Bryant v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                  In the
                             Supreme Court of Georgia
                                              No. S26A0097
                                             Johnnie Bryant
                                                    v.
                                               The State

                          On Appeal from the Superior Court of Harris County
                                            No. 22CR149

                                           Decided: May 5, 2026


                    COLVIN, Justice.
                  Appellant Johnnie Bryant appeals his convictions for the
            malice murder of Dylan Eldridge, the aggravated assaults of
            James Blackmon and Willie Feggins, and related crimes arising
            from the same incident. 1 On appeal, Bryant contends that the ev-
            idence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process


                    1 The crimes occurred on November 1, 2021. On July 19, 2022, a Harris
            County grand jury returned an indictment charging Bryant with malice mur-
            der (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault of Eldridge (Count
            3), aggravated assault of Feggins and Blackmon (Counts 4 and 5), and three
            counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 6,
            7, and 8). Bryant was tried by a jury in June 2023 and found guilty on all
            counts. The trial court sentenced Bryant to life in prison without the possibility
            of parole for malice murder (Count 1) and purported to merge Bryant’s felony
            murder count (Count 2) into Count 1. The trial court also entered consecutive
            sentences of 20 years each for Bryant’s aggravated assaults of Eldridge, Feg-
            gins, and Blackmon (Counts 3, 4, and 5), and consecutive sentences of five
            years each for Bryant’s three charges of possession of a firearm during the
            commission of a felony (Counts 6, 7, and 8), for a total sentence of life in prison
to support his convictions; that the State failed to disprove his
defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt; that he is en-
titled to a new trial on the “general grounds” provided in OCGA
§§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21; that the trial court plainly erred by admit-
ting Eldridge’s autopsy photos; that the trial court plainly erred
by allowing the State to “badger” a witness for the defense during
cross-examination; that he received constitutionally ineffective
assistance from his trial counsel in several ways; and that the
prosecutor improperly expressed his personal belief that Bryant
was guilty during the State’s closing argument. These arguments
fail. We therefore affirm Bryant’s convictions for malice murder,
aggravated assault against Feggins, aggravated assault against
Blackmon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony. But because Bryant’s conviction for aggravated assault
against Eldridge should have merged into his malice murder con-
viction, we vacate his conviction and sentence for that offense, as
explained further below. We also take this opportunity to correct
a separate sentencing error regarding his felony murder convic-
tion.
       1. The evidence at trial showed the following. Bryant and
his wife, Ruby Bryant, were engaged in a property dispute with
Eldridge concerning four parcels of land on the east side of Sunny-
side Church Road, which runs roughly north-south. At the time
of Eldridge’s death, Ruby owned the first property, 330 Sunnyside


without parole plus 75 years. As explained in Division 8, infra, Bryant’s sen-
tences with respect to Counts 2 and 3 were in error, and we correct those errors
below.
         On July 10, 2023, Bryant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he
later amended through new counsel. The trial court heard Bryant’s motion on
September 11, 2024, and denied it by written order on June 27, 2025. Bryant
then filed a timely notice of appeal. His case docketed in this Court for the term
beginning in December 2025 and was submitted for a decision on the briefs.




                                        2
Church Road, where she had lived for more than 70 years, and
where she and Bryant had lived together for more than 45 years.
Through a family estate, Ruby also controlled a second property:
a large, oddly shaped, and mostly undeveloped tract of land that
bordered her home to the east and to the south. Trouble between
the Bryants and Eldridge began in early 2020, when Eldridge
purchased the third property at issue, 246 Sunnyside Church
Road, a residential property to the south of Ruby and Bryant’s
home. And that trouble intensified when Eldridge began to har-
vest wood from the fourth property, 146 Sunnyside Church Road,
a rectangular plot of undeveloped land that was surrounded on
three sides by the land Ruby controlled through her family estate
and which was only accessible by means of an unpaved path that
ran through the estate’s land. At the time of Eldridge’s death, 146
Sunnyside Church Road was owned by Jeff Moore, but Moore had
agreed to sell the land to Eldridge and had given Eldridge per-
mission to use it prior to the closing of the sale.
       (a) On November 1, 2021 — the day Eldridge was killed —
Ruby contacted law enforcement to report a trