Jonathan Rodriguez v. Valentina Rodriguez

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                     Case No. 5D2025-0040
                 LT Case No. 59-2017-DR-4000
                 _____________________________

JONATHAN RODRIGUEZ,

    Appellant,

    v.

VALENTINA RODRIGUEZ,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________


On appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County.
Christopher Sprysenski, Judge.

Flavio E. Alvarez of Alvarez Law, Kissimmee, for Appellant.

Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannon of Shannin Law
Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

                          May 1, 2026

KILBANE, J.

    Jonathan Rodriguez (“Former Husband”) appeals final
orders in his marriage dissolution case with Valentina Rodriguez
(“Former Wife”). This case went to trial before a general
magistrate, whose recommended order was entered by the trial
court. Former Husband timely moved to vacate the order
pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490, which
was summarily denied for failure to submit all transcripts from
the four-day trial. Because the trial court erred in summarily
denying Former Husband’s motion to vacate based solely on the
lack of a complete transcript, we reverse.

                             Facts

     The marital dissolution trial was held before a general
magistrate on June 13–14, September 14, and November 13,
2023. In February 2024, after the trial court entered the
magistrate’s recommended order, Former Husband timely moved
to vacate the order and set the motion for hearing. Based on
scheduling conflicts and a judicial transfer, Former Husband was
granted three extensions as to the hearing date. On the
afternoon of the scheduled hearing, however, the court cancelled
via email because “the transcript is missing the last day of trial
on 6/28.” Former Husband responded that no hearing was held
on June 28, 2023, after which the parties disputed which
transcripts were missing.

     In December 2024, the trial court denied Former Husband’s
motion based on noncompliance with Florida Family Law Rule of
Procedure 12.490(f) in failing to provide all transcripts of the
proceedings before the magistrate or notice that he would only be
submitting a partial record.       Former Husband moved for
reconsideration or rehearing asserting he submitted the
transcripts from June and November 2023, not all the transcripts
were relevant to his motion, and the cancellation of the hearing
violated his due process rights. The court denied the motion, and
Former Husband timely appeals.

                            Analysis

     The denial of a motion to vacate under rule 12.490 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Oramas v. Asencio, 425 So.
3d 1184, 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026). But strictly legal questions—
including whether the trial court interpreted a procedural rule
correctly or satisfied due process—are reviewed de novo. See
Barco v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 975 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Fla.
2008) (“[A]ppellate courts apply a de novo standard of review
when the construction of a procedural rule . . . is at issue.”);
Williams v. Sapp, 255 So. 3d 912, 914 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)



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(“Appellate courts review possible due process violations in family
law cases de novo.”).

      The Florida Supreme Court adopted rule 12.490 to provide
for the use of general magistrates (formerly referred to as
“general masters”) in family law matters. Historically, after a
hearing, the magistrate would submit a report and
recommendations to the circuit court. See Wells v. Wells, 392 So.
3d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Subsequently, a party could file
exceptions that the trial court had to hear before entering its
order on the matter. Id.; see also Oliva v. Oliva, 357 So. 3d 1266,
1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“It is well established Florida law that
if a party timely files exceptions to a general magistrate’s report,
a hearing on a party’s exceptions is mandatory.” (citation
modified)); Figueroa v. Kossiver, 336 So. 3d 1260, 1263 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2022) (“Had Former Husband [filed exceptions], the trial
court would have been required to hold a hearing on the
exceptions.”). Summary denial of timely filed exceptions was
considered reversible error. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Edmonds, 363
So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“[W]here a party timely files
exceptions to a magistrate’s report, it is reversible error for a trial
court to fail to conduct a hearing on the exceptions before
entering an order on the report.”); Jean v. Jean, 320 So. 3d 313,
317 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“Because the trial court erred in
summarily denying the Former Wife’s exceptions to the
magistrate’s report and recommendations based upon a failure to
file the transcript, we reverse the order approving and adopting
the magistrate’s report and recommendations and the order
summarily denying the Former Wife’s exceptions to the
magistrate’s report and recommendations, and we remand for the
trial court to hold a hearing and consider the exceptions on the
merits.”); cf. Langsetmo v. Metza, 306 So. 3d 112, 114 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2020) (finding party’s due process rights were violated
where exceptions were summarily denied based on failure to
provide transcript within timeframe of local administrative
order).

