Chadwick Willacy v. State of Florida & Chadwick Willacy v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
                           ____________

                        No. SC2026-0519
                          ____________

                     CHADWICK WILLACY,
                         Appellant,

                               vs.

                      STATE OF FLORIDA,
                           Appellee.

                           ____________

                        No. SC2026-0526
                          ____________

                     CHADWICK WILLACY,
                         Petitioner,

                               vs.

                      STATE OF FLORIDA,
                         Respondent.

                          April 15, 2026

PER CURIAM.

     Thirty-one years after Chadwick Willacy was sentenced to

death for capital murder, Governor DeSantis signed his death
warrant on March 13, 2026, with an execution date of April 21,

2026.

     When the warrant was signed, Willacy already had a pending

motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 1 seeking

public records from the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC)

on Florida’s lethal injection protocol. He filed a second motion after

the warrant was signed seeking from FDOC, the Executive Office of

the Governor (Governor), the Office of the Attorney General (AG),

and the State Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit (State

Attorney) records regarding communications purportedly had

among them. The circuit court denied both motions in one order

and denied Willacy’s subsequent motion for rehearing/in camera



      1. When rule 3.852 was adopted, it was described as a
“discovery rule for public records production ancillary to
proceedings pursuant to [Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure]
3.850 and 3.851,” i.e., postconviction proceedings. Sims v. State,
753 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Amends. to Fla. Rules of
Crim. Proc., 754 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 1999)); see also Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.852(a)(1) (“This rule is applicable only to the production of
public records for capital postconviction defendants and does not
change or alter the time periods specified in Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.851. Furthermore, this rule does not affect,
expand, or limit the production of public records for any purposes
other than use in a proceeding held pursuant to rule 3.850 or rule
3.851.”).


                                 -2-
review. Importantly, Willacy did not file a rule 3.851 motion. And

the time to file such a motion under our order setting an expedited

timeline for post-warrant proceedings has already expired.

     For the reasons explained below, we have jurisdiction 2 but

treat Willacy’s appeal of the order denying his public records

requests as a petition filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate

Procedure 9.142(c) and deny the petition. We dismiss his appeal

from the order denying his motion for extension of time to file a

successive postconviction motion. We further deny Willacy’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus, as well as his request for oral

argument.

                            I. Background

     The facts of this case are especially heinous. Willacy was in

the process of burglarizing the home of his neighbor, Marlys Sather,

when she came home and caught him in the act. After binding,

strangling, and bludgeoning her with a force so intense that it



     2. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P.
9.142(c); Sims, 753 So. 2d at 67 (reviewing order denying public
records under rule 3.852 on plenary appeal where capital
defendant’s warrant had been signed and successive postconviction
motion was still pending).


                                 -3-
dislodged a portion of her skull, Willacy doused her with gasoline

and set her on fire, training a fan on the fire to feed the flames. Ms.

Sather ultimately died from smoke inhalation. And Willacy was

convicted of first-degree murder, arson, robbery, and burglary.

     We affirmed Willacy’s convictions on direct appeal but

remanded for a new penalty phase based on the trial court’s denial

of Willacy’s attempt to rehabilitate a juror. Willacy v. State, 640 So.

2d 1079 (Fla. 1994).

     Following his new penalty phase, the jury recommended the

death sentence by a vote of 11-1, and the trial court again

sentenced him to death. The sentence was supported by the

existence of five aggravating factors showing that the murder was:

(1) committed in the course of a robbery, arson, and burglary; (2)

committed to avoid lawful arrest; (3) committed for pecuniary gain;

(4) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) committed in a

cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. The trial court found

no statutory mitigators and thirty-one nonstatutory mitigators to

which it assigned little weight. We affirmed his sentence on appeal.

Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 970

(1997).


                                 -4-
     Willacy then filed his initial postconviction motion, followed by

an amended motion, raising thirty-one claims. Following an

evidentiary hearing on multiple claims, the circuit court denied

relief. We affirmed, and we also denied an accompanying petition

for writ of habeas corpus. Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131 (Fla.

2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1265 (2008).

     Willacy filed a flurry of other unsuccessful state and federal

challenges over the years. See Willacy v. McNeil, 33 So. 3d 36 (Fla.

2010) (table) (denying successive habeas petition); Willacy v. State,

90 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2012) (affirming denial of first successive

postconviction motion), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1147 (2013); Willacy

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 6:08-CV-619-ORL-31LRS, 2014 WL

3594213 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014) (denying federal habeas petition

raising many of the same claims raised in Willacy, 967 So. 2d 131),

aff’d, 703 F. App’x 744 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 964

(2018); 3 Willacy v. State, 238 So. 3d 100 (Fla.) (affirming denial of




    3. Several years later, Willacy moved to reopen his federal
habeas case. The motion was denied, and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals denied a certificate of appealability.


