In re Parker B.

Filed 5/4/26
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION


               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA


 In re PARKER B., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.


 THE PEOPLE,                                       D084848

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                 (Super. Ct. No. J244794)

         v.

 PARKER B.,

         Defendant and Appellant.


       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Tilisha Martin, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
       Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                             I. INTRODUCTION

       The juvenile court declared then-15-year-old Parker B. (Minor) a ward
of the court based on separate assaults he committed when he was 13 and 14
years old. After performing suitably on probation for six months, Minor
moved to dismiss the petition and set aside the findings under Welfare and

Institutions Code section 782, 1 and to seal his records under section 786.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and partially granted the
motion to seal as to all charges except for the assault Minor committed when
he was 14. The court found this record ineligible for sealing under section
786, subdivision (d) (section 786(d)), which prohibits courts from sealing
records pertaining to offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b) (section
707(b)) that were “committed when the individual was 14 years of age or
older unless the finding on that offense was dismissed.” (§ 786(d).) The court
also concluded that this assault charge prevented the court from relieving
Minor from a prohibition on acquiring firearms before he turned 30.
      Minor raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the trial court
erred by not sealing the record regarding the assault he committed when he
was 14. He reasons that the section 782 dismissal satisfied the condition in
section 786(d) that the court dismiss “the finding on that offense.” We agree.
Section 782 “ ‘is a general dismissal statute’ ” and a dismissal under that
section “ ‘operates, as a matter of law, to erase the prior [adjudication] as if
the [juvenile] had never suffered the [adjudication] in the initial instance.’ ”
(People v. Haro (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 718, 721 (Haro).) Therefore, we
interpret an unqualified section 782 dismissal of an adjudicated petition as
encompassing the offenses alleged in the petition and all findings the court
has made on those offenses. Because the court here did not qualify its
section 782 dismissal in any way, the dismissal encompassed the findings on


1     Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.

                                        2
the assault Minor committed when he was 14, thereby entitling him to
sealing of the record on that offense under section 786.
      Second, Minor contends the section 782 dismissal also erased the
assault charge for purposes of relieving him from the firearm restriction. We
disagree. The interplay between the dismissal, sealing, and firearm
restriction statutes prohibits a court from sealing records pertaining to a
firearm restriction. (See In re Joshua R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 864, 869
(Joshua R.).)
      Accordingly, we modify the juvenile court’s order to seal all of Minor’s
records in this case. As so modified, the order is affirmed.
           II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In 2023, the People filed a petition against Minor arising from two
assaults he committed at school — one in 2021 when Minor was 13, and
one in 2022 when he was 14. In connection with each incident, Minor
was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) with an enhancement for personally inflicting
great bodily injury (id., § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); and battery inflicting serious
bodily injury (id., § 243, subd. (d)). Assault under Penal Code section 245,
subdivision (a)(4) is an offense listed in section 707(b)(14).
      On October 19, 2023, after a contested adjudication hearing, the
juvenile court found the charges and enhancement allegations true. The
court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed him on probation in his
father’s custody, and prohibited Minor from “knowingly hav[ing] any firearm
in his[] possession until attaining the age of 30.” (See Pen. Code, § 29820,
subd. (b) [providing that a person adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for
committing an offense listed in § 707(b) “shall not own, or have in possession


                                         3
or under custody or control, a firearm until the person is 30 years of age or
older”].)
      After Minor performed satisfactorily on probation for six months, he
requested that the court set aside its findings and dismiss the petition under
section 782, seal his records under section 786, and relieve him from the
firearm restriction. The People opposed the request. The trial court
dismissed the petition, sealed the records as to all charges except the assault
Minor committed when he was 14 (Count 1), and denied the request to relieve
Minor from the firearm restriction.
      Minor appeals.
                               III. DISCUSSION

      This appeal raises questions of statutory interpretation regarding the
juvenile dismissal, sealing, and firearm restriction statutes. We review these
questions de novo. (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406 (Greg F.); In re
Taylor C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 492, 496 (Taylor C.).)

