Leighton v. Kratos Logistics, LLC, Ascendant Claims Services

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
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                        No. 1D2024-2569
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BRIAN LEIGHTON,

    Appellant,

    v.

KRATOS LOGISTICS, LLC and
ASCENDANT CLAIMS SERVICES,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________


On appeal from the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims.
Iliana Forte, Judge.

Date of Accident: February 9, 2022.

                           May 6, 2026

PER CURIAM.

     Claimant, Brian Leighton, appeals an amended final
compensation order in which the Judge of Compensation Claims
(JCC) deemed his most recent petition for benefits untimely under
section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes. For the reasons that follow,
we hold that the petition was timely filed and, therefore, set aside
the amended order.

     As found by the JCC, Claimant sustained a compensable
injury on February 9, 2022, while in the course and scope of his
employment as a delivery driver. On February 12, Claimant was
evaluated by Dr. Bartoli, who prescribed medication and physical
therapy. On February 17, the employer/carrier (E/C) first learned
of the accident and injury, and on February 22, the E/C authorized
treatment and began to pay disability benefits. The E/C’s final
payment of indemnity benefits occurred on June 29, 2022.
Claimant’s final visit to an authorized health care provider
occurred on August 1, 2022. On May 9, 2023, Claimant sought
reimbursement from the E/C for Dr. Bartoli’s care. The E/C
reimbursed Claimant for that care the following day.

     On March 1, 2024, Claimant filed the petition for benefits at
issue, requesting treatment from a neurosurgeon, among other
things. The E/C asserted that the petition was barred by the
statute of limitations. Claimant argued below, as he does on
appeal, that the E/C’s May 2023 reimbursement rendered his
petition timely. The JCC found merit in the statute of limitations
defense, finding that the E/C’s reimbursement did not constitute a
“furnishing” of benefits under section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes.
This appeal followed.

      Pursuant to section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2021), a
petition for benefits is barred unless it is filed “within 2 years after
the date on which the employee knew or should have known that
the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and
scope of employment.” Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2021),
tolls the two-year period when “[p]ayment of any indemnity benefit
or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance
pursuant to either a notice of injury or a petition for benefits [is
made] . . . for 1 year from the date of such payment.”

     In Estes v. Palm Beach County School District, 51 Fla. L.
Weekly D536a, 2026 WL 796496, *8 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 23, 2026)
(en banc), we recently held that section 440.19(2) suspends or
temporarily stops the limitation period set forth in subsection (1)
rather than extending it, as our previous case law had concluded.
There, the claimant received workers’ compensation benefits
immediately following her workplace accident in 2021 until
January 2023. Id. at *1. We concluded that the one-year tolling
clock contained within section 440.19(2) stopped the running of the
two-year-limitations-period clock after the accident until one year
after she received those benefits, which was through at least
January 2024. Id. at *7. As such, when the claimant filed her


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petition for benefits in June 2024, she was only about six months
into the running of the two-year-limitations-period clock, which
did not expire until January 2026. Id. For that reason, we set
aside the final order’s dismissal of the petition. Id.

     Based upon our holding in Estes, we need not consider here
whether the E/C’s May 2023 reimbursement to Claimant
constituted a furnishing of benefits under section 440.19(2)
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. This is because, as the
JCC found, and as the E/C acknowledges, the last provision of
authorized medical care for Claimant occurred on August 2, 2022.
In accordance with the holding of Estes and pursuant to section
440.19(2), that furnishing of care tolled section 440.19(1)’s two-
year-limitations-period clock until one year after receipt of that
care. In other words, subsection (2)’s two-year-limitations period
did not begin to run until August 2023. The petition for benefits
at issue was filed in March 2024, squarely within that two-year
period.

    Because dismissal of Claimant’s petition for benefits was not
warranted in this case, we SET ASIDE the order under review.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LEWIS and TREADWELL, JJ., concur.
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    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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Michael J. Winer of Winer Law Group PA, Tampa, for Appellant.

Kimberly J. Fernandes of Kelley Kronenberg, Tallahassee, for
Appellees.




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