                                  -5-
successive postconviction motion raising Hurst 4 claim), cert. denied,

586 U.S. 866 (2018); Willacy v. State, 314 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2021)

(affirming denial of successive postconviction motion raising claim

under Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019)).

     And in this case, after the circuit court denied his motion for

public records on March 23, 2026, two days later, Willacy filed a

motion for rehearing and in camera inspection of the records and a

motion for an extension of time to file a successive postconviction

motion. Both motions were denied, though the circuit court

granted Willacy additional time to file his successive postconviction

motion.

     In the meantime, on March 25, 2026, Willacy petitioned this

Court for mandamus relief (SC2026-0483), which was denied on

March 31, 2026. 5 Willacy never filed a successive postconviction



      4. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in
part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).

      5. In death penalty cases, a mandamus petition is treated as
it would be under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(e) and
(h), see Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(b)(1), and there is no automatic stay of
proceedings. The only automatic stay provided for extraordinary
writs under rule 9.100(h) applies when an appellate court issues a
show cause order on a prohibition petition.


                                 -6-
motion.6

     Instead, he filed the instant action, habeas petition, and

challenges to the denials of his motions for extension of time to file

a successive postconviction motion and for rehearing/in camera

inspection of public records.

                      II. Rule 9.142(c) Petition

                     A. Jurisdiction and Scope

     This petition concerns only the circuit court’s single order

denying Willacy’s public records requests—the pre-warrant request

filed March 6 and the post-warrant requests filed March 18—and

Willacy’s related motion for rehearing/in camera review. All public

records requests were raised in motions filed pursuant to Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852.

     When rule 3.852 was adopted, it was described as a “discovery

rule for public records production ancillary to proceedings pursuant

to rules 3.850 and 3.851.” Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla.

2000) (citing Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc., 754 So. 2d 640,




     6. In his mandamus petition, Willacy asserted that without
the requested records, a rule 3.851 motion could not be filed.


                                 -7-
643 (Fla. 1999)). Though we did not indicate in Sims whether the

order was final or nonfinal, in that case, this Court reviewed an

order denying public records under rule 3.852 on plenary appeal

where the capital defendant’s warrant had been signed and the

successive postconviction motion was still pending. Id. at 67. A

month later, in Trepal v. State, we determined that we have

jurisdiction over nonfinal discovery orders in postconviction death

cases, 754 So. 2d 702, 707 (Fla. 2000) (“We emphasize that our

review of interlocutory orders is limited to postconviction

proceedings following imposition of the death penalty . . . .”), and

described an order denying a motion to compel public records as a

postconviction discovery order, id. at 706 (“Following the signing of

the warrant . . . [t]he trial court denied Sims’ motion to compel

production of public records, which this Court affirmed by

order . . . .” (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Sims v.

State, 750 So. 2d 622, 623 n.3 (Fla. 1999))). To effectuate the

procedures in Trepal, we then adopted rule 9.142, which provides

for review of nonfinal orders in death penalty postconviction

proceedings. See Amend. to Fla. Rules of App. Proc. (Rule 9.142),

837 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2002).


                                  -8-
     Though no successive postconviction motion is currently

pending in this case, we think it appropriate to treat Willacy’s

appeal of the circuit court’s order denying both his March 6 and 18

public records requests as a petition seeking review of a nonfinal

discovery order pursuant to rule 9.142(c) based on our precedent.

     However, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review

Willacy’s claim that the circuit court erred by denying his later-filed

motion for extension of time to file his postconviction motion. This

issue is untethered to any claim for relief from his judgment or

sentence. As such, we find it is a nonappealable interlocutory order

and decline to address it further. 7

               B. Denial of Public Records Requests

     During the hearing on the pre- and post-warrant motions,

Willacy argued that the denial of his motions would violate his right

to access public records under article I, section 24 of the Florida

Constitution and his federal rights to due process and equal

protection under the United States Constitution.




     7. Even if this order could be considered, Willacy would be
time-barred from seeking review because the time for filing a
postconviction motion has expired.

                                  -9-
     Willacy sought from FDOC records related to executions

carried out after March 1, 2025, and virtually every aspect of the

lethal injection process, including: execution team training;

execution logs, checklists, and compliance verification; the process

of obtaining, handling, storing, preparing, and administering the

lethal injection drugs; monitoring data; methods for assessing

consciousness and confirming death; and post-execution

debriefings.

