In re Sebastian C.

Filed 4/15/26
                     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FOUR


 In re Sebastian C., a Person Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                 A172531
       Plaintiff and Respondent,             (Solano County Super. Ct.
 v.                                          No. J45299)

 SEBASTIAN C.,
       Defendant and Appellant.


       Appellant Sebastian C., now 19 years old, was committed to a secure
youth treatment facility pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 875 at the age of 14 after he admitted to having committed voluntary
manslaughter. In this appeal, he challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his
request to be released from the secure facility and placed in the home of his
adult sister. He contends the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of
statutory interpretation that his sister’s home did not qualify as a “less
restrictive program” under section 875, subdivision (f). The Attorney General
argues that the trial court’s ruling is correct because, among other things, the
sister’s home is not a less restrictive program under the plain language of the
statute. The Attorney General also argues that the appeal should be



       1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
                                       1
dismissed because Sebastian’s subsequent placement in his mother’s home as
part of a less restrictive program has rendered the appeal moot.
      Because the proper interpretation of section 875, subdivision (f) is a
matter of broad public interest, we resolve the briefed issue to clarify that
placement in a family home with supervision and programming provided by a
community-based agency can meet the requirements of a less restrictive
program under section 875, subdivision (f). Because the appeal is moot,
however, we need not decide whether the court abused its discretion in
denying the requested placement, and therefore dismiss the appeal. (See
People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 883.)
                               BACKGROUND
                                        I.
      Under section 875, subdivision (b)(1), when committing a ward to a
secure youth treatment facility, the juvenile court is directed to “set a
baseline term of confinement” that represents “the time in custody necessary
to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare
the ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the
community.” Under subdivision (c)(1), “the court shall additionally set a
maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and
circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward
under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed appropriate to achieve
rehabilitation.”
      At progress review hearings held every six months under section 875,
subdivision (e)(1)(A), the court may reduce the baseline term or “may
additionally order that the ward be assigned to a less restrictive program, as
provided in subdivision (f).” Subdivision (f) reads in relevant part, “(1) Upon
a motion from the probation department or the ward, the court may order
that the ward be transferred from a secure youth treatment facility to a less
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restrictive program, such as a halfway house, a camp or ranch, or a
community residential or nonresidential service program. The purpose of a
less restrictive program is to facilitate the safe and successful reintegration of
the ward into the community. . . . Approval of the request for a less
restrictive program shall be made only upon the court’s determination that
the ward has made substantial progress toward the goals of the individual
rehabilitation plan described in subdivision (d) and that placement is
consistent with the goals of youth rehabilitation and community safety. In
making its determination, the court shall consider both of the following
factors: [¶] (A) The ward’s overall progress in relation to the rehabilitation
plan during the period of confinement in a secure youth treatment facility.
[¶] (B) The programming and community transition services to be provided,
or coordinated by the less restrictive program, including, but not limited to,
any educational, vocational, counseling, housing, or other services made
available through the program. [¶] (2) In any order transferring the ward
from a secure youth treatment facility to a less restrictive program, . . . [t]he
court shall set the length of time the ward is to remain in a less restrictive
program, not to exceed the remainder of the baseline or modified baseline
term. . . . If, after placement in a less restrictive program, the court
determines that the ward has materially failed to comply with the court-
ordered conditions of placement in the program, the court may modify the
terms and conditions of placement in the program or may order the ward to
be returned to a secure youth treatment facility for the remainder of the
baseline term, or modified baseline term, and subject to further periodic
review hearings, as provided in subdivision (e) and to the maximum
confinement provisions of subdivision (c). If the ward is returned to the
secure youth treatment facility under the provisions of this paragraph, the


