BENNETT v. THE STATE (Two Cases)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                 In the
                           Supreme Court of Georgia
                                            No. S26A0049
                                              Bennett
                                                  v.
                                             The State

                                                   and

                                            No. S26A0226
                                                Kates
                                                  v.
                                             The State

                        On Appeal from the Superior Court of Glynn County
                                         No. CR2100241

                                          Decided: May 5, 2026


                   COLVIN, Justice.
                 Everett Bennett and Travis Tyrone Kates appeal from
          their convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm
          during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting
          death of Antonio Randolph. 1 On appeal, Kates challenges the suf-
          ficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions as a matter of

                   1 The crimes occurred on July 22, 2019. On November 20, 2019, a
          Glynn County grand jury indicted Bennett, Kates, and Ethan Bennett
          (“Ethan”). The co-indictees were reindicted on July 14, 2021, October 13, 2021,
          and finally on December 15, 2021. The final indictment, on which Bennett and
          Kates were later tried (Indictment No. CR-2100241), jointly charged Bennett,
Kates, and Ethan with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), ag-
gravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 6), and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 7). The co-indictees were also sepa-
rately charged with felony murder in Count 3 (Kates), Count 4 (Ethan), and
Count 5 (Bennett). Bennett and Ethan were jointly charged with simple bat-
tery (Count 8). Kates and Bennett were separately charged with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 9 and 11, respectively). And Ethan was
separately charged with possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer
(Count 10).
         The trial court severed Ethan’s case. Ethan was tried first, and a jury
found him guilty. A jury trial was then held for Bennett and Kates on Indict-
ment No. CR-2100241 from February 28 through March 3, 2022. The trial court
granted Bennett’s motion for a directed verdict as to the simple-battery count
(Count 8). The court presented to the jury a “dummy” version of Indictment
No. CR-2100241, which removed the simple-battery count (Count 8), removed
the counts naming only Ethan (Counts 4 and 11), and renumbered the counts.
As relevant here, Counts 6, 7, and 9 of the indictment corresponded, respec-
tively, to Counts 5, 6, and 8 of the “dummy” indictment.
         The jury found Bennett and Kates guilty of all counts against them,
except for the simple-battery count, which had been removed from their con-
sideration. Following the jury verdict, the trial court nol prossed the indict-
ments against Bennett and Kates that the grand jury had returned before In-
dictment No. CR-2100241.
         The trial court entered final dispositions for Bennett and Kates that
used the count numbers from Indictment No. CR-2100241, rather than the
count numbers appearing on the “dummy” version of the indictment that was
given to the jury. As to both Bennett and Kates, the trial court imposed sen-
tences of life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count
1) and five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (Count 7). The felony murder counts were vacated by operation of
law, although, due to a scrivener’s error, Bennett’s final disposition sheet listed
the vacated felony-murder counts as Counts 2 and 4, rather than as Counts 2
and 5. The trial court merged for sentencing purposes the remaining counts
against Bennett (Counts 6 and 11) and against Kates (Counts 6 and 9).
         Bennett timely filed a motion for new trial on March 20, 2022, and
amended the motion through new counsel on July 2, 2024. Kates timely filed a
motion for new trial on March 23, 2022, and amended the motion through new




                                        2
constitutional due process and under Georgia’s circumstantial-ev-
idence statute; Kates and Bennett argue that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence regarding shell cas-
ings collected when officers responded to a prior shots-fired call
involving Kates; Bennett raises several ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims; Bennett also argues that cumulative prejudice
from the trial court error and instances of ineffective assistance
of counsel warrant a new trial; and Kates argues that scrivener’s
errors on his final disposition should be corrected. As explained
below, we affirm Appellants’ judgments of conviction.
       1. The trial evidence showed the following. Randolph (the
victim of the shooting) was a drug dealer and addict who lived in
the Arco area of Brunswick. About three years before he died,
Randolph started dating Jennifer Ahnberg, the mother of several
children, including Appellant Bennett and his younger brother,
co-indictee Ethan Bennett (“Ethan”). Kates had been friends with
the Bennett brothers for many years. And Bennett and Ethan
knew and had spent time with Randolph.
      Randoph and Ahnberg’s relationship revolved around
drugs, primarily methamphetamine. Shortly after they started
dating, the two moved to Savannah for a two-year period. Ran-
dolph and Ahnberg continued using methamphetamine in Savan-
nah and ended up living in a homeless encampment under a
bridge. At trial, Ahnberg recounted a time when she and Ran-
dolph got into an argument, and he abandoned her while she was


counsel on April 28, 2024. Following hearings on the motions, the trial court
entered an order denying Bennett’s motion for new trial on June 25, 2025, and
an order denying Kates’s motion for new trial on August 27, 2025. Bennett and
Kates timely filed notices of appeal directed to this Court. The cases were dock-
eted to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for deci-
sions on the briefs.




                                       3
using a needle to inject methamphetamine into her arm. Some-
time after that incident, Randolph left Ahnberg in Savannah and
returned to Brunswick.
       About two months later, Randolph traveled to Savannah
and brought Ahnberg back to Brunswick, where they resumed
their relationship. During the next year, Randolph and Ahnberg
were homeless and would sleep either outside Randolph’s
mother’s house or in a nearby abandoned house.
       About a month before the shooting, Ahnberg broke up with
Randolph and started dating Lewis Ramsey, a “crack” cocaine ad-
dict, who introduced Ahnberg to the drug. After the breakup,
Ahnberg continued living in the abandoned house, and Randolph
stayed outside his mother’s house much of the time. Ramsey and
Randolph were friendly, and Ahnberg continued regularly using
drugs with Randolph.
       Ahnberg testified that Bennett and Ethan, who knew she
was on drugs, “were upset because of how [she] looked and the
drug use.” And a text message sent from Randolph’s phone to
Ahnberg’s friend in the month leading up to the shooting noted
that the sender, who identified herself in a message as “Jennifer
ahnberg,” was “hungry[,] dirty[,] skinny[,] and sweating while
mosquito[s] eat me up in a[n] abandon[ed] house,” that “Ethan
[had] move[d] back yesterday [and] seen me,” and that “his heart
is so broke[n] [over] how I look.”
      The trial evidence indicated that Bennett and Ethan
blamed Randolph for Ahnberg’s drug addiction and for abandon-
ing her in Savannah. Ramsey testified that Ahnberg had told her
sons that Randolph left her when something went wrong while
she was injecting “meth” in Savannah. And in her police inter-
view, which was played for the jury, Bennett’s girlfriend, Terriana
Mullen, said that Bennett and Ethan were upset with Randolph




