue in this case and is applicable to “a
major participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision
(d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) As Strong explained,
“[t]he major participant and reckless indifference phrases were
‘derive[d] verbatim’ from United States Supreme Court
precedent concerning the permissible scope of capital
punishment for felony murder.”                (Strong, at p. 705.)
Furthermore, subdivision (e)(3) explicitly invokes the
corresponding special circumstance provision in section 190.2,
subdivision (d). (See § 189, subd. (e)(3).) Section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) contains no similar language referencing the
special circumstance.


                                  16
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


in furtherance of the common design.”               (Dickey, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 900.) Applying that rule, we concluded that
section 190.2, former subdivision (b) was “not helpful to [the]
defendant because, under the felony-murder doctrine, he was
found guilty of aiding or abetting first degree murders.” (Ibid.)
However, Senate Bill 1437 “narrows the felony-murder rule
significantly by limiting it to the actual killer and to accomplices
who either intend to kill and aid in the murder or play a major
role in the underlying felony and act with reckless indifference
to human life.” (Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 173,
review granted.) This change abrogates Dickey’s reasoning
because now “[i]t is no longer true that all persons who aided in
a burglary or robbery are guilty of murder when one of them
kills during that offense. Whether such a participant is liable
for murder is what the jury is now charged with deciding when
it applies section 189(e).” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p.
587 (dis. opn. of Raphael, J.); see also Jackson, at p. 172.) Thus,
the question we are presented with here is which individuals
remain liable for first degree murder. To allow the now-
outdated legal principle informing Dickey to dictate our decision
here would be circular and inconsistent with the very purpose of
Senate Bill 1437’s changes to the felony-murder rule.8

8
       The Court of Appeal further relied upon language from our
decision Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 433 where we said that
if a jury “made findings on all of the other elements supporting
felony murder under section 189 as amended, including (1) the
commission or attempted commission of a felony enumerated in
that statute and (2) the death of a person during the commission
or attempted commission of the enumerated felony” and the
“jury additionally found intent to kill,” that “would conclusively
establish all of the elements of felony murder under current



                                 17
                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


      C. There Is Nothing in the Legislative History of
         Senate Bill 1437 That Persuades Us To Adopt a
         Different Result
       The statutory language clearly demonstrates that section
189, subdivision (e)(2) requires proof the defendant aided or
abetted the actual killer in the lethal act itself, and not just the
underlying felony. (See Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 975–976 [“ ‘ “If the language is clear, courts must generally
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend” ’ ”].) As a result, we need not address the Attorney
General’s arguments pertaining to legislative history. In any
event, the legislative history does not aid the Attorney General’s
argument. (See People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1063
[“ ‘[E]ven if we considered the language and structure of [Senate
Bill 1437] to be susceptible to the Court of Appeal’s . . . reading,’
and thus employed ‘ “ ‘other aids, such as the statute’s purpose,
legislative history, and public policy’ ” ’ (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 967), we would find nothing in that inquiry that
persuades us to adopt a different conclusion”].)
     The Attorney General argues that the legislative history
shows that Senate Bill 1437 did not change the actus reus for


law.” (Id. at p. 464.) However, Curiel addressed the mental
state required in a direct aiding and abetting case, and was not
a felony-murder case. (See Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 173, review granted.) We also made clear that our holding
was limited to the specific facts and circumstances that were
presented in that case. (See Curiel, at p. 467 [“we need not
decide whether the jury necessarily found the requisite actus
reus because we conclude the jury did not necessarily find the
requisite mens rea for direct aiding and abetting liability”]; see
also id. at p. 470, fn. 7.)


                                  18
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


felony-murder liability as an aider and abettor with intent to kill
because the bill’s primary purpose was to bar the imputation of
malice to aiders and abettors to murder. The Attorney General
relies upon the legislative finding that “[i]t is necessary to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) The
Attorney General emphasizes that the focus for the second
category of persons in this expressed purpose is on the mens rea
and not the actus reus. The Attorney General also relies upon
various legislation resolutions and reports highlighting the need
to bar the imputation of malice. (See Sen. Conc. Res. No. 48,
Stats. 2017 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) res. ch. 175; Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 4 [“Under this bill, prosecutors
would no longer be able to substitute the intent to commit a
felony for the intent to commit murder”].)
      While barring the imputation of malice was certainly an
issue that the Legislature sought to address, the legislative
findings and legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 reflect that
the bill was also directed at the actus reus requirement and,
more generally, at making a broad ameliorative change to more
equitably sentence offenders. The legislative findings expressed
a need for reform and “for statutory changes to more equitably
sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in
homicides.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b), italics added.) The
legislative findings note that “a person should be punished for
his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual


                                 19
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


culpability.” (Id. § 1(d), italics added.) Furthermore, the
legislative findings explained that “[a] person’s culpability for
murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions and
subjective mens rea.” (Id. § 1(g), italics added.) Legislative
reports on Senate Bill 1437 further confirm that the Legislature
was concerned with both the actus reus and mens rea. (See, e.g.,
Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437, supra, as
introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 9 [“those who . . . cause a death will
still be liable for murder. S.B. 1437 simply reduces the
unfairness of the felony-murder rule by refocusing attention on
the intent and actions of the participants”]; Assem. Com. on Pub.
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as
amended May 25, 2018, p. 4 [the bill “ ‘seeks to restore
proportional responsibility in the application of California’s
murder statute reserving the harshest punishments for those
who intentionally planned or actually committed the killing’ ”
(italics added)].)
      The legislative history thus shows that the Legislature
was interested in addressing both the acts and intent required
to prove felony murder, and it certainly does not demonstrate
that Senate Bill 1437 was concerned only with barring the
imputation of malice to aiders and abettors to murder.
      D. Interpreting Section 189, Subdivision (e)(2) To
         Require a Nonkiller To Aid the Lethal Act Itself
         Would Not Lead to Illogical Results
      The Attorney General argues that Morris’s interpretation
of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) would be illogical because it
would require both a greater mens rea and actus reus than
required under subdivision (e)(3). Under the amended felony-
murder rule, there are three theories of liability: “[t]he person
was the actual killer” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); “[t]he person was not


                                 20
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree” (id., subd. (e)(2)); and “[t]he person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life” (id., subd. (e)(3)). The Attorney
General argues that this structure of section 189, subdivision (e)
is most logically understood as increasing the actus reus
requirement for felony murder as the mens rea decreases. The
Attorney General believes that as the reader progresses from
subdivision (e)(1) to subdivision (e)(3), the actus reus required
becomes progressively more onerous and the mens rea becomes
less onerous. The Attorney General further contends that
Morris’s interpretation would mean that both a greater mens
rea is required under subdivision (e)(2) than under subdivision
(e)(3) — an intent to kill rather than reckless indifference to
human life — and also a greater actus reus — aiding the lethal
act itself rather than a major participant in the underlying
felony.
      It may be, as the Attorney General contends, that the
Legislature was trying to create an inversely proportional
relationship between actus reus and mens rea for the three
theories of felony-murder liability in subdivision (e). However,
it may also be that the Legislature simply was trying to create
different paths to liability in order to better accord with an
individual’s culpability depending on the circumstances of the
case. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1437, supra, as amended May 25, 2018, p. 4 [“ ‘restor[ing]
proportional responsibility in the application of California’s
murder statute reserving the harshest punishments for those
who intentionally planned or actually committed the killing’ ”].)


                                 21
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


This conclusion is consistent with the language the Legislature
enacted. And it is not illogical to conclude that the Legislature
sought to capture three different scenarios of potential
liability — as opposed to create a perfect, inverse sliding scale of
actus reus and mens rea culpability — especially since there is
nothing in the legislative history that reflects such an intent.
      Furthermore, even adopting Morris’s interpretation of the
statute, section 189 still does not reflect, as the Attorney
General suggests, a decreasing overall level of culpability when
progressing through the three theories of felony murder in
subdivision (e). Indeed, section 189, subdivision (e)(2) does not
necessarily require a heightened level of culpability when
compared to subdivision (e)(3). Rather, the level of culpability
for a defendant charged with felony murder under subdivision
(e)(2) versus a defendant charged under subdivision (e)(3)
depends on the circumstances of the case. The court in Kelly
explained there could be situations where “the defendant offers
minor assistance to a qualifying felony not expecting (but
secretly hoping) it will result in the death of another human
being. Under that scenario, the defendant would be liable for
felony murder under the [Attorney General’s] interpretation of
section 189(e)(2) if a death occurred during the felony, even if he
was not present at the scene of the killing. But, despite
harboring a malicious mindset, he could actually be less
culpable than someone whose participation in the felony was so
considerable that it amounted to reckless indifference to human
life for purposes of section 189(e)(3).”           (Kelly, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 175, review granted; see also Morris,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.)
[describing a “hypothetical bank robbery involving three
coparticipants” to show how the three theories of felony-murder


                                 22
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


liability in subd. (e) apply].) Thus, there may be situations
where a person convicted under subdivision (e)(2) has greater
culpability than a person convicted under subdivision (e)(3), and
vice versa, but there is nothing illogical about adopting Morris’s
interpretation of subdivision (e)(2).
       The Attorney General similarly argues that Morris’s
reading of section 189, subdivision (e) would render subdivision
(e)(2) superfluous to subdivision (e)(3), which addresses felony
murder as a major participant with reckless indifference to
human life. However, for similar reasons, this is not so.
Subdivision (e)(2) is not superfluous because “not everyone who
directly aids and abets a murder [under subdivision (e)(2)] is
liable for murder as a major participant under that section.”
(Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 176, review granted.)
Rather, in order to satisfy the major participant element in
subdivision (e)(3), the defendant’s personal involvement must be
“substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary aider and
abettor to an ordinary felony murder . . . .” (People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 802; accord, Kelly, at p. 176.) Thus, even
when interpreting subdivision (e)(2) to require aiding the actual
killer in the lethal act itself, subdivision (e)(3) still has
independent meaning based upon its heightened requirements
for the major participant element.
      The Attorney General next argues that Morris’s reading of
section 189, subdivision (e) would render subdivision (e)(2)
superfluous to direct aiding and abetting murder under
standard aiding and abetting law. However, contrary to the
Attorney General’s claim, interpreting subdivision (e)(2) to
require aiding the actual killer in the lethal act itself is not the
same as requiring proof the defendant directly aided and
abetted murder. Rather, in order for an accomplice to be liable

