James Aren Duckett v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
                            ____________

                         No. SC2026-0528
                           ____________

                     JAMES AREN DUCKETT,
                           Appellant,

                                 vs.

                       STATE OF FLORIDA,
                            Appellee.

                           April 30, 2026

PER CURIAM.

     James Aren Duckett is a prisoner under sentence of death

whose execution has been stayed. In this case, he appeals the

circuit court’s order denying his request to be provided the

underlying DNA testing data necessary for an analysis and opinion

by a qualified bioinformaticist. That data was generated by a

private laboratory that tested a DNA sample relevant to Duckett’s

guilt or innocence. Duckett also appeals the circuit court’s denial

of his demands for public records in which he sought the testing

data as well as information pertaining to the private laboratory’s
testing process and protocols. 1

     For the reasons that follow, we reverse the circuit court’s

denial of Duckett’s request for the underlying DNA testing data. 2

However, we affirm the court’s denial of his public records demands

insofar as they sought information regarding the testing process

and protocols. Consistent with these holdings, we remand for the

underlying testing data to be provided for a statistical analysis, as

directed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE).

Further, if a dispute arises regarding the extent of the data

necessary for analysis, the circuit court shall hold an evidentiary

hearing to resolve the dispute.

                                    I

     On February 27, 2026, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a

warrant scheduling Duckett’s execution for March 31, 2026.




     1. As explained in greater detail below, we have jurisdiction.
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 925.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025); see
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(f).

     2. To the extent Duckett’s public records demands also
sought the testing data, we decline to address whether the circuit
court abused its discretion in denying the production of such
records. Our opinion today renders moot any dispute over the
correctness of the circuit court’s ruling in this respect.

                                   -2-
Following issuance of the death warrant, Duckett filed a motion,

which he later amended, seeking postconviction DNA testing under

section 925.11, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.853. The sample he wanted tested was a 1987 swab

from the victim’s underwear mounted on a slide (called “Q-6(3)”),

which had continuously been in the State’s possession. The swab

contained a small number of sperm heads. Duckett contended that

DNA testing would show that the sperm was not his, meaning that

someone else committed the murder and he is actually innocent.

     Over two decades ago, during Duckett’s initial postconviction

proceedings, we were informed that certain items of clothing

introduced into evidence could possibly be tested for DNA,

including Q-6(3). Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 230 (Fla. 2005).

We relinquished jurisdiction to the circuit court to allow for

determination of “whether there in fact existed clothing that could

be tested for DNA.” Id. On remand, the examiner for FDLE

determined that because Q-6(3) had deteriorated and contained too

few sperm heads, the DNA testing methods then available would not

have produced any conclusive results. Id. The examiner added

that any attempt to test the sample would have destroyed it. Id.


                                 -3-
Outside agencies confirmed the FDLE examiner’s concerns. Thus,

no testing was performed on Q-6(3). Id.

     Noting these background facts, Duckett argued in his rule

3.853 motion that Q-6(3) should be tested using Single Nucleotide

Polymorphism (SNP), a technology that allows for more reliable DNA

testing of small, deteriorated samples. He requested that Q-6(3) be

sent to a private laboratory 3 because FDLE does not have the

capability to perform SNP testing.

     The State agreed that Q-6(3) was potentially exculpatory and

therefore focused its arguments on the testing process. Essentially

accepting the State’s position, the circuit court granted Duckett’s

motion for DNA testing. Per section 925.11(2)(h), the court

permitted the State to exercise complete control over the location,

timing, and method of testing. When it became clear that FDLE

could not complete the SNP testing, Q-6(3) was ultimately sent to a

private laboratory requested by the State called DNA Labs

International, Inc. (DLI).




     3. Duckett asked that the testing be performed by Othram,
Inc. He noted that this laboratory had the appropriate capabilities
and that FDLE had an existing contract with it.

                                -4-
     Meanwhile, two days after his rule 3.853 motion was granted,

Duckett filed his fifth successive postconviction motion under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, in which he claimed,

among other things, that the forthcoming DNA results would

provide newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence.4 At the

Huff 5 hearing, the circuit court learned that DNA testing would not

be completed within the timeline contemplated by our scheduling

order. Therefore, the circuit court asked us for an extension of time

to allow the DNA testing to be completed and thereby give the court

the opportunity to “fully adjudicate the matter.” We granted that

request in part and issued a revised scheduling order.

     At a subsequent status conference, FDLE explained that

testing would likely be completed around March 27, 2026, a date

beyond the timeframe contemplated by our revised scheduling

order. In light of this and other facts, Duckett asked the circuit

court to stay the execution and to delay ruling on his successive




      4. Per our scheduling order and absent a stay, Duckett was
required to file his successive postconviction motion before DNA
testing results were available.