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ward’s baseline or modified baseline term shall be adjusted to include credit
for the time served by the ward in the less restrictive program.”
      “[A]t the conclusion of the baseline confinement term, including any
modified baseline term, [the court shall] hold a probation discharge hearing
for the ward. For a ward who has been placed in a less restrictive program
described in subdivision (f), the probation discharge hearing shall occur at the
end of the period, or modified period, of placement that has been ordered by
the court. At the discharge hearing, the court shall review the ward’s
progress toward meeting the goals of the individual rehabilitation plan and
the recommendations of counsel, the probation department, and any other
agencies or individuals having information the court deems necessary. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court shall order that the ward be discharged to
a period of probation supervision in the community under conditions
approved by the court, unless the court finds that the ward constitutes a
substantial risk of imminent harm to others in the community if released
from custody. If the court so finds, the ward may be retained in custody in a
secure youth treatment facility for up to one additional year of confinement,
subject to the review hearing and probation discharge hearing provisions of
this subdivision and subject to the maximum confinement provisions of
subdivision (c).” (§ 875, subd. (e)(3).)
                                           II.
      In August 2022, Sebastian was committed to Solano County’s secure
youth treatment facility for a baseline term of four years after he admitted
having committed voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and
having personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). (People v. Sebastian C. (In re Sebastian C.) (Dec. 5,
2023, A167599) [nonpub. opn.].) At review hearings held pursuant to section
875, subdivision (e)(1)(A) at six-month intervals between March 2023 and
                                           4
October 2024, the juvenile court reduced his baseline term by a total of nine
and one-half months.
      In January 2025, with approximately nine months remaining on his
baseline term, the probation department petitioned the court to approve
Sebastian’s “step-down into foster care as a Less Restrictive Program.” It
requested that the court enter a general placement order for Sebastian,
which would allow him to attain status as a foster youth and be placed in a
Supervised Independent Living Placement (SILP) with his adult sister. It
explained that all re-entry options were considered but that the “[o]ther Less
Restrictive Program[] . . . options available to him . . . will not designate him
as a foster youth” and thus, do not allow access to services and funding under
the extended foster care program. The probation department reported that
because Sebastian was recently reassessed at a moderate risk to reoffend, it
was recommending a “very high level of community supervision.” According
to the probation department, “[w]eekly contacts and frequent home visits will
monitor compliance along with his whereabouts. Referrals to appropriate
services and interventions will facilitate continued efforts to achieve
rehabilitating [sic]. A case worker will monitor and facilitate his success
towards his placement case plan and Transitional Independent Living Plan
[]. He will be required to attend school and/or maintain employment. His
recommended terms include drug testing and search and seizure. Should he
fail to demonstrate compliance, he may return to [the secure youth treatment
facility] to continue treatment.”
      An addendum submitted to the trial court provided additional detail on
the services to be provided. It reads in part: “Upon entering the community,
[Sebastian] will be referred to community-based interventions that will
continue to meet his treatment needs. He will be referred to Seneca family of


                                        5
Agencies to ensure he remains connected to therapy. He will be referred to
First Place for Youth to engage in [Independent Living Placement]
workshops. He will have the option to remain connected to his mentor who
has met with him during his commitment. He will have weekly contact with
Probation to monitor compliance with his terms of supervisions, as well as to
ensure progress towards his Individualized Rehabilitation Plan (IRP) and
placement case plan goals. Frequent home visits will serve as additional
means to monitor success. During his contacts with Probation, he will work
one-on-one to complete written cognitive behavioral tools to practice and
reinforce the skills he learned during his commitment to RISE.”
      The juvenile court denied the request. The court explained that
section 875 “very clearly states here that the less restrictive program is
supposed to be providing the community transition services. In fact,
[subdivision] (f)(1)(B) says programming and community transition services
to be provided or coordinated by the less restrictive program[], including, but
not limited to, any educational, vocational, counseling, housing or other
services made available through the program. I do not believe his sister’s
house is a program, and this is very clear what the statute requires.” The
court noted that the county only has one identified less restrictive program
and also added, “I did reach out to others to find out if this is a less restrictive
program and it doesn’t qualify.” The trial court also rejected defense
counsel’s argument that the proposed “less restrictive program” included not
just the sister’s housing but her coordination with the probation department
for supervision and services.
      In his opening brief, Sebastian notes that in March 2025, the juvenile
court granted the probation department’s petition to transfer Sebastian to
the Rise Up House, the county’s approved less restrictive program referenced