                                 23
                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


for directly aiding and abetting a murder, the accomplice must
“ ‘aid[] the commission of that offense with “knowledge of the
direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to
assist in achieving those unlawful ends.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) In contrast, subdivision (e)(2) simply
requires the defendant, with the intent to kill, to “aid[], abet[],
counsel[], command[], induce[], solicit[], request[], or assist[] the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.”
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) Although subdivision (e)(2) includes “aid[]”
or “abet[]” language, it does not contain all the elements of direct
aiding and abetting murder because, even under Morris’s
interpretation of subdivision (e)(2), it does not require the same
knowledge requirements as direct aiding and abetting.
Specifically, subdivision (e)(2) requires the accomplice have the
intent to kill, while direct aiding abetting requires the
accomplice have “ ‘ “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s
unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those
unlawful ends.” ’ ” (Curiel, at p. 463, italics added.) Morris’s
reading of section 189 does not render subdivision (e)(2)
superfluous to direct aiding and abetting murder because
subdivision (e)(2) requires the accomplice to have the intent to
kill but does not require the accomplice to know the direct
perpetrator’s intent.
       Finally, the Attorney General argues Morris’s position is
illogical because it would require a higher level of culpability to
establish a first degree felony-murder conviction than to
establish eligibility for the death penalty with a true finding on
a special circumstance. As an initial matter, and as the
Attorney General acknowledges, there is no constitutional
impediment to such a scheme. A scheme narrowing eligibility
at the guilt phase as opposed to the penalty phase is not


                                  24
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                  Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


constitutionally proscribed when, as it does here, it narrows the
class of death-eligible defendants to first degree felony
murderers from all potential murder defendants.              (See
Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 246 [“the ‘narrowing
function’ was performed by the jury at the guilt phase when it
found defendant guilty of three counts of murder under the
provision that ‘the offender has a specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person’ ”].) As one
Court of Appeal explained, “our role is not to ask whether a
given special circumstance narrows an already-narrowed subset
of murderers (first degree murderers) who have been found
guilty of murder under one particular theory of liability (felony
murder). Rather, our task is to determine whether the state’s
capital punishment law genuinely narrows the entire class of
murderers to a subclass of death-eligible murderers.” (People v.
Wilkins (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 153, 165, italics omitted.) In this
case, the felony-murder special circumstance “makes a subclass
of murderers — first degree felony murderers — death eligible.
It does not apply to other murderers such as second degree
murderers or simple murderers. Because the statute renders a
mere subset of murderers eligible for the death penalty, it
sufficiently narrows the overall class of murderers as required
by the Eighth Amendment.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Landry
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 108 [“There is no requirement at the
eligibility stage that a narrowly circumscribed class of
defendants for whom the death penalty is reasonably justified
be further distinguished according to the particular
circumstances that led to their eligibility”].)
     Furthermore, to the extent that the Attorney General
argues that it would be illogical for the Legislature to have
intended to require more culpability for a felony-murder


                                 25
                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


conviction than for a special circumstance finding, the Attorney
General’s argument assumes that a special circumstance
finding requires less culpability than a felony-murder
conviction. However, the special circumstance finding is
dependent on the defendant aiding murder in the first degree
under current law. (See § 190.2, subd. (c) [“Every person, not
the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any
actor in the commission of murder in the first degree . . .” (italics
added)].) In order to support that a special circumstance finding
requires less culpability than a first degree murder verdict, the
Attorney General appears to assume that Dickey continues to
articulate the controlling standard for the special circumstance
under section 190.2, subdivision (c). In Dickey, evidence that a
defendant “planned and participated in the burglaries and
robberies” would permit a first degree murder verdict upon
which the special circumstance finding was premised. (Dickey,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 900.) However, under the amended
felony-murder rule, such evidence, without more, is no longer
sufficient for a first degree murder verdict. And if a defendant
who merely aided or abetted in the underlying felony cannot be
liable for first degree murder, then the defendant also cannot be
liable for the special circumstance finding under section 190.2,
subdivision (c) on the ground that the defendant committed first
degree murder. Finally, the Legislature is not required to
amend the felony-murder rule and the special circumstance at
the same time. Indeed, a Legislature interested in reforming
the felony-murder rule can first amend the provisions that
directly address the felony-murder rule and then later, if it
chooses, amend related special circumstance provisions. (See,
e.g., People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 866 [“We are also


                                  26
                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                   Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


mindful that the legislative branch is entitled to proceed
incrementally, so long as it proceeds rationally, in ‘walking [the]
tightrope’ of the political process”].)
                          III.   CONCLUSION
      We hold that section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires that
the nonkiller aid or abet the actual killer in the lethal act itself,
and not just the underlying felony.9 We reverse the Court of
Appeal and remand for reconsideration in light of our opinion.
Morris has not had a chance to present evidence of his
culpability at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. On remand,
the Court of Appeal may consider the Attorney General’s
remaining arguments in order to determine whether Morris has
made the necessary prima facie showing for an evidentiary
hearing.10 (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)




9
      We disapprove Courts of Appeal reaching the opposite
conclusion in People v. Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at page 566,
People v. Lopez, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at page 616, review
granted, People v. Taito, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at page 704,
review granted.

