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Troy William Armstrong v. State of Florida

Docket 5D2024-1508

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

Criminal AppealAffirmed in Part, Reversed in Part
Filed
Jurisdiction
Florida
Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Type
Opinion
Docket
5D2024-1508

Appeal from a criminal judgment and sentence in Putnam County Circuit Court challenging convictions for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation.

Summary

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed Troy William Armstrong’s convictions for multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation. The State conceded that one count (Count II), charging sexual battery under section 794.011(2)(a) based on 'union' with the victim’s anus by the defendant’s mouth, required proof of penetration and there was no evidence of anal penetration. The court reversed Count II on that basis, affirmed the remaining convictions, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that partial reversal.

Issues Decided

  • Whether the evidence supported a conviction under section 794.011(2)(a) for anal sexual battery based on 'union' with the defendant's mouth absent proof of penetration.
  • Whether any other challenges to the convictions and sentence warranted reversal.

Court's Reasoning

The court accepted the State’s concession that the statute defines sexual battery to require penetration when the contact is made by something other than a sexual organ, and 'union' alone without anal penetration does not satisfy the statute’s element for Count II. Because there was no evidence of anal penetration, Count II could not stand. The court found no merit in the other challenges and therefore affirmed the remaining convictions.

Authorities Cited

  • Section 794.011(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2020)
  • Johnson v. State632 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)

Parties

Appellant
Troy William Armstrong
Appellee
State of Florida
Judge
Alicia R. Washington
Attorney
Jennifer Walker Cogdill
Attorney
James Uthmeier
Attorney
Roberts J. Bradford, Jr.

Key Dates

Decision date
2026-04-24

What You Should Do Next

  1. 1

    Review mandate and judgment entry

    Defense counsel should obtain the appellate mandate and confirm the trial court enters an amended judgment removing Count II and determine whether resentencing is required.

  2. 2

    Consider post-judgment motions

    Either party may file any timely motions permitted by the rules (for example, a motion for rehearing) within the applicable deadlines stated in the appellate rules.

  3. 3

    Consult about collateral options

    Defense should evaluate whether the partial reversal affects sentencing or collateral challenges and advise the client about possible next steps, including potential further appeals if appropriate.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide?
The court reversed one conviction (Count II) because the statute required proof of anal penetration when the contact was made by the defendant’s mouth and there was no evidence of penetration, affirmed the other convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.
Who is affected by this decision?
Troy William Armstrong is directly affected—the reversal removes one conviction from his judgment while the remaining convictions and sentence stand.
What happens next?
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the partial reversal, which may include resentencing or correction of the judgment.
Can this decision be appealed further?
A party may seek further review if authorized; the opinion notes it is not final until disposition of any timely motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure (e.g., motions for rehearing).

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                     Case No. 5D2024-1508
                 L.T. Case No. 2020-CF-001402
                 _____________________________

TROY WILLIAM ARMSTRONG,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________


On appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County.
Alicia R. Washington, Judge.

Jennifer Walker Cogdill, Fleming Island, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J.
Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                         April 24, 2026

MACIVER, J.

     Troy Armstrong raises multiple issues challenging his
judgment and sentence for multiple counts of sexual battery and
lewd and lascivious molestation. Among Armstrong’s assertions is
that he is wrongly convicted of violating section 794.011(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (2020), by penetrating or having union with the
victim’s anus with his mouth (Count II). Armstrong asserts and
the State concedes that union is not sufficient for this specific
charge 1 and there was no evidence of anal penetration. On the
State’s concession of error, we reverse Armstrong’s conviction for
Count II.

    We reject Armstrong’s remaining assertions and affirm the
remaining counts without further discussion.

     AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for
further proceedings.

LAMBERT and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________




    1   Sexual battery is defined as “oral, anal, or vaginal
penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the
anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object . . . .” §
794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2020). Thus, where the contact is made
by something other than a sexual organ, in this case Armstrong’s
mouth, penetration is an element of the charge. See Johnson v.
State, 632 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).


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