                                4
because he had “drugged [their] momma up real bad and just left
her” with a needle in “her arm.” Mullen also testified at trial that
Bennett told her that he and Ethan thought Randolph was re-
sponsible for their mother’s drug addiction. And although
Ahnberg denied at trial that there was a “beef” between her sons
and Randolph, she testified that Bennett and Ethan had “con-
fronted” Randolph about Ahnberg’s drug use.
        Randolph was shot and killed late on July 22, 2019.
Ahnberg and Randolph’s mother each testified that, around noon
that day, they saw a tan-colored car parked near Randolph’s
mother’s house. Ahnberg testified that the car belonged to Ben-
nett’s girlfriend (Mullen), and that Mullen, Bennett, and Ethan
were in the car. Although Ahnberg did not recall seeing Kates,
whom she had known when he was “little,” Randolph’s mother
testified that Kates, whom she had seen on a prior occasion, was
also in the car.
       Ahnberg testified that her sons stopped by for a brief con-
versation with her before leaving. According to Ahnberg, at that
time, she had been up for several days smoking “crack” and
“looked bad, really bad.” And she said that, later in the day, Ben-
nett and Ethan, who had previously taken her to a rehabilitation
center called “Gateway,” “called [her] back about going to rehab”
again.
      Mullen testified that, in the afternoon on the day Randolph
was killed, she drove Bennett, Kates, Ethan, and a friend named
Devin to Statesboro in her Toyota Camry, which the record shows
was tan/gold in color. Mullen said that they returned to Bruns-
wick later that afternoon.
      According to Ahnberg, that night Bennett and Ethan
stopped by to check on her “a couple of times” because they
planned to take her to a rehabilitation center the next morning




                                 5
and wanted to make sure they knew where she would be. Ahnberg
testified that, “[s]ometime that evening,” she and Randolph got
into the tan car with Bennett and Ethan and asked for a ride to
the store so Randolph could get cigars for “blunts.” But Bennett
refused to take them because he did not want Ahnberg to get
“high,” so Ahnberg and Randolph got out of the car.
       Ahnberg said that she saw her sons again later that night.
And Ramsey recalled that Bennett, Ethan, Kates, and another
male came by in a “gold” car. Ramsey testified that Ahnberg told
her sons, “[D]on’t hurt him [Randolph] so bad.” And the State
played for the jury a portion of Ahnberg’s police interview in
which she said that she told her sons “not to hurt him [Randolph],
period.” Although Ramsey could not specifically recall at trial
what Ahnberg’s sons had said in response, he testified that, dur-
ing his police interview, he had reported that one of Ahnberg’s
sons responded, “[N]o, f**k that, he left you for dead.” And
Ahnberg testified that, at some point, her sons drove away in Mul-
len’s car.
       Mullen testified that she had been staying with Bennett at
Bennett’s father’s house in Brunswick, and that she was there
with Bennett, Kates, Ethan, and Devin on the night of the shoot-
ing. Mullen admitted that she lent her car to Bennett around
11:00 that night, and that Bennett took Kates, Ethan, and Devin
with him. Just before midnight, both Randolph’s mother (who was
inside her own house) and Ahnberg (who was in the abandoned
house a street over) heard several gunshots. Surveillance video
from a camera down the street from Randolph’s mother’s house
captured a portion of the shooting from a distance. The video,
which was played for the jury, showed two figures stepping into
view, one of the figures running across the street toward Ran-
dolph’s mother’s house, and a flash consistent with a gunshot




                                6
from the location of the other figure.
      Ramsey testified that, after the gunshots rang out,
Ahnberg “blurted … out” either “[T]hey just killed Antonio [Ran-
dolph]” or “[T]hey just shot … Antonio [Randolph].” And Ahnberg
similarly testified that she remembered saying to Ramsey,
“[T]hey’re shooting and I hope it has nothing to do with Antonio
[Randolph].”
       Ahnberg testified that, sometime after she heard the gun-
shots, she called Bennett, who said that he was on his way to their
father’s house, where he lived, and that he was “almost there.”
Mullen testified that Bennett, Kates, Ethan, and Devin returned
to Bennett’s father’s house with her car around 1:00 a.m. Mullen
then drove the men to Ethan’s girlfriend’s house, where she
dropped off Ethan and Devin. Ethan’s girlfriend testified that
Ethan and Devin came to her house around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. and
appeared “nervous, sweaty, [and] a little dirty.” Mullen then
drove Kates to his residence.
       After dropping off Kates, Mullen started driving Bennett
to her cousin’s house, where they were going to stay for the night.
But on the way, around 2:00 a.m., a police officer stopped Mullen’s
car near a hospital because her headlights were off. Video of the
traffic stop captured on the officer’s body camera, which was
played for the jury at trial, showed that Bennett was sitting in
the back seat of Mullen’s car. And a recording of Mullen’s subse-
quent police interview, which was played for the jury, showed that
she told the detective that, when the police officer pulled her over,
Bennett kept saying, “It’s over, it’s over.”
      At trial, Mullen also admitted telling a detective that, at
some point, Bennett told her “something” or “something bad” had
“happened to his mom’s boyfriend,” whom Mullen understood to
be Randolph. And Mullen testified that, following the traffic stop,




                                 7
she drove Bennett to her cousin’s house, where they stayed for the
night.
       Shortly after the shots were fired, officers responded to the
roadway in front of Randolph’s mother’s house, where they found
four 9mm shell casings, some of which were MKE-branded. But
officers did not locate Randolph’s body at that time. Around 8:30
in the morning, Randolph’s sister found Randolph lying dead on
the ground near Randolph’s mother’s house. Randolph had been
shot four times from behind, and the medical examiner testified
that his cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
       Sergeant Gary Scott Coleman testified that MKE is a Turk-
ish brand of ammunition that, though commercially available, is
“very rare” in the United States. The State also introduced evi-
dence indicating that Kates had previously possessed MKE am-
munition. Specifically, Kates’s mother testified that, on June 8,
2019 (about six weeks before Randolph’s shooting), gunshots rang
out near her house shortly after Kates, who had been sitting out-
side her house, had left to buy a cigar, and that Kates “didn’t
never come back.” And an officer testified that, in response to a
shots-fired call, he went to Kates’s mother’s house, where he lo-
cated three MKE-branded, 9mm shell casings “in front of and to
the side of [a] chair” that Kates’s mother reported Kates had been
sitting in when the gunshots occurred.
        Pursuant to search warrants, officers later searched the
phones of Ethan and Kates. With the benefit of testimony from
Officer Antonio Hurst, who explained the meaning of certain
slang terms, a text-message exchange between Ethan and a con-
tact listed in Ethan’s phone as “Bro” (which, as explained below,
the evidence indicated was Bennett), showed the following. In
text messages between July 16 (a week before the shooting) and
the early morning of July 23 (shortly after the shooting), Ethan