10
      The Attorney General argues the jury’s true finding as to
the financial-gain special circumstance “demonstrates that
Morris aided and abetted the killing itself with intent to kill and
is thus guilty of murder even under the interpretation of section
189, subdivision (e)(2), that Morris advances.” Furthermore, the
Attorney General also argues, “in addition to felony murder, the
jury’s true finding as to the financial gain special circumstance
encompassed all the elements of direct aiding and abetting.” We
do not address these arguments here and the Court of Appeal
may address them on remand.


                                  27
                     PEOPLE v. MORRIS
               Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.


                                          GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
EVANS, J.




                              28
                      PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                             S284751


         Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Guerrero


      I join in the majority’s holding that Penal Code
section 189, subdivision (e)(2),1 requires a participant in a felony
who is not the actual killer to aid or assist in the killing itself,
or the lethal act, that occurs during the commission of the felony.
I write separately to explain that unlike the majority, I do not
find the language of subdivision (e)(2) “ ‘plain and
unambiguous.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) In my view, the
majority’s interpretation stands in relative equipoise to the
interpretation advanced by the Attorney General, the Court of
Appeal, and several other courts that have considered the
issue — that a felony participant aids an actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree by aiding the killer in
the underlying felony.           (See People v. Taito (2025)
115 Cal.App.5th 694, 704, review granted Jan. 28, 2026,
S294105 (Taito); People v. Lopez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 616,
621, review granted Nov. 13, 2024, S287162; People v. Morris
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1020, review granted July 17,
2024, S284751 (Morris); People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
566, 578–579 (Lopez).) Our normal interpretative aids, such as
the structure and purpose of the statute and the legislative
history accompanying Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), do not enable us to conclude with any
degree of certainty which actus reus the Legislature sought to

1
      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 1
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


require for felony participants who are not themselves actual
killers, but act with intent to kill. Where, as here, two
reasonable interpretations of a criminal statute stand in relative
equipoise, the rule of lenity operates to “ ‘ “giv[e] the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of
interpretation.” ’ ” (People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 611
(Nuckles).) Applying the rule of lenity, I would adopt the
interpretation more favorable to defendant in this case, and on
that basis join in the majority’s interpretation of
subdivision (e)(2).
                                 I.
       As the majority notes, the Legislature significantly
narrowed the scope of the felony-murder doctrine in adopting
Senate Bill 1437. Section 189, subdivision (e), now provides
that “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of [an enumerated felony] in which a death occurs
is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶]
(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not
the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, . . . or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.”
      “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation,
our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin
by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker)), and determining “whether the



                                 2
                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                      Guerrero, C. J., concurring


language of the statute is ambiguous” (People v. Dieck (2009)
46 Cal.4th 934, 940). “A statutory provision is ambiguous if it is
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘If
the statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, [we] consider other aids, such as the statute’s
purpose, legislative history, and public policy’ ” ’ ” ’ ” to resolve
the ambiguity. (Walker, at p. 1032.)
      The pertinent question is what it means for a felony
participant to aid or assist an actual killer “in the commission of
murder in the first degree,” for purposes of section 189,
subdivision (e)(2). (Italics added.) The majority concludes that
the commonsense meaning involves aiding the killing of a
human being and not just aiding in the commission of an
enumerated felony. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9–10.) The majority
is correct that this is a reasonable interpretation of the statute,
but I respectfully disagree that it is the only reasonable
interpretation. The Attorney General’s interpretation, that
aiding in the commission of murder in the first degree includes
aiding in the underlying felony, is also reasonable.
       As the Court of Appeal explained, “ ‘murder in the first
degree’ ” is a “legal term of art” specifically defined in the Penal
Code. (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025; see Taito,
supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 704, review granted; Lopez, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) Where a legislative body uses a term
in a statute that “has developed a particular meaning in the law,
we generally presume the legislative body used the term in that
sense rather than relying on ordinary usage.” (In re Friend
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 730.) Similarly, where “ ‘the Legislature
has provided an express definition of a term, that definition
ordinarily is binding on the courts.’ ” (People v. Canty (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1266, 1277.)

                                  3
                         PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                      Guerrero, C. J., concurring


      “[M]urder of the first degree” is defined in subdivision (a)
of section 189 as murder2 that is “perpetrated” by one of several
enumerated means. This includes murder “committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,” one of several
enumerated felonies. (§ 189, subd. (a).) Thus, for purposes of
California law “murder in the first degree” does not simply
equate to killing a human being. (§ 189, subd. (e).) It is the fact
that the killing is perpetrated by a specific means that qualifies
the killing as murder in the first degree, and one of those means
is committing a felony during which the killing occurs.
       Thus, for purposes of subdivisions (a) and (e)(2) of
section 189, a person with the specific intent to kill may
reasonably be said to aid or assist an actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree in one of two ways:
(1) by aiding in the killing, i.e., the act that causes the death; or
(2) by aiding in the commission of the felony that effects such a
killing, i.e., the act that qualifies the killing as a first degree
murder. The interpretation turns on which element or elements
of first degree murder the Legislature intended to require the
felony participant to aid in. The Legislature may, as the
majority asserts, have intended to require the participant to aid
in the killing element. However, as the Attorney General and
other courts have recognized, the Legislature may have also
intended to require the participant to aid in either the killing
element or the commission-of-a-qualifying-felony element.
Because subdivision (e)(2) of section 189 is reasonably



2
      Murder is defined in section 187, subdivision (a), as “the
unlawful killing of a human being, or fetus, with malice
aforethought.”


