J.J.A., a Child v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                   _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D2025-1759
                   LT Case No. 16-2024-CJ-1143-A
                   _____________________________

J.J.A., a Child,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                   _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
William Collins Cooper, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Judson Searcy, Assistant
Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Darcy Townsend,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

                            May 1, 2026


KILBANE, J.

     J.J.A., a juvenile, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion
to suppress and a disposition order adjudicating him delinquent.
We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress without comment,
but we reverse the disposition order and remand with instructions
to enter a corrected order in accordance with this opinion.
                               Facts

     J.J.A. pled nolo contendere to, and the trial court adjudicated
him delinquent of, possession of a firearm by a minor, a first-
degree misdemeanor. See § 790.22(3), (5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2025). In
the disposition order, the court committed J.J.A. for placement in
a moderate-risk residential commitment program “for an
indeterminate period, but no longer than the child’s 21st birthday
or the maximum term of imprisonment an adult may serve for each
count listed above, whichever comes first.”

     During the pendency of this appeal, J.J.A. timely served a
motion to correct the disposition order under Florida Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.135(b)(2), arguing the order failed to specify
the maximum penalty1 or to account for predisposition credit as
required under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.115(d)(2).2
Due to the trial court’s failure to timely rule on the motion, we
treat the motion as denied. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.135(b)(1)(B), (2)(B)
(2025); J.H. v. State, 344 So. 3d 616, 619 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)
(“Under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135(b)(1)(B), should
a trial court fail to respond to a motion to correct a disposition
order within thirty days of entry, the motion is deemed denied.”).
The State concedes that the disposition order should reflect the
maximum penalty and predisposition credit.

                             Analysis

     We review a motion to correct a disposition order filed under
rule 8.135(b)(2)—the “juvenile version” of Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(b)—de novo. See N.J.P. v. State, 331 So. 3d 157,
158 & 158 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); see also E.S.B. v. State, 822 So.


    1.    For adult offenders, a first-degree misdemeanor is
punishable by “a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 1
year.” § 775.082(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025).

     2. J.J.A. preserved this argument by filing the rule 8.135(b)(2)
motion. See E.S.B. v. State, 822 So. 2d 579, 580 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002) (“Appellant’s utilization of rule 8.135(b)(2) preserved this
issue for appellate review.”).


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2d 579, 580 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Florida Rule of Juvenile
Procedure 8.135(b)(2) was recently amended to provide the same
procedural safeguards as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b)(2).”); J.H., 344 So. 3d at 621 (“A trial court’s ruling, or
failure to rule, on a motion to correct a sentencing error presents a
purely legal issue which an appellate court reviews de novo.”).

     Florida law requires a disposition order to “specify[] the. . .
maximum penalty defined by statute and . . . the amount of time
served in secure detention before disposition.” Fla. R. Juv. P.
8.115(d)(2) (emphasis added); see N.J.P., 331 So. 3d at 159 (“[I]t is
not enough for a disposition order to merely reference the
maximum statutory sentence for an offense without specifying
what the maximum sentence actually is.” (quoting A.M.R. v. State,
134 So. 3d 502, 503 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014))). Further, a trial court is
required to grant predisposition credit for time served “on a
‘determinate’ commitment for an offense such as a misdemeanor
that will necessarily conclude before the juvenile reaches the age
at which DJJ’s authority ends.” J.I.S v. State, 930 So. 2d 587, 590
(Fla. 2006).3

    Here, the disposition order failed to specify the maximum
penalty for the offense and J.J.A.’s predisposition credit for time
served. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.115(d)(2). And because J.J.A.’s


     3. All juvenile commitments are technically “indeterminate.”
See § 985.455(3), Fla. Stat. (2025) (“Any commitment of a
delinquent child to the department must be for an indeterminate
period of time, which may include periods of temporary release;
however, the period of time may not exceed the maximum term of
imprisonment that an adult may serve for the same offense.”). But
because the time in commitment cannot exceed the maximum
adult punishment, “[c]ourts sometimes refer to commitments
circumscribed by the maximum adult punishment as
‘determinate.’” J.I.S., 930 So. 2d at 593. Whether a juvenile is
entitled to predisposition credit depends on this distinction. See
In re Amends. to the Fla. R. Juv. P., 26 So. 3d 552, 557 (Fla. 2009)
(“[E]ntitlement to credit for time served in secure detention prior
to commitment is dependent upon whether the commitment is
determinate or indeterminate.”).


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commitment will “necessarily conclude” before he “reaches the age
at which DJJ’s authority ends,” it constitutes a determinate
commitment. J.I.S., 930 So. 2d at 590. Accordingly, the court was
required to grant J.J.A. predisposition credit for time served. Id.

                           Conclusion

     The trial court reversibly erred in failing to specify the
maximum penalty, and failing to grant and specify predisposition
credit. Thus, we reverse the disposition order and remand for the
trial court to enter a corrected disposition order in accordance with
this opinion.

     AFFIRM in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED with
instructions.

WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.




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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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