Court Filings

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Tyrone Eric Taylor-Shorter challenging a trial court’s orders in a child support action brought by the Georgia Department of Human Services. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in domestic relations matters, including actions to establish parental support obligations, must be pursued by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Because Taylor-Shorter did not follow the discretionary-appeal procedure, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits of his challenges.

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal from a Family Court order that granted the respondent's unopposed motion to dismiss a Family Court Act article 8 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Family Court concluded the parties did not have an intimate relationship under Family Court Act § 812(1)(e). Because the dismissal order was entered after the petitioner defaulted and CPLR 5511 bars appeals entered on a default, the Second Department held the petitioner must first move to vacate the default before seeking review, so the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed an unopposed voluntary motion by appellant D.E.P. to dismiss an appeal from a final order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (child referred to by initials). The court found the motion complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), that granting dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no appellate decision had been issued. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, declined to entertain a rehearing motion, and ordered issuance of its mandate immediately.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Susanne E. Krupa’s direct appeal from a final divorce decree because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations cases must be pursued by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35. Krupa filed a notice of appeal rather than the required discretionary application, and the court held that compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional. Because Krupa did not follow that procedure, the court granted Timothy E. McLane’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Chuka Anene’s discretionary application for review of a February 3, 2026 divorce judgment because it was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. Anene filed the application on March 27, 2026 — 52 days after entry of the decree — and the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider untimely applications under OCGA § 5-6-35(d). The court therefore dismissed the application as untimely, noting a prior direct appeal by Anene had already been dismissed as improper in divorce cases.

The Appellate Division dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a divorce action concerning the equitable distribution of marital property. The appeals arose from a September 19, 2024 Supreme Court order in Livingston County that, among other things, distributed the parties' marital assets. The appellate court issued a unanimous order dismissing both matters without costs and referenced a companion memorandum decision in a related appeal. No substantive reversal or modification of the lower court's distribution is contained in this short order.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed an appeal by defendant Bradford Morse challenging a Supreme Court order that, among other things, approved compensation for the Attorney for the Children in a matrimonial action. The court held the appeal could not proceed as of right because the challenged order did not decide a motion made on notice under CPLR 5701(a) and therefore is not immediately appealable. The panel declined to treat the notice of appeal as a permission-to-appeal application and denied discretionary review.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus petition by Zachary Brice Knox challenging a temporary restraining order that denied him possession and access to a child. After the petition was filed, the trial court modified and partially vacated the TRO and set a hearing for temporary orders. Because the complained-of provisions were vacated, the appellate court found Knox’s complaints moot and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under the appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a county court-at-law involving matters concerning M.P. and A.P. because the appellant failed to pay the required $205 filing fee after her claim of indigence was rejected by the trial court. The appellate court gave notice and a deadline to pay, warned dismissal would follow under the appellate rules, and the fee was not paid by the deadline. The court denied as moot the appellant's pending motions and ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal.

The court granted the father's request to dismiss his own appeal in a child custody case. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the child and filed to terminate parental rights; instead the parties reached an agreed judgment appointing the Department permanent managing conservator while mother and father remained possessory conservators. The father, incarcerated at the time, initially appealed but after new appellate counsel secured a hearing and the father waived his motion for new trial and the appeal, he moved to dismiss the appeal, which the court granted under the appellate rules.

The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because her notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court signed the final order on 2025-06-24, and the notice of appeal was required within 20 days (by 2025-07-14) for this accelerated appeal pathway. Mother did not file her notice until 2026-03-17, and she did not respond to the court's request to show grounds to retain the appeal. Because no timely notice or extension was filed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Russell Carl Nast’s direct appeal of the trial court’s October 8, 2025 order confirming an arbitration award and granting a divorce because appeals in divorce cases must proceed by discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). The court concluded the proper procedure was an application for discretionary appeal, and that procedure is jurisdictional, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the direct appeal. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the respondent’s request for a frivolous-appeal penalty.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted direct appeal by Olufeyijimi Awofadeju from a final divorce decree entered December 22, 2025. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35, and the appellant did not follow that procedure. Because use of the discretionary-appeal process is jurisdictional, the improperly filed direct appeal could not proceed and was dismissed on April 22, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kentay Smith’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Smith sought review of post-October 17, 2025 orders after filing a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026. The court held that the controlling final order was entered October 17, 2025, and Smith’s notice of appeal was not filed within the 30-day statutory deadline. The February 19, 2026 order merely stated the case was closed and made no new substantive custody ruling, so it was not appealable. Motions to expedite and for emergency consideration were also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Second Court of Appeals for Texas dismissed Father's accelerated appeal from a January 6, 2026 final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because Father failed to file his appellate brief by the March 3, 2026 deadline and did not respond to the court's March 16, 2026 notice. The court gave Father until March 26, 2026 to file a brief and a motion explaining the delay but received no response. Citing Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure allowing dismissal for want of prosecution, the court dismissed the appeal on April 16, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed two direct appeals challenging a trial court’s award of $5,005 in attorney fees and a contempt finding in a domestic relations case because the appellants did not follow the required discretionary-review procedure. The trial court had apportioned the fee award between the father (Randy Harling, Jr.) and his former counsel (Bataski Bailey). The Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because Georgia law requires an application for discretionary review to appeal orders in domestic relations matters and awards under OCGA § 9-15-14. Noncompliance with that procedure is jurisdictional, so the appeals were dismissed on April 16, 2026.