      A. The Juvenile Dismissal and Sealing Framework

            1. Dismissal

      Section 782 was enacted in 1971 to recodify the juvenile courts’
longstanding discretion to dismiss juvenile matters. (In re J.B. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 410, 418.) Section 782, subdivision (a)(1) (section 782(a)(1))
reads in part: “A judge of the juvenile court in which a petition was filed . . .
may dismiss the petition, or may set aside the findings and dismiss the
petition, if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the
person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds
that they are not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.”



                                         4
      In Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th 718, the court held that section
782(a)(1) “ ‘is a general dismissal statute’ that is similar in its operation to
Penal Code section 1385.” (Haro, at p. 721, fn. omitted; see Pen. Code,
§ 1385, subd. (a) [“The judge or magistrate may, . . . in furtherance of justice,
order an action to be dismissed.”]; Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 416 [“In
terms similar to section 782, Penal Code section 1385 grants trial courts the
power to dismiss a criminal action ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ”].)
“ ‘[D]ismissal under [Penal Code] section 1385 of the charge underlying a
prior conviction operates, as a matter of law, to erase the prior conviction as if
the defendant had never suffered the conviction in the initial instance.’ ”
(Haro, at p. 721, quoting People v. Barro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 62, 66
(Barro).)
      Haro addressed whether the dismissal under section 782 of a juvenile
adjudication that would otherwise qualify as a strike under the “Three
Strikes” Law precluded the use of that adjudication as a strike in a
later criminal proceeding. (Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) The
Haro court looked to Barro, which addressed that question in the context
of a dismissal of an adult conviction and concluded that a dismissal under
Penal Code section 1385 precluded use of the offense as a strike. (Haro, at
pp. 721–723.) Barro reached its conclusion after comparing section 1385 to
another Penal Code provision allowing dismissal (Pen. Code, § 1203.4),
leading the Barro court to conclude Penal Code section 1385 should be
interpreted broadly. (Barro, at pp. 66–67.) Drawing on the reasoning in
Barro, Haro concluded the differences between section 782 and another
Welfare and Institutions Code section allowing dismissal of juvenile petitions
warranted interpreting section 782 broadly. (See Haro, supra,
221 Cal.App.4th at p. 722 [“Just as . . . section 782 is similar in its wording to

                                         5
Penal Code section 1385, the courts have found . . . section 1772 to be

comparable to Penal Code section 1203.4.”].) 2
      From this, the Haro court concluded that “a dismissal under,
section 782, of the petition underlying a juvenile adjudication has the same
effect” as a Penal Code section 1385 dismissal: “ ‘[it] operates, as a matter of
law, to erase the prior [adjudication] as if the [juvenile] had never suffered
the [adjudication] in the initial instance.’ ” (Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at
p. 720, quoting Barro, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 66.)
      Dismissal under section 782 is discretionary. (See § 782,
subd. (a)(2)(A); Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 419.) This discretion
authorizes juvenile courts to dismiss all or any part of a petition. (In re J.P.
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 74, 81 [holding that the “juvenile court’s authority
[under section 782] to ‘set aside the findings and dismiss the petition . . .
includes the power to dismiss any part of that petition” (italics added)].)
      “Section 782 was amended, effective January 1, 2023, to state that
‘[d]ismissal of a petition . . . pursuant to this section . . . does not alone
constitute a sealing of records as defined in Section 781 or 786.’ [Citations.]
Hence, dismissal of a petition does not automatically result in the sealing of



2      The Barro court found Penal Code section 1385 broad in comparison to
Penal Code section 1203.4, subdivision (a)(1), which expressly provides that
convictions dismissed upon completion of probation “shall have the same
effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or information
dismissed.” (See Barro, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67, italics omitted.)
The Haro court similarly found section 782 broad in comparison to section
1772, which provides in subdivision (a) that upon satisfaction of certain
criteria a juvenile “shall thereafter be released from all penalties and
disabilities resulting from the offense,” subject to many exceptions listed in
subdivision (b). (See Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722–724.)

