People v. Sanchez

Filed 3/23/26; Certified for Publication 4/8/26 (order attached)




              COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION ONE

                                  STATE OF CALIFORNIA


 THE PEOPLE,                                               D085325

         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. RIF1600163)
         v.

 VICTOR LOPEZ SANCHEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.


        APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Joshlyn R. Pulliam, Judge. Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded
with instructions.
        Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
        Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Tyler L. Krentz, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
        In 2024, the trial court received a letter from an analyst at the
Department of Corrections noting an error in the calculation of the aggregate
state prison term on the abstract of judgment from the 2019 resentencing of
Victor Lopez Sanchez which took place after remand from our court. The
court responded to the letter by holding a hearing, at which the court
endeavored to correct the issue. Sanchez argues in this appeal that the court
erred by not conducting a full resentencing; by denying his Romero motion;
and by not reconsidering the imposition of the upper term as to one of the
counts of conviction. Because the error in 2019 was a clerical one, the court
in 2024 was not required to conduct full resentencing. Accordingly, we affirm
that portion of the judgment denying resentencing and denying the Romero
motion. However, the court went beyond its authority to correct the clerical
error and made impermissible modifications to the 2019 misdemeanor
sentences. We vacate this portion of the order and remand with instructions
so that the abstract can once more be amended to correctly reflect the 2019
sentence.
                      I.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      A detailed recitation of the facts underlying Sanchez’s conviction is not

necessary for the purposes of this appeal. 1 It suffices to say that in 2016,
Sanchez was convicted of multiple felony and misdemeanor counts involving
violent offenses against his wife and a neighbor. Sanchez was sentenced to
state prison for a term of 38 years 4 months for the felony counts, plus a
consecutive county jail term of 2 years 6 months for the misdemeanor counts.
      On direct appeal, this court reversed the judgment as to Sanchez’s
conviction for discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling and remanded


1     We grant Sanchez’s unopposed request that we take judicial notice of
the clerk’s transcript from the court proceedings against him from October
2015 through the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 in July of 2023; and the unpublished decisions of our court in
People v. Sanchez (Aug. 28, 2018, D073727) [nonpub. opn.] (direct appeal,
affirming in part and reversing and remanding with instructions in part);
and People v. Sanchez (Feb. 23, 2024, D083028) [nonpub. opn.] (affirming
denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.6).

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the matter for further proceedings on that count, but affirmed the judgment
in all other respects. (People v. Sanchez (Aug. 28, 2018, D073727) [nonpub.
opn.].)
      A hearing after remand was held on March 1, 2019. The minute order
for that hearing reflects that the court struck count 11 “which will reduce the
sentence by 3 years 8 months.” The minute order further provided that
Sanchez was sentenced to “State Prison for the total term of 37 years and 2
months.”
      Shortly thereafter, it came to the court’s attention that there was an
issue with that sentence, and so the court revisited the sentence at a hearing
on May 24, 2019.
      Although the record before us does not include the transcript from the
May 24, 2019 proceeding, the minute order notes that Judge Keen presided,
and further states that “when count 11 was stricken the enhancement of
[Penal Code section] 12022.1 was also stricken. The time imposed for the
enhancement of 2 years is also stricken.” This order was intended to fully
comply with our court’s instructions on remand. The minute order then
listed, separately, the time imposed for each count, deleting any time for
count 11. The sum of the time for the felony counts is 33 years. For the
misdemeanor counts, the minute order showed “county jail 1 year/county jail
1 year/county jail 180 days (6 months).”
      The final sentence of the minute order states, “Sentenced to State
Prison for a total term of 35 years 6 months.” However, that sum includes
the time imposed on the misdemeanor counts, which expressly provided for
county jail as to those counts. Thus, the state prison term should have been
calculated at 33 years.




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      The resulting second amended felony abstract of judgment continued
this error forward. Box 8 stated that the total time was 35 years 6 months.
      On January 22, 2024, a correctional case records analyst for the legal
processing unit of the Department of Corrections Division of Adult
Institutions sent a letter to Judge Keen, noting that “the Abstract of
Judgment and/or Minute Order may be in error, or incomplete [because]
references to misdemeanor counts . . . and time imposed should not be
included in Total State Prison Term.” The court set a hearing to address the
issue and ordered that Sanchez be produced from prison to attend the
hearing.