                                 8
referred to having a gun, saying, “I got my 40,” “Glock s**t.” Using
the term “slide” (which means having “shot at somebody”) and the
term “federal” (which refers to law enforcement surveillance),
Bennett said he “just slide the other night” and “hit the whole
house up,” to which Ethan responded, “Talking too much over the
phone, Federal[ ].” Bennett said he “took momma to gateway,”
and Ethan responded, “S**t broke my heart to see her like that.”
Invoking the nickname of Bennett’s girlfriend (“Tiggy”), Bennett
then said, “Ik[.] I cried on tiggy the same night I saw her … I
couldn’t look her in her eyes.” And Ethan responded, “Me either.”
Then, using the word “bless” (which means “t[aking] care of [an]
individual” by causing their “death,” “beat[ing] them up,” or
“robb[ing] them”), Ethan made an apparent reference to the vic-
tim (Antonio Randolph), saying, “[G]otta bless tonio b***h a**.”
Bennett then made an apparent reference to his earlier comment
about having shot at a house the other night, responding, “Lol[,]
who house u think I did that to[?]” And using the word “opp” (an
abbreviation for “opponent”), Bennett further said, “But he wasn’t
there so ima double back[.] I gotta find him lol[.] [H]e my favorite
opp.”
       In text messages between Ethan and “Bro” (Bennett) start-
ing at 1:09 on July 23 (shortly after the shooting and shortly be-
fore Mullen was pulled over near a hospital for having her head-
lights off, while Bennett was in the car), Bennett texted, “Yall
straight[?]” And Ethan responded, “Yea.” Soon after, Bennett
texted, “They pulled us over because … her lights wasn’t on all
the way.” Ethan responded, “Noo where y’all at[?]” And Bennett
said, “[B]y the hospital[.]” Using the word “tweakin” (which
means being “scared”), Ethan then texted, “I’m tweakin.” And
Bennett responded in relevant part, “U trippin but we good[.]”
      On Kates’s phone, officers found social media messages




                                 9
sent from Kates’s account, including messages from the day of the
shooting that said Kates was in Statesboro at 12:54 p.m. and was
on his way back at 6:44 p.m. Messages on Kates’s social media
account from the night of, and day following, the shooting in-
cluded a message from Kates at 12:16 a.m. that said, “Thug pull
up on me”; a message sent to Kates at 11:32 a.m., which included
a news article regarding an “Arco death investigation follow[ing]
[a] report of gunfire”; a message from Kates to Bennett’s girlfriend
(Mullen) attempting to get into contact with Bennett at 12:05
p.m.; a message from Kates at 6:19 p.m. saying, “Listen ok like fr
listen ok i need to talk to u its a emergency”; and messages from
Kates at 11:22 p.m. asking someone named Keith, “Man dam u
heard Ethan and them booked[?]” and “U wiping[?]” Finally, in an
exchange between Kates and a woman named Nesha a few days
after the shooting, Kates said in relevant part, “one day ima be
gone … u never know[,] i can go get 30 years or get killed fr.” And
Neesha responded, “First off your not going no where and if u got
sunt to prison or die ill always be there.”
       Finally, the State played for the jury Kates’s police inter-
view. In his interview, Kates said that he was close with Bennett
and Ethan, and that he had gone with them to Statesboro on the
day of the shooting. But he denied any involvement in the shoot-
ing, said that he went home before 11:00 p.m. on the day of the
shooting, that he got “real high” and fell asleep alone on his front
porch before midnight, and that the next time he saw Bennett and
Ethan was when they came to his house to pick him up around
4:00 or 5:00 a.m.
      2. On appeal, Kates argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict because the trial evi-
dence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to




                                10
prove that he was involved in Randolph’s murder and was insuf-
ficient under Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence statute to dis-
prove the reasonable hypothesis that the Bennett brothers acted
alone in shooting Randolph. We disagree. As explained below, the
trial evidence was constitutionally sufficient to prove that Kates
participated in Randolph’s murder, at least as a party to the
crime. See OCGA § 16-2-20(b)(3) (providing that a person is a
party to a crime if he “[i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commis-
sion of the crime”). And the jury was authorized to reject as un-
reasonable the alternative hypothesis that the Bennett brothers
acted alone without Kates’s participation.
       “The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a di-
rected verdict of acquittal is the same as for determining the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.” Washington v.
State, 320 Ga. 839, 844 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). When
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitu-
tional due process,
      we view the evidence presented at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether any
      rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
      guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crimes for
      which he was convicted. In making that determina-
      tion, we put aside any questions about conflicting ev-
      idence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of
      the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to
      the discretion of the jury. As long as there is some
      competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support
      each fact necessary to make out the State's case, the
      jury’s verdict will be upheld.

Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 303 (2025).




                                11
       Additionally, under Georgia statutory law, “[w]hen a con-
viction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, the State must
present sufficient evidence to exclude every other reasonable hy-
pothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” Clements v. State,
321 Ga. 164, 168 (2025) (cleaned up). See also OCGA § 24-14-6.
“We have explained, however, that not every hypothesis is rea-
sonable, and the evidence does not have to exclude every conceiv-
able inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that are
reasonable.” Clements, 321 Ga. at 168 (cleaned up). “Whether an
alternative hypothesis is reasonable and whether it has been ex-
cluded by the evidence are questions for the jury,” and “we will
not disturb the jury’s findings on those questions unless they are
insupportable as a matter of law.” Id. at 168–69 (quotation marks
omitted).
       “Where, as here, the defendant is charged as a party to the
crime, conviction requires proof that the defendant shared a com-
mon criminal intent with the direct perpetrators of the crimes.”
Grant v. State, 319 Ga. 490, 493 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).
While “mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient evi-
dence to convict one of being a party to a crime[,] … a jury may
infer a common criminal intent from the defendant’s presence,
companionship, and conduct with other perpetrators before, dur-
ing, and after the crimes.” Id. (cleaned up).
        Here, the trial evidence was constitutionally sufficient to
authorize a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Kates
shared a common criminal intent with the Bennett brothers and
participated in Randolph’s murder. It is undisputed on appeal
that the trial evidence showed that Bennett and Ethan had a mo-
tive to harm Randolph, whom they blamed for their mother’s drug
addiction. And text messages from Ethan’s phone showed that
Bennett and Ethan planned to “bless” (harm or kill) Randolph.