                                          6
the juvenile records.” (Taylor C., supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.)
Accordingly, a juvenile who desires to seal records pertaining to a dismissed
petition must do so under a different statute.

             2. Sealing

      “There are two provisions of law allowing for the sealing of a minor’s
juvenile delinquency file; the first is . . . discretionary, the second is . . .
mandatory.” (S.V. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1181 (S.V.).)
The discretionary statute — section 781 — “ ‘provides that a juvenile
record . . . may be sealed when the juvenile reaches his majority or upon the
expiration of five years from the date on which the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court terminates’ ” and the person has remained law-abiding. (In re Jose S.

(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1114; see S.V., at p. 1181.) 3 “Section 781 was
generally enacted ‘to protect minors from future prejudice resulting from
their juvenile records.’ ” (In re Jeffrey T. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1020.)
It therefore provides that “[o]nce the court has ordered the person’s records
sealed, the proceedings in the case shall be deemed never to have occurred,
and the person may properly reply accordingly to any inquiry about the



3     Section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(A) states in relevant part: “If a petition
has been filed with a juvenile court to commence proceedings to adjudge a
person a ward of the court, . . . the person . . . may, five years or more after
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has terminated . . . , or, in any case at
any time after the person has reached 18 years of age, petition the court for
sealing of the records. . . . If, after hearing, the court finds that since the
termination of jurisdiction . . . the person has not been convicted of a felony or
of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has
been attained to the satisfaction of the court, it shall order all records,
papers, and exhibits in the person’s case in the custody of the juvenile court
sealed . . . .”

                                           7
events, the records of which are ordered sealed.” (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
Nevertheless, section 781 limits the circumstances under which a record
involving an offense listed in section 707(b) may be sealed. (§ 781,
subd. (a)(1)(D)–(E); see Jeffrey T., at pp. 1020–1021.)
      The mandatory sealing statute — section 786 — “employ[s] a
streamlined . . . procedure for dismissing juvenile delinquency petitions and
sealing juvenile records . . . when a ward ‘satisfactorily completes’ probation
or supervision.” (In re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 705–706.) Section
786, subdivision (a) provides: “If a person who has been alleged or found to
be a ward of the juvenile court satisfactorily completes (1) an informal
program of supervision . . . , (2) probation under Section 725, or (3) a term of
probation for any offense, the court shall order the petition dismissed” and
“[t]he court shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed
petition. . . .” (§ 786, subd. (a)(1), italics added; see S.V., supra,
13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181.) “The court shall send a copy of the [sealing]
order” to applicable agencies and officials and must “specify a date by which

the sealed records must be destroyed.” (§ 786, subd. (a).) 4
      “The purpose underlying [section 786] is ‘to speed up and facilitate the
reentry into mainstream society, rehabilitation, and employability of
juveniles with nonserious, nonviolent delinquency histories.’ ” (In re Brandon
H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1283 (Brandon H.).) Therefore,


4     As we discuss further in part III.C.2., post, regarding firearm
restrictions, section 786, subdivision (a)(1) also provides: “If a record contains
a sustained petition rendering the person ineligible to own or possess a
firearm until 30 years of age pursuant to Section 29820 of the Penal Code,
then the date the sealed records shall be destroyed is the date upon which the
person turns 33 years of age.”

                                          8
subdivision (b) of section 786 provides that “[u]pon the court’s order of
dismissal of the petition, the arrest and other proceedings in the case shall be
deemed not to have occurred and the person who was the subject of the
petition may reply accordingly to an inquiry by employers, educational
institutions, or other persons or entities regarding the arrest and proceedings
in the case.”
      Section 786(d) limits the circumstances under which a record involving
an offense listed in section 707(b) may be sealed: “A court shall not seal a
record or dismiss a petition pursuant to this section if the petition was
sustained based on the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of
Section 707 that was committed when the individual was 14 years of age or
older unless the finding on that offense was dismissed or was reduced to a
misdemeanor or to a lesser offense that is not listed in subdivision (b) of
Section 707.” (Italics added.)