     5. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

                                 -5-
postconviction motion until the DNA testing was completed. The

State, by contrast, urged the court to rule on the motion and allow

Duckett to file another successive rule 3.851 motion based on the

DNA results, if they were favorable to him. Agreeing with the State,

the court issued a final order summarily denying Duckett’s

successive postconviction motion and declining to stay the

execution. As for Duckett’s newly discovered evidence claim, the

court ruled there was currently no factual basis for granting relief

because it had yet to receive the DNA results.

     Duckett appealed the summary denial of his successive

postconviction motion. He also moved for a stay of execution and

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. That appeal (case number

SC2026-0049) and petition (case number SC2026-0450) are still

pending before us. 6 Meanwhile, Duckett filed a motion in circuit

court requesting that FDLE provide him the testing data and

protocols as soon as the DNA results became available.

     On March 26, 2026, we exercised our discretion and granted

Duckett’s motion for a stay of execution to allow for completion of



      6. No one disputes that these matters are within this Court’s
jurisdiction.

                                 -6-
the DNA testing. See § 922.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2025) (“The execution

of a death sentence may be stayed . . . incident to an appeal.”). 7

     Testing was completed the following day. The Certificate of

Analysis conveyed that the DNA indicated at least one male

contributor. The report went on to conclude that “[d]ue to the

limited nature of the DNA calls obtained from this sample, it is not

suitable for genealogical comparisons or phenotype and ancestry

estimations.” In an accompanying email, FDLE relayed that the

testing was “inconclusive” and noted that neither FDLE nor DLI has

the capability to complete the testing process by performing a

statistical analysis on the data that was generated. 8 However,

FDLE suggested that a qualified bioinformaticist may be able to

perform that analysis and, thus, provide statistical calculations.

     At this point, the State asked us to lift the stay of execution,




     7. Justice Tanenbaum dissented.

     8. In the email, FDLE explained that although testing “yielded
results for Y (male-specific) SNPs,” DLI “has no mechanism to
provide a statistical weight associated with only the Y SNP results,”
which means it is “unable to report a match between Mr. Duckett’s
Y SNPs and those detected in the sample.” By the same token,
according to FDLE, this meant DLI also was unable to report an
exclusion.

                                 -7-
whereas Duckett requested that we relinquish jurisdiction to the

circuit court. On March 30, 2026, we issued an order explaining

that the circuit court continued to have concurrent jurisdiction to

rule on motions related to DNA testing and successive claims filed

by Duckett and that nothing in our prior scheduling order

precluded these additional filings. Accordingly, we declined to lift

the stay and denied Duckett’s motion to relinquish as moot. 9

     Thereafter, Duckett asked the circuit court to order that the

underlying testing data be released by the State and DLI for a

qualified bioinformaticist to perform a statistical analysis. He

asserted that this analysis could exonerate him and requested that

the circuit court hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve any related

factual issues. He also filed public records demands under Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(i), seeking the testing data as well

as DLI’s testing process and protocols. In response, the State

asserted that the testing results did not exonerate Duckett but

actually inculpate him. It further argued that no analysis of the

testing data was necessary because any such analysis would only




     9. Justice Tanenbaum dissented in part.

                                 -8-
affect the degree of inculpation. The State also objected to the

disclosure of DLI’s testing process and protocols. Finally, it

contended that no evidentiary hearing was required.

     After holding two status conference hearings with less than a

day’s notice and at which no sworn testimony was permitted, the

circuit court issued an order denying Duckett’s request for the

testing data. The court found that Duckett had failed to establish

how the information he sought could lead to his exoneration. The

court also denied his public records demands on the basis that they

were neither “relevant to the subject matter of a proceeding under

rule 3.851” nor “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i)(2)(C).

     Duckett appeals that order, which concluded rule 3.853

proceedings in circuit court.

                                  II

     Though neither party raises the issue, we begin by addressing

our jurisdiction to review the challenged order. See JJJTB, Inc. v.

Schmidt, 415 So. 3d 129, 132 (Fla. 2025) (“Subject matter

jurisdiction is uniquely unwaivable because it concerns a court’s

constitutional or statutory authority to hear a certain type of case,


                                 -9-
and the parties cannot confer such authority on a court.” (citing

MCR Funding v. CMG Funding Corp., 771 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2000))). We are satisfied that we have jurisdiction.

     Section 925.11(3)(a) provides that “[a]n appeal from the court’s

order on the petition for postsentencing DNA testing may be taken

by any adversely affected party.” Likewise, rule 3.853 provides that

“[a]n appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court only

from the final order disposing of the motion.” Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.853(f). Lastly, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140 confirms

that “[a] defendant may appeal . . . orders denying relief under” rule

3.853. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D).