                                         6
by the court above. At that time, Sebastian had approximately eight months
remaining on his baseline term. In May 2025, however, the court ordered
that Sebastian be remanded back to the county secure youth treatment
facility based upon an allegation that he failed to comply with the rules of his
release.
       In response to this court’s request for additional briefing regarding
Sebastian’s current placement, Sebastian’s counsel wrote that on February 9,
2026, Sebastian was placed in the home of his mother as a less restrictive
program. The supplemental briefing indicates that the order was issued by a
different judge from the one who issued the order on appeal. At that time,
Sebastian had served all of the baseline term ordered by the court.
Sebastian’s supplemental brief notes, however, that as a condition of his
release, the parties stipulated to a one-year extension of his baseline term
under section 875, subdivision (e)(3), so that, according to counsel, as of
March 2026, nine months remained on Sebastian’s baseline term during
which he could still be returned to custody in the secure youth treatment
facility.
                                  DISCUSSION
                                         I.
       It is our “duty to decide ‘ “ ‘actual controversies by a judgment which
can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he critical
factor in considering whether an . . . appeal is moot is whether the appellate
court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.’ [Citation.] A
court ordinarily will dismiss an appeal when it cannot grant effective relief,
but may instead ‘exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue when
there remain “material questions for the court’s determination” [citation],
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where a “pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to
recur” [citation], or where “there is a likelihood of recurrence of the
controversy between the same parties or others.” ’ ” (In re David B. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.)
      Here, a decision reversing the trial court’s order rejecting placement
with the sister will have no practical impact on Sebastian now or in the
future. The court has since issued two step-down orders and he is currently
placed in a less restrictive program with housing provided by his mother.
The denial of his initial placement request will not alter his current
placement nor will the reversal of that order impact any future placement
requests.
      Sebastian argues, however, that if the appeal is found to be moot, this
court should “exercise its discretion to consider the issues on the merits for
the purpose of providing guidance to the courts below about the
implementation of this new statutory scheme.” He argues that “[t]he
probation department, courts and the parties themselves would benefit from
clarification regarding what constitutes a less restrictive program and
whether release to a family member’s residence with probation department
support in the form of intensive supervision and support services meets the
requirements of a less restrictive program.” In his supplemental briefing, he
argues that if the placement in the home of his mother does not work out,
which he asserts is not unlikely, he “could end up back before the court
seeking an alternative placement in the home of his sister or other family
member as a less restrictive program. If he comes before the judge who
earlier rejected a family home as a less restrictive program, he may once
again be denied this option.”




                                        8
      The Attorney General disagrees that this appeal presents an issue of
broad public interest that is likely to recur. The Attorney General argues:
“Though appellant relies on a broad statutory interpretation of section 875 to
level his argument . . ., his appeal largely concerns the court’s application of
section 875 to his particular request to be placed with his sister as a less
restrictive program. . . . His argument that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in failing to consider his sister’s home as a less restrictive
placement within the meaning of the statute—and subsequent denial of his
request to transfer to his sister’s home under that statute—turns on case-
specific facts, including his individual progress with his personalized
rehabilitation plan and at the [secure youth treatment facility], the
programs, therapies, or benefits offered by transfer to his sister’s home, and
his potential danger to the community upon transfer. The resolution of
circumstances unique to appellant alone would not provide helpful guidance
in future cases.”
      The Attorney General’s characterization of the court’s ruling as
involving only statutory application rather than interpretation is not entirely
correct. The trial court clearly wrestled with whether and under what
circumstances a family home could qualify as a less restrictive program. The
Attorney General argues that the sister’s home does not constitute a less
restrictive program under the plain language of the statute. Interpretation of
section 875, subdivision (f) is a matter of public importance and clarification
on the definition of a less restrictive program under that provision would be
helpful both to trial courts in general and to Sebastian should the issue recur
in his case. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of
this limited issue.