      B. Minor’s Request for Dismissal and Sealing

      In May 2024, the probation officer reported that Minor had performed
well on probation for six months. The officer therefore believed supervision
was no longer needed and recommended that the wardship be terminated.
      At a May 14, 2024 review hearing, Minor’s counsel orally requested
that the court dismiss the petition under section 782. The attorney explained
that “the main basis for this request” was removing the firearm restriction as
a barrier to Minor’s goal of serving in the military or law enforcement. The
prosecutor objected that the request should be made by noticed motion. The
court initially granted the motion to dismiss, finding Minor “successfully
complied with . . . probation” and that “there is no further need of treatment
with respect to rehabilitation.” Minor’s counsel then requested that the court


                                        9
seal Minor’s record under section 786. The court responded that it believed
the section 707(b) offenses were not sealable and that the firearm restriction
would remain. The court vacated its section 782 dismissal to allow the
parties to brief the dismissal, sealing, and firearm issues.
      Minor filed a formal motion to dismiss the petition and set aside the
court’s findings under section 782, and to seal the court’s records under
section 786. Minor argued he was eligible under section 782 both because
dismissal was “in the interests of justice and [his] welfare” and because he
was “not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” (§ 782(a)(1).) Citing Haro,
supra, 221 Cal.App.4th 718, Minor argued a section 782 dismissal “would in
effect erase the existence of the petition and the adjudication,” which would
both allow for sealing of the section 707(b) offense under section 786(d), and
“relieve [him] of the firearm prohibition.” He acknowledged case law holding
that a dismissal and sealing under section 786 would not relieve him of the
firearm restriction (see Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 869), but he
argued a section 782 dismissal “is broader” than a dismissal and sealing
under section 786.
      The People filed a brief opposing sealing of the section 707(b) offense
and relief from the firearm restriction. As to sealing, the People argued that
dismissal under section 782 would not entitle Minor to sealing under
section 786 because of the recent amendment to section 782 clarifying that
dismissal under that section “does not alone constitute a sealing of records as
defined in Section 781 or 786.” (§ 782, subd. (e).) Regarding the firearm
restriction, the People relied on Joshua R.’s holding that the firearm
restriction statute’s provision that it applies “ ‘[n]otwithstanding any other
law’ ” prevailed over section 786. (Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 869,
quoting Pen. Code, § 29820, subd. (d).)

                                       10
      The juvenile court orally announced its ruling at a July 12, 2024
hearing. The court granted Minor’s request to dismiss the petition under
section 782, “specifically finding that [he] is not in need of rehabilitation, as
the court is finding that he has satisfactorily completed probation.”
      Regarding sealing, the juvenile court found that both battery counts
were sealable because they are not listed in section 707(b) and that the
assault committed when Minor was 13 was sealable because section 786(d)
precludes sealing only as to section 707(b) offenses committed when the
juvenile was at least 14 years old. For that reason, though, the court declined
to seal the record regarding the assault count Minor committed when he was
14 (Count 1). The court added that Minor could petition the court to seal this
record under section 781 once he turns 18.
      Next, the court ordered that the firearm restriction remain in place.
The court found Haro distinguishable because “section 782 is not silent as to
the firearm restriction related to the outcome of the general dismissal per
[section] 782, unlike Penal Code section 1385, which is silent on that issue.”
The court cited section 782, subdivision (b) “specifically” as “stat[ing] [that]

the firearm restriction continues.” 5 The court stated it was also relying on
Joshua R.’s “hold[ing] that the firearm restriction applies, notwithstanding
any other law.”