                                  4
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


susceptible to either interpretation, the statute is inherently
ambiguous.
      Consider the facts of this case. Richard Morris, Jr., was
one of two participants in a robbery during which a victim was
shot and killed. There is no dispute that the jury necessarily
found Morris acted with the specific intent to kill. Assuming
Morris’s coparticipant was the shooter, Morris may reasonably
be said to have aided or assisted his coparticipant in murder in
the first degree if, with the specific intent to kill, he either
(1) helped his coparticipant shoot the victim, or (2) helped his
coparticipant perform the robbery during which his
coparticipant committed the shooting. In either case, Morris’s
assistance would have contributed to his coparticipant’s
commission of murder in the first degree for purposes of how the
Penal Code defines the term. Indeed, as one lower court noted,
the Legislature may have reasonably determined that
“[d]efendants who aid a qualifying felony with an intentional
plan to kill” are equally deserving of the harshest punishments
as those that in fact commit the killing. (See Lopez, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.)
                                II.
      Because the language of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) is
ambiguous, the next step is to turn to our interpretative aids to
resolve the ambiguity, including canons of statutory
construction (McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group (2010)
48 Cal.4th 104, 110) and the statute’s purpose, legislative
history, and public policy (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1032).
The Attorney General relies largely on our prior decision in
People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884 (Dickey) in support of his
proposed interpretation. The majority, by contrast, concludes



                                 5
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


that various structural aspects of section 189, subdivision (e), as
well as our prior opinion in People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147,
202 (Fayed), support its interpretation. In my view, the
arguments offered by the Attorney General and the majority
lend some support to each of the competing interpretations, but
do not pull strongly in either direction.
       The Attorney General’s reliance on Dickey implicates one
of our well-established canons of construction:             “When
legislation has been judicially construed and subsequent
statutes on a similar subject use identical or substantially
similar language, the usual presumption is that the Legislature
intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly
appears.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135; see
People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 367 [“ ‘[T]he Legislature
is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in
effect at the time legislation is enacted and to have enacted and
amended statutes “ ‘in the light of such decisions as have a direct
bearing upon them’ ” ’ ”].)
      In Dickey, we interpreted language in section 190.2, the
special circumstance statute, that is substantially similar to
section 189, subdivision (e)(2). Section 190.2, subdivision (a),
sets forth various special circumstances that, if found true, set
the penalty for first degree murder as death or life in prison
without the possibility of parole (including that the murder was
a felony murder, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Subdivision (c) then
provides as follows: “Every person, not the actual killer, who,
with the intent to kill, aids, . . . or assists any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall be punished by
death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances
enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true . . . .”

                                 6
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                      Guerrero, C. J., concurring


As the text indicates, both subdivision (c) of section 190.2 and
subdivision (e)(2) of section 189 apply to nonkillers who, with
intent to kill, aid or assist “in the commission of murder in the
first degree.”
      In Dickey, the defendant challenged a jury’s felony-murder
special-circumstance finding under the predecessor statute to
section 190.2, subdivision (c).3 The defendant argued, like
Morris argues here, that the statute’s use of the term “aiding . . .
in the commission of murder in the first degree” required the
prosecution to prove he aided or abetted the killing itself, rather
than merely aided or assisted in the underlying felonies.
(Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 900.)          We rejected the
defendant’s argument, expressly holding that section 190.2,
former subdivision (b) required only that the defendant aid or
assist in the underlying felony. (Dickey, at pp. 900–901.)
      Because section 189, subdivision (e)(2) so closely mirrors
section 190.2, we might normally assume, as the Attorney
General argues, that the Legislature intended to incorporate our
interpretation of aiding “in the commission of murder in the first


3
      Section 190.2, former subdivision (b) provided: “Every
person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of
intentionally aiding, . . . or assisting any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or
confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole, in any case in which one or more of the
special circumstances . . . has been charged and specially found
under Section 190.4 to be true.” (§ 190.2, former subd. (b), added
by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), renumbered as § 190.2,
subd. (c) by initiative, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).) For
purposes of the analysis, there are no meaningful differences
between former subdivision (b) and current subdivision (c) of
section 190.2.