     From FDOC, the AG, the Governor, and the State Attorney,

Willacy sought internal and interagency communications from

March 6 to March 13, 2026, discussing his March 6 records

request; the scheduling of his execution; or any communications

regarding his death warrant. He asserted that any such records

     would demonstrate whether the interested agencies
     involved communicated regarding Chadwick Willacy’s
     demand for public records filed on March 6, 2026;
     whether the interested agencies’ silence regarding the
     records demand was due to advanced notice that the
     Governor would be signing Mr. Willacy’s death warrant or
     in the alternative, if the signing of Mr. Willacy’s death
     warrant was in response to Willacy’s March 6th public
     records demand.
           [And the requests are also] reasonably calculated to
     lead to admissible evidence regarding whether [FDOC]
     continues to strategize means to avoid compliance with
     record demands and thus preventing the discovery of


                                - 10 -
     evidence that is not in compliance with carrying out
     executions in accordance with the lethal injection
     protocol signed by the Secretary on February 18, 2025,
     and whether noncompliance unnecessarily subjects Mr.
     Willacy to suffering and cruelty in violation of the Eighth
     and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
     and corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution.

(Footnote omitted.)

     The circuit court denied both motions. Though we ordinarily

review such claims when raised in conjunction with a final order

addressing the postconviction motion for an abuse of discretion, see

Heath v. State, 426 So. 3d 1253, 1263 (Fla. 2026) (reviewing denial

of a public records request for abuse of discretion (citing

Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 200 (Fla. 2013))), cert. denied,

No. 25-6746, 2026 WL 363902 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2026), in Trepal, this

Court announced that it would utilize the certiorari review standard

applied by the district courts of appeal in reviewing discovery

orders:

     Drawing upon the district courts’ use of the writ of
     certiorari to provide an instructive model of how this
     Court may exercise its jurisdiction in such cases, we hold
     that to obtain relief an appellant must establish that the
     order compelling discovery does not conform to the
     essential requirements of law and may cause irreparable
     injury for which appellate review will be inadequate.




                                - 11 -
754 So. 2d at 707. 8

     The irreparable harm requirement has been codified in rule

9.142(c)(4)(F). And on this point, Willacy has asserted that he

cannot file a successive postconviction motion without the

requested records. Given the expedited timeline of this active

warrant case, we will assume for the sake of argument that Willacy

has satisfied a showing of irreparable harm.

     However, Willacy has not demonstrated that the circuit court

departed from the essential requirements of the law by denying his

records requests. As a result, we deny his petition.

     As a preliminary matter, we agree with the circuit court’s

conclusion that all Willacy’s requests were unrelated to any

colorable claim for postconviction relief—the common objection




      8. “Generally speaking, irreparable harm cannot be
speculative, but must be real and ascertainable.” Wal-Mart Stores
E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490-91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
(citing Holden Cove, Inc. v. 4 Mac Holdings, Inc., 948 So. 2d 1041,
1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)). “However, irreparable harm in the
discovery of confidential information presents an exception to this
general rule. This type of harm is known as ‘cat out of the bag’
harm because once the documents are disseminated, a privacy . . .
interest has been invaded which cannot be remedied on direct
appeal.” Id.


                               - 12 -
advanced by each of the agencies. We find unpersuasive Willacy’s

counter—that denial was improper because nothing in rule 3.852 or

the Florida Statutes expressly imposes such a requirement, and to

do so places a higher burden on capital defendants than on other

persons—because we have long recognized the requirement of a

nexus between the requested records and a colorable claim for

postconviction relief. See, e.g., Sims, 753 So. 2d at 70; Dailey v.

State, 283 So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019); Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d

695, 700 (Fla. 2017). The reason we require some nexus is because

the rule “is not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing

expedition for records unrelated to a colorable claim for

postconviction relief.” Sims, 753 So. 2d at 70.

     Willacy’s argument that the term “colorable claim” is a

“judicially imposed requirement” is a non-starter. The term follows

from the rule’s mandate—that requested records be relevant to a

postconviction proceeding or reasonably calculated to lead to

admissible evidence. In this context, the relevancy of the requested

records, or their ability to be reasonably calculated to lead to

admissible evidence, is directly measured by their connection to a

colorable claim for relief. This limitation is particularly important in


                                 - 13 -
post-warrant proceedings to ensure that records requests are not

used as a delay tactic but reflect a focused investigation into a

legitimate area of inquiry. See id. (“Rule 3.852 is not intended for

use by defendants as . . . ‘nothing more than an eleventh hour

attempt to delay the execution rather than a focused investigation

into some legitimate area of inquiry.’ ”). Willacy’s claim that he

should not be required to establish that the requested records relate

to a colorable claim for postconviction relief thus fails. And the

circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of the

law by requiring a showing of a colorable claim.