5     It appears the juvenile court misspoke when it cited section 782,
subdivision (b) because that provision does not mention firearms; rather, it
prescribes how courts must explain their decisions under section 782.
Because we conclude the juvenile court’s ruling maintaining the firearm
restriction is supported by other valid rationale, we do not discuss the court’s
reliance on section 782, subdivision (b) any further. (See People v. Camacho
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123 [“we review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm’ ”].)

                                        11
      C. Analysis

            1. The Juvenile Court Erred by Not Sealing Minor’s
                Record as to Count 1

      Minor contends the juvenile court erred in not sealing his record as to
Count 1 because the section 782 dismissal satisfied section 786(d)’s
requirement that “the finding on [his section 707(b)] offense was dismissed.”
(§ 786(d).) We agree.
      As noted, the Haro court held that section 782 “ ‘is a general dismissal
statute’ ” (Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 721), which “ ‘operates, as a
matter of law, to erase the prior [adjudication] as if the [juvenile] had never
suffered the [adjudication] in the initial instance’ ” (id. at p. 720). Based on
the Haro court’s reasoning, the court in In re David T. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
866 (David T.) held that a section 782 dismissal entitled a juvenile to sealing
of a section 707(b) offense (robbery) under section 781 even though section
781 then barred — without exception — sealing of a record involving a

section 707(b) offense committed after age 14. (David T., at pp. 872–875.) 6
The David T. court reasoned that allowing dismissal would not conflict with
section 781’s proviso that its sealing restriction applies “[n]otwithstanding
any other law” because, “once the court set aside the robbery finding and
dismissed the petition under section 782, there was no longer any robbery
finding or sustained petition left to be governed by the limitation on record
sealing contained in . . . section 781.” (David T., at p. 877.)



6     As noted, section 781 now allows sealing of records regarding
section 707(b) offenses under certain circumstances. (See § 781,
subd. (a)(1)(D)–(E).)

                                        12
      The People argue David T. is no longer good law because the
Legislature has since amended section 782 to add subdivision (e), which
clarifies that “[d]ismissal of a petition, or setting aside of the findings and
dismissal of a petition, pursuant to this section, after the person was declared
a ward, does not alone constitute a sealing of records as defined in Section
781 or 786.” In support, the People cite Taylor C., supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
492, in which a juvenile obtained a section 782 dismissal of an offense listed
in section 707(b) and required him to register as a sex offender under Penal
Code section 290.008. (Taylor C., at pp. 494–495.) The juvenile argued
he was entitled to sealing under section 781 even though that statute
prohibits courts from sealing a record relating to a section 707(b) offense
“ ‘committed after attaining 14 years of age for which the person is required
to register pursuant to Section 290.008 of the Penal Code.’ ” (Taylor C., at
p. 497, quoting § 781, subd. (a)(1)(F).) The juvenile court denied the motion
to seal, and the Taylor C. court affirmed, finding that section 781,
subdivision (a)(1)(F) unambiguously rendered “a subset of sex offenses . . .
categorically and unequivocally not eligible for sealing.” (Taylor C., at p. 497,
original italics omitted & italics added.)
      In so holding, the Taylor C. court rejected the juvenile’s argument that,
under David T., “the juvenile court’s dismissal of his petitions under
section 782 erased the adjudication of the prior offenses such that they
are deemed to have never occurred, which relieved him of any future
adverse consequences of those offenses, including the sealing limitation
in subdivision (a)(1)(F) of section 781.” (Taylor C., supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 497.) The Taylor C. court found David T. distinguishable because David T.
“interpreted an earlier version of section 782 that—unlike the current
version—did not include any limitations on the relief offered by dismissal.”