                                12
Ramsey testified that, on the night of the shooting, Kates was
present when Ahnberg instructed the Bennett brothers not to
harm Randolph and the Bennett brothers rebuffed Ahnberg’s di-
rective, which supported an inference that Kates knew about the
plan to harm Randolph. See Rosenau, 321 Ga. at 305 (explaining
that “the jury could reasonably infer that [the defendant] shared
[a co-defendant’s] criminal intent from,” among other things, “tes-
timony that [the defendant] was present for a conversation about
robbing [people]”). Because Mullen testified that Kates departed
with the Bennett brothers shortly before the shooting and re-
turned with them shortly after the shooting, the jury was author-
ized to find that Kates accompanied the Bennett brothers as they
carried out their plan to harm Randolph. See Kelley v. State, 248
Ga. 133, 134–35 (1981) (holding that the trial evidence was con-
stitutionally sufficient where, among other things, “witnesses
placed [the defendant] in the company of [a participant in the
crimes], both before and after the robbery and shooting”). And the
testimony that the MKE ammunition used in Randolph’s shooting
was “very rare,” and that the same kind of “very rare” MKE shell
casings were found where Kates had been during a prior shooting
incident, supported an inference that Kates either personally shot
Randolph or provided the ammunition used to do so. See Gartrell
v. State, 304 Ga. 809, 812 (2018) (holding that the evidence was
constitutionally sufficient where, among other things, the defend-
ant “possessed the same type of ammunition as the projectile that
was recovered from [the victim’s] body, which was also consistent
with the cartridge casing found at the scene).
       Finally, the trial evidence authorized the jury to find that
Kates was “conscious of his guilt, and therefore guilty of” the
charges against him. Sharkey v. State, 320 Ga. 477, 481 (2024).
Specifically, because Mullen testified that she saw Kates with the
Bennett brothers during the timeframe Kates told police he was




                                13
“high” and asleep on his front porch, the jury was permitted to
infer that Kates lied to the police about his whereabouts during
the shooting to hide his participation in the crimes. See Douglas
v. State, 321 Ga. 739, 746 (2025) (noting that the defendant’s “lies
to … law enforcement about what happened … could [be] con-
strue[d] as evidence of consciousness of guilt”); Bates v. State, 317
Ga. 809, 816 (2023) (noting that the defendant “lied to police that
he was texting when the crimes occurred, from which the jury
could infer that he was trying to hide his own participation”). And
Kates’s social media messages showed that, after the crimes oc-
curred, Kates expressed that he would “be gone” one day and
could “get 30 years or get killed,” which authorized the jury to find
that Kates knew he was guilty and feared being caught and pun-
ished for a capital offense. See Jenkins v. State, 303 Ga. 314, 315–
16 (2018) (concluding that the evidence supported the defendant’s
conviction for murder and other offenses where, after a shooting
occurred, the defendant said, “I don’t want to go to jail”).
        Accordingly, the trial evidence was sufficient as a matter
of constitutional due process to establish that Kates was at least
a party to the crimes. And although this evidence was circumstan-
tial, the jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable Kates’s al-
ternative hypothesis that the Bennett brothers committed the
shooting alone, without Kates’s participation. This is particularly
true because Mullen’s testimony about seeing Kates shortly be-
fore and after the shooting, which the jury was authorized to be-
lieve, conflicted with Kates’s claim that he was alone on his front
porch at the time. See Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 714 (2022)
(concluding that the jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s
alternative hypothesis as unreasonable where the defendant told
“stories that conflicted with other evidence”).
      3. Bennett and Kates argue that the trial court abused its




                                 14
discretion in admitting, over their objection, evidence from
Kates’s mother and an officer showing that, in response to a shots-
fired call on June 8, 2019 (about six weeks before Randolph’s
shooting), the officer found MKE-branded shell casings near a
chair where Kates had been sitting. Specifically, Kates’s mother
testified at trial that, on June 8, 2019, Kates was sitting outside
her house and told her he was going to leave to buy a cigar, that
sometime after “[h]e was supposed to been going” to buy the cigar
and “had done left” she heard gunshots, that Kates “didn’t never
come back,” and that officers later recovered shell casings in her
neighbor’s yard. And the responding officer testified that Kates’s
mother told him Kates had been sitting outside in a chair next to
the road when the gunshots occurred, and that he recovered three
MKE-branded, 9mm shell casings “in front of and to the side of
the chair.” The trial court ruled that this evidence was intrinsic
to the charged offenses because it linked Kates to Randolph’s
shooting, which also involved use of MKE ammunition,2 and that
the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its
probative value. On appeal, Bennett and Kates argue again that
the evidence was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule
404(b)”) and OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). This claim fails, how-
ever, because, as explained below, the trial court properly deter-
mined that the testimony regarding the prior shots-fired call was
intrinsic evidence not subject to Rule 404(b) and that the evidence
was not inadmissible under Rule 403.


       2 Sergeant Coleman testified at trial that Walmart had a deal to carry
Turkish-made MKE ammunition in 2013, but that the deal went “south.” He
further testified that, although MKE ammunition remained commercially
available in the United States, it was “very rare.” And he said that, although
he had submitted thousands of shell casings to the National Integrated Ballis-
tics Identification Network over the years, he had only seen MKE ammunition
used in a total of two Glynn County cases.




                                     15
       Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part that “[e]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with.” OCGA § 24-4-404(b). “This rule applies only to extrinsic ev-
idence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga.
846, 856 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). “Intrinsic evidence of
a charged offense is not subject to Rule 404(b) and remains ad-
missible even if it incidentally places the defendant’s character at
issue.” Id. (cleaned up).
       “The line between extrinsic and intrinsic evidence is not al-
ways a bright one, but, as a general matter, ‘intrinsic evidence’
refers to direct evidence of the charged crime, as opposed to evi-
dence of other crimes.” Pierce, 319 Ga. at 856 (cleaned up). “Evi-
dence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context,
motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted as intrinsic
evidence if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged
crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the
crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the
jury.” Harris v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 378 (2020) (cleaned up).
“[W]hen we consider what evidence is necessary for the State to
complete the story of the crime, ‘necessary’ is not used in a strictly
literal sense, but rather, refers to what evidence is reasonably
necessary for the State to complete the story of the crime.” Id. at
379.
       Here, the testimony regarding the shots-fired call six
weeks before Randolph’s shooting—which supported a finding
that Kates previously possessed a gun and the same, “very rare”
type of foreign-made ammunition used in Randolph’s shooting—
was “intrinsic evidence” that was “reasonably necessary to com-
plete the story of the crimes for the jury” because it “added signif-
icant weight to the State’s theory that” Kates was either “the