     Turning to the specifics of Willacy’s March 6 public records

request, he sought records relating to nearly every aspect of the

lethal injection process to determine whether FDOC was complying

with its protocol and whether a constitutional violation might exist.

That was a fishing expedition. He did not allege that the records

would support a postconviction claim.

     Willacy was merely “ ‘seeking to discover if possible claims

exist, rather than records to support a colorable claim for

postconviction relief,’ an objective unsupported by law.” Heath, 426

So. 3d at 1265 (quoting Damas v. State, 423 So. 3d 811, 823 (Fla.


                                - 14 -
2025)). And so the circuit court properly denied this motion.

      With respect to Willacy’s March 18 public records requests,

they suffer from the same defect as the first. Willacy asserted that

the records sought would demonstrate whether the agencies to

which they were directed communicated regarding the March 6

records request or the signing of the death warrant, or if the signing

of the death warrant was in response to the March 6 request.

Willacy theorized that such communications might show that FDOC

avoided responding to his March 6 request to be able to “reframe” it

as a post-warrant request requiring that it be related to a colorable

claim. 9

      These assertions, even if true, do not establish a colorable

claim for postconviction relief. There is no prohibition on

communication among executive branch agencies regarding a




      9. Willacy argued below that any “colorable claim”
requirement for capital postconviction defendants to obtain public
records only applies to post-warrant requests because the cases
cited by the agencies in their objections discussing the “colorable
claim” requirement were post-warrant cases. But we can discern
no reason to treat a pre-warrant request for additional public
records under rule 3.852(i) differently than a post-warrant request
under the same provision.


                                 - 15 -
capital defendant, a public records request, or the signing of a

death warrant. To the extent Willacy is attempting to establish a

claim that he was somehow improperly selected for a death

warrant, “challenges to the Governor’s absolute discretion to issue

death warrants . . . do not present colorable claims for

postconviction relief.” Id. at 1264-65.

     Like the March 6 request, the March 18 request also

constituted a fishing expedition seeking records in the hope of

uncovering a claim rather than supporting an existing one. Rule

3.852 does not permit such exploratory discovery.

     Moreover, we have repeatedly rejected arguments that denials

of requests under rule 3.852 for public records regarding Florida’s

administration of its lethal injection protocol or speculative

interagency communications violate the right of access to courts,

due process, or equal protection. See, e.g., King v. State, SC2026-

0336, 2026 WL 672101, at *5-6 (Fla. Mar. 10) (concluding that

denial of similar public records request regarding lethal injection

protocol did not violate due process on ground that records were

necessary to support equal protection claim, where defendant failed

to allege he was not afforded notice and opportunity to be heard on


                                 - 16 -
public records demand; instead, circuit court held hearing on

demand, and defense counsel presented argument on issue but

never “asserted a divergence from protocol that would result in a

manner of execution that would raise equal protection concerns”),

cert. denied, 2026 WL 730666 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2026); Kearse v. State,

428 So. 3d 75, 81 (Fla. 2026) (rejecting claim that denying post-

warrant public records requests for interagency communications

based on speculation that state or county agency engaged in

misconduct by contacting juror violated defendant’s rights to due

process and equal protection), cert. denied, No. 25-6926, 2026 WL

586905 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2026); Damas, 423 So. 3d at 823 (rejecting

capital defendant’s postconviction claim that denial of public

records requests violated his rights to due process and access to

courts where defendant was “seeking to discover if possible claims

exist, rather than records to support a colorable claim for

postconviction relief”); Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203, 211-12

(Fla.) (rejecting claim that denial of post-warrant requests under

rule 3.852 for public records relating to lethal injection protocol

violated defendant’s rights to due process and access to courts

where requests did not relate to a colorable claim for relief), cert.


                                 - 17 -
denied, 146 S. Ct. 57 (2025). We likewise reject Willacy’s

arguments that the denial of the records requests at issue violated

his rights of access to courts, due process, or equal protection.

     In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not depart from

the essential requirements of the law because Willacy failed to

establish that the requested records were tied to a colorable claim

for postconviction relief. Having found no error, we need not

address the agencies’ other objections and deny Willacy’s petition.