     Here, the challenged order denied Duckett the relief he sought

under rule 3.853, namely for the complete results of his DNA

testing. In other words, the order “adversely affected” him.

§ 925.11, Fla. Stat. Moreover, the order here is “final” as required

by rule 3.853(f) because it concluded the rule 3.853 proceedings

and brought “an end to the judicial labor,” S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v.

Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974). Notably, we have exercised

appellate jurisdiction to review final orders denying capital

defendants’ motions for postconviction DNA testing, citing the


                                - 10 -
constitutional provision giving us authority to review death-penalty

appeals. E.g., Everett v. State, 377 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 2024);

Reynolds v. State, 373 So. 3d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 2023). 10

                                  III

     Duckett argues that the circuit court erred in denying his

request for the underlying testing data necessary for a qualified

bioinformaticist’s analysis and opinion. He contends that without

this data he has not been provided the complete testing results, to

which he is entitled under section 925.11 and rule 3.853. On this

record, we agree.

     Section 925.11(2)(i) provides that “[t]he results of the DNA

testing ordered by the court shall be provided to the court, the



      10. The dissent argues, in part, that we do not have
jurisdiction to address collateral matters in cases where the death
penalty has been imposed. None of the cases cited by the dissent
lead to that conclusion. Longstanding precedent says just the
opposite. See State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71
(Fla. 1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction
over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all
types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”); Willacy v.
State, No. SC2026-0519, 2026 WL 1021168, at *3 (Fla. Apr. 15),
cert. denied, No. 25-7220, 2026 WL 1074143 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2026);
Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702, 705-06 (Fla. 2000). We are not
convinced that our precedent is “clearly erroneous,” State v. Poole,
297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020), nor has either party asked us to
revisit our prior holdings in this regard.

                                - 11 -
sentenced defendant, and the prosecuting authority.” (Emphasis

added); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(8). In this case, we are

persuaded that the complete “results” include the underlying

testing data, not simply DLI’s report that testing was “inconclusive”

when it (and FDLE) lacks the capability to provide the analysis that

FDLE suggested may be possible. 11 Our reasoning is twofold.

     First, to grant a motion for postconviction DNA testing, section

925.11 requires the court to find, among other things, that “the

results of DNA testing of that physical evidence would be admissible

at trial.” § 925.11(2)(f)2., Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.853(c)(5)(B). As the State readily concedes, an expert testifying at

trial must provide statistical calculations of the testing data when

reporting DNA results. See Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla.

1997). An expert cannot simply say there is a “match” between the

defendant’s DNA and the profile obtained from testing. Against this



      11. We note that “inconclusive” is not synonymous with
“incomplete.” Duckett has not received the complete results
because he has not been given the underlying data. Nevertheless, it
is possible that, after conducting the statistical analysis that FDLE
suggests is possible in this case, the entity performing the analysis
will be unable to offer a definitive conclusion based on a
comparison of Duckett’s known DNA and the profile generated from
the sample.

                                  - 12 -
backdrop, the statute’s reference to “the results of DNA testing . . .

be[ing] admissible at trial” suggests that those “results” include the

testing data necessary for a DNA expert to offer an opinion at trial.

     Second, FDLE itself has suggested that Duckett has received

incomplete testing results. On several occasions, it has indicated

that the “results” include the testing data upon which DLI’s

“inconclusive” finding was made. Namely, in an email, FDLE

confirmed that the testing “yielded results for Y (male-specific)

SNPs” but that both FDLE and DLI have “no mechanism to provide

a statistical weight associated with only the Y SNP results.” FDLE

therefore suggested the following course:

     A qualified bioinformaticist may be able [to] provide an
     opinion and calculation based on the Y SNP results.
     Speaking only from personal awareness of entities
     working in this space, I believe Parabon Nanolabs, Inc.
     and/or Othram, Inc. would be capable of further
     reviewing the Y SNP data.

(Emphasis added.) This phrasing equates the “Y SNP results” with

the “Y SNP data,” which has yet to be analyzed. FDLE says that

another laboratory might be able to perform that analysis on the

testing data. Accordingly, this email (along with other statements

by FDLE) supports the conclusion that without the underlying data,



                                 - 13 -
Duckett has not been supplied complete testing results. 12

     The State disagrees. 13 Citing the circuit court’s ruling below,

it argues Duckett failed to show how any analysis of the testing

data would exonerate him. In the State’s view, it was proper for the

circuit court to impose a burden on Duckett to demonstrate,

through expert testimony or otherwise, how that analysis would




     12. The dissent does not expressly engage with our
interpretation of section 925.11. It merely asserts, without
elaboration, that Duckett has received the testing results. We
simply disagree.
     Relatedly, the dissent contends that Duckett has requested
the underlying data only to impeach DLI’s testing process. While
Duckett may have sought information regarding DLI’s testing
process and protocols for that purpose, we have denied those
requests. But Duckett has also repeatedly asserted (at the status
conferences and in his briefing) that a statistical analysis of the
underlying data—which neither DLI nor FDLE is able to perform—
could exonerate him. Although the dissent suggests that this
analysis could never be exonerating, we do not find evidentiary
support for that conclusion in the record before us.

