Stephanie Proffitt v. State of Florida

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                         STATE OF FLORIDA
                        _____________________________

                             Case No. 6D2024-1066
                        Lower Tribunal No. 21-CF-016591
                        _____________________________

                                STEPHANIE PROFFITT,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                      Appellee.
                        _____________________________

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County.
                                Bruce Kyle, Judge.

                                   April 17, 2026

NARDELLA, J.

      Stephanie Proffitt (“Proffitt”) appeals her convictions for drug related crimes 1

arguing that evidence was improperly admitted at trial and that, after trial, the court

imposed a vindictive sentence. We reject both arguments but write only to address




      1
         Trafficking in 4 grams or more of fentanyl (Count I); possession of a
controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Count II); trafficking in 28 grams
or more of fentanyl (Count III); possession of a controlled substance (Count IV); and
possession of a place with knowledge of trafficking, sale, or manufacture of a
controlled substance (Count V).
the second—that her sentence must be reversed because the trial court imposed a

vindictive sentence after she declined to accept the State’s plea offer.

                                  BACKGROUND

      Before calling the jury in on the morning of trial, the court asked defense

counsel to confirm that Proffitt would not be accepting the State’s plea offer of the

25 years with all mandatory minimums wrapped together, as it would impact other

pending matters. 2 The court then offered defense counsel a few minutes to confer.

      When the conference ended, defense counsel announced that Proffitt would

not accept the State’s offer. To clarify the status, the court then questioned: “And

no counter I am assuming then?” Defense counsel stated no. The court then asked

what the offer was and confirmed on the record that Proffitt wanted to reject it. In

her detailed response, Proffitt stated that she had not “really talked to him (counsel)

much in the whole process of everything” but that she was told about an offer which

the court was unaware of. The court then once again confirmed that Proffitt did not

want to accept the State’s offer and did not need more time to speak with counsel.

      Proffitt proceeded to trial where she was found guilty as charged on all counts.

The trial court granted the State’s request and imposed the maximum sentence on



      2
        One issue related to whether another individual who was out of custody
needed to be held, and another was scheduling reasons involving depositions and
out-of-state travel.

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Count III—30 years’ imprisonment with a 25-year mandatory minimum. It imposed

concurrent prison sentences on the other counts. 3 When imposing the sentence, the

trial court acknowledged defense counsel’s mitigation argument but stated that it did

not believe the mitigator applied and would not reduce Proffitt’s sentence even if it

did apply based on the evidence that was adduced at trial.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Whether a sentence is vindictive is a question of law reviewed de novo. See

Gonzalez v. State, 419 So. 3d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“Our evaluation of

whether a defendant’s sentence stems from judicial vindictiveness is a question of

law. As a result, our review is de novo.”); Pickard v. State, 417 So. 3d 491, 494

(Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“Whether a sentence is vindictive is a question of law that we

review de novo.”).

                                    DISCUSSION

      Proffitt argues the trial court’s sentence was unconstitutionally vindictive and

characterizes the trial court’s actions at the start of trial as judicial participation in

plea discussions that the court itself initiated.      “[W]hen a claim of vindictive

sentencing is raised, the reviewing court must examine all of the surrounding

circumstances of a rejected plea and the sentence imposed to determine whether they



      3
        15 years with a 3-year mandatory minimum (Count I); 15 years (Count II);
5 years (Count IV); and 15 years (Count V).
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create a presumption of vindictiveness.” Concepcion v. State, 188 So. 3d 5, 9 (Fla.

3d DCA 2016). In determining whether the totality of the circumstances give rise

to a presumption of vindictiveness, we begin by considering the non-exhaustive list

of factors announced in Wilson v. State, 845 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2003), which are:

      (1) whether the trial judge initiated the plea discussions with the
      defendant in violation of Warner 4; (2) whether the trial judge, through
      his or her comments on the record, appears to have departed from his
      or her role as an impartial arbiter by either urging the defendant to
      accept a plea, or by implying or stating that the sentence imposed would
      hinge on future procedural choices, such as exercising the right to trial;
      (3) the disparity between the plea offer and the ultimate sentence
      imposed; and (4) the lack of any facts on the record that explain the
      reason for the increased sentence other than that the defendant
      exercised his or her right to a trial or hearing.