    As the use of magistrates in family law developed, the Court
warned “we emphasize that we are in no way implying that
judges may merely ‘rubber-stamp’ the recommendations of
masters.   An adequate method of judicial review of the


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recommendations is still required given the limited judicial
authority that may be vested in masters.” In re Fam. L. R. P.,
663 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis added), order
clarified, 667 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1996). The Court reiterated the
extent of judicial review required was dependent upon whether
exceptions were filed:

              We find that, provided a judge carefully
         considers (1) whether the evidence and facts, as
         fully set forth in a master’s report, support the
         recommendations of the master and (2)
         whether the recommendations are justified
         under the law, then the review, absent
         exceptions, is adequate and satisfies the spirit
         of Lyon. Notwithstanding this finding, we
         emphasize that a judge must review the entire
         record if exceptions are filed.

Id.

     On the other hand, judicial review could not become a
substitute for the judgment of the magistrate. See Figueroa, 336
So. 3d at 1263 (“[O]nce a trial court appoints a magistrate to
make findings, it loses the prerogative of substituting its
judgment for that of the magistrate.” (citation modified)); Posso v.
Sierra, 311 So. 3d 1021, 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (“We recognize
that once a matter has been heard by a magistrate and evidence
taken, a judge is not allowed to substitute his or her judgment for
that of the magistrate.”). Instead, in that context, the circuit
court “takes on the role of an appellate court.” Figueroa, 336 So.
3d at 1263.

     In 2022, rule 12.490 was significantly amended to make the
review process of matters heard by general magistrates and child
support hearing officers consistent. See In re Amends. to Fla.
Fam. L. R. P. 12.490 & 12.491, & Forms 12.920(a)–(c), 346 So. 3d
1053, 1054 (Fla. 2022) (noting intention to “align the process for
hearings in front of general magistrates under rule 12.490 with
the process for hearings in front of child support hearing officers
under rule 12.491”). Under the new procedure, instead of a
report and recommendations, a general magistrate would submit
a recommended order to the court. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P.

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12.490(e)(1) (2022). The court would then promptly review and
enter the recommended order unless it was determined to be
facially or legally deficient.1 See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(e)(3).
Within ten days of entry, any affected party could move to vacate
the order. Id. Thus, as amended, the rule replaced the parties’
filing of exceptions before the magistrate’s recommendations were
adopted by the court with a motion to vacate filed after the court
enters the magistrate’s order as its own.2 See Wells, 392 So. 3d at
236.

     That said, the amended rule continued to include language
requiring a hearing on a timely filed and pursued motion to
vacate. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(e)(4) (“A motion to vacate
the order must be heard within 30 days from the date the motion
is filed, unless the time frame is extended by court order.
Thereafter, the judge must enter an order rendering a ruling no
later than 30 days after the hearing on the motion to vacate.”
(emphases added)); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(e)(6) (“A timely filed
motion to vacate stays the enforcement of the recommended order
rendered by the court until after the court has conducted a
hearing on the motion to vacate and renders an order granting or
denying the motion to vacate.” (emphasis added)); see also
Valcarcel v. Valcarcel, 361 So. 3d 388, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
(“Hearings on motions to vacate under rules 12.490 and 12.491 . .
. are mandatory.”) (reversing orders adopting recommended
orders without hearing motions to vacate); Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
112 (2012) (“Mandatory words impose a duty[.]”). But see Fla.


     1. This initial review is consistent with the former rule’s
requirement for judicial review absent exceptions. See In re Fam.
L. R. P., 663 So. 2d at 1049,1052 (Fla. 1995).

      2. Judicial review of the entire file after the motion to vacate
is filed mirrors the review required after the filing of exceptions
under the prior rule. See In re Fam. L. R. P., 663 So. 2d at 1052;
see also Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f)(1) (2024) (“The record must
consist of the court file, all depositions and documentary and
other evidence presented at hearing, including the transcript of
the relevant proceedings before the general magistrate.”).