      13. We observe that in various statements in its answer brief,
the State (whether intentionally or not) draws an equivalence
between the DNA testing “results” and the testing data. See, e.g.,
Answer Brief of Appellee at 6 (“Duckett presented no testimony or
affidavits to demonstrate that statistical analysis of the results
could yield any exculpatory evidence.”); id. at 13 (“To label the
results as anything other than ‘inconclusive’ requires statistical
analysis.”); id. (noting that “[t]he lower court denied the motion for
statistical analysis of the SNP DNA results”).


                                - 14 -
lead to his exoneration. 14 This argument is meritless.

     The circuit court’s imposition of this exoneration-based

burden at this stage has no basis in section 925.11 or rule 3.853.

Upon granting Duckett’s motion for postconviction DNA testing, the

court found that he had met the requirements of the statute and

rule—i.e., that he carried his burden. Once that ruling was made,

Duckett was not required to establish anything else to receive the

complete results of that testing. Therefore, the circuit court

compounded its error in denying Duckett’s request for the

underlying data based on his failure to carry a burden that is

without legal foundation.

     For all of these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order to

the extent it denied Duckett’s request for the underlying DNA

testing data necessary for analysis.

                                  IV

     Duckett also claims the circuit court abused its discretion in

denying his demands for additional public records, in which he




     14. Even so, as noted above, the State insisted that an
evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.


                                - 15 -
sought information about DLI’s testing process and protocols. 15 We

find no abuse of discretion.

     The circuit court rejected Duckett’s demands on the basis that

this information was not “relevant to a subject matter of a

proceeding under rule 3.851” or “reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence.” See Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.852(i)(2)(C). We agree that Duckett has failed to allege, as rule

3.852 and our precedent require, how DLI’s testing process and

protocols could relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.

See Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019). Instead, he

seeks this information only as possible impeachment evidence.

Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of these demands as

to the testing process and protocols.

                                   V

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand for the full results of Duckett’s DNA testing—namely,

the underlying data—to be provided to him so that the statistical



     15. As we have noted, Duckett also sought the testing data in
these records demands. Given our holding, we decline to address
the denial of those demands, finding any dispute regarding them to
now be moot.

                                 - 16 -
analysis he seeks may be performed by a qualified bioinformaticist.

Furthermore, we instruct the circuit court to hold an evidentiary

hearing if any dispute arises as to the extent of the data necessary

for analysis.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.
TANENBAUM, J., dissents with an opinion.

NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.

TANENBAUM, J., dissenting.

     The court has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal in this

case. We should dismiss.

                                   I

                                  A

     When Florida’s citizens revised Article V of their constitution

in 1956, they modernized “the Florida judicial system at the

appellate level,” creating district courts of appeal that would have

the “final and absolute” word “in most instances” of review. Jenkins

v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357–58 (Fla. 1980). That is to say, the

district courts were “meant to be courts of final, appellate

jurisdiction” regarding nearly all trial court final judgments and


                                - 17 -
orders. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958); cf. Art. V,

§ 5(c), Fla. Const. (1956) (providing for the right to appeal “all final

judgments or decrees” to the district court “except those from which

appeals may be taken direct to the supreme court or to a circuit

court”); id. § 4(b) (limiting the right to directly appeal a trial court’s

final judgment to the supreme court to several very narrow

categories, including “judgments imposing the death penalty”).

     The objective was to relieve the supreme court’s extreme case

congestion. Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1358–59. This court’s power, in

turn, was “limited and strictly prescribed.” Id. at 1357 (commenting

in the context of this court’s power “to review decisions of the

district courts of appeal”); cf. Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339

So. 2d 200, 200 (Fla. 1976) (“The jurisdiction of this Court extends

only to the narrow class of cases enumerated in Article V, Section

3(b) of the Florida Constitution.” (emphasis supplied)). Doing so

would leave the supreme court to “function[] as a supervisory body

in the judicial system for the State, exercising appellate power in

certain specified areas essential to the settlement of issues of public

importance and the preservation of uniformity of principle and

practice.” Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1357–58.