                                        13
(Taylor C., at p. 497.) Specifically, the Taylor C. court found that the
Legislature’s “unambiguous” clarification that dismissal of a petition under
section 782 “does not alone constitute a sealing of records” (§ 782, subd. (e))
means that “the reasoning of David T. no longer applies to the extent it held
dismissal under section 782 automatically releases the person from the
sealing limitations in section 781.” (Taylor C., at p. 498, italics added.)
      We find David T., Taylor C., and newly added subdivision (e) of
section 782 reconcilable. Under David T., a section 782 dismissal “is a
general dismissal . . . intended to erase a prior adjudication—not merely
reduce or mitigate it—and to thereby protect the person from any and all
future adverse consequences based on that adjudication.” (David T., supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 877, citing Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) This
dismissal generally entitles a juvenile to have his or her record sealed. But
under section 782, subdivision (e), the dismissal does not itself effectuate the
sealing; that must be pursued under either section 781 or 786. And as
clarified in Taylor C., a juvenile seeking sealing under section 781 or 786
based on a section 782 dismissal is subject to any restrictions on sealing
contained in the applicable sealing statute. (Taylor C., supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497–498.) In Taylor C., sealing was unavailable
because section 781’s restriction on sealing registrable sex offenses was
“categorical[].” (Taylor C., supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 497.)
      Unlike the restriction at issue in Taylor C., the restriction at issue
here — section 786(d) — is not categorical. It allows a juvenile to seal a
section 707(b) offense committed after age 14 if “the finding on that offense
was dismissed.” (§ 786(d).) The question here, then, is whether a section 782
dismissal constitutes a dismissal of “the finding on [a section 707(b)] offense.”
(§ 786(d).)

                                       14
      The confusion over this question arises because section 782(a)(1)
contemplates two types of dismissal — the court “may dismiss the petition, or
may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition.” (Italics added.) The
juvenile court here dismissed “the petition” without specifying whether it was
also “set[ting] aside the findings” underlying the petition. (§ 782(a)(1).) The
parties dispute whether this dismissal satisfied section 786(d)’s sealing
requirement that “the finding on the offense was dismissed.”
      Minor contends “the most reasonable interpretation” of section
782(a)(1)’s alternative phrasing focuses on the procedural posture of the case
when the court grants dismissal. “[I]f the juvenile had not yet been declared
a ward” — that is, the court had not yet made any findings on the offense —
then “the petition would be dismissed” under the first clause. But “if the
juvenile had already been declared a ward” — that is, the court had made
findings on the offense — then “the findings would be set aside and the
petition dismissed” under the subdivision’s second clause.
      The People argue that “ ‘dismissal of a finding’ does not simply refer to
dismissal of a petition at a different point in time” (that is, after the court has
made findings) because a dismissal of findings has “distinct legal
ramifications” from a mere dismissal of a petition. “For example,” the People
note, “dismissal of a finding on an offense can function to prevent a
prosecutor from using the true finding later in criminal proceedings whereas
a dismissed petition and sealed record, without dismissing the offense, allows
prosecutors to later utilize the record. [Citations.] Therefore, ‘dismissal of a
finding’ does not simply refer to dismissal of a petition at a different point in
time, but rather a different type of dismissal with distinct legal
ramifications.”



                                        15
      We think Minor has the better argument. His interpretation accounts
for the fact a court can dismiss a juvenile proceeding at the pleadings
stage — in which case the court would “dismiss the petition” — or after the
petition has been adjudicated — in which case the court would “set aside the
findings and dismiss the petition.” (§ 782(a)(1).) This approach is consistent
with the statute’s wording. (See Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 406 [“Our
fundamental task in construing a statute ‘is to ascertain the Legislature’s
intent [and] effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin our inquiry by
examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning.’ ”].) It honors the statutory purpose of accelerating rehabilitated
juveniles’ “ ‘reentry into mainstream society.’ ” (Brandon H., supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1283.) And it reflects Haro’s established holding that
“a dismissal under section 782 of the petition underlying a juvenile
adjudication” “ ‘operates, as a matter of law, to erase the prior [adjudication]
as if the [juvenile] had never suffered the [adjudication] in the initial
instance.’ ” (Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) The People’s proposed
interpretation achieves none of these ends; rather, it narrowly focuses on only
the consequences that flow from the different types of dismissals.
      We therefore hold that when a juvenile court dismisses a petition under
section 782 after the court has adjudicated its allegations, the dismissal
constitutes both a “set[ting] aside [of] the findings and [a dismissal of] the
petition” unless the court indicates a narrower intent. (§ 782(a)(1).) Of
course, a court can exercise its discretion to dismiss less than an entire




