Court Filings

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed an unopposed voluntary motion by appellant D.E.P. to dismiss an appeal from a final order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (child referred to by initials). The court found the motion complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), that granting dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no appellate decision had been issued. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, declined to entertain a rehearing motion, and ordered issuance of its mandate immediately.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus petition by Zachary Brice Knox challenging a temporary restraining order that denied him possession and access to a child. After the petition was filed, the trial court modified and partially vacated the TRO and set a hearing for temporary orders. Because the complained-of provisions were vacated, the appellate court found Knox’s complaints moot and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under the appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a county court-at-law involving matters concerning M.P. and A.P. because the appellant failed to pay the required $205 filing fee after her claim of indigence was rejected by the trial court. The appellate court gave notice and a deadline to pay, warned dismissal would follow under the appellate rules, and the fee was not paid by the deadline. The court denied as moot the appellant's pending motions and ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal.

The court granted the father's request to dismiss his own appeal in a child custody case. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the child and filed to terminate parental rights; instead the parties reached an agreed judgment appointing the Department permanent managing conservator while mother and father remained possessory conservators. The father, incarcerated at the time, initially appealed but after new appellate counsel secured a hearing and the father waived his motion for new trial and the appeal, he moved to dismiss the appeal, which the court granted under the appellate rules.

The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because her notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court signed the final order on 2025-06-24, and the notice of appeal was required within 20 days (by 2025-07-14) for this accelerated appeal pathway. Mother did not file her notice until 2026-03-17, and she did not respond to the court's request to show grounds to retain the appeal. Because no timely notice or extension was filed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals for Texas dismissed Father's accelerated appeal from a January 6, 2026 final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because Father failed to file his appellate brief by the March 3, 2026 deadline and did not respond to the court's March 16, 2026 notice. The court gave Father until March 26, 2026 to file a brief and a motion explaining the delay but received no response. Citing Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure allowing dismissal for want of prosecution, the court dismissed the appeal on April 16, 2026.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal in a child-support modification case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant filed a notice of appeal after the trial court had entered and then vacated an order dismissing his motion and granted a new trial date; no final, signed order was in the clerk’s record. The appellate court warned the appellant to show cause and to file any supplemental clerk’s record by a deadline, but the appellant did not respond. Because there was no final judgment or appealable order, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by Grant Allen Nelson from a final divorce decree entered July 7, 2025, after Nelson filed an unopposed motion stating he no longer wished to prosecute the appeal. Because no other party appealed and the motion complied with Texas appellate procedure, the court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision is procedural and does not address the merits of the underlying divorce decree.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas granted the appellant Erica Arnez Jackson's motion for voluntary dismissal of her appeal from a judgment of the County Court at Law No. 2, Galveston County (trial court case no. 25-FD-0597). Because no opinion had issued, the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and dismissed any other pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a merits determination.