Christopher J. Porter v. State of Florida

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                      CHRISTOPHER J. PORTER,
                             Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                            No. 4D2024-0961

                             [April 29, 2026]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Timothy Lawrence Bailey, Judge; L.T. Case No.
062019CF014992A88810.

  Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Siobhan Helene Shea, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  James Uthmeier, Tallahassee, Attorney General, and Anesha Worthy,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

                       ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

KLINGENSMITH, J.

    Appellant, Christopher J. Porter, appeals his conviction and sentence
following a jury trial in which he was adjudicated guilty of one count of
sexual battery upon a person less than twelve years of age, two counts of
lewd or lascivious molestation of a person less than twelve years of age,
and one count of lewd or lascivious exhibition of a person less than twelve
years of age. We affirm on all issues raised except for one: whether the
trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to correct sentence. On
that point, we agree with Appellant in part and reverse portions of the
defendant’s sentence.

   The trial court proceeded directly to sentencing following the jury’s
verdict of guilty on all counts. The State represented that the trial court
was required to impose a life sentence for count one (sexual battery) and
25-year mandatory minimum sentences for counts two and three (lewd or
lascivious molestation). The State requested 15 years for count four (lewd
or lascivious exhibition), while defense counsel asked the court to “proceed
with the minimum mandatory sentencing as required under the new
statutes.”

   The trial court orally sentenced Appellant to “life in prison on count
one. 25 years on count two, 25 years on count three, and 15 years on
count four” to run concurrently.        However, the written sentencing
document contains a notation that “the court further orders Counts 1+2
min/mand of 25 years.” The trial court also entered a cost order, which
imposed misdemeanor costs and a $65 county ordinance charge pursuant
to section 939.185(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2023).

    Appellant moved to correct his sentence on three grounds. First, he
asked the trial court to vacate the misdemeanor costs because he was
charged with felonies. Second, Appellant argued the county ordinance
cost should be vacated because the cost was discretionary and was not
orally pronounced. And third, Appellant argued the 25-year mandatory
minimum sentence for the sexual battery charge should be vacated. The
trial court denied Appellant’s motion on all three grounds.

  We review motions to correct sentencing errors de novo. Shaw v. State,
418 So. 3d 183, 185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).

Imposition of Costs

   Appellant argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court
erroneously imposed misdemeanor costs because all of Appellant’s crimes
were felonies. See Hartfield v. State, 381 So. 3d 646, 647 (Fla. 1st DCA
2024).    Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court with
instructions to strike the misdemeanor costs. See id. Appellant need not
be present. See Johnson v. State, 293 So. 3d 582, 584–85 (Fla. 1st DCA
2020) (citation modified) (“Should the trial court strike the fines in an
amended judgment, Appellant need not be present.”); Selwyn v. State, 903
So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (stating that striking court costs is a
ministerial function which does not require a defendant’s presence).

   The trial court also imposed a $65 cost under section 939.185(1)(a),
Florida Statutes (2023). Appellant argues that the cost “should be
vacated,” but provides no explanation for his claim. The State responds
by asserting “there was nothing improper about the imposition of the $65
cost.” We agree.

  Section 939.185(1)(a) provides “[t]he board of county commissioners
may adopt by ordinance an additional court cost, not to exceed $65 to be

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imposed by the court when a person . . . is found guilty of . . . any felony.”
Further, section 939.185(2) provides the “court shall order a person to pay
the additional court cost.” (emphasis added). Also, section 10-3 of the
Broward County Code of Ordinances, ch. 10, art.1, provides in relevant
part: “[i]n accordance with the authority granted by Section 939.185,
Florida Statutes, an additional court cost of sixty-five dollars ($65.00) shall
be imposed by the court upon every person who . . . is found guilty of . . .
any felony.” (emphasis added). The trial court need not orally pronounce
that cost at sentencing. Shaw, 418 So. 3d at 186. Accordingly, the $65
county ordinance cost was mandatory and properly imposed.

Mandatory Minimum Sentence

   Appellant argues his 25-year mandatory minimum for sexual battery
should be vacated. The State correctly concedes error on this issue as
well.

    The sexual battery conviction is punishable by a mandatory life
sentence without the possibility of parole. § 775.082(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2015). Here, the trial court orally pronounced Appellant’s sentence as life
in prison for count one (sexual battery) and 25 years on counts two and
three (lewd and lascivious molestation). However, the written sentencing
document noted that “the court further orders Counts 1+2 min/mand of
25 years.” (emphasis added). We can only surmise that the trial court
meant to write “Counts 2+3” because lewd and lascivious molestation has
a 25-year mandatory minimum. § 775.082(3)(a)4.a., Fla. Stat. (2015).
Further, the court orally sentenced Appellant to life, not 25 years, for count
one (sexual battery). Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court
to strike the mandatory minimum for sexual battery. See Flores v. State,
58 So. 3d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (Mem). Appellant need not be
present for the trial court to make this correction. See id. (“Resentencing
is not required [to strike an improper mandatory minimum], and appellant
need not be present for this ministerial sentence correction.”).

   We affirm without comment on all other issues raised, including
Appellant’s claim he was entitled to a twelve-person jury. See Guzman v.
State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. denied, No. SC2022-
1597, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2595
(2024).

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

SHAW and LOTT, JJ., concur.


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                      *        *        *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.




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