                                  - 18 -
     For this approach to work, though, this court would have to be

careful “not to venture beyond the limitations of its own powers by

arrogating to itself the right to” engage in review not provided for by

the constitution. Lake, 103 So. 2d at 642. Yet the court did not

heed its own caution, continuing to construe its jurisdiction ever

more broadly, once again resulting in “a staggering case load.”

Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1358. The supreme court ultimately urged

another constitutional amendment, one that would further limit its

jurisdiction and essentially save it from its own accretions of

authority. See id. at 1358–59. The voters approved that

amendment, which went into effect in 1980.

     To be sure, these increasing jurisdictional limitations still left

in place the court’s express power to “hear appeals from final

judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty.” Art. V,

§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (1980). Against the historical backdrop just

described, though, there is no good reason to read this grant of

jurisdiction more broadly than others—so no justification for this

court’s repeated “venture[s] beyond the limitations” that section

3(b)(1) expressly establishes regarding review of death penalty

judgments. Lake, 103 So. 2d at 642.


                                 - 19 -
     “Our state Constitution is a limitation upon power,” so

“constitutional jurisdiction” cannot be expanded if doing so

“result[s] in a diminution of the constitutional jurisdiction of some

other court.” Harry E. Prettyman, Inc. v. Fla. Real Est. Comm’n, 109

So. 442, 445 (Fla. 1926) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Hodgson

v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303, 304 (1809); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank

of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983). The rule under our modern

constitutional structure is that the district court of appeal has

exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all trial court final judgments

and orders “not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit

court.” Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.

     Considering, then, the constitutional provision granting this

court limited direct review authority in matters involving the death

penalty, the text could not be plainer. A final judgment that

imposes the death penalty is appealable to this court (so not

appealable to the district court of appeal). But if a trial court order

to be reviewed is not one imposing the death penalty, it is not

appealable to this court, only to the district court. Reading the

scope of our authorized review any more broadly than what the

clear text provides necessarily aggrandizes what should be our own


                                 - 20 -
narrow appellate authority at the expense of the broad jurisdiction

the constitution expressly gives to the district courts of appeal.16

                                   B

     That, unfortunately, is what continues to happen in cases like

this. Do not lose sight of the only matter on review in this so-called

appeal: an order denying free-floating discovery requests related to

DNA testing that was both ordered and completed, requests

unmoored from any ongoing proceeding attacking the legality of a

judgment and death sentence subject to this court’s appellate

jurisdiction.

     To be clear, the petition for DNA testing is not a collateral

proceeding attacking the legality of the judgment. A petition filed

under section 925.11, Florida Statutes, opens a parallel proceeding,



      16. I recently explained the historical basis for this court also
having jurisdiction over a collateral attack on a judgment imposing
the death penalty under this constitutional provision. See Willacy
v. State, No. SC2026-0519, 2026 WL 1021168, at *8–9 (Fla. Apr. 15)
(Tanenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(observing that this court’s affirmance of the judgment imposing the
death penalty merges with that judgment, such that a motion filed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 attacking the
underlying absolutely final judgment proceeds under our
jurisdiction in a way mirroring the coram nobis proceeding that a
rule 3.851 proceeding replaced), cert. denied, No. 25-7220, 2026 WL
1074143 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2026).

                                 - 21 -
advancing a separate right of action to obtain testing if certain

criteria are met. The DNA testing is not a discovery device adjunct

to a collateral attack. And the statute is not death-specific. It

authorizes DNA testing for any felony, not just in cases in which

death has been imposed. See § 925.11(1), Fla. Stat. The trial court

ordered the DNA testing the defendant requested, the testing was

conducted, and the results were provided.

     The lab’s certificate of analysis said the following as its

“results/conclusion”:

     These [extracted] items were combined into a single
     sample for DNA analysis. The DNA profile obtained from
     this sample indicates at least one male contributor. Due
     to the limited nature of the DNA calls obtained from this
     sample, it is not suitable for genealogical comparisons or
     phenotype and ancestry estimations.

The report attached pages of data purporting to show how that

testing was conducted. This is all that section 925.11 requires.

See § 925.11(2)(i), Fla. Stat. (“The results of the DNA testing ordered

by the court shall be provided to the court, the sentenced

defendant, and the prosecuting authority.”). There is no statutory

provision that authorizes follow-up discovery once the results are

provided or that provides for continued proceedings to challenge the



                                 - 22 -
integrity or accuracy of the testing or the results. 17 Simply put,

even this independent statutory proceeding, filed in the closed

criminal case, is over.