                                  7
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


degree,” as stated in Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th 884, into
section 189, subdivision (e)(2). However, I agree with the
majority that under the unique circumstances presented, such
an assumption is not necessarily warranted. As the majority
notes, Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to the felony-murder
doctrine abrogated a key premise on which we relied in Dickey.
In Dickey, we reasoned that section 190.2, former
subdivision (b), required only that a felony participant aid or
assist in an underlying felony because “[a]ll persons aiding or
abetting the commission of [an enumerated felony] are guilty of
first degree murder when one of them kills while acting in
furtherance of the common design.” (Dickey, at p. 900.) That
premise no longer holds. Following the Legislature’s adoption
of Senate Bill 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), a felony participant’s
liability for murder is limited to the specific instances
enumerated in section 189, subdivision (e). Thus, while Dickey
does lend some support to the Attorney General’s proposed
interpretation, I agree with the majority that the circumstances
present an unusual case in which we should not assume the
Legislature necessarily intended to adopt our prior
interpretation of language used in an earlier enacted statute.4
      According to the majority, several contextual reasons
support its conclusion that the plain meaning of section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) requires the felony participant to aid in the
killing itself, rather than merely aid in the underlying felony.



4
      I also agree with the majority’s conclusions that the
legislative history does not support the Attorney General’s
proposed interpretation over its interpretation, and that its
proposed interpretation would not lead to illogical results. (Maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 18–27.)


                                 8
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


The reasons offered do not strongly support the majority’s
interpretation.
      First, the majority notes that the Legislature used the
term “underlying felony” elsewhere in section 189, namely in
subdivision (e)(3). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10–12.) According to
the majority, the fact that the Legislature used the term
“underlying felony” elsewhere in section 189 indicates that it did
not intend the term aiding a “murder in the first degree” (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)) to mean merely aiding in an underlying felony.
However, the same can be said about the majority’s proposed
interpretation. The Legislature used the term “killing” in
subdivisions (a) and (d) of section 189 when referring to a lethal
act that causes a death, as well as in numerous neighboring
provisions of the Penal Code. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 188, subd. (b),
190, subd. (d), 190.2, subd. (a)(10), (13).)      Similarly, the
Legislature used the term “actual killer” in section 189,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) when referring to the person or
persons that most directly perpetrate the killing. To the extent
the Legislature’s use of the term “underlying felony” elsewhere
in section 189 indicates that it did not intend aiding in the
commission of murder in the first degree to mean aiding in the
underlying felony, its use of the terms “killing” and “actual
killer” would similarly indicate it did not intend aiding in the
commission of murder in the first degree to simply mean aiding
in the killing.
      The majority also contends that the Attorney General’s
proposed interpretation would create surplusage within
section 189, subdivision (e)(2). The majority notes that the
preamble to subdivision (e) states that, to be liable for felony
murder, a defendant must first be “[a] participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in

                                 9
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


subdivision (a) in which a death occurs . . . .” In light of the
preamble, the majority concludes that interpreting the phrase
“aid[ing] . . . or assist[ing] . . . in the commission of murder in
the first degree” to include aiding in the underlying felony would
render the entire 21-word clause at the end of section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) surplusage. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–14.)
      I agree with the majority’s general point that, if the
Legislature intended to require a felony participant who acts
with intent to kill to do no more than aid the killer in the
underlying felony, the language used in section 189,
subdivision (e) is cumbersome and not a straightforward way to
do so. However, I do not share the majority’s view that such an
interpretation renders the final 21 words in subdivision (e)(2)
surplusage. Section 189, subdivision (e) imposes an initial
requirement that the person participate in an enumerated
felony “in which a death occurs.” It does not, however, specify
how that death must occur during the felony. Subdivision (e)(2)
then includes three clauses, each of which adds an additional
element. The first clause requires that the participant not be
“the actual killer” (thus distinguishing subd. (e)(1)). The second
clause requires that the participant act “with the intent to kill.”
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) The final, 21-word clause — the one the
majority refers to — requires that the participant aid or assist
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
(Ibid.) In other words, the final clause sets a limitation on how
the death must occur during the felony: one of the participants
in the felony must be the actual killer, or person directly
responsible for the victim’s death.        The third clause in
subdivision (e)(2) thus serves to exclude cases where, for
example, the circumstances causing the death are too
tangentially related to any felony participant’s conduct, such


                                 10
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


that no participant may reasonably be described as an actual
killer. (See Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018,
pp. 3, 6 [expressing concern that felony-murder liability may
attach where “accidental” deaths occur during the commission
of a felony, such as a fall by a victim while chasing a
participant].)
       Moreover,      any      surplusage      in     section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) may reasonably be explained by the fact that
subdivision (e)(2) mirrors pre-existing subdivision (c) of
section 190.2. As discussed, subdivision (c) of section 190.2 sets
forth when a jury may find a special circumstance true for
nonkillers who act with intent to kill. As the Attorney General
argues, the Legislature’s decision to incorporate language from
section 190.2, subdivision (c) into section 189, subdivision (e)(2)
may reasonably reflect its intent to limit a defendant’s liability
for felony murder to the same conditions under which the special
circumstance statute applies. Given the alternative explanation
for the Legislature’s use of the language, I do not view the
existence of arguable surplusage as especially probative of the
Legislature’s intent. (See Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 858, 872 [“canons of interpretation ‘are not
immutable rules’; they are ‘guidelines subject to exceptions,’ ”
including where competing canons point in different
directions].)
      Finally, the majority asserts that our opinion in Fayed
supports its interpretation. But Fayed has no relevance to this
case.
      Fayed addressed an application of the financial gain
special circumstance, not the felony-murder special