       C. Motion for Rehearing and In Camera Inspection

     In his connected claim, Willacy asserts that the circuit court

erred by failing to grant his motion for rehearing and request to

conduct an in camera inspection of the requested records that the

agencies objected to on the grounds that the records were exempt

and confidential. Though we review for a departure from the

essential requirements of the law in this case, we have recognized

that granting an in camera inspection is within the circuit court’s

discretion, and have held that there is no abuse of that discretion

when a defendant merely speculates that a colorable claim might be

uncovered. See Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 628 (Fla.) (“Jones

speculates that in camera inspection might have uncovered Brady


                                - 18 -
material. But Jones has not identified any reason to believe that

Brady material has been withheld, nor has he identified any

authority requiring an in camera inspection or evidentiary hearing

under these circumstances. We cannot find that the circuit court

abused its discretion here.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 146 S.

Ct. 79 (2025).

     Though Willacy cites Everglades Law Center, Inc. v. South

Florida Water Management District, 290 So. 3d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2019), for the proposition that the circuit court’s failure to

conduct an in camera review of the subject record amounted to

“fundamental error,” Everglades Law Center is inapposite because it

was not a capital postconviction case, but rather a case about the

statutory mediation communication exemption under sections

44.102(3) and 44.405(1), Florida Statutes (2017).

     Willacy’s requests come under rule 3.852 and the

corresponding Florida Statutes applicable only to public records in

capital postconviction cases. These provisions set forth a

streamlined method for submitting records throughout capital

proceedings into a records repository by certain deadlines for the

purpose of providing an orderly and “carefully tailored discovery


                                 - 19 -
rule for public records production ancillary to rule 3.850 and 3.851

proceedings.” Sims, 753 So. 2d at 69 (quoting In re Amends. to Fla.

R. Crim. P.—Cap. Postconviction Pub. Recs. Prod., 683 So. 2d 475,

476 (Fla. 1996)). While in camera inspection of exempt or

confidential records is permitted, whether to grant in camera

inspection is at the discretion of the circuit court in capital

postconviction proceedings. 10

     Thus, we reject Willacy’s suggestion that an in camera

inspection was required. And given our conclusion that the circuit

court did not err in denying Willacy’s public records requests

because he hoped to uncover a claim rather than to support one,

Willacy has likewise failed to demonstrate how the circuit court



      10. The current version of section 27.7081(11)(a)-(b) explicitly
places the decision to “[c]ompel or deny disclosure of records” or
“[c]onduct an inspection in camera” in a capital postconviction case
within the sound discretion of the trial court. § 27.7081(11)(a)-(b),
Fla. Stat. (2025) (“In proceedings under this section the trial court
may: (a) Compel or deny disclosure of records. (b) Conduct an
inspection in camera.” (emphasis added)). “Per the
‘Mandatory/Permissive Canon,’ the word ‘may’ is commonly treated
as a permissive word granting discretion.” Boca Ctr. at Mil., LLC v.
City of Boca Raton, 312 So. 3d 920, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citing
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 112 (2012)); see also City of Miami v. Gonzalez, 419
So. 3d 677, 685 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (quoting same).


                                 - 20 -
erred by denying his request for an in camera inspection and

rehearing. Therefore, we deny relief on this issue.

              III. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

      In his habeas petition, Willacy repeats his claim that the

denials of both his public records requests violate his rights to due

process, equal protection, and access to courts. We deny his

petition because orders denying public records requests are not

cognizable in a petition for habeas corpus. See Johns v.

Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1971) (habeas corpus is not

a substitute for certiorari). Accordingly, Willacy is not entitled to

relief.

                            IV. Conclusion

      We deny Willacy’s petition seeking review of the circuit court’s

orders denying his requests for public records and rehearing/in

camera inspection, and we deny his petition for writ of habeas

corpus. We dismiss his appeal of the circuit court’s order denying

his motion for an extension of time. We also deny his request for

oral argument. No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this




                                 - 21 -
Court. 11

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
TANENBAUM, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an
opinion.

TANENBAUM, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

     The defendant’s judgment of conviction and death sentence

became absolutely final when this court issued its mandate

affirming them in 1997. There has not been a pending post-

conviction motion attacking the judgment or sentence since 2020,

when the trial court rendered its order denying the last of the

defendant’s successive motions under rule 3.851, an order that this

court affirmed in 2021. This court, in turn, lacks jurisdiction in

case number 26-0519. The court has no constitutional authority to

consider, as a matter of appellate review, the defendant’s last-

minute request to review the trial court’s run-of-the-mine refusal to

compel state agencies to disclose public records under section



     11. Because the time for filing a successive postconviction
motion has expired, Willacy’s postconviction proceedings in Florida
are now final.