      17. The defendant nevertheless gets away with using as a red
herring the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”)
analyst’s characterization about the results and her lack of
qualification to offer an opinion about those results’ being
inconclusive. The FDLE analyst could not offer an opinion at a
hypothetical new trial because she did not conduct the testing, so
her comments do not matter. The information being commented on
would be inadmissible hearsay. Cf. Linn v. Fossum, 946 So. 2d
1032, 1038–39 (Fla. 2006); Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 796–98
(2024). Still, the defendant now wants, basically, the “source code”
for the testing so that his expert can review and perhaps opine
about the reliability of the test results quoted above. The defendant
undoubtedly is using the DNA testing process as an impermissible
“fishing expedition.” Cf. Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla.
2004) (“Rule 3.853 is not intended to be a fishing expedition.”).

      Simply put, though section 925.11 establishes an independent
right of action, the action is disposed of once the testing is ordered
and the results provided. It does not create a new “mini-trial” over
whether the DNA testing results are probative of the defendant’s
guilt or innocence. Any evidentiary hearing instead would occur in
a pending rule 3.850 or rule 3.851 proceeding. By contrast, the
only purpose of the testing under the statute is to produce results
from existing evidence that a defendant contends will definitively
exonerate him. See § 925.11(1), Fla. Stat. Exonerating results
presumably would be clear and unambiguous, and they would
easily support a prompt vacatur of the judgment upon proper post-
conviction motion or habeas petition. That is not what the
defendant here is seeking.

      The defendant wants data he can feed to an expert he would
hire to testify about the testing. But there are clear limits to what

                                 - 23 -
     This court’s mandate affirming the trial court’s “judgment

imposing the death penalty” made that judgment absolutely final in

1990, upon which the trial court lost jurisdiction forever—save for

consideration of an authorized collateral attack. The trial court

summarily denied the post-warrant collateral attack as one that




such a “bioinformaticist” could testify to that would be probative of
the defendant’s actual innocence—given that the proposed expert is
not the one who conducted the DNA testing, either. The defendant
then is not looking for admissible, clearly exonerating evidence; he
is seeking evidence to impeach an expert (the lab analyst who did
conduct the test) who, at best, could testify only why the results do
not conclusively inculpate him. Any such impeachment evidence
could not give rise to doubt about the legality of the judgment
imposing the death penalty, which is what a new rule 3.851 motion
would have to be based on at this point.

      The majority’s reliance on Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271
(Fla. 1997), for its approach is misplaced. That decision addressed
the application of the now-defunct Frye standard to DNA testing.
See Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1997) (noting that in
Brim, “we reaffirmed our adherence to the Frye test for the
admissibility of DNA evidence, and clarified that each stage of the
DNA process, i.e., the methodology for determining DNA profiles, as
well as the statistical calculations used to report the test results—
both of which are at issue in the instant case—are subject to the
Frye test”). With this court’s amendment to Florida Rule of
Evidence 90.704, “[f]acts or data that are otherwise inadmissible
may not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or
inference unless the court determines that their probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.” In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence
Code, 278 So. 3d 551, 552 n.4 (Fla. 2019).

                                - 24 -
was time-barred—that is, as one not authorized by this court’s

rules. Indeed, as the defendant admitted during a hearing under

rule 3.851(f)(5)(B), his last-minute, post-warrant collateral attack

under the rule lacked any exonerating DNA test results constituting

newly discovered evidence that would except him from the time

bar.18

     The requests the court now purports to address were made

even though there was no pending collateral attack on the judgment

imposing the death penalty. It is quite clear, then, that the order on

review does not impose the death penalty, and it does not reject an

attack on the judgment that originally did.19 Jurisdiction to review

this order can find no textual support in our constitution.



      18. The majority correctly notes that there is no dispute this
court has jurisdiction in case numbers 2026-0449 and 2026-0450.
The former involves the final order summarily denying the
defendant’s last rule 3.851 motion. The latter is the defendant’s
habeas petition. Our jurisdiction, however, is not free-form; it is
tied to the order to be reviewed or the writ being sought. The
jurisdiction we have in those two cases cannot support
manufacturing jurisdiction over the order in this case, an order
produced in a separate proceeding that could have no direct effect
on the merits under consideration in case numbers 2026-0449 and
2026-0450.