                                 16
shooter in this case” or had supplied the ammunition used to
shoot Randolph. Ealey v. State, 322 Ga. 509, 518 (2025) (cleaned
up) (holding that “evidence showing that [the defendant] owned
and possessed that same type of handgun [used to commit mur-
ders] several months before the murders” was admissible intrin-
sic evidence). See also Felton v. State, 322 Ga. 530, 542 (2025)
(holding that “evidence showing that [the defendant] was in pos-
session of multiple, colored-handled knives” a couple days after
the murder was “intrinsic” evidence that was “‘inextricably inter-
twined’ with the evidence regarding [the victim’s] death by sharp-
force wounds,” where the knives “appeared to come from the
same knife set as” a knife and sheath found at the crime scene).
       As intrinsic evidence, the testimony regarding the prior
shots-fired call was not subject to the restrictions of Rule 404(b)
but still had to satisfy Rule 403. 3 See Ealey, 322 Ga. at 518. Rule
403 provides in relevant part that “[r]elevant evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” OCGA § 24-4-403. Here, the testi-
mony regarding the prior shots-fired call, which tied Kates to the
ammunition used in the shooting, “had significant probative
value” because there were no eyewitnesses to the murder, the
State’s case against Kates was “circumstantial [in] nature,” and
Kates “denied any involvement” in the shooting. Ealey, 322 Ga. at
519. See also Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 419 (2024) (concluding
that testimony that the defendant had previously been seen with
the same kind of gun used in the murder was probative, and that
the need for the evidence was great because the evidence of the
defendant’s guilt was circumstantial). And Appellants have not


       3 Because the evidence was intrinsic, “the State was not obligated to
provide reasonable notice to the defense in advance of trial under Rule 404(b).”
Rouse v. State, 322 Ga. 328, 337 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).




                                      17
shown that any unfair prejudice from the evidence “substantially
outweighed” its significant probative value. OCGA § 24-4-403.
Evidence that Kates possessed MKE-branded ammunition and a
gun “was not—on its own—unfairly prejudicial” but instead rele-
vant, “inculpatory evidence” connecting him to Randolph’s shoot-
ing. Felton, 322 Ga. at 543 (emphasis added). “And the prior inci-
dent, a shooting in which no one was hurt or prosecuted, was not
unfairly inflammatory,” particularly because the State did not in-
troduce any evidence about the circumstances under which Kates
fired the MKE-branded ammunition. Flakes v. State, 323 Ga. 477,
488–89 (2026). In short, there was little danger of the jury finding
Kates guilty because he previously fired a gun rather than based
on the trial evidence connecting him to Randolph’s murder. See
id. (holding that evidence of a prior shooting that linked the de-
fendant to the murder weapon was admissible under Rule 403
where “[t]here was little danger of the jury finding [the defendant]
guilty because he [previously] fired a gun … , rather than based
on the [trial] evidence”). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence.
       4. Bennett raises several claims of constitutionally ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. “In reviewing a ruling on a claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel, we defer to the trial court’s find-
ings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the
law to the facts de novo.” Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 568, 578 (2023)
(quotation marks omitted).
       “To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a
defendant must show deficient performance and prejudice.”
Washington, 320 Ga. at 851. “Establishing deficient performance
requires a defendant to demonstrate that his attorney performed
at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the cir-
cumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Id.




                                 18
(quotation marks omitted). “There is a strong presumption that
counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Over-
coming that presumption requires an appellant to show that no
reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did or would
have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. (cleaned up).
       “To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the
result of the trial would have been different.” Washington, 320
Ga. at 851 (quotation marks omitted). And “[i]f the defendant fails
to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, this Court
need not examine the other requirement.” Id.
        (a) Bennett argues that his trial counsel was constitution-
ally ineffective for failing to object to testimony from Ramsey and
Ahnberg about what Ahnberg said when, while she was inside the
abandoned house a street over from the location of Randolph’s
shooting, she heard gunshots ring out. Specifically, at trial, Ram-
sey testified that, after the gunshots rang out, Ahnberg “blurted
… out” either “[T]hey just killed Antonio [Randolph]” or “[T]hey
just shot … Antonio [Randolph].” And when asked if she had said
Bennett and Ethan had “just shot or killed Antonio [Randolph],”
Ahnberg responded, “No, I did not. I don’t recall. I don’t remember
saying that. I remember saying, [Ramsey], they’re shooting and I
hope it has nothing to do with Antonio.” According to Bennett,
trial counsel should have objected to this testimony because it was
inadmissible under several rules of evidence and because the tes-
timony was prejudicial, in that it suggested that Bennett’s mother
believed “he was capable of murder.”
       Assuming without deciding that the challenged testimony
was inadmissible and that trial counsel was deficient for failing
to object to it, Bennett has not shown prejudice because the other




                                19
evidence against him, though circumstantial, was strong. Testi-
mony from Mullen and Ahnberg showed that Bennett was moti-
vated to harm Randolph because he blamed Randolph for
Ahnberg’s drug addiction and poor physical condition, as well as
for abandoning her in a vulnerable state in Savannah. Text mes-
sages between Bennett and his brother (Ethan) prior to the shoot-
ing showed that they planned to “bless” (harm or kill) Randolph,
and that Bennett intended to “double back” to find and shoot Ran-
dolph, whom Bennett considered his “favorite opp” (opponent).
Ahnberg admitted to police that she had instructed Bennett and
Ethan not to hurt Randolph. And Ramsey’s testimony supported
a finding that, on the night of the shooting, the Bennett brothers
rebuffed Ahnberg’s instruction not to hurt Randolph “bad,” with
one of the brothers saying, “f**k that, he left you for dead.” See
Evans v. State, 322 Ga. 652, 664 (2025) (evidence showing that
the co-defendants discussed committing a crime against the vic-
tim before the shooting occurred supported a determination that
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming); DeVanna v. State, 312
Ga. 689, 696 (2021) (concluding that “the State presented an over-
whelming amount of evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt, including
messages [the defendant] sent to multiple people in the week
leading up to [the victim’s] shooting saying that he wanted to kill
[the victim] by shooting her in the head”).
       Mullen’s trial testimony and statements to the police about
the night of the shooting also showed that Bennett had partici-
pated in the shooting. Specifically, she testified that Bennett,
Ethan, Kates, and another man left the Bennett brothers’ father’s
house shortly before the shooting and returned shortly after. See
Evans, 322 Ga. at 664 (witnesses’ testimony that the defendant
left his house with the co-defendants shortly before the shooting
and return with them shortly after supported the conclusion that
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming). She also indicated that