                                 11
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


circumstance. (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(1); Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 201–202.) The financial gain special circumstance applies
where “[t]he murder was intentional and carried out for
financial gain.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) In Fayed, the defendant
paid an employee to arrange for the murder of his estranged
wife. The employee in turn enlisted two associates to carry out
the killing. (Fayed, at p. 155.) On appeal, the defendant argued
that the evidence did not support the special circumstance
finding because the person who stood to gain financially from
the murder (his employee) was not the person who actually
killed the victim (the associates whom the employee enlisted).
(Id. at p. 201.) We rejected defendant’s argument. Relying in
part on the fact that section 190.2, subdivision (c) makes special
circumstance findings applicable to nonkillers who aid in the
murder with intent to kill, we held that it was immaterial which
person — the actual killer or an intermediary — stood to reap
the “financial gain” from the murder. (Fayed, at p. 202.)
      Fayed says nothing about whether a felony participant
must aid the killing itself, rather than the underlying felony.
The defendant in Fayed was not convicted under a felony-
murder theory, and the felony-murder special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) was not at issue.
                                III.
      Ultimately, section 189, subdivision (e)(2) does not
perfectly correspond to either the majority’s interpretation or
the interpretation advanced by the Attorney General and Court
of Appeal. The Legislature would have better accomplished the
majority’s interpretation had it stated that a felony participant
who acts with intent to kill must aid or assist the actual killer
in the “killing,” “actual killing,” or “lethal act,” rather than in



                                 12
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                      Guerrero, C. J., concurring


the “commission of murder in the first degree.” Similarly, the
Legislature would have better accomplished the Attorney
General’s proposed interpretation had it stated, for example,
that a felony participant must aid or assist the actual killer in
“either the lethal act or the underlying felony.” Neither the
“ ‘text, context and structure, overall purpose, relevant case law,
[or] legislative history’ ” provide a satisfactory answer as to
what the Legislature intended to require when stating that a
felony participant must, with intent to kill, aid the actual killer
in the commission of murder in the first degree. (People v.
Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 1012.)
       In this circumstance, the rule of lenity applies to resolve
the otherwise insoluble ambiguity in the statute. The rule of
lenity generally requires that, where two reasonable
interpretations of a criminal statute “ ‘ “ ‘ “stand in relative
equipoise,” ’ ” ’ ” ambiguity “ ‘ “should be resolved in favor of
lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable
doubt on questions of interpretation.” ’ ” (Nuckles, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 611.) The rule is grounded in principles of due
process for those potentially subject to criminal penalties.
“ ‘Application of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes
will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal
and strikes the appropriate balance between the legislature, the
prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability.’ ” (People
ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 313.)
      The rule “ ‘does not apply every time there are two or more
reasonable interpretations of a penal statute.’ ” (Nuckles, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 611.) Rather, the rule applies “ ‘only if the court
can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended;
there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify
invoking the rule.’ ” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58.)

                                  13
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                     Guerrero, C. J., concurring


Where resort to other interpretative aids does not resolve the
criminal statute’s ambiguity, “ ‘the rule of lenity is a tie-
breaking principle.’ ” (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880,
889.)
       This case is one in which the competing interpretations
stand in relative equipoise, and we can do no more than guess
what the Legislature intended. The Legislature’s use of the
phrase aiding the actual killer “in the commission of murder in
the first degree” in section 189, subdivision (e)(2), is ambiguous.
Our normal interpretative aids do not resolve that ambiguity in
favor of either competing interpretation offered by the parties.
The rule of lenity thus operates as the appropriate tie-breaking
principle. Indeed, resort to the rule is especially appropriate
considering the Legislature’s general ameliorative goal in
enacting Senate Bill 1437 to limit the scope of the felony-murder
doctrine. I therefore join the majority on this basis in adopting
the construction of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) that is more
favorable to defendants: a participant in a felony is liable for a
murder only if that person acts with intent to kill, and aids or
assists the actual killer in committing the lethal act.

                                             GUERRERO, C. J.




                                 14
                      PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                             S284751


              Dissenting Opinion by Justice Yegan


       I respectfully dissent. One hundred seventy-five years of
felony-murder precedent should not be set aside by an
ambiguous statute. I agree with the Court of Appeal opinion
authored by Justice Delaney with a concurrence by Presiding
Justice O’Leary, People v. Morris (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1016
(Morris), which applied the traditional felony-murder rule.
(See also People v. Taito (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 694, 704,
review granted Jan. 28, 2026, S294105; People v. Lopez (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 616, 621, review granted, Nov. 13, 2024,
S287162 (Lopez); Morris, at p. 1020; People v. Lopez (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 566, 578–579.) The felony-murder rule and its
history in California for about 175 years is fully explicated by
Justice Mosk in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465. In
my opinion, even though it may be controversial, the
traditional felony-murder rule has served California well.
“ ‘Salus populi suprema lex esto.’ ” (People v. Pacheco (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 207, 209 [“ ‘The safety of the community is the
highest law’ ”].) To the extent the Legislature seeks to modify
it, as “interpret[ed]” by the majority (maj. opn. ante, at pp. 2, 9,
23), their remedy has taken the “teeth” out of the rule.
       The judiciary does not judge the wisdom of legislation,
and it is the business of the Legislature to define crime and the
punishment, therefore. (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414.)
When the Legislature announces an unambiguous rule either
superseding or modifying the felony-murder rule, I will follow