    19. Notably, the defendant still has not attempted to file a
new motion under rule 3.851, claiming his actual innocence and

                                - 25 -
                                  II

                                  A

     The majority’s response to the clear conflict described above is

to rely primarily on the court’s “longstanding precedent” that claims

exclusive review authority over “all types of collateral proceedings in

death penalty cases.” State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d

70, 71 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis supplied). By “collateral proceedings,”

the court in Fourth District seems to have been referencing matters

beyond just post-conviction challenges to a judgment imposing the

death penalty. Before and since, the court has routinely expanded

its authority based on its own apparent, non-textual view that it

has perpetual authority over the case in which the death penalty

was imposed, even if the judgment itself has become final and not




relying on the results of the DNA test. Cf. Everett v. State, 377 So.
3d 1123, 1126 (Fla. 2024) (taking the defendant to task for alleging
that the DNA testing “could result in an acquittal” rather than
explaining that the testing “will exonerate” him); Hitchcock, 866 So.
2d at 27–28 (criticizing the defendant for failing to meet his burden
to explain “how” the testing will exonerate him). The defendant
already has received all that the statute guarantees to him: the
testing of a sample, and the results of that sample. It did not turn
out as he had hoped, obviously—otherwise right now he would be
vigorously pursuing a new post-conviction motion, claiming that the
results exonerate him.

                                - 26 -
subject to further attack. 20 Having taken more of a “might makes

right” approach starting in the 1990s and continuing through

present day, this court never has engaged in a textual analysis to

support this otherwise raw exercise of power—routinely citing only

to past practice instead. See, e.g., Fourth Dist., 697 So. 2d at 71

(citing two decisions from the 1990s for support, even though the

court in both instances simply took jurisdiction, without any

textual consideration); Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702, 705–06 (Fla.

2000) (noting that the court has “been less than precise in defining

our authority to” review interlocutory orders “in cases involving

death-sentenced defendants”; quoting the constitutional provision

giving jurisdiction to review a judgment “imposing the death

penalty”; then string-citing cases in which the court previously



     20. As I previously explained, “[a]bsent an attack on the
judgment and death sentence previously affirmed, this court’s
appellate jurisdiction under section 3(b)(1) is not implicated in any
way,” and an active warrant does not “give us extraordinary
appellate review powers.” Willacy, 2026 WL 1021168, at *10–11
(Tanenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). At the
same time, contrary to the majority’s characterization, I do not
question our writ authority, under Article V, section 3(b)(7), to
address urgent interlocutory matters, provided there is an
independent basis for our appellate jurisdiction—like a pending rule
3.851 proceeding. Id. Here, we do not have jurisdiction because
that appellate jurisdictional hook is missing.

                                - 27 -
“review[ed] interlocutory discovery orders in capital collateral

proceedings . . . although absent an express statement of how the

Court determines whether to exercise its jurisdiction”).

     Though the majority continues this primary reliance on past

practice for authority, it does cite four provisions purportedly

supporting its jurisdictional claim. First, it cites Article V, section

3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, but as explained above, the plain

text does not support that claim. Once again, textual treatment of

the phrase “judgment imposing the death penalty” demonstrating

how the court could have jurisdiction over a mere discovery order,

is not on offer. Second, it cites section 925.11(3), which simply

restates the constitutional proposition under Article V, section

4(b)(1)—that a trial court’s order granting or denying the petition is

appealable by the adversely affected party. 21 The statute does not




     21. The Legislature created a separate right of action to have
DNA testing ordered. § 925.11(1), Fla. Stat. (“Petition for
Examination”). The defendant moved for a DNA test under the
statute and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853, and that
motion was granted. That grant of relief presumably was a final
order that would be appealable as such to the district court having
geographical jurisdiction. He did not appeal the order with a claim
that he was “adversely affected,” so that matter is final and

                                 - 28 -
specify that, in a “death case,” the appeal must go to this court; it

merely states that an appeal “may be taken,” presumably from the

final order granting or denying the petition. § 925.11(3)(a), Fla.

Stat. Even if it did state that in a death case, the appeal would go

to this court, that likely would be an unconstitutional expansion of

this court’s constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction, as suggested

earlier. Third, the majority cites Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.853 and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D).

Neither rule specifies that an appeal could or must be taken to the

supreme court, and this court cannot expand its own constitutional

jurisdiction—a substantive matter—by procedural rule. 22

     It has been said that “death is different.” Fitzpatrick v. State,

527 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1988); Yacob v. State, 136 So. 3d 539,

546 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Fitzpatrick); cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.




absolute. At all events, the order for a DNA test itself has no effect
on the “judgment imposing the death penalty.”

      22. The Florida Constitution gives this court authority to
define jurisdiction by rule only with respect to a district court of
appeal’s authority to review specified non-final orders. See Art. V,
§ 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (providing that a district court of appeal “may
review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by
rules adopted by the supreme court”).

                                 - 29 -
238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that the

“penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal

punishment, not in degree but in kind”). True though this may be,

an active death warrant does not excuse a departure from our

supposed “commitment to the supremacy-of-text principle”—our

“recogni[tion] that the words of a governing text are of paramount

concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text

means.” Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, 384 So.

3d 67, 77 (Fla. 2024) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). If

it is true that “we give the words of the constitution their plain,

usual, ordinary, and commonly accepted meanings at the time they

were written,” City of Tallahassee v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n,

Inc., 375 So. 3d 178, 183 (Fla. 2023), we should do so consistently,

all the time.

