Marriage of Bowman

Filed 4/3/26
                   CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION SIX


 In re Marriage of CHARLES              2d Civ. No. B331924
 and JULIE ANN BOWMAN.               (Super. Ct. No. FL108245)
                                     (San Luis Obispo County)

 CHARLES WAYNE BOWMAN,

      Respondent,

 v.

 JULIE ANN BOWMAN,

      Appellant.



      This attorney’s fees appeal arises from a marital
dissolution. Julie Bowman (wife) appeals a postjudgment order
awarding her reasonable attorney’s fees of $12,500 instead of the
approximately $49,000 she had claimed pursuant to a “prevailing
party” attorney’s fees clause in a marital settlement agreement
(MSA). She contends the trial court erred because it considered
Charles Bowman’s (husband’s) ability to pay and other equitable
factors when determining the amount of the fee award. She
contends the court should have applied Civil Code section 1717 to
the MSA’s fee provision rather than Family Code sections 2030
and 2032.1
       We affirm. We hold that, in determining the amount of fees
where the MSA includes a prevailing party attorney’s fees clause,
the trial court retains discretion to consider the factors set forth
in sections 2030 and 2032, including the losing party’s ability to
pay. Wife has not shown that the trial court erred as a matter of
law or abused its discretion in considering the Family Code
factors. She forgets that the family law court is a court of
fairness and equity. (In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1172, 1174.)
                Factual and Procedural Background2
       The parties married in 1989 and separated in 2010. A
judgment of dissolution was entered in 2010. The judgment
incorporated an MSA awarding the family home to wife. The
MSA provided that, if the home is sold, the “net proceeds” will be
divided equally between the parties. The trial court retained
jurisdiction “to make other orders necessary to carry out this
judgment.”
       The MSA included the following attorney’s fees clause: “In
the event any further action is ever brought to enforce any of the
provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to receive from the other party such reasonable legal fees
and necessary costs as shall be affixed by the Court.”


      1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to

the Family Code.
      2 We grant husband’s May 14, 2025 unopposed motion to

augment the record to include three documents filed in the trial
court.




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       In 2011 the parties amended the MSA to provide that wife
“will be removed from the [home’s] title and agrees to sign a
Quitclaim Deed removing her name.” Husband “will assume all
responsibility for the home.” The amendment further provided,
“When the house is eventually . . . sold, the parties agree that the
net proceeds will be divided equally.” The parties subsequently
disagreed whether wife retained an interest in the home after she
had signed the quitclaim deed. In March 2021 the trial court
ruled: “Wife has a one-half interest in the [home]. The assertion
that [she] has no ownership interest in the [home] is unsupported
by the record.”
        After the ruling, wife requested that the court “confirm
that [husband] does not have the sole decision over when the
[home] will be sold.” In September 2021 the trial court ordered
the parties “to meet and confer to determine whether they can
agree to list the residence for sale, or whether [husband] intends
to buyout [sic] [wife’s] half of the interest.”
       Nearly one year later, the trial court granted husband’s
request to buy out wife’s interest in the home. He did so. The
only issue remaining was an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
       Wife filed a request for an “Award of Contract [Attorney’s]
Fees & Costs” in the amount of $49,312.48, arguing that she had
prevailed on all of the issues. This amount included costs of
$743.15. Wife noted, “Her attorney took the matter on a
contingency basis and fronted all fees and costs to help her obtain
her rightful interest.” Husband opposed wife’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs. He argued, inter alia, that wife was not
the prevailing party.




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                             Trial Court’s Ruling
       The trial court awarded wife attorney’s fees of $12,500. It
did not make an award of costs. It observed, “[T]his is a limited
asset case that has been over litigated.” The trial court also
considered the financial situation of both parties, noting that
neither party has significant income and that both parties’ main
source of support is Social Security. It further noted that the
home’s equity had been exhausted. The court concluded,
“Neither party could afford this expensive litigation. [Husband]
is unable to afford an award of fees as requested by wife.”
       In light of the parties’ financial situation and overlitigation
of the case, the trial court found attorney’s fees of $12,500 were
reasonable “for . . . a determination as . . . to [wife’s] equity in the
property, and her ability to receive said equity.” The court was
“concerned that the efforts involved were not reasonably
calculated to lead to the expeditious resolution of this matter.”
Because husband lacked the funds to pay the entire amount, the
trial court allowed him, “to make interest-free payments . . . at a
rate of $200 per month payable directly to [wife’s counsel].” It
later denied wife’s request to recalculate the fee award under
Civil Code section 1717 without considering husband’s ability to
pay.
        The Trial Court Did Not Err by Applying the Family
       Code Fee Statutes to Wife’s Request for Attorney’s Fees
       In light of our holding (see ante, p. 2), wife must show an
abuse of discretion to prevail on her request for a $49,000 fee
order. “The purpose of an attorney fees award in a marital
dissolution proceeding is to provide, as necessary, one of the
parties with funds adequate to properly litigate the matter.
[Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . A motion for attorney fees is left to the trial