                                        16
petition or all its attendant findings. 7 (See In re J.P., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th
at p. 81 [holding that the “juvenile court’s authority [under § 782] to ‘set aside
the findings and dismiss the petition . . . includes the power to dismiss any
part of that petition” (italics added)].) In such a case, the effect of the
dismissal on the juvenile’s ability to seal under one of the sealing statutes
will depend on the specific wording and scope of the court’s dismissal. But
absent an express qualification of a dismissal, we will construe a dismissal
under section 782 of an adjudicated petition as an unqualified dismissal that
encompasses all the offenses alleged in the petition and all findings the court
has made on those offenses.
      Turning to the dismissal here, the juvenile court did not qualify its
section 782 dismissal in any way. The court did not indicate that it was
dismissing (or desired to dismiss) fewer than all of the offenses alleged in the
petition or that it was dismissing the petition but not setting aside the
findings the court made on the offenses alleged in the petition. Further,
despite Minor expressly requesting that the court both set aside its findings
and dismiss the petition, the People did not oppose the request based on that
distinction. We therefore interpret the juvenile court’s section 782 dismissal
here as a dismissal of all four offenses alleged in the petition and the findings
the court made on each of those counts — including Minor’s section 707(b)
offense. Because the juvenile court dismissed the findings on that offense,
Minor satisfied the requirements of section 786(d) and was entitled to have



7     The People seem to argue the opposite here — that by “dismiss[ing] the
entire petition pursuant to section 782 . . . the court did not dismiss . . .
[Count 1].” This has it backwards. Dismissing the petition dismisses all of
its charges.

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his record regarding Count 1 sealed as well. We will modify the judgment
accordingly.

            2. The Juvenile Court Correctly Maintained the Firearm
                Restriction

      Minor contends the juvenile court erred by concluding that he remains
subject to the firearm restriction. We disagree.
      Penal Code section 29820, subdivision (b) provides that “[a] person
described in subdivision (a)” — which includes a person adjudged a ward of
the court for committing a section 707(b) offense — “shall not own, or have in
possession or under custody or control, a firearm until the person is 30 years
of age or older.” The juvenile court must use Department of Justice (DOJ)
forms to “notify [DOJ] of persons subject” to a firearm restriction under this
provision. (Pen. Code, § 29820, subd. (d).) “Notwithstanding any other law,
the forms required to be submitted to [DOJ] . . . may be used to determine
eligibility to acquire a firearm.” (Ibid.)
      The juvenile court based its ruling on Joshua R, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th
864, which held that a sealing order under section 786 does not relieve
a juvenile from the firearm restriction under Penal Code section 29820.
(Joshua R., at pp. 868–869.) The Joshua R. court recognized that
section 786, subdivision (b) provides that if a juvenile meets the sealing
criteria, “the offense ‘shall be deemed not to have occurred.’ ” (Joshua R.,
at p. 869.) But the court found that the statutes “can be reconciled” (id.
at p. 868) by deferring to the firearm restriction’s admonition that its
record-keeping requirements apply “ ‘[n]otwithstanding any other law’ ”
(id. at p. 869, quoting Pen. Code, § 29820, subd. (d), italics omitted).