The First Department dismissed as moot an appeal by a father challenging a Supreme Court Bronx County temporary custody order that gave physical custody to the mother and visitation to the father. The court granted the father's appellate counsel's motion to withdraw under Anders v. California after concluding there were no nonfrivolous issues to raise. The panel held the temporary visitation order was not an appealable final disposition under the Family Court Act and, in any event, the temporary order expired and has been superseded by later custody and visitation orders that were not appealed, rendering this appeal moot.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal in a child-support modification case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant filed a notice of appeal after the trial court had entered and then vacated an order dismissing his motion and granted a new trial date; no final, signed order was in the clerk’s record. The appellate court warned the appellant to show cause and to file any supplemental clerk’s record by a deadline, but the appellant did not respond. Because there was no final judgment or appealable order, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kyle Ramsey’s direct appeal of a twelve-month protective order granted to Kristina Ramsey under Georgia’s Family Violence Act for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that appeals in domestic relations and Family Violence Act matters must be pursued by filing an application for discretionary appeal in the appellate court rather than by a trial-court notice of appeal. Because Kyle did not follow the mandatory discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kreslyn Barron Odum’s application for discretionary appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside an order requiring her to pay half of a guardian ad litem’s fees. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the underlying custody case remains pending and the order is interlocutory. Odum failed to follow interlocutory appeal procedures, including obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, so the discretionary-appeal process could not cure that jurisdictional defect.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Husband’s direct appeal from a final divorce judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that appeals in divorce and related domestic relations matters must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review under OCGA § 5-6-35, and that compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Husband did not follow the required discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it could not consider the appeal and dismissed the case.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Grant Allen Nelson from a final divorce decree entered July 7, 2025, after Nelson filed an unopposed motion stating he no longer wished to prosecute the appeal. Because no other party appealed and the motion complied with Texas appellate procedure, the court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision is procedural and does not address the merits of the underlying divorce decree.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas granted the appellant Erica Arnez Jackson's motion for voluntary dismissal of her appeal from a judgment of the County Court at Law No. 2, Galveston County (trial court case no. 25-FD-0597). Because no opinion had issued, the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and dismissed any other pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a merits determination.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal filed by Chuka Anene from a trial court’s final judgment and decree of divorce because appeals in divorce and other domestic relations matters require a discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35. The court explained that compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional and cited precedent holding the same. Because the appellant did not follow that mandatory procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal on April 7, 2026.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Demarcus Davis from a final divorce judgment entered January 6, 2026. The court held that appeals in domestic relations cases must be brought by application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Davis filed only a notice of appeal and asked the court to treat it as a discretionary application, but the court found that compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional. Because Davis did not file the required application, the court granted Young Seon Jo’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tommy Martin’s direct appeal of a trial court order denying his motion to confirm service and reinstate a child support enforcement case because the court lacked jurisdiction. Georgia law requires appeals in domestic relations matters, including child support collection, to proceed by application for discretionary review. Martin used a direct appeal rather than the required discretionary-review procedure, and that failure is jurisdictional, so the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by the mother of minor J. G. challenging a juvenile court order that terminated her parental rights. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the mother failed to file the required application for discretionary review under Georgia law. The opinion cites the statute and precedent establishing that compliance with the discretionary-review procedure is jurisdictional, so dismissal — not a decision on the merits of the termination — was required.

The Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed the record and determined that discretionary review was not appropriate in William Paul Bradley, Jr.’s case. The court concluded that granting the application for discretionary appeal was improvident and therefore dismissed the appeal. This order ends this Court of Appeals proceeding without addressing the merits of the underlying dispute.