      Prior to the hearing, Sanchez’s defense counsel filed a Romero motion 2
and a sentencing brief, asking the court to impose concurrent sentences on all
counts. The People filed an opposition to the motion.
      Judge Pulliam presided at the hearing on September 18, 2024. Defense
counsel argued in support of the Romero motion. In response, the court
stated, “The Court believes this issue is, namely, a correction of how his time
is to be served on the charges that he was convicted of and not an illegal
sentence that would warrant a complete resentencing of all of the charges he
was convicted of.” Judge Pulliam then modified the sentence so that the time
imposed for each of the three misdemeanor counts was six months, to run
concurrently with each other, and concurrently with the felony counts. “And
by making that correction, that would reduce his state prison term to a total
of 33 years. [¶] And that should satisfy the department of corrections in
terms of correcting that numerical error.” The court noted once again that


2     A Romero motion is a defense motion made pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 that asks the court to strike a
“strike” in the interests of justice.


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the issue did not warrant full resentencing, but nonetheless, the court stated
that it had reviewed and considered the Romero motion and then denied it.
The minute order for the hearing reflected that the court vacated the
sentence as to counts 12 through 14 and sentenced Sanchez to three
concurrent terms of 180 days in the Riverside County jail for each of those
counts.
        Sanchez timely appealed.
                              II.   DISCUSSION
        Sanchez argued that the court erred in denying his request for full
resentencing and further erred by denying his Romero motion and his request
to reduce the imposition of an upper term.      The People counter that Sanchez
was not entitled to full resentencing, and that the court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it modified the term of two misdemeanor counts and made
them concurrent to other counts.
A.      Sanchez Was Not Entitled to Full Resentencing
        “Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of
jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence
has commenced.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344.) There are
some exceptions to this rule. Relevant here, the court has the authority to
correct a clerical error at any time. (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702,
705.)
        A clerical error is an error that occurs in the recording of a judgment; a
judicial error is an error in rendering the judgment. (People v. Boyd (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63 (Boyd).) Upon the correction of a clerical error, the
full resentencing rule does not apply because the case remains final. (People
v. Humphrey (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 371, 380 (Humphrey).)
        Sanchez contends that the error in the 2019 sentencing was a judicial
error, not a clerical error. We are not persuaded. It is clear from the 2019

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minute order that the court never intended to sentence Sanchez to state
prison on misdemeanor charges. Instead, a simple math error occurred when
either the court or the clerk failed to distinguish between time imposed on
felonies (to be served in state prison) and time imposed on misdemeanors (to
be served in county jail), in stating the total time imposed to be served in
state prison. The error in the resulting abstract reflected this rudimentary
math error. (See Humphrey, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 380 [court stated it
was correcting a clerical error on the abstract; if the minutes or abstract of
judgment do not “reflect the judgment pronounced by the court, the error is
clerical, and the record can be corrected at any time to make it reflect the
true facts”].)
      Sanchez argues that the “error that occurred was not in recording the
years of the sentence on the abstract of judgment; the error was far more
complicated and involved how to craft a sentence that included a
misdemeanor sentence that should be served in county jail.” Not so. At the
2019 sentencing, Sanchez was sentenced to felony terms that totaled 33
years. He was sentenced to misdemeanor terms that totaled 2 years 6
months. The abstract of judgment indicated prison time of 35 years 6
months. This was a simple math error.
      The difference between clerical error and judicial error can be seen in
cases finding that an error in the sentence was judicial, not clerical. For
example, in People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 790 (Singleton)
the sentencing court had imposed a sentence at one third the middle term,
although the Penal Code mandated imposition of the full middle term.
Similarly, in People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 983 (Codinha), the
sentence was imposed concurrently but the Penal Code required that it be
consecutive. In other words, the court in each of those cases made a legal