                                  5
Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(e)(5) (“Failure to seek a hearing date in
conformity herewith may result in a denial of the motion to
vacate.”).3



     3. Former Husband’s motion to vacate was filed before but
scheduled for hearing after additional amendments became
effective as of July 1, 2024. See In re Amends. to Fla. Fam. L. R.
P., 389 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. 2024). Alongside changes not relevant
here, the 2024 amendment provides that this motion may
function as a motion for rehearing. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P.
12.490(e)(4) (2024). Yet this language is sandwiched in the same
subsection between unchanged language requiring a hearing on
the motion. Id. (“A motion to vacate the order must be heard
within 30 days from the date the motion is filed, unless the time
frame is extended by court order. If applicable, a motion to vacate
operates as a motion for rehearing under rule 12.530. Thereafter,
the judge must enter an order rendering a ruling no later than 30
days after the hearing on the motion to vacate.” (emphases
added)). Thus, even if the 2024 amendment applied, a timely
filed and pursued motion must be heard unless it is properly
treated as a motion for rehearing. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P.
12.490(e)(4) (2024) (“If applicable, a motion to vacate operates as
a motion for rehearing under rule 12.530.” (emphasis added));
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(f) (“When any motion for rehearing or
new trial is filed, the court must initially make a determination if
a hearing on the motion is required. If a hearing is required, the
court must provide notice of the hearing on the motion for
rehearing or new trial. If the court determines that a hearing is
not required, then the court must enter an order granting or
denying the motion in accordance with this rule.”).

      Although the implications of the 2024 amendments were not
addressed by the parties, were this change to end the mandatory
right to hearing on a timely filed and pursued motion to vacate if
it is properly treated as a motion for rehearing in accordance with
rule 12.490(e)(4), this would be a substantive change in the law.
See M.D. Transp. v. Paschen, 996 So. 2d 902, 904–05 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2008) (“Substantive law prescribes duties and rights and
procedural law concerns the means and methods to apply and
enforce those duties and rights.” (citation modified)); cf. Peeples v.

                                  6
     The amended rules also continue to require the movant to
submit an adequate record for judicial review, which includes
transcripts of the proceedings before the magistrate. See Fla.
Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f)(1). More specifically, absent waiver, the
movant must provide either the full transcript of all proceedings
before the magistrate or notice that only a partial record would
be submitted:

         Unless waived by order of the court prior to any
         hearing on the motion to vacate, the transcript
         of all relevant proceedings, if any, must be
         delivered to the judge and provided to all other
         parties not less than 48 hours before the
         hearing. If less than a full transcript of the
         proceedings    taken     before  the    general
         magistrate is furnished by the moving party,
         that party must promptly file a notice setting
         forth the portions of the transcript that have
         been ordered. The responding parties must be
         permitted to designate any additional portions
         of the transcript necessary to the adjudication
         of the issues raised in the motion to vacate or
         cross-motion to vacate.

Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f)(2). Yet the rule does not clearly
provide the consequence for failure to comply with this
requirement.4


Pilcher, 423 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 1982) (“The right to a hearing
before a final administrative order is rendered is substantive in
nature, but the timing of when and before whom that hearing
must occur is procedural.”); Cleveland Clinic Fla. v. Daniels, 384
So. 3d 182, 185–86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (“Substantive changes to
vested rights are presumed not to apply retroactively, but
procedural/remedial changes can apply to pending cases.”). For
this reason, we employ the version of rule 12.490 that applied
when Former Husband’s motion was filed.