                                - 22 -
27.7081, Florida Statutes, in an otherwise closed criminal case with

no collateral relief claim pending. I dissent to the extent the court

purports to exercise jurisdiction in case number 26-0519. 12

     Our jurisdiction to directly review any trial court order is

severely limited. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1)–(2), (5), Fla. Const. In death

cases, we have the authority to “hear appeals from final judgments

of trial courts imposing the death penalty.” Id. (b)(1) (emphases

supplied). The constitution, then, ties our appellate review

authority to the trial court’s final order adjudicating the defendant

guilty of capital murder and imposing a sentence of death. If a trial

court’s order does not fit this bill, we lack appellate jurisdiction

under subsection (b)(1).

     One might fairly ask, “What about an order denying or




      12. Regarding the petition for habeas relief in case number
26-0526—over which we do have jurisdiction—I concur in the
denial of relief. His claims about being unable to access additional
records are not cognizable as due-process claims, his claimed right
to any additional records being ancillary to a nonexistent post-
conviction proceeding. Cf. Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 391–92
(Fla.) (rejecting similar rights claim), cert. denied, Tanzi v. Dixon,
145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025). In any event, his access to additional
records has nothing to do with the legality of the process that led to
his conviction and death sentence. The claims cannot support
habeas here.

                                 - 23 -
granting a post-conviction motion filed under rule 3.851?” This

court previously claimed for itself the authority to review such

orders. See State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71

(Fla. 1997). And that claimed authority was consistent with

longstanding jurisprudence.

     To obtain collateral relief from a criminal judgment or

sentence, a defendant historically would do so via a writ of error

coram nobis. “The office of the writ of error coram nobis is to bring

to the attention of the court, for correction, an error of fact-one not

appearing on the face of the record, unknown to the court or the

party affected, and which, if known in season, would have

prevented the rendition of the judgment challenged.” Lamb v. State,

107 So. 535, 538 (Fla. 1926); see also Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594,

597 (Fla. 1957) (explaining that to obtain a writ, the “showing must

be such that if the matters shown had been before the trial court

when judgment was entered, the court would have been precluded

from entering the judgment”).

     Once the judgment had been affirmed on appeal, however, “the

trial court [was] without authority to consider an application for a

writ of error coram nobis, unless permission [was] duly given by the


                                 - 24 -
appellate court that affirmed the judgment.” Lamb, 107 So. at 540.

That permission was necessary because “the affirmed judgment

[was] also the judgment of the appellate court, and the lower court

[was] without power to review the affirmed judgment or to impair its

validity or effect.” Id. at 539–40; see also Russ, 95 So. 2d at 597

(explaining that the supreme court’s granting leave on petition “is

equivalent to an order or mandate that the trial court allow the writ,

that it determine the truth of the facts alleged in the petition and

that if they be established as being true then the judgment should

be set aside and new proceedings be had”).

     Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851 now

serve as streamlined procedural substitutes for the writ. Cf.

Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1989) (noting how

rule 3.850 has effectively absorbed most claims that could be

brought under either habeas corpus or error coram nobis); Wood v.

State, 750 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 1999) (noting similarity between

the relief to be obtained under the writ and under rule 3.850). See

generally In re Rule of Crim. Proc. 3.851 (Collateral Relief After Death

Sentence has been Imposed), 626 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1993)

(adopting new rule 3.851 but noting that the “proceedings and


                                 - 25 -
grounds for postconviction relief remain as provided under Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850”); In re Rules Governing Cap.

Postconviction Actions, 763 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 2000) (readopting

rule 3.851 as it existed prior to its legislative repeal). Because a

motion filed under rule 3.851 attacks the underlying absolutely

final judgment the same way a coram nobis proceeding did, this

court naturally would have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from

an order denying relief from the judgment (with which our

affirmance in the initial appeal would have merged), just as this

court earlier had jurisdiction to grant the trial court leave to

entertain the writ.

     The problem here is that the defendant did not file a motion

for postconviction relief under rule 3.851 in the trial court, and he

is not before this court collaterally attacking the judgment and

imposition of a death sentence that we previously affirmed.

Instead, the defendant purports to appeal only a trial court order

denying his demand for additional public records under section

27.7081(8) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852.