     A “longstanding precedent” that demonstrably deviates from

the clear text is not immune from reconsideration, regardless of the

context and regardless of whether anyone has asked for that

reconsideration. Cf. Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 724–25

(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The true irony of our modern stare

decisis doctrine lies in the fact that proponents of stare decisis tend


                                 - 30 -
to invoke it most fervently when the precedent at issue is least

defensible.”). We must continuously police our own jurisdictional

boundaries; no one can do it for us. Ensuring that we act only

within constitutional constraints is an ongoing exercise in self-

discipline. Doing so is the true demonstration of judicial restraint.

     Our duty always is to apply the law as written. As this court

has said:

     In a case where we are bound by a higher legal authority—
     whether it be a constitutional provision, a statute, or a
     decision of the Supreme Court—our job is to apply that law
     correctly to the case before us. When we are convinced that a
     precedent clearly conflicts with the law we are sworn to
     uphold, precedent normally must yield.

State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020); see id. (noting that

“reliance interests are lowest in cases . . . involving procedural and

evidentiary rules” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Franchise

Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 248 (2019) (noting that stare

decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution

because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional

amendment” (internal quotations omitted)).

                                   B

     In the end, the defendant is gaming the process set out in



                                - 31 -
section 925.11 to delay execution of his sentence, which he has yet

to demonstrate is unlawful, despite his having had decades to do

so. His effort, misguided as it is, should have taken place in the

context of a pending rule 3.851 motion, where he would bear the

burden of showing “how” the new information “will” exonerate him.

Hitchcock v. State, 866 So. 2d 23, 27–28 (Fla. 2004); Reynolds v.

State, 373 So. 3d 1124, 1126–27 (Fla. 2023). Instead, he is being

permitted to circumvent this burden and obtain further delay, using

the pending death warrant to manufacture urgency—regarding a

closed trial-court proceeding—where none exists. Cf. Reynolds, 373

So. 3d at 1127 & n.6 (noting the defendant’s failure to pursue DNA

testing on certain items in an earlier motion “despite [his] being

aware of the[] existence” of items to be tested and the availability of

DNA testing methods); Arango v. State, 437 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla.

1983) (criticizing “the all too frequent and questionable practice of

waiting until the eleventh hour to raise or prosecute issues which

could have and should have been raised months or years before”);

Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1307 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., in

chambers) (criticizing how, in a death warrant context, “‘hydraulic

pressure’ [can be] brought to bear upon any judge or group of


                                 - 32 -
judges [that] inclines them to grant last-minute stays in matters of

this sort just because no mortal can be totally satisfied that within

the extremely short period of time allowed by such a late filing he

has fully grasped the contentions of the parties and correctly

resolved them”).

     There is no constitutional basis for our intervention in this

matter, and the pending death warrant by itself cannot supply it.

No textual defense of this court’s exercise of jurisdiction in cases

like this one has ever been offered, not before and not today. None

exists. Our previous exercises of jurisdiction, and the one in this

case, have been demonstrated here to be wrong—expressly contrary

to the plain jurisdictional statements in the Florida Constitution.

     The defendant has had his “day in court”—many days, in fact.

Over the decades, this court has rejected his legal challenges to his

conviction and sentence of death. Continuing Justice Rehnquist’s

point from before:

     There must come a time, even when so irreversible a
     penalty as that of death has been imposed upon a
     particular defendant, when the legal issues in the case
     have been sufficiently litigated and relitigated that the
     law must be allowed to run its course. If [our holdings]
     are to be anything but dead letters, capital punishment
     when imposed pursuant to the standards laid down in


                                 - 33 -
     those cases is constitutional; and when the standards
     expounded in those cases and in subsequent decisions
     of this Court bearing on those procedures have been
     complied with, the State is entitled to carry out the
     death sentence. Indeed, just as the rule of law entitles
     a criminal defendant to be surrounded with all the
     protections which do surround him under our system
     prior to conviction and during trial and appellate review,
     the other side of that coin is that when the State has
     taken all the steps required by that rule of law, its will,
     as represented by the legislature which authorized the
     imposition of the death sentence, and the state courts
     which imposed it and upheld it, should be carried out.

Evans, 440 U.S. at 1303.

     The appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County,
    Brian Welke, Judge
    Case No. 351987CF001347AXXXXX

Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Brittney Lacy,
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mary Elizabeth Wells,
Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Courtney
M. Hammer, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida,

     for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
Charmaine Millsaps, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida, Naomi Nichols, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida, and Nicole Rochelle Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

     for Appellee




                                - 34 -