Bailey v. State

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Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.




                                                  In the
                             Supreme Court of Georgia
                                              No. S26A0440
                                               John Bailey
                                                    v.
                                                The State

                        On Appeal from the Superior Court of Chatham County
                                        No. SPCR2202175J4

                                          Decided: April 21, 2026


                    MCMILLIAN, Justice.
                   Appellant John Bailey was convicted of felony murder
            predicated on kidnapping in connection with the death of Melanie
            Steele. 1 On appeal, Bailey argues that his trial counsel rendered

                    1 Steele died on the night of September 13, 2019. On August 3, 2022,
            a Chatham County grand jury indicted Bailey, Taj Gayle, Justin Path, and
            Marcus Wilson for various crimes related to Steele’s death. As for Bailey, he
            was indicted for felony murder predicated on conspiracy to sell or purchase
            controlled substances (Count 1), conspiracy to commit the sale or purchase of
            controlled substances (Count 2), felony murder predicated on kidnapping
            (Count 3), kidnapping (Count 4), armed robbery (Count 5), possession of a fire-
            arm during commission of a felony (Count 6), and possession of a firearm by a
            convicted felon (Count 7). Wilson pleaded guilty before trial to reduced charges
            of tampering with evidence and false imprisonment; Path pleaded guilty before
            trial to the reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter, and both agreed to tes-
            tify truthfully as part of their plea deals. The State nolle prossed Counts 5, 6,
            and 7 before trial. At the joint trial of Bailey and Gayle, held in September
            2023, the jury found Bailey guilty of all counts against him. The trial court
            sentenced Bailey to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for
            Count 3 felony murder predicated on kidnapping. The court merged Count 4
            kidnapping into Count 3. The court purported to merge Count 2 conspiracy to
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move to sup-
press cell phone record evidence on the ground that the search
warrant and supporting application and affidavit used to obtain
that evidence were defective. For the reasons that follow, we af-
firm.
       1. In Gayle v. State, 322 Ga. 112 (2025), we summarized
the evidence presented at Bailey and Gayle’s trial as follows:
        [The evidence] showed that Steele arranged with a
        friend [Path] to sell drugs to John Bailey, but in-
        stead, Bailey, along with Gayle, kidnapped Steele,
        drove her to a desolate area, and shot her. Wilson
        was also present when Steele was shot.

        The primary evidence against Gayle [and Bailey]
        came from Wilson’s trial testimony. According to
        Wilson, on the evening of September 13, 2019, Bai-
        ley called him asking him to come over to a friend’s
        house to do Bailey a “favor.” Upon arriving at the
        house, Wilson met up with Bailey and Gayle; Bailey
        said he was planning to buy some “dope” and asked


commit the sale or purchase of controlled substances into Count 1 felony mur-
der based thereon, which was error because Count 1 was vacated by operation
of law. See Copeland v. State, 316 Ga. 452, 452 n.1 (2023). But because this
merger error benefits Bailey and the State has not raised it on cross-appeal,
we decline to exercise our discretion to correct it under Dixon v. State, 302 Ga.
691, 698–99 (2017). Gayle was found not guilty of Counts 1 and 2, but guilty
of Counts 3 and 4, and we affirmed his conviction in Gayle v. State, 322 Ga.
112 (2025).
         Bailey filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended by new
counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Bailey’s motion for new
trial, as amended, on August 14, 2025. Bailey filed a timely notice of appeal
on September 14, 2025, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court
beginning in December 2025 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the
briefs.




                                       2
Wilson to follow him in his car because he needed a
ride back after the transaction. Wilson agreed, and
Bailey and Gayle then walked down the street, say-
ing they had to get the money.

Shortly afterward, Wilson saw a “young . . . lady” in
a white Dodge Neon turn down the street. After-
ward, Bailey returned, driving the white Neon with
Gayle in the backseat, but the woman was nowhere
in sight. Wilson followed the car that Bailey was
driving to a road “that didn’t have much street lights
on it, or any buildings,” and when they stopped and
got out of their cars, Bailey “told [Wilson] that he
was about to do something. He was about to shoot
this person that was – that they had in the back of
the car.” Wilson testified that in response, “I pretty
much was, like, what the F. And I started kinda ask-
ing him, like, why he was doin’ it. And I was like
begging and pleading with him to not do that be-
cause he asked me to come with him, and I didn’t
wanna be a part of that.” Bailey and Gayle then
pulled the person from the back of the car wrapped
in “what looked like a bedsheet,” put her on her
knees, and Bailey shot her. Wilson testified that “I
saw a flash, and I turned around, and I ran . . . as
fast as I could” and drove away.