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                                       II.
      As set forth above, section 875, subdivision (f)(1) authorizes the trial
court to issue an order at a review hearing transferring a ward “from a secure
youth treatment facility to [a] less restrictive program, such as a halfway
house, a camp or ranch, or a community residential or nonresidential service
program.” (Italics added.) That subdivision states that the “purpose of a less
restrictive program is to facilitate the safe and successful reintegration of the
ward into the community.” (Ibid.) In deciding whether the placement is
consistent with the goals of youth rehabilitation and community safety, the
statute directs the court to consider “[t]he programming and community
transition services to be provided, or coordinated by the less restrictive
program, including, but not limited to, any educational, vocational,
counseling, housing, or other services made available through the program.”
(§ 875, subd. (f)(1)(B).)
      The trial court found, and the Attorney General agrees, that the sister’s
home was not a “program” under the plain language of subdivision (f)(1)(B) of
section 875 because it does not provide or coordinate programing and
community transition services. We are not persuaded by this reading of the
statute. Subdivision (f)(1) identifies a “community . . . nonresidential service
program” as an example of a less restrictive program. Subdivision (f)(1)(B)
describes the programming and services the court should consider in deciding
whether to approve the transfer request, but it does not purport to define
“less restrictive program.” And the word “any” in the list it provides—
“including, but not limited to, any educational, vocational, counseling,
housing, or other services” (italics added)—indicates that the program need
not provide or coordinate every listed service in order to qualify as a less
restrictive program. Thus, consistently with the statute, a ward could receive


                                       10
programming or services from a community nonresidential service program
while being housed in a relative’s home.
      Sebastian cites a document prepared by the Offices of Youth and
Community Restoration (OYCR)2 that identifies “prioritizing home” as a key
component of less restrictive programs. It explains: “In light of the
previously discussed components to consider when creating [less restrictive
programs (LRPs)], it is important to emphasize that whenever possible, home
with robust supports as detailed in youths’ [individualized rehabilitation
plans (IRPs)] should be utilized as less restrictive programs. . . . If youth can
receive the support they require as part of their IRP at home through
community-based agencies, they should. [¶] Counties should leverage and
build partnerships with existing agencies in the community to ensure that
home is available as soon as possible for as many young people as possible.”
      The document offers the following example of a “Home-Based” less
restrictive program: “Advance Peace is an organization that works with
young men involved in gun violence at their homes through the Peacemaker


      2 The OYCR, which is housed within the Health and Human Services

Agency, was established by the Legislature in 2020 pursuant to section 2200
“to promote trauma responsive, culturally informed services for youth
involved in the juvenile justice system that support the youths’ successful
transition into adulthood and help them become responsible, thriving, and
engaged members of their communities.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 50, eff.
Sept. 30, 2020; § 2200, subd. (b); In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899,
907.) Sebastian’s request that we take judicial notice of the publication by
the OCYR of a document entitled “Less Restrictive Programs: Considerations
and Possibilities” is granted. (https://oycr.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/346/2024/02/OYCR_OnePager_LRPs.pdf [as of
4/15/2026].) Sebastian’s request that this court take judicial notice of a
Judicial Council of California Memorandum to Presiding Juvenile Court
Judges entitled “Recent Legislative Changes Concerning Division of Juvenile
Justice Realignment” is denied as unnecessary to our resolution of the
appeal.
                                       11
Fellowship. The Fellowship is an 18-month mentorship program that
delivers robust support and programming to youth at their respective homes
based on their individual needs through community-based agencies.
Individualized programming includes gang intervention, behavioral health
treatment, substance use treatment, restorative programming, life skills
development, and educational and vocational support, along with mentorship
from credible messengers who share similar experiences. Youth are also
provided with income assistance through LifeMAP Milestone Allowances,
which are incentive-based stipends for youth as they progress throughout
their time in the Fellowship. Since the creation of the Fellowship, rates of
gun-related injuries have decreased, and members of the Fellowship have
faced lower rates of rearrest [citation]. Advance Peace is a community-based
organization that leverages both private funding and funding from
government agencies to provide robust support and restorative programming
that promote healing and accountability for youth at home, not through
incarceration. When considering home with support as an LRP for young
people, Advance Peace’s Peacemaker Fellowship can be looked to for
inspiration.”
      We agree with Sebastian that OYCR’s recommendation that less
restrictive programs include placement within a relative’s home, with
supervision and programming provided by a community-based agency, is
consistent with both the language and purpose of the statute. In such
circumstances, the less restrictive program is the “community . . .
nonresidential service program,” not just the family home.
      The trial court expressed concern that what the probation department
proposed as a less restrictive program was actually a disposition that would
be appropriate following a probation discharge hearing under