     4. Oddly, only the notice required under the rule reveals the
potential outcome of noncompliance. For example, the order
setting the motion must include the following:

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    Here, after the trial court entered the magistrate’s
recommended order, Former Husband timely moved to vacate
and pursued a hearing on the motion, receiving three extensions
unrelated to the sufficiency of the record. Because Former
Husband never sought judicial waiver, he was required to either
submit a record that included all the trial transcripts5 or provide



         SHOULD YOU WISH TO SEEK REVIEW
         OF THE RECOMMENDED ORDER MADE
         BY THE GENERAL MAGISTRATE, YOU
         MUST FILE A MOTION TO VACATE IN
         ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 12.490(e),
         FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF
         PROCEDURE. YOU WILL BE REQUIRED
         TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A
         RECORD SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
         YOUR MOTION TO VACATE OR YOUR
         MOTION WILL BE DENIED. A RECORD
         ORDINARILY INCLUDES A WRITTEN
         TRANSCRIPT   OF   ALL   RELEVANT
         PROCEEDINGS UNLESS WAIVED BY
         ORDER OF THE COURT PRIOR TO ANY
         HEARING ON THE MOTION TO VACATE.
         THE PERSON SEEKING REVIEW MUST
         HAVE THE TRANSCRIPT PREPARED
         FOR THE COURT’S REVIEW.

Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(d)(4) (emphasis added). At the same
time, the notice warns only that an insufficient record—which
“ordinarily” includes transcripts—may lead to denial of the
motion, not that it will be summarily denied.

     5. The rule instructs the party to submit—or notify the other
party of its intention not to submit—all transcripts of relevant
proceedings before the magistrate, not merely the subjectively
relevant transcripts. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f)(1) (“The
record must consist of the court file . . . including the transcript of
the relevant proceedings before the general magistrate.”
(emphasis added)), (f)(2) (“Unless waived by order of the court
prior to any hearing on the motion to vacate, the transcript of all

                                  8
notice of the portions he would be submitting before the hearing.
See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f)(1)–(2). Former Husband did
neither. For this reason alone, the circuit court cancelled the
hearing and denied his motion.




relevant proceedings, if any, must be delivered to the judge and
provided to all other parties not less than 48 hours before the
hearing. If less than a full transcript of the proceedings taken
before the general magistrate is furnished by the moving party,
that party must promptly file a notice setting forth the portions
of the transcript that have been ordered.” (emphases added)); see
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts       56 (2012) (“The words of a
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey,
in their context, is what the text means.”). Yet the rules do not
define “proceedings.” See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.020 (“For
definitions of family law terms found in these rules, refer to the
Family Law Glossary of Common Terms and Definitions
contained in the General Information for Self-Represented
Litigants located at www.flcourts.org.”); General Information for
Self-Represented           Litigants,         Fla.          Courts,
https://flcourtsmedia.flcourts.gov/content/download/217367/file/ge
ninfo.pdf (last visited March 30, 2026) (defining “hearing” as “a
legal proceeding before a judge or designated officer (general
magistrate or hearing officer) on a motion” and “trial” as “the
final hearing in a contested case”); see also Proceeding, Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “proceeding” as “[t]he
business conducted by a court or other official body; a hearing”);
Bryan A. Garner, Proceeding; Proceedings, Garner’s Dictionary of
Legal Usage (3rd ed. 2011) (“In reference to business done by a
tribunal of any kind, the proceeding and the proceedings are
interchangeable. . . . But if several hearings are referred to,
proceedings is the better choice.”). Here, Former Husband only
submitted the transcripts of the portions of the proceedings
before the magistrate that he considered relevant to his motion.
But the record does not establish that he was provided notice
that those transcripts were considered insufficient until the court
abruptly cancelled on the afternoon of the scheduled hearing.


                                9
     While an incomplete record may have ultimately doomed his
claims, it was reversible error for the trial court to summarily
deny the motion after Former Husband timely filed the motion,
scheduled a hearing date, and provided most of the transcripts of
the proceeding held before the magistrate.         While Former
Husband neglected to submit all the trial transcripts, the trial
court also failed to assess whether he may have substantially
complied with the rule. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f) (“For the
purpose of the hearing on a motion to vacate, a record,
substantially in conformity with this rule, must be provided to
the court by the party seeking review for the court’s review.”
(emphasis added)).

                          Conclusion

    The trial court reversibly erred in summarily denying
Former Husband’s motion to vacate based solely on his failure to
submit all trial transcripts. Thus, we reverse the denial of the
motion and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.6

    REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

JAY, C.J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.




    6. Because the remaining issues raised on appeal were the
subject of Former Husband’s motion to vacate, they should be
assessed if the trial court reaches the merits on remand.


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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________




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