Wilson then called Bailey, who didn’t pick up but
called him back, and Wilson asked him “what the F
did he just do and why did he just do that.” Bailey
asked Wilson to meet him back where they had first
met, and Wilson did so. Wilson testified that he
thought if he did not go back to meet them, “they




                          3
might start to think that I went to say something; so
I just went back and so I could get that night over
with” because “I was afraid that they’ll think that I
wanted to say something or that I went to tell on
them,” perhaps to Wilson’s father, who “used to be in
law enforcement.”

Wilson met up with Bailey and Gayle, and Gayle got
in the car with Wilson, telling him to follow Bailey,
who drove the Neon. At one point early in the trip,
they lost Bailey, but they then located him and fol-
lowed him to Bonaventure Road, where Gayle told
Wilson to stop, and Bailey left the white Neon, got
into Wilson’s car, and passed his gun to Gayle. Wil-
son testified that he was “scared” and “confused,”
saying, “I thought that I might have kinda – I might
have been next at that point.” Wilson said that he
then dropped Gayle and Bailey off and “went to get
some weed to try to block out what I had just saw.”

Detectives investigating Steele’s disappearance
learned that Wilson may have been involved in her
disappearance. When they first spoke to Wilson, he
denied any involvement. Months later detectives in-
terviewed Wilson again, and after he again initially
denied involvement, he then told them about the
murder. Wilson testified at trial that he did not orig-
inally tell detectives everything that happened and
that even when he began telling them what really
happened, he “told bits and pieces” because he was
still “afraid” of being targeted as a “snitch” and that
law enforcement “would think that I had something
to do with [Steele’s murder].”




                          4
      Eventually, Wilson told detectives the version of
      events comporting with his trial testimony, summa-
      rized above, and took them to the location of the
      murder, where they discovered Steele’s skeleton, a
      shell casing, and a “piece of cloth” that looked like “a
      shirt, pillowcase, or whatever.” The medical exam-
      iner determined that Steele’s cause of death was “a
      gunshot wound [to] the back of the torso.” Detectives
      also discovered Steele’s abandoned vehicle where
      Wilson said it had been dumped.

      Cell phone records introduced at trial placed the
      phones of Gayle, Bailey, Wilson, and Steele together
      in the same area at the same time where and when
      Wilson said they had met before the murder and in
      the same area and at the same time where and when
      he said the murder occurred and where Steele’s re-
      mains were found. Those records also placed the
      phones of Gayle, Bailey, and Wilson together in the
      same area and at the same time where and when
      Wilson said they had dumped Steele’s car. Those
      records further showed multiple communications
      between the various parties, including calls between
      the phones of Bailey and Wilson, and a call from
      Gayle’s phone to Bailey’s phone at the time Gayle
      and Wilson were trying to locate where Bailey was
      when they lost him on the way to abandon Steele’s
      car, all in accordance with Wilson’s account of
      events.

322 Ga. at 112–14.




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       2. In his sole enumeration of error, Bailey argues that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to
suppress Bailey’s cell phone records on the ground that the search
warrant and supporting affidavit and application for the phone
records lacked probable cause and did not meet the particularity
requirement. 2
       To prevail on his claim, Bailey must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To show deficient performance, Bai-
ley “must demonstrate that counsel performed counsel’s duties in
an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circum-
stances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Payne
v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 328–29 (2022). “In determining whether
counsel’s performance was deficient, the relevant inquiry is
‘whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally compe-
tent assistance.’” Ford v. Tate, 307 Ga. 383, 386 (2019) (quoting
Strickland, 466 US at 690). “The law recognizes a strong pre-
sumption that counsel performed reasonably,” and Bailey “bears
the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Blocker v. State, 316
Ga. 568, 578 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Bailey
“must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his

       2 Bailey also argues in a footnote that trial counsel was deficient for
failing to request a special interrogatory to the jury on whether Wilson was an
accomplice and whether corroboration of his testimony was required under
OCGA § 24-14-8. Although Bailey acknowledges that “current law does not
permit an allegation of ineffectiveness for failure to request something that is
not required,” he argues that “the current state of the law must change.” We
express no opinion on this issue which was not enumerated as error on appeal.
See Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 37–38 (2018) (“[A]n appealing party may not
use its brief to expand its enumeration of errors by arguing the incorrectness
of a trial court ruling not mentioned in the enumeration of errors.”) (citation
and punctuation omitted).