                                20
Bennett told her “something” or “something bad” had “happened
to his mom’s boyfriend [Randolph]” before the public knew about
the murder. See id. (the defendant’s rap lyrics reflecting
knowledge of the crime supported a conclusion that the evidence
of guilt was overwhelming). And according to statements Mullen
made during her police interview, when a police officer pulled
over her car shortly after the shooting, Bennett, who was sitting
in the back seat, kept saying, “It’s over, it’s over”—statements
that reflected an understanding of his culpability. See Carrillo v.
State, 321 Ga. 453, 458–59 (2025) (holding that there was no prej-
udice from alleged deficient performance where, among other
things, the defendant sent a message saying, “I know I f**ked up,”
which “suggested that [the defendant] understood the signifi-
cance of shooting” and “implie[d] his guilt”).
        Moreover, Ahnberg’s statements about the shooting were
not particularly inculpatory. This is because the statements sug-
gested that “they” were involved in the shooting without specifi-
cally identifying the Bennett brothers as the culprits, and because
Ahnberg did not personally witness the shooting, making her
statements about who may have been involved in the shooting
speculative.
       Given that the above evidence “strongly supported” the
guilty verdicts and that Ahnberg’s statements were not particu-
larly inculpatory, Bennett has not shown “a reasonable probabil-
ity that the result of his trial would have been different” but for
trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony suggesting that his
mother believed he shot Randolph. Evans, 322 Ga. at 666.
       (b) Bennett argues that his trial counsel was constitution-
ally ineffective for failing to raise an authentication objection, un-
der OCGA § 24-9-901 (“Rule 901”), to the admission of text mes-
sages found on Ethan’s cell phone. Specifically, Bennett argues




                                 21
that trial counsel should have objected on the ground that the
State failed to adequately identify Bennett as the contact listed
in Ethan’s phone as “Bro.” As explained below, however, Bennett
has not established deficient performance because he has not
shown that the trial court would have sustained an objection un-
der Rule 901. See Momon v. State, 322 Ga. 848, 853 (2025) (ex-
plaining that the failure to show that an evidentiary objection
“would have been successful … ends the deficiency inquiry”).
       Rule 901(a) provides that “[t]he requirement of authentica-
tion or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
shall be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” OCGA § 24-
9-901(a). And Rule 901(b) provides that one way evidence may be
authenticated is by “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction
with circumstances.” OCGA § 24-9-901(b)(4).
       Here, the “contents” of the text messages, “taken in con-
junction with circumstances,” supported a finding that the con-
tact identified as “Bro” was Bennett. OCGA § 24-9-901(b)(4).
Given that the trial evidence established that Ethan was Ben-
nett’s younger brother, the fact that the contact listed as “Bro”
referred to Ethan as “lil bru” suggested that “Bro” was Bennett.
Text messages from “Bro” also made comments about “tiggy” (the
nickname of Bennett’s girlfriend, Mullen) and “mamma” (an ap-
parent reference to Ahnberg, the mother of the Bennett brothers)
that, when considered together with other evidence admitted at
trial, suggested that “Bro” was Bennett. Specifically, one text
message from “Bro” referred to “tiggy … be[ing] at the house
24/7,” and Mullen testified at trial that, at the time, she was stay-
ing with Bennett at Bennett’s father’s house. “Bro” said in a later
text message that he “cried on tiggy the same night [he] saw




                                 22
[mamma],” which was consistent with Mullen’s and Ahnberg’s
testimony that Bennett was upset about Ahnberg’s condition. An-
other text message discussed having “t[aken] momma to gate-
way,” which aligned with Ahnberg’s testimony that her sons had
previously taken her to a rehabilitation center called “Gateway.”
“Bro” also texted Ethan a picture of Bennett, Ethan, and Kates.
Further, the trial evidence showed that, while Mullen was driving
Bennett at about 2:00 a.m. on July 23 (after the just-before-mid-
night shooting on July 22), a police officer pulled her over near a
hospital for not having headlights on. And text messages from the
early hours of July 23 showed that “Bro” told Ethan that “[t]hey
pulled us over” “by the hospital,” and that “her lights wasn’t on
all the way.”
       In addition to relying on the contents of the text messages
to “support a finding that the matter in question” (text messages
from the contact listed as “Bro”) were “what its proponent
claim[ed]” (text messages from Bennett), OCGA § 24-9-901(a), the
State also admitted independent evidence that the contact listed
as “Bro” was Bennett. Specifically, the State introduced into evi-
dence a social-media-message exchange between Kates and Mul-
len in which Mullen provided Kates with Bennett’s phone num-
ber. And the phone number provided by Mullen matched the
phone number assigned to the contact listed as “Bro” in Ethan’s
phone.
       Because the State adequately identified the contact listed
as “Bro” on Ethan’s phone as Bennett, an objection on that basis
would have been meritless. Accordingly, Bennett has not shown
that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise such
an objection. See Hughes v. State, 310 Ga. 453, 459 (2020) (no de-
ficient performance where an argument that evidence “was not
properly authenticated” was “meritless”).




                                 23
        (c) Bennett argues that his trial counsel was constitution-
ally ineffective for failing to object to testimony from Officer Hurst
explaining the meaning of certain slang terms used in the text-
message exchange between Ethan and the contact listed in
Ethan’s phone as “Bro” (which, as described above, the evidence
showed was Bennett). According to Bennett, Officer Hurst’s testi-
mony implied that Bennett was in a gang because Bennett and
Ethan used terminology that gang members also use. And he con-
tends that trial counsel should have objected because the testi-
mony was “character evidence” that caused “prejudice.” Based on
Bennett’s references to “character evidence” and “prejudice,” we
construe his argument as claiming that trial counsel should have
objected to Officer Hurst’s testimony under OCGA § 24-4-404(a)
(“Rule 404(a)”), which provides in relevant part that “[e]vidence
of a person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admis-
sible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion,” and Rule 403, which, as noted above, pro-
vides in relevant part that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” OCGA § 24-4-403. As explained below, we con-
clude that Bennett has not shown that his counsel rendered defi-
cient performance in failing to raise objections under Rule 404(a)
or Rule 403 because he has not shown that such objections would
have been sustained. See Momon, 322 Ga. at 853.
       By way of background, the State introduced testimony
from Officer Hurst at trial to aid the jury in understanding some
of the language used in text messages found on Ethan’s phone.
Officer Hurst testified that he had taken “gang training and clas-
ses,” but that most of what he knew about “how the streets use”
certain slang terms he learned from “[p]ersonal experience.” He
said that he had learned “certain jargon” while investigating nar-
cotics and gang cases, and that he was also familiar with slang