                                 1
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                        Yegan, J., dissenting


it. They have not done so and the language seized upon by the
majority, “interpreting” Penal Code section 189, subdivision
(e)(2),1 is, in my opinion, a judicial stretch. There is way too
much “interpretation” going on here.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) is not going to win an award for clarity. Subdivision
(e)(2) of section 189, enacted in 2018, does not say that the
aider and abettor must have “aided” or “assisted” the actual
killer in the “lethal act.” (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 10.) This is
“added” by the majority opinion. The Legislature uses the
words “aided” or “assisted” the killer “in the commission of first
degree murder.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) As indicated in the
underlying Court of Appeal majority opinion, the latter phrase
is a description of what crime is at issue, i.e., “a legal term of
art.” (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025.) The statute
is not “ ‘plain and unambiguous.’ ” (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 10,
quoting Morris, supra, at p. 1031 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.).) An
example of the Legislature’s choice of language being “plain
and unambiguous” would be this statement of intent: “The
traditional felony murder rule is abolished. Participation in
the underlying felony which results in murder, standing alone,
no longer supports a murder conviction.”
       The majority opinion here declares that the language
chosen by the Legislature satisfies the statutory construction
rules. That is to say, the statute passes the “plain and common
sense” test and is “clear.” (Maj. opn. ante, at pp. 10, 11.) Well,
it was not “plain and common sense” and “clear” to Justice
Delaney, Presiding Justice O’Leary, Justice Sanchez, Justice


        1
            All further statutory designations are to the Penal
Code.


                                 2
                        PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                        Yegan, J., dissenting


Motoike, Justice Gooding, Justice Hanasono, Justice Egerton,
Justice Adams, Justice Slough and Justice Miller. It is not
“plain and common sense” to the Chief Justice. (Conc. opn. of
Guerrero, C. J.) And, it is not “plain and common sense” and
“clear” to me. “We may not rewrite the statute to conform to
an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.”
(Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253.)
And, neither the California Supreme Court nor the Court of
Appeal should “interpret” a statute by adding words to it, to
reach a result it thinks furthers an ambiguous goal. I disagree
that adding language is the most “natural reading” of the new
statute. (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 10.)
       Any person who conspires with and aids the actual
perpetrator of the lethal act (the person who physically
delivers the fatal injury by, e.g., shooting) and commits the
underlying felony with a criminal mindset of committing only
the underlying felony, should have liability pursuant to the
felony-murder rule. Now there is something in addition: the
defendant must “aid[]” or “assist[]” the actual perpetrator of
the lethal act. (§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) It must be emphasized
that, traditionally, the actual perpetrator of the “lethal act”
(ibid.) need not even strike a blow nor shoot the murder victim.
The killing may be “inadvertent” or “accidental” and the felony
murder rule would apply. (People v. Washington (1965) 62
Cal.2d 777, 781.) If the victim dies of a heart attack upon
seeing a home intruder, each other intruder is guilty of felony
murder. The underlying enumerated felonies are so inherently
dangerous to human life that those who commit the underlying
felony should be strictly liable for any death as a result thereof.
       It is common knowledge that a criminal is emboldened
when he or she has an accomplice who aids in the criminal


                                 3
                       PEOPLE v. MORRIS
                       Yegan, J., dissenting


enterprise. In the typical felony murder case, an accomplice
who aids in the underlying felony is a willingly “major
participant” who is acting with a “reckless indifference” to any
homicide which results from the commission of the underlying
felony. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1021.)
      The rule of lenity, relied upon by the Chief Justice, is
well known. (People v. Alberts (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1424,
1426 (opn. of Yegan, J.).) In my view, it has no application
here. The statute is ambiguous and we should not “save” it
with an imaginative interpretation. We should not have to
“interpret” (maj. opn. ante, at pp. 2, 9) or “guess” at what the
Legislature intended.
      The facts of the instant case demonstrate an uncharged
conspiracy and sophisticated plan to commit, at the very least,
residential burglary and armed robbery. And, appellant
Richard Morris, Jr., did assist even under the new majority
“interpretation” of the felony-murder rule. He helped to
handcuff the victim in his bedroom before the victim was
executed. It is much easier for an actual murderer to execute
the victim if he is handcuffed. It appears that the only reason
why appellant was not in the bedroom assisting in the actual
shooting, is because he was busy forcibly raping the murder
victim’s girlfriend in another bedroom.

                                               YEGAN, J *




*
      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


                                4
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Morris
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 100 Cal.App.5th 1016
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S284751
Date Filed: May 4, 2026
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Lewis W. Clapp
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and
Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

Galit Lipa, State Public Defender, and Samuel Weiscovitz, Deputy
State Public Defender, for the Office of the State Public Defender as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael R. Johnsen,
Lynne G. McGinnis, Collette C. Cavalier, Alan L. Amann and James
M. Toohey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Pauline E. Villanueva
Appellate Defenders, Inc.
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 696-0282

James M. Toohey
Deputy Attorney General
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 738-9043