                                       6
lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.”
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice,
Bailey “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been
different.” Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409 (2024) (citation and
punctuation omitted). If either prong is not met, we need not ad-
dress the other. Id.
      In his motion for new trial, Bailey argued that his trial
counsel was ineffective for not moving to “suppress the cell phone
information from Mr. Bailey’s phone,” because “the warrants
were far overbroad.” He later moved to supplement the record
with the “Search Warrant and Affidavit signed on January 15,
2020 for the cell phone data including all location data,” which he
described as “the basis of the critical cell site location data used
to convict Mr. Bailey and was the subject of the testimony at the
Motion for New Trial hearing.”
       The search warrant was directed to Google, Inc. and sought
information related to two Gmail accounts associated with Bailey.
Specifically, the warrant sought location information and sub-
scriber information from Google concerning the two Gmail ac-
counts from September 13–14, 2019, the dates around which
Steele disappeared. The supporting affidavit explains that after
Steele’s husband determined that Steele was missing, he called
someone named Justin Path to look for her because Steele had
said that she was going to meet her friend “JP.” A detective in-
vestigating Steele’s disappearance obtained a search warrant for
Path’s phone records and determined that Path had called Bailey
during the time period leading up to Steele’s murder and at least
nine times after Steele’s husband had called looking for her. Bai-
ley was subsequently questioned and claimed that he was at work




                                 7
on the night that Steele disappeared even though it was discov-
ered that was not true. According to the affidavit, the detective
took possession of Bailey’s cell phone and subsequently obtained
a search warrant for the phone, which led to the discovery of the
two Gmail accounts associated with Bailey. The affidavit also
avers that based on the affiant’s training and experience, an indi-
vidual’s Google account “typically is in the form of a Gmail ad-
dress” and that “Google collects and retains information about the
user’s location if the user has enabled Google to track web and
app activity.”
       The trial court granted Bailey’s motion to supplement the
record with the search warrant and affidavit but denied his mo-
tion for new trial, ruling that “trial counsel was not deficient in
failing to file a motion to suppress the cell phone records because
review of the affidavit and application for search warrant would
have yielded an adverse ruling to a filed Motion to Suppress.”
       On appeal, Bailey argues that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive for not moving to suppress evidence obtained from the Google
search warrant because the search warrant and supporting affi-
davit and application lacked probable cause and did not meet the
particularity requirement. 3 However, even were we to assume
that trial counsel was deficient for failing to move to suppress the
evidence obtained from the Google search warrant Bailey chal-
lenges, Bailey has failed to carry his burden of showing prejudice.
Importantly, it appears that three searches in this investigation
produced evidence from Bailey’s cell phone: the search of infor-
mation related to Bailey’s Google accounts, which he challenges,



       3 Bailey also argues, in passing, that “[t]he failure to attack the fruits
of these searches amounted to an abdication of the constitutional role in the
adversarial process.”




                                       8
and separate searches of Bailey’s physical cell phone and of infor-
mation from his cell phone carrier, Sprint/T-Mobile, neither of
which he challenges, although both were referred to in the chal-
lenged Google search warrant. Bailey has not cited to where the
search warrant or warrants of his physical cell phone or cell phone
carrier data appears in the record. 4
        Moreover, Bailey has not shown what evidence was ob-
tained from the challenged Google search warrant that does ap-
pear in the record or how that evidence was used either during
the investigation or at trial, and our independent review of the
record supports that information from the challenged search war-
rant was not used at trial to establish Bailey’s cell phone location
during the course of the crimes. The State’s expert on cell phone
mapping testified that he mapped the locations of all the cell
phones in this case and times of their communications with one
another using the call records and cell tower location data from
the Sprint phone records of Bailey and the T-Mobile, Sprint, and
AT&T phone records of Steele, Path, Gayle, and Wilson, without
making any mention of any Google records. Because Bailey has
not shown what information was obtained from the challenged
search warrant or how those records were presented or used at
trial, Bailey has failed to show that there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel’s alleged deficiency, the result of the
trial would have been different. See Zayas, 319 Ga. at 409; see
also Gines v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 87, __ Ga. __, __ (2026) (“[A]
conclusory allegation is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice.”).
Accordingly, Bailey’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.




       4 Based on our independent review, we have not been able to locate
these other search warrants in the record.




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       Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.




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