     To be sure, the statute creates a limited substantive right for a

criminal defendant sentenced to death, and rule 3.852 can only


                                 - 26 -
implement this right as legislatively established, not build upon it to

create an even broader right. The Legislature, in turn, was clear

that the statute “does not affect, expand, or limit the production of

public records for any purpose other than use in a proceeding held

pursuant to Rule 3.850 or Rule 3.851, Florida Rules of Criminal

Procedure.” § 27.7081(2), Fla. Stat. In other words, the

substantive right the Legislature created is not a stand-alone right

that could support an independent cause of action in the trial

court; it, like its implementing procedural rule, establishes a means

of public records discovery “ancillary to proceedings pursuant to

rules 3.850 and 3.851.” Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. 3.852

(Cap. Postconviction Pub. Recs. Prod.) & Rule 3.993 (Related Forms),

754 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis supplied) (citing In re

Amend. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc.-Cap. Postconviction Pub. Recs.

Prod., 683 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. 1996)).13




     13. Not that it makes much difference here, but because the
statutory right is only a discovery right and does not establish a
separate right of action, an order on a motion pursuing that right
could not be a “final order.” Cf. State v. White, 24 So. 160, 165 (Fla.
1898) (describing a final judgment as “dispos[ing] of every question
involved in the case,” leaving “nothing open for future decision,”
contemplating no “further action [] to be had in the cause, other

                                - 27 -
     As noted at the top, a careful reading of Article V, section

3(b)(1) demonstrates that our jurisdiction is dependent on there

being a challenge to the judgment imposing a death sentence—

either directly (on original appeal) or indirectly (on review of a denial

or grant of collateral relief). The defendant here has lodged no such

attack on the judgment, meaning there is no proceeding currently

pending in the trial court (i.e., no active, cognizable claim against

the validity of the judgment and death sentence) that will lead to a

final order appealable to this court under our limited constitutional

authority.

     An active death warrant does not give us extraordinary

appellate review powers under the Florida Constitution, and it does

not give rise to some extralegal proceeding in the trial court over




than to enforce the decree rendered”); State Rd. Dep’t v. Crill, 128
So. 412, 414–15 (Fla. 1930) (characterizing final, appealable
judgment as one that “determines the merits of the controversy or
the rights of the parties and leaves nothing for future
determination,” as one that “adjudicates the merits of the cause and
disposes of the action” and “puts an end to the suit” (citations
omitted)); Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla.
1951) (“A judgment is ‘final’ for the purposes of an appeal when it
terminates a litigation between the parties on the merits of the case
and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined.”).

                                 - 28 -
which we then have plenary authority. And rule 3.851(h) does not

by its terms even contemplate more expansive jurisdiction once the

death warrant is signed; it simply establishes an expedited yet

orderly schedule if the defendant chooses to file one more motion

for post-conviction relief, even one that is otherwise procedurally

barred.14




      14. As this court previously has stated, discovery under the
statute and rule require there to be “a colorable claim for
postconviction relief”; it is not a “procedure authorizing a fishing
expedition for records” that the defendant hopes might give him a
basis to assert a colorable claim that he currently is not aware of.
Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000). The statutory
discovery regime also is not to be used merely as “an eleventh hour
attempt to delay the execution rather than a focused investigation
into some legitimate area of inquiry.” Id. at 70. A defendant
already possessing a good-faith basis for post-conviction relief
would file a motion saying so and then seek discovery to further
prove his claim. By contrast, a demand to compel—without a
pending rule 3.851 motion—submitted only after a death warrant is
signed, fairly can be characterized as a pre-motion fact-finding
expedition seeking to delay execution. Yet this court risks giving
imprimatur to the approach by wholly resting its purported exercise
of jurisdiction on it. The truth is, the trial court utterly lacks
jurisdiction to consider such a demand in a closed criminal case.
When a defendant asks the trial court to compel production under
the statute, in the absence of a pending rule 3.851 motion, the
better approach would be for the State to seek a writ of prohibition
directed to the trial court from the supervisory district court of
appeal.


                                - 29 -
     Put another way, an active death warrant, by itself, does not

reopen the closed criminal case that produced the conviction and

death sentence. The warrant, in fact, has the opposite legal effect,

signaling that the condemned defendant has completed his direct

appeal, his initial post-conviction challenge, and his pursuit of

federal habeas relief (if any). See § 922.052(2), Fla. Stat. (requiring

the Governor to issue a death warrant upon the supreme court

clerk’s certification to this effect and completion of the clemency

process). Even though a death sentence has been imposed, we

operate like any other appellate court, with only the jurisdiction

specified in the constitutional text—no more, no less. 15 Absent an



      15. Cases like Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2000), and
Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2000)—and the cases on which
the latter relies—seem to presume this court’s “plenary” authority to
review nearly all orders pertaining to a defendant sentenced to
death, regardless of the procedural posture of the underlying
criminal case. None of those cases provide any meaningful textual
analysis to support the proposition, making the proposition highly
suspect. See, e.g., Trepal, 754 So. 2d at 705–06 (acknowledging
that “[t]he current practice for this Court is to occasionally grant
review of interlocutory orders in cases involving death-sentenced
defendants” though it has “been less than precise in defining our
authority to grant such review” but then, as authority, just relying
on that history of “accepting jurisdiction in the instant scenario []
absent an express statement of how the Court determines whether
to exercise its jurisdiction”). It is worth noting, though, that Trepal
is what prompted our adoption of Florida Rule of Appellate