                                 24
“terms and terminology” because he was personally “in the streets
young” and “had used [those terms] when [he] was a young’un.”
He further indicated that movies had “a lot of” impact on the
“basic talk” used “in the criminal world.”
       According to Officer Hurst’s testimony, the word “slide” re-
fers to having “shot at somebody”; the word “federal” can refer to
law enforcement surveillance; the word “bless” is a “street term”
used by “gang members” that refers to “t[aking] care of [an] indi-
vidual,” that is, harming a person by, for example, causing their
“death,” “beat[ing] them up,” or “robb[ing] them”; the abbrevia-
tion “OPP” refers to an “opponent”; and the phrase “I’m tweak-
ing,” as used “[i]n a gang context” or by someone “in a criminal
lifestyle,” means “I’m scared.”
        With the benefit of Officer Hurst’s testimony, the jury could
infer from the text messages that Bennett and Ethan agreed that
they should “bless” (harm or kill) Randolph; that Bennett consid-
ered Randolph his “opp” (opponent); that Bennett claimed to have
“slid[ ]” (shot) at Randolph’s mother’s house (where Randoph
spent much of his time) and planned to go back to shoot at Ran-
dolph again; that what Bennett was saying over text messages
made Ethan concerned about “[f]ederal[ ]” (law enforcement sur-
veillance); and that Ethan was “tweakin” (scared) when he found
out that Bennett had been pulled over by police after the shooting.
       In its order denying Bennett’s motion for new trial, the trial
court concluded that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to
raise an objection based on character evidence or prejudice be-
cause such objections would have been meritless. Trial counsel
had testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he did not
think Officer Hurst’s references to gang members using certain
terms were harmful because, among other things, Officer Hurst
“didn’t call any of the co-defendants a gangster,” and the fact that




                                 25
gang members use a term “doesn’t mean that every young person
that uses that term is a gang member.” In concluding that a char-
acter-evidence objection would have been overruled, the trial
court found, consistent with trial counsel’s testimony, that Officer
Hurst’s testimony did not indicate that only gang members used
such slang terms or connect Bennett to a gang. And the court fur-
ther found that Officer Hurst’s testimony about the meaning of
unfamiliar slang terms was highly probative in helping the jury
understand the text messages, and that the testimony’s probative
value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prej-
udice.
       Here, Bennett has not shown that the trial court erred in
concluding that a character-evidence objection to Officer Hurst’s
testimony would have been overruled. First, the record supports
the trial court’s finding that Officer Hurst did not suggest that
Bennett was a gang member. A review of Officer Hurst’s trial tes-
timony reveals that he did not testify that either of the Bennett
brothers were gang members or that their use of slang terms used
by gang members, criminals, and young people alike indicated
that they were gang members. To the contrary, Officer Hurst’s
testimony clearly indicated that one need not be a gang member
or criminal to use such terms, as he testified that he had person-
ally used such language in his youth and that such language often
derived from movies. Further, trial counsel, who had an oppor-
tunity to witness Officer Hurst testify, came away with the same
impression—that Officer Hurst was not testifying or insinuating
that the Bennett brothers’ use of slang terms sometimes used by
gang members meant that they were gang members. Accordingly,
Bennett has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding
that Officer Hurst’s testimony did not indicate that he was a gang
member. And as a result, the trial court did not err in concluding




                                26
that an objection under Rule 404(a)—that Officer Hurst’s testi-
mony was being admitted to prove that Bennett acted in conform-
ity with some trait of character associated with gang member-
ship—would have been overruled. See Robinson v. State, 322 Ga.
279, 283–84 (2025) (affirming the trial court’s determination that
trial counsel was not deficient where the factual finding underly-
ing that determination “was supported by the record” and there-
fore “not clearly erroneous”).
        Bennett has likewise failed to show that the trial court
erred in concluding that an objection to Officer Hurst’s testimony
under Rule 403 would have been overruled. “[A]ny risk of unfair
prejudice was low” because, as the trial court reasonably found,
Officer Hurst did not testify, or otherwise suggest, that the Ben-
nett brothers’ use of slang terms sometimes employed by gang
members showed that they were themselves gang members.
Pierce, 319 Ga. at 858. And the trial court reasonably determined
that Officer Hurst’s testimony was highly probative. As explained
above, Officer Hurst’s explanations of unfamiliar slang terms
helped the jury understand that, in their text-message exchange,
the Bennett brothers were planning to shoot and kill Randolph.
See Blash v. State, 318 Ga. 325, 336 (2024) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony explain-
ing “gang language” because the testimony “was highly proba-
tive,” in that “it helped the jury understand the unfamiliar termi-
nology in the calls,” and the defendant’s “statements using that
vernacular showed that he wanted to speak with others because
they were cooperating with the State in a manner that was unfa-
vorable to him”); Richardson v. State, 308 Ga. 70, 71–72 (2020)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting testimony from a gang expert that a letter sent by the de-
fendant “contained numerous gang references” because the letter




                                27
was “incomprehensible to someone unfamiliar with the vernacu-
lar of [the defendant’s] gang,” and the testimony showed that the
defendant’s letter was an “attempt to conceal his involvement in
the crimes,” which “was evidence of his guilt”). The text-message
exchange was a key piece of evidence that the State relied on in
closing arguments to show that Bennett intended to kill Ran-
dolph. And because, as the trial court reasonably determined,
Bennett “has not shown that the low risk of unfair prejudice” from
Officer Hurst’s testimony “substantially outweighed the proba-
tive value of the evidence,” he has not established that his trial
counsel performed deficiently in failing to raise an objection to the
evidence under Rule 403. Pierce, 319 Ga. at 858.
       (d) Bennett contends that his trial counsel was constitu-
tionally ineffective for failing to stipulate that (as relevant to the
charge against him for being a felon in possession of a firearm) he
had prior felony convictions. As a result of the failure to stipulate,
the State admitted into evidence a certified copy of Bennett’s con-
viction for two counts of obstruction of an officer “by offering and
doing violence to [a juvenile correctional] officer,” which showed
that he did not serve prison time for the offenses and was instead
sentenced to five years’ probation. On appeal, Bennett argues that
this evidence was particularly harmful because he was on trial for
violent crimes and his record of conviction showed that his prior
felonies were for violent crimes, as well.
       Assuming without deciding that trial counsel’s decision not
to stipulate to Bennett’s prior convictions was deficient perfor-
mance, Bennett has not shown prejudice. As we have explained,
“[a] defendant may be prejudiced by the admission of a prior con-
viction into evidence when the prior conviction is of the nature
likely to inflame the jury’s passions and raise the risk of a convic-
tion based on improper considerations.” Jackson v. State, 317 Ga.