Id. at 156. Here, as we explain below, the circumstances do not give rise to a

presumption of vindictiveness.

   1. Initiating Plea Discussions

      The trial court did not initiate plea discussions. Initiating plea discussions

occurs when, for example, the court itself extends a plea offer. See, e.g., Pickard,

417 So. 3d at 494 (“The court started plea discussions by offering a two-year

sentence.”). Here, the court did what it was allowed to do—ask about the status of

the plea negotiations. “Prior to trial, a judge may ask the attorneys if a plea offer has

been extended, and may ask the defendant if he is aware of a pending plea offer


      4
          State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000).

                                           4
without violating Warner’s restrictions.” 5 Vondervor v. State, 847 So. 2d 610, 614

(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Wilson, 845 So. 2d at 157 n.9). A trial court crosses the

line between a proper plea colloquy and prohibited conduct when it insinuates itself

into the bargaining process, which was not done in this case. See id. (“First, no

violation of Warner appears to exist. A plea offer was made by the State and simply

agreed to by the trial judge, who did not insinuate himself into the bargaining process

or depart from his role as an impartial arbiter.”).

   2. Comments on the Record/Departure from Role as Impartial Arbiter

      There is no indication on this record that the trial court departed from its role

as a neutral arbiter. A departure from the role as an impartial arbiter occurs when

the court, for example, urges the defendant to accept a plea or otherwise indicates

that a defendant’s sentence will be increased because the defendant exercised the

right to a trial. See Concepcion, 188 So. 3d at 10 (record did not reflect abandonment

of neutrality where “[t]he trial court did not recommend or urge the defendant to

accept the State’s plea offer or imply that upon a conviction, the defendant’s

sentence would be increased because he exercised his right to a trial.”). Here, the

court asked defense counsel if counsel would like time to confer with Proffitt and

counsel agreed. The court did not force this conference between counsel and Proffitt.



      5
        We recognize that asking for a memorialization of the State’s plea offer on
the record can be useful in confirming that a defendant is aware of the offer.
                                         5
   3. Disparity

      The disparity prong of the Wilson factors has been interpreted in two ways.

First, “[t]he disparity referred to in the third Wilson factor is the disparity between

the trial court’s plea offer to resolve the case, and after defendant rejects the court-

extended offer, the trial court’s ultimate post-trial sentence.” Williams v. State, 225

So. 3d 349, 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). Under this framework, there is no disparity

here because the trial court did not make a plea offer.

      Second, courts have also looked at the difference between the State’s pre-trial

offer and the ultimate sentence imposed. See, e.g., Redmond v. State, 970 So. 2d

915, 915 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (rejecting claim of vindictiveness because imposition

of harsher sentence after trial than had been offered by the State during pre-trial

negotiations did not create presumption of vindictiveness). Under this framework,

we conclude that although the sentence imposed is greater than the plea offer

extended by the State, Proffitt has not set forth a compelling argument as to why the

difference in this case is so great that it warrants scrutiny. In any event, a “disparity

between the State’s pre-trial plea offer and the sentence imposed by the trial court

after trial, standing alone, does not create a presumption of vindictiveness nor require

resentencing.” Concepcion, 188 So. 3d at 10.




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   4. Explanation for the Sentence

      The trial court explained the reason for its sentence. It did not believe that

there were mitigation factors. The court also explained that based on the evidence

introduced at trial there was no doubt as to Proffitt’s involvement with the drug

trafficking.

                                 CONCLUSION

      In sum, nothing in the record before this Court raises a presumption of

vindictiveness. Accordingly, we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.

WHITE and GANNAM, JJ., concur.


Michelle Medina, of Baez Law Firm, Miami, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.


  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
           AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED




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