Neely Petrie-Blanchard v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                     Case No. 5D2024-1293
                  LT Case No. 2020-CF-4668-A
                 _____________________________

NEELY PETRIE-BLANCHARD,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________


On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County.
Lisa Diane Herndon, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Robert J. Pearce, III,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alyssa M.
Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.


                          May 1, 2026


PER CURIAM.

      Neely Petrie-Blanchard was offered a lawyer but voluntarily
represented herself at trial, which resulted in her conviction of
first-degree murder. She was not offered a lawyer to represent her
at the sentencing phase, however, where she was given a
mandatory life sentence. Because the failure to renew the offer of
a lawyer at sentencing was fundamental error, reversal is
required.1

     For three and a half years, Petrie-Blanchard was represented
by private counsel, but a month before trial she dismissed her
attorney and sought to represent herself. The trial court conducted
an adequate Faretta2 inquiry and allowed her to proceed pro se.
Prior to trial, as well as the first day of trial, the trial court
confirmed that Petrie-Blanchard wished to proceed pro se and
renewed the offer of counsel, as is legally required. See State v.
Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 250−51 (Fla. 1997) (outlining the
requirements for conducting an adequate Faretta inquiry);
Richardson v. State, 325 So. 3d 1012, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
(finding renewal of counsel “must occur at a critical stage of the
proceedings that is separate and distinct from the other parts of
the trial”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(5) (noting it is the duty of the
trial court to renew the offer of counsel “at each subsequent stage
of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without
counsel”).

     On the last day of trial, following the jury verdict, the trial
court proceeded immediately to sentencing but failed to renew the
offer of counsel, which is generally fundamental error. See
Williams v. State, 215 So. 3d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“A
trial court’s failure to offer counsel for sentencing ordinarily
constitutes fundamental error.”); Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562,
566 (Fla. 2008) (noting “denial of counsel for an entire sentencing
proceeding would constitute fundamental error”); Gonzalez v.
State, 838 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (noting “the
denial of the right to counsel is fundamental error”); Smith v.
State, 41 So. 3d 1081, 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (finding per se
reversible error where “trial judge did not renew the offer of
assistance of counsel” to the defendant at sentencing and citing to
Jackson). As our Court has held:


    1 We affirm without comment the other two issues raised on

appeal.
    2 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).




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    If a defendant waives the right to counsel at any stage of
    the criminal proceedings, the trial court must renew the
    offer of assistance of counsel at each subsequent stage of
    the proceedings. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d)(5). Sentencing
    is a critical stage in criminal proceedings; and, even if a
    defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this
    omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right
    to counsel.

Hardy v. State, 655 So. 2d 1245, 1247−48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see
also Chestnut v. State, 578 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
(same).

     The State says the failure to renew the offer of counsel for
sentencing was harmless error because Petrie-Blanchard was
subject to a mandatory life sentence. But, as just stated, the failure
to renew the offer of counsel at sentencing is generally
fundamental error that cannot be considered harmless. Even so,
the state of the law is that when a defendant faces a mandatory or
predetermined sentence, the defendant has the right to be
represented by counsel. See Sanders v. State, 787 So. 2d 264,
264−65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing and remanding for
resentencing after trial court imposed a life sentence without a
hearing, even though “the only sentencing option available to the
trial court was the imposition of a sentence for life imprisonment”).
Additionally, “the length of a convicted defendant’s sentence is not
the only issue that may arise at a sentencing hearing.” Sandoval
v. State, 884 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Even where a
defendant may face a predetermined sentence in his or her
sentencing hearing,

    counsel might have filed a motion for new trial under
    Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.600; a motion for
    arrest of judgment under Florida Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 3.610 on the grounds that the information was
    so defective it would not support a conviction, that the
    court lacked jurisdiction, that the verdict was uncertain,
    or that the defendant was convicted of an offense not
    charged; or a motion to have a lesser conviction entered
    under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.620 if the


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    evidence did not sustain the verdict. Counsel would have
    assessed whether there was any reason why sentence
    could not be imposed under Florida Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 3.720, such as the defendant’s insanity, the
    defendant’s pardon, that the defendant was not the
    person convicted, or that the defendant was pregnant (the
    last being obviously irrelevant as to this defendant but
    not as to all defendants who might be facing mandatory
    sentences). The court at sentencing might also be
    determining the award of credit for jail time, restitution,
    and the imposition of a lien for the public defender’s
    services. Counsel has the responsibility to make such
    objections at sentencing as may be necessary to keep the
    defendant’s case in an appellate pipeline. And at
    sentencing, as this court has previously recognized, “[t]he
    advisability of an appeal must then, or shortly, be
    determined.” Evans v. State, 163 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 1964) (quoting Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d
    225, 227 (5th Cir. 1950)). These responsibilities apply
    equally, if not more so, to a defendant facing a mandatory
    sentence of life in prison.

Id. at 216 n.1 (citation modified). The reason why the renewal of
the offer of counsel is required is straightforward: the requirement
of a mandatory sentence does not negate a criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel as to other aspects of the sentencing
process. Id. at 216 (“Otherwise, the mere fact of a mandatory
sentence would nullify a defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel.”).

     Accordingly, Petrie-Blanchard’s judgment is AFFIRMED, but
we REVERSE her sentence and REMAND for resentencing with
either appointed counsel or waiver of the right to counsel.


MAKAR and SOUD, JJ., concur.
EISNAUGLE, J., concurs in part and concurs in result with opinion.




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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________




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                                           Case No. 5D2024-1293
                                      LT Case No. 2020-CF-4668-A


EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in part and concurring in result.

     I agree that we must reverse Appellant’s sentence because the
trial court failed to re-offer counsel prior to sentencing. Our
decision in Williams v. State concludes that this error is
fundamental. 215 So. 3d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
(considering the issue in the context of an ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim). The majority’s harmless error discussion
is therefore unnecessary. See Johnson v. State, 833 So. 2d 252, 255
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“An error which is so significant as to be
fundamental . . . cannot also be harmless.”). I do not join that part
of the majority’s opinion.




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