                                 28
95, 103 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). But “this Court has
[also] held that even violent crimes, crimes involving firearms,
and drug offenses were not likely to inflame the jury’s passions in
murder cases.” Id. at 103–04 (quotation marks omitted).
       Here, Bennett has not shown that informing the jury that
he had been convicted of obstructing an officer “likely inflamed
the passions of the jury,” much less that it caused him prejudice.
Jackson, 317 Ga. at 104. As an initial matter, the only evidence
admitted regarding Bennett’s prior convictions was the record of
conviction itself. Although the record of conviction showed that
Bennett had been convicted of violent offenses (two counts of vio-
lently obstructing a juvenile correctional officer), it also reflected
that the crimes for which Bennett had been convicted were dis-
similar to the shooting-related crimes charged in the instant case
(murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in
possession of a firearm), which reduced the risk that the jury
might convict him based on his propensity to commit similar
crimes. And the prosecutor did not even reference the crimes for
which Bennett had previously been convicted during closing ar-
guments, stating in conclusory fashion only that “[a] person pos-
sessing a firearm [charge] … is when a … person possesses a fire-
arm having been convicted of a felony,” and “[w]e have that in this
case with both [d]efendants.”
       Given that Bennett’s prior convictions were “[un]likely to
inflame the jury’s passions,” that the prosecutor “did not present
any details concerning” the prior convictions or “emphasize” them
in any way, and that, as explained above, the evidence of Ben-
nett’s guilt “was strong,” we conclude that Bennett has failed to
show that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of his
trial would have been different” but for his trial counsel’s failure




                                 29
to stipulate to his felon status. Jackson, 317 Ga. at 103–04 (quo-
tation marks omitted) (holding that the defendant failed to show
prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to stipulate to the defend-
ant’s felon status, even where the State introduced evidence that
the defendant had a prior conviction for “aggravated assault” and
a charge for “possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, predicated
on a felony conviction for possession of cocaine”). See also Marrow
v. State, 322 Ga. 370, 374 (2025) (holding that the defendant did
not establish prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to stipulate to
his prior felony conviction for armed robbery, where, among other
things, “[t]he prior conviction was not emphasized in any way, or
even mentioned again after the certified conviction was read into
the record,” and “the evidence against [the defendant] was
strong”).
       5. Bennett argues that cumulative prejudice from the as-
serted trial court error and the enumerated instances of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel warrant a new trial. We disagree.
        For purposes of this analysis, we have assumed two in-
stances of deficient performance on the part of trial counsel—the
failure to object to testimony recounting a statement by Bennett’s
mother that her sons shot or killed Randolph, and the failure to
stipulate to Bennett’s felon status. As we explained above, Ben-
nett failed to show prejudice from the former instance of assumed
deficiency because, setting aside the challenged testimony, there
was strong evidence of Bennett’s guilt—including evidence from
more than one source that Bennett had a motive to harm Ran-
dolph, text messages in which Bennett and his brother planned
to shoot and kill Randolph, and statements Bennett made to his
girlfriend after the crime that strongly suggested his culpability
in the shooting. And we likewise concluded that Bennett had not




                                30
shown prejudice from the latter instance of assumed deficiency
based in large measure on the same strong evidence of his guilt.
“[C]onsidering collectively” the prejudice arising from these in-
stances of assumed deficiency, we reach the same conclusion:
Bennett “has not shown a reasonable probability of a different re-
sult” because, even if the evidence admitted as a result of the as-
sumed deficiencies had been excluded, the evidence of Bennett’s
guilt would still have been strong. Williams v. State, 318 Ga. 83,
97 (2024).
       6. Finally, Kates asks that we remand the case with in-
structions for the trial court to correct “scrivener’s errors” on his
sentencing sheet. As explained below, we decline to do so.
       In its order denying Kates’s motion for new trial, the trial
court concluded that Kates’s sentencing sheet contained “scrive-
ner’s errors,” in that the counts listed on the sentencing sheet did
not correspond to the appropriate count numbers in the indict-
ment. The trial court ordered that the sentencing sheet be cor-
rected, but it does not appear from the record on appeal that the
trial court ever issued a revised sentencing sheet.
       Although Kates and the State appear to agree on appeal
that the trial court should issue a revised sentencing sheet for
Kates, we disagree. As explained in footnote 1 above, the count
numbers on Kates’s sentencing sheet correspond to the count
numbers in the indictment returned by the grand jury, rather
than to the count numbers in the “dummy” indictment prepared
for, and provided to, the jury at trial (which renumbered some of
the counts). In concluding that the counts were misnumbered on
Kates’s sentencing sheet, it appears that the trial court either
failed to appreciate that the count numbers on the indictment and
“dummy” indictment were different, or erred in treating the
“dummy” indictment as the indictment under which Kates was




                                 31
convicted and thus as the indictment to which the sentencing
sheet should correspond. Cf. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App.
729, 740 (2012) (explaining that a court order nol prossing a
“dummy” accusation that was “sent out with the jury” and subse-
quently filed in error “had no effect on [the] appellant’s convic-
tions” under the operative accusation). Because the operative in-
dictment was the one returned by the grand jury, and because the
count numbers on Kates’s sentencing sheet correspond to that in-
dictment, there is no need for the trial court to revise the count
numbers on his sentencing sheet. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in failing to “correct” the sentencing sheet, and we deny
Kates’s request that we remand the case for the trial court to do
so. 4
       Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur, except War-
ren, P. J., not participating.




        4 To the extent that any other sentencing errors in these cases remain,
nothing in this opinion precludes the trial court from correcting those errors in
accordance with OCGA § 17-10-1(f)(1) (“[W]ithin 120 days after receipt by the
sentencing court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judgment after direct
appeal, … the court imposing the sentence has the jurisdiction, power, and
authority to correct or reduce the sentence ….”).




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