Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Dawon’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in a construction-payment dispute. The parties had a detailed January 2024 service agreement that included a broad, surviving arbitration clause. In August 2024 they signed a short one-page follow-up agreement about cost handling and scheduling that did not address dispute resolution and did not supplant the original contract. The appellate court held the second agreement did not supersede the first, so the original arbitration clause remained enforceable and dismissal and arbitration were required.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court award of $14,525 in attorney fees to a third party, Yaarit Silverstone, in a garnishment proceeding. SMS Financial Recovery Services had appealed the fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 after the trial court found SMS’s post-judgment motions and discovery were frivolous or for harassment. The appellate court held that OCGA § 9-15-14 authorizes fee awards only in "civil actions" and must be strictly construed; garnishment is a special statutory proceeding, not a civil action, so § 9-15-14 does not authorize fees in this context. Because of that legal conclusion, the court reversed the award and did not decide the other claimed errors.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss in a negligence suit filed by a mother on behalf of her burned six-year-old son against his teacher, another teacher/paraprofessional, the school nurse, the principal, and the Cobb County School District. The defendants moved to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), asserting sovereign and official immunity and submitted affidavits. The trial court treated the motion as converted to summary judgment because affidavits were attached and delayed ruling on immunity. The appeals court held that attaching affidavits did not automatically convert a jurisdictional immunity motion into summary judgment and remanded for the trial court to consider the immunity defenses properly.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Smart Venture Capital’s appeal and ruled that the trial court erred in denying Smart Venture’s motion to set aside a default judgment. The Association sued the property owners and added Smart Venture (a secured creditor) but failed to effect service on Smart Venture’s registered agent. The court held the certified-mail evidence lacked a required postmark and there was no proof Smart Venture received or signed for the mailing, so service was not perfected and the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Stanley Randolph’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after police detained and searched him. Officers found Randolph sitting in a parked sedan in a high-crime cul-de-sac at night, blocked the car, and required the occupants to exit; officers later saw a backpack with suspected marijuana and then searched. The appellate court held the encounter was a detention requiring particularized, objective suspicion, which the record did not supply prior to the restraint, so the stop and subsequent evidence collection were unlawful and suppression was required.

The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s judgment that had affirmed the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment’s denial of Beacon Media’s permit to erect a freestanding billboard. Beacon applied for a permit, the City initially denied it, then granted it, and an adjacent landowner, Jamestown, appealed to the BZA and succeeded. The appeals court held Jamestown lacked standing under Georgia’s substantial-interest-aggrieved-citizen test because it did not show any special harm unique from other similarly situated property owners. Because Jamestown lacked standing, the court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of the BZA decision.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that GEICO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings for breach of a settlement agreement. The case arose after Abdel-Rahman made a pre-suit motor vehicle tort settlement offer that included the five statutory material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) plus additional nonstatutory terms. GEICO sent a written acceptance agreeing to the material terms while rejecting the offeror’s attempt to make the statute inapplicable. The court followed prior appellate decisions holding that acceptance of the statutory material terms alone forms an enforceable settlement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1, so GEICO proved a breach and entitlement to specific performance.