                                      12
subdivision (e)(3) of section 875, which is held at the conclusion of the
baseline confinement term (including a modified baseline term). That
subdivision provides in part: “At the discharge hearing, the court shall
review the ward’s progress toward meeting the goals of the individual
rehabilitation plan and the recommendations of counsel, the probation
department, and any other agencies or individuals having information the
court deems necessary. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall order
that the ward be discharged to a period of probation supervision in the
community under conditions approved by the court, unless the court finds
that the ward constitutes a substantial risk of imminent harm to others in
the community if released from custody.” (§ 875, subd. (e)(3).)
      We do not think the statute’s provisions for probation supervision after
discharge imply that placement in a relative’s home cannot constitute a less
restrictive program. The statute uses similar language to describe the
purposes of a less restrictive program and of probation conditions following
discharge. Again, it provides that “[t]he purpose of a less restrictive program
is to facilitate the safe and successful reintegration of the ward into the
community.” (§ 875, subd. (f)(1).) At the discharge hearing, “the court shall
determine the reasonable conditions of probation that are suitable to meet
the developmental needs and circumstances of the ward and to facilitate the
ward’s successful reentry into the community.” (Id., subd. (e)(4).) The
overlap in these descriptions suggests that the requirements imposed on a
ward could look similar under each subdivision, although there might be
differences in the kind, source, or amount of programming and services
received. For a ward whose progress warrants it, such a less restrictive
program is not an improper effort to jump to the discharge phase of the case




                                       13
but something the statute appears to contemplate in appropriate
circumstances.
      The Attorney General alternatively argues that the probation
department failed to supply the juvenile court with enough information about
the programming or services Sebastian would receive, and that in the
absence of that information “the court properly determined that placement
with his sister was not a ‘less restrictive program’ within the meaning of
section 875.” We do not see the issue here as one of statutory meaning.
Certainly, the juvenile court must be provided with sufficient information
regarding “any educational, vocational, counseling, housing, or other services
made available through the program” to enable it to properly evaluate
whether the placement is consistent with the goals of youth rehabilitation
and community safety. (§ 875, subd. (f)(1).) Here, the court could have
required more details from the probation department before deciding whether
to approve the recommended transfer. But we disagree that what is
described in the addendum quoted above cannot constitute a less restrictive
program as a matter of law. Because the order denying placement is moot,
we need not further opine on the probation department’s proposal.
                                DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed as moot.
                                             GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
SWEET, J. *




*Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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Trial Court:                Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge:                Honorable Terrye Davis

Counsel for Defendant and   Eileen Manning-Villar, under
Appellant:                  appointment by the Court of Appeal

Counsel for Plaintiff and   Rob Bonta
Respondent:                 Attorney General of California
                            Charles C. Ragland
                            Chief Assistant Attorney General
                            Jeffrey M. Laurence
                            Senior Assistant Attorney General
                            Catherine A. Rivlin
                            Supervising Deputy Attorney General
                            Maya Bourgeois
                            Deputy Attorney General




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