What did the court decide?

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the long-delayed motion claiming ineffective trial counsel because it was untimely and no exception applied.

Why did the timing matter?

Florida limits most postconviction claims to within two years after the judgment becomes final; here the motion came decades later and the appellant did not allege a recognized exception.

Who is affected by this decision?

Enrique Someillan, who filed the postconviction motion, is affected because his ineffective-assistance claim remains denied; the State is affected insofar as it was allowed to rely on prejudice from the delay.

Can this be appealed further?

The opinion notes it is not final until disposition of a timely motion for rehearing; the appellant may seek rehearing and, if unsuccessful, could seek review by the Florida Supreme Court if jurisdictional standards are met.

Enrique Jesus Someillan v. State of Florida

Docket 3D2025-2397

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

Criminal AppealAffirmed

Filed: May 6, 2026 · today
Jurisdiction: Florida
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Type: Opinion
Case type: Criminal Appeal
Disposition: Affirmed
Docket: 3D2025-2397

Appeal from the circuit court’s summary denial of a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850

Summary

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s summary denial of Enrique Jesus Someillan’s postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Someillan filed the motion more than 30 years after his judgment and sentence became final and failed to plead any of the limited exceptions to Florida’s two-year filing deadline. The court noted the State demonstrated prejudice from the delay: the trial lawyer is deceased, investigative files were destroyed, and key witnesses are unavailable, and Someillan already benefited from his plea terms. Because the motion was untimely and barred, the denial was affirmed.

Issues Decided

Whether a postconviction ineffective-assistance claim filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence became final is timely under rule 3.850.
Whether any exception to the two-year time bar applies to permit review of the untimely 3.850 motion.
Whether prejudice to the State (deceased counsel, destroyed files, unavailable witnesses) supports denial under laches or related equitable doctrines.

Court's Reasoning

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 contains a two-year time limit for filing postconviction motions and specifies limited exceptions; the appellant did not allege any enumerated exception. The State showed tangible prejudice from the decades-long delay — deceased trial counsel, destroyed investigative materials, and unlocatable witnesses — and the appellant had already received the benefits of his plea agreement. These facts and precedent about laches and untimeliness compelled affirmance of the summary denial.

Authorities Cited

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(1)–(3)
Cuffy v. State190 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
State v. Ortiz79 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
Bartz v. State740 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
Flowers v. State278 So. 3d 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)

Parties

Appellant: Enrique Jesus Someillan
Appellee: State of Florida
Judge: Carmen Cabarga
Attorney: Carlos A. Canet
Attorney: Ryan Schelwat

Key Dates

Opinion filed: 2026-05-06

What You Should Do Next

1
Consider filing a motion for rehearing
The appellant may timely file a motion for rehearing in the Third District to challenge the court’s conclusions or press any overlooked exceptions to the time bar.
2
Assess grounds for discretionary review
If rehearing is denied, consult counsel about whether to seek discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court, focusing on whether a conflict or significant legal issue exists.
3
Evaluate alternative remedies
If direct relief is foreclosed, consider whether any narrow statutory or constitutional avenues remain, supported by concrete factual allegations that fit an enumerated exception to the 3.850 deadline.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide?: The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the long-delayed motion claiming ineffective trial counsel because it was untimely and no exception applied.
Why did the timing matter?: Florida limits most postconviction claims to within two years after the judgment becomes final; here the motion came decades later and the appellant did not allege a recognized exception.
Who is affected by this decision?: Enrique Someillan, who filed the postconviction motion, is affected because his ineffective-assistance claim remains denied; the State is affected insofar as it was allowed to rely on prejudice from the delay.
Can this be appealed further?: The opinion notes it is not final until disposition of a timely motion for rehearing; the appellant may seek rehearing and, if unsuccessful, could seek review by the Florida Supreme Court if jurisdictional standards are met.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed May 6, 2026.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D25-2397
                      Lower Tribunal No. F91-35914
                          ________________


                      Enrique Jesus Someillan,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                            State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.



      An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carmen Cabarga, Judge.

      Law Office of Carlos A. Canet, P.A., and Carlos A. Canet (Plantation),
for appellant.

      James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ryan Schelwat, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.


Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Over three decades after his judgment and sentence became final,

appellant, Enrique Jesus Someillan, sought postconviction relief alleging the

performance by his trial counsel was grossly deficient. The lower court

summarily denied the motion.         Because Someillan failed to allege an

enumerated exception to the two-year requirement circumscribed by Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b), the State established that Someillan’s

former trial counsel is now deceased, the investigative file was destroyed,

key witnesses, including the victim, are unlocatable or unavailable, and

Someillan reaped the benefits of the terms of the plea bargain he negotiated,

we are constrained to affirm the order under review. See Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v.

State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no

‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing

successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla.

3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he

has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from

challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”);

Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring motion

under doctrine of laches “where there has been both a lack of due diligence

on the part of the defendant in bringing forth a claim and prejudice to the


                                        2
State”); Flowers v. State, 278 So. 3d 899, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel filed more than two years after the

defendant's judgment and sentence became final are untimely unless they

fall within an exception to the two-year deadline); Cooper v. United States,

66 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion under doctrine of

laches where defendant delayed bringing claim for six years).

     Affirmed.




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