                                 - 30 -
attack on the judgment and death sentence previously affirmed,

this court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 3(b)(1) is not

implicated in any way. 16

     Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142 cannot supply a

basis for jurisdiction that we do not otherwise have. Jurisdiction

being a matter of substantive law, this court cannot use its

rulemaking authority to create or expand its jurisdiction. Rule

9.142(c), properly understood, simply implements this court’s

extant constitutional authority to issue “all writs necessary to the

complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” Art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const.

Indeed, it has all the markings of a certiorari proceeding. See Fla.




Procedure 9.142(c). See Amend. to the Fla. Rules of App. Proc. (Rule
9.142), 837 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2002). And Trepal at least involved
review of a discovery order rendered in the context of a pending
post-conviction motion filed in the trial court. See 754 So. 2d at
703. At all events, the scope of our claimed jurisdiction in death
cases should be revisited to ensure that we are strictly adhering to
the constitution’s jurisdictional prescriptions.

      16. There is a clear distinction between our plenary appellate
jurisdiction under section 3(b)(1) and our habeas authority under
section 3(b)(9). These are different proceedings, conducted under
very different standards for entitlement to relief. The habeas
petition that the defendant filed in separate case number 26-0526
does not provide a basis for jurisdiction in case number 26-0519.


                                 - 31 -
R. App. P. 9.142(c)(2), (3)(A), (5), (6). Even if this court does not

want to label it a proceeding seeking review on a writ of certiorari,

that is precisely what the proceeding is. 17

     There is no inherent constitutional problem with rule 9.142’s

subdivision (c); but, as this court has observed, the constitution’s

Article V, section 3(b)(7), by its own terms, requires there to be an

independent jurisdictional hook supporting the court’s authority to

issue an extraordinary writ under that constitutional provision. See

St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1980)

(“The all writs provision of section 3(b)(7) does not confer added

appellate jurisdiction on this Court, and this Court’s all writs power

cannot be used as an independent basis of jurisdiction as petitioner



      17. Oddly, this court disclaimed, without explanation, having
“jurisdiction to entertain petitions for common law certiorari.”
Trepal, 754 So. 2d at 706. That presumably references the April
1980 revision to Article V that removed a provision giving this court
the authority to “review by certiorari . . . any interlocutory order
passing upon a matter, which upon final judgment would be
directly appealable to the supreme court.” The import of this aspect
of the revision is ambiguous, given that the same revision left intact
the text that remains as section 3(b)(7)—the “all writs” provision. At
all events, the court cannot disclaim its certiorari authority yet
establish a process by which it can grant interlocutory relief that is
in every way (including the standard for granting relief) identical to
the writ of certiorari, save for the labelling.


                                  - 32 -
is hereby seeking to use it.”). The court, in addressing the

defendant’s claim on the merits, now purports (without expressly

saying so) to exercise authority under section 3(b)(7)—which rule

9.142(c) necessarily implements—without the “independent basis of

jurisdiction” that we typically demand before we will even entertain

a petition for such relief. See Williams v. State, 913 So. 2d 541, 543

(Fla. 2005) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because “the all writs

provision does not constitute a separate source of original or

appellate jurisdiction but rather operates in furtherance of the

Court’s ‘ultimate jurisdiction,’ conferred elsewhere in the

constitution”).

     The absence in this case, then, of a motion under rule 3.851

pending in the trial court—one that attacks either the conviction or

the death sentence that we previously affirmed—wholly obviates

this court’s jurisdiction to address any of the merits in case number

26-0519. I would dismiss that case in its entirety.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,
    Kathryn Speicher, Judge
    Case No. 051990CF016062AXXXXX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Melody
Jacquay-Acosta, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann


                                 - 33 -
Marie Mirialakis, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Joshua P. Chaykin, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
and Mahham Syed, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

     for Appellant/Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael W.
Mervine, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, and
Jonathan S. Tannen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
Florida,

     for Appellee/Respondent




                                - 34 -