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court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear showing of abuse. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of
Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863, 868-869; see also Estate of
Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448-1449 [abuse of
discretion standard on appeal].)
        In exercising its discretion, the court is authorized by the
Family Code to consider the parties’ financial situation and
ability to pay, among other equitable factors. Section 2030,
subdivision (a) requires the court to “ensure that each party has
access to legal representation . . . by ordering, if necessary based
on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay the
other party, or the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is
reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees . . . .” Any fee award
must be “just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of
the respective parties.” (§ 2032, subd. (a).) “Notwithstanding the
parties’ relative economic circumstances, an award under section
2030 et seq. is properly denied if a case has been overlitigated or
if the fees otherwise were not ‘reasonably necessary.’” (In re
Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 112.)
       Wife claims the court erred because it applied sections 2030
and 2032 instead of Civil Code section 1717, the prevailing party
fee statute generally applicable to contractual attorney’s fees
awards. Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) provides, “[I]n
any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides
that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
contract, shall be awarded . . . to the prevailing party, then the
party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the
contract . . . shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in
addition to other costs.” Like the Family Code fee statutes, Civil
Code section 1717 grants the court “broad discretion . . . to fix an




                                 5
award of attorney fees in a reasonable amount.” (PLCM Group,
Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1088 (PLCM Group).) “We
apply de novo review to determine the scope of the statute.” (N.S.
v. D.M. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054.)
       Wife contends that the court’s discretion under the Family
Code to consider equitable factors does not apply where the
parties have agreed in an MSA to award fees to the prevailing
party. Once a contractual fee provision exists, wife insists, the
court loses discretion to apply the Family Code and is instead
limited by Civil Code section 1717 to using the “lodestar” method
of calculating a reasonable fee. Under this method, the court
calculates the fee by multiplying the number of hours worked by
a reasonable hourly rate. The resulting amount may then be
adjusted based on factors specific to the case. (PLCM Group,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)
       Wife relies on Walker v. Ticor Title Co. of California (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 363 (Walker) to support this contention. There,
the court concluded, “[I]t is inappropriate to consider the losing
party's financial status as an equitable factor in assessing
contractual attorney fees,” i.e., fees awarded pursuant to Civil
Code section 1717. (Id. at p. 372.) Walker is, however,
distinguishable because it did not involve a proceeding for
dissolution of marriage.
       Wife also relies on In re Marriage of Sherman (1984) 162
Cal.App.3d 1132. It is not controlling. There, the MSA provided
that the prevailing party “‘shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs . . . .’” (Id. at p. 1136.) The appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to
wife as the prevailing party. The trial court did not err in
refusing to allow husband to present evidence of his inability to




                                 6
pay because the award “emanated from the contractual
relationship of the parties and not from their relationship under
the Family Law Act . . . .” (Id. at p. 1140.)
       As the court noted in In re Marriage of Guilardi (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 770, 774, Sherman applied Civil Code section 1717
and the contractual fee provision to uphold the trial court’s
discretion in making a fee award, not to restrict it. Sherman
allows a trial court to rely on Civil Code section 1717 to award
attorney’s fees without considering the losing party’s ability to
pay. Sherman does not require that the court do so. Nor does it
hold the Family Code inapplicable to an MSA attorney’s fees
provision. Instead, Civil Code section 1717 provides an
alternative basis for awarding attorney’s fees. (See Hogoboom et
al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶
14.275 [“Where, by marital settlement agreement . . . , the parties
have agreed to a recovery of fees and costs in an action arising
under the contract, the contract itself provides an alternative
basis for a fees and costs award. The Family Code fee award
statutes are not determinative of entitlement to a fee award or
the amount thereof when fees are sought pursuant to contract.
[Marriage of Sherman, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 1140 . . . ]”].)
(Italics added, brackets for citation to Sherman in original.)
       In determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fees
award in a dissolution proceeding, the trial court retains
discretion to consider the losing party’s ability to pay and other
equitable factors as provided in sections 2030 and 2032.
Sherman did not remove that discretion. Wife has not cited any
appellate decision that holds otherwise. (See also Garcia v.
Santana (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 464.)




                                7
       Here, the trial court acted within its discretion when it
relied on the Family Code to determine the amount of wife’s
attorney’s fees award. The MSA provided for an award of
“reasonable legal fees and necessary costs as shall be affixed by
the Court.” It did not foreclose consideration of either party’s
financial need or ability to pay, nor did it prohibit application of
the Family Code fee statutes. It placed no limit on the factors the
trial court could consider in determining the amount of
reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded.
       As to wife’s lodestar computation, wife correctly notes that
there is no evidence the trial court rejected her counsel’s claimed
hourly rate or number of hours worked. Pursuant to the Family
Code fee statutes, the court reasonably reduced wife’s lodestar
figure to take into account husband’s ability to pay and other
factors mentioned in sections 2030 and 2032.
       “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion
for fees and costs.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 964, 975.) Wife has not shown that, “‘“considering
all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of [the trial
court’s] order, no judge could reasonably”’” have found that her
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs should be limited to $12,500.
(In re Marriage of Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 869.)
                           Costs on Appeal
       “[N]ormally a prevailing party on appeal is entitled to costs
on appeal . . . .” (Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 899, 911.) Although husband is the prevailing party
in this appeal, in his brief he “prays that in the interests of
justice this Court find that neither party is entitled to its fees and
costs on appeal.” We accept his representation that “[n]either
party can pay the costs . . . .”




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                            Disposition
      The postjudgment order awarding wife attorney’s fees of
$12,500 and denying her an award of costs is affirmed. The
parties shall pay their own costs on appeal.
      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.



                                   YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:


             BALTODANO, J.


             CODY, J.




                               9
                 Matthew G. Guerrero, Judge

          Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

               ______________________________

     Barnick | Hodges and Whitney Northington Barnick; Rossi
Law and Richard Rossi, for Appellant.
     Lewi Law and Christopher C. Lewi, for Respondent.