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      The Joshua R. court reasoned that “the current state of the law
requires this outcome and furthers the primary purpose of both statutes. The
goal behind . . . section 786 . . . is to allow certain juvenile offenders who have
successfully completed their probation to lead productive lives without the
black mark of a record hanging over their heads for employment and
educational purposes. The only purpose of [Penal Code] section 29820 is to
prevent those who have committed certain offenses as juveniles from owning
firearms before they turn 30 years old. Ordering the record sealed, as
required by . . . section 786, while at the same time allowing the DOJ to
maintain the [f]irearm [f]orm until [the juvenile] turns 30 will serve both
purposes.” (Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 869.)
      Based on this reconciling, the Joshua R. court held that “while the rest
of the record must be sealed and destroyed by the date the court specifies in
[its sealing order] . . . , the [f]irearm [f]orm need not be ordered destroyed
until [the juvenile]’s 30th birthday.” (Joshua R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at
p. 869.)
      Minor argues Joshua R. is distinguishable because it involved a
dismissal under section 786, whereas his case involves a broader dismissal
under section 782, which effectively erased his petition. We are not
persuaded that this distinction makes a difference here. Although “[s]ection
782 is a very different statute from section 786 in that it vests broad
discretion in the trial court and contains a much higher standard for
dismissal” (David T., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 878), the consequences of a
dismissal under either statute are the same: it is as if the petition never
existed. (See Haro, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 720 [§ 782 dismissal
“erase[s]” the prior conviction]; § 786, subd. (b) [“the arrest and other
proceedings in the case shall be deemed not to have occurred”].)

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      More importantly, as we discussed above in reconciling the relevant
case law and statutes (see part III.C.1, ante), the Legislature amended
section 782 to clarify that a dismissal does not effectuate a sealing of records,
thus subjecting section 782 dismissals to the restrictions imposed by the
sealing statutes. (See Taylor C., supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497–498.)
Shortly after Joshua R. was decided, the Legislature amended section 786 to
subordinate its sealing provisions to Penal Code section 29820 firearm
restrictions. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1002, § 1.5.) Specifically, the Legislature
amended section 786 to clarify that sealed records containing firearm
restrictions under Penal Code section 29820 shall not be destroyed until the

person turns 33 years of age (§ 786, subd. (a)) 8 and may be accessed by DOJ
to determine a person’s suitability to acquire firearms (§ 786,

subd. (g)(1)(J).) 9 We infer from these amendments that the Legislature
intended for firearm restrictions to survive sealing orders under section 786,
even if the sealing order follows a section 782 dismissal.
      Minor also argues that the result in Joshua R. is contrary to the
Legislature’s intent behind section 782 to remove juvenile offenders’ barriers



8     Subdivision (a) of section 786 reads in relevant part: “If a record
contains a sustained petition rendering the person ineligible to own or
possess a firearm until 30 years of age pursuant to Section 29820 of the Penal
Code, then the date the sealed records shall be destroyed is the date upon
which the person turns 33 years of age.”

9      Subdivision (g)(1)(J) of section 786 reads: “A record that has been
ordered sealed by the court under this section may be accessed, inspected, or
utilized . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [b]y the Department of Justice for the purpose of
determining if the person is suitable to purchase, own, or possess a firearm,
consistent with Section 29820 of the Penal Code.”

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to employment, specifically including military service. 10 We are not
persuaded. The Joshua R. court specifically wrestled with the competing
policies behind the dismissal/sealing statutes and the firearm restriction
statute. And the subsequent firearm-related amendments to section 786
confirm that the Legislature resolved those competing interests in favor of
the firearm restriction.
                             IV. DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s July 12, 2024 order is modified to seal Minor’s
record as to all counts (including Count 1). As so modified, the order is
affirmed.



                                                                     RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:


MCCONNELL, P. J.


BUCHANAN, J.




10    For example, the author of the bill that amended section 782 in 2022
noted that the bill would “allow justice-impacted youth to fully access future
opportunities,” including “enlist[ing] in the military.” (Assem. Com. on Public
Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Mar. 24, 2022, p. 3.)

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