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error in the sentence. Here, nothing suggests that the sentencing court made
the legal error of ordering that Sanchez would serve time in prison for his
misdemeanor convictions. In the 2024 hearing, the court’s only role was to
ensure that the abstract reflected the felony terms of 33 years in prison. This
did not trigger a right to full resentencing. Accordingly, we do not reach
Sanchez’s further argument as to the court’s denial of his Romero motion or
his argument regarding imposition of the upper term.
B.    The Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Modify the Sentences on the
      Misdemeanor Counts.
      As argued by the People, at the 2024 hearing, the court went beyond
simply fixing the clerical error in the 2019 sentence. Instead of noting that
the correct prison time ordered by Judge Pulliam was 33 years and then
directing that the abstract be amended to reflect the correct figure, the court
chose to reduce the time imposed on two of the misdemeanor counts (from the
imposed terms of one year each to six months each) and to make all of them
concurrent, rather than consecutive, to all other counts. The People contend
that in doing so, the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority and that we
should therefore vacate this portion of the sentence.
      Generally speaking, sentence modifications beyond clerical corrections
require an authorization set forth in a statute, such that the court has subject
matter jurisdiction to make the modification. (People v. Cota (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 318, 328–330.) Here, beyond the argument that the error was
judicial, Sanchez identifies no statutory authority to support the changes
made to his misdemeanor convictions. There was no formal recommendation
for recall from the secretary of the department of corrections, nor did the
court recall the sentence, so Penal Code section 1172.1 did not entitle him to
resentencing. (See Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 987; Singleton,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.) Further, the sentence was legally


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permissible, foreclosing any possible authority under the unauthorized

sentence doctrine. 3 As we previously held, Sanchez was not entitled to
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, nor does anything in Penal
Code section 1170 provide a basis for the court to resentence on its own
motion.
      We note that after outlining the issue that it had identified with
Sanchez’s sentence, the letter from the department of corrections analyst
provided, “Please review your file to determine if a correction is required.
When notified by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that an
illegal sentence exists, the trial court is entitled to reconsider all sentencing
choices, People v. Hill [1986] 185 Cal.App.3d 831.” The letter’s citation to
Hill does not change our analysis. The letter did not recommend recall or
resentencing and did not use the term recall. (See People v. Magana (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1124-1125) [where the problem with the sentencing was
a clerical one, the department’s letter requesting the trial court to determine
whether a correction was needed did not constitute a recommendation for
recalling the sentence]; cf. Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 783
[concluding that similar language in the department’s letter to the court did
not confer jurisdiction to modify the sentence].)




3      We recognize the split of authority as to whether a court may correct an
illegal sentence after the case is final, even in the absence of a specific
statutory authority. (Compare Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 990
[court may correct an unauthorized sentence where the error was apparent
from the face of the record] with Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 792–797 [court lacked jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence in
the absence of a basis for jurisdiction].) We need not wade into this issue,
because Sanchez’s sentence was not illegal in any respect.


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      We further note that the People did not argue before the trial court that
it lacked authority to modify the terms of Sanchez’s misdemeanor
convictions. However, a legal error at sentencing that is both obvious and
correctable without requiring further proceedings is not subject to forfeiture.
(See People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26). Further, where the court
lacks jurisdiction to modify a final sentence, a resentencing is void. (See
Boyd, supra 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 71.) As the People note, simply dismissing
the appeal would leave intact the void judgment. (See People v. Alanis (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477 fn. 5.) So that the judgment in this matter
correctly reflects the lawful 2019 sentence, we must vacate the portions of the
court’s order that modified the misdemeanor terms and ran them
concurrently.
      Finally, it is necessary to remand for the correction of the abstract of
judgment. After Judge Pulliam ruled, the court prepared a third amended
felony abstract of judgment, properly showing the correct prison term on the
felonies as 33 years in box 8 of the form. Arguably, no further modification
for the abstract is necessary, because the form is limited by its terms to
felony convictions. However, for completeness, we conclude that the abstract
should also reflect the county custody time for the misdemeanors, totaling 2
years 6 months, consecutively, which can be noted in the “other orders”
section in box 13 of the form.
                           III.   DISPOSITION
      The 2024 order is reversed insofar as it modified the misdemeanor
sentences imposed in 2019. That portion of the order is void. In all other
respects, the order is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the court to issue
a fourth amended felony abstract of judgment to reflect 33 years of state
prison time in box 8, and a total of 2 years 6 months of consecutive county



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custody time in box 13, in substantially the same terms set forth in the
second amended abstract, and send a copy of the amended abstract to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.


                                                                  KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:


DATO, Acting P. J.


CASTILLO, J.




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Filed 4/8/26
                         CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                            STATE OF CALIFORNIA


 THE PEOPLE,                                  D085325

         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                              (Super. Ct. No. RIF1600163)
         v.

 VICTOR LOPEZ SANCHEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.


       THE COURT:
       The opinion in this case filed March 23, 2026 was not certified for
publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to
rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
       IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
       ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”
appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.


                                                             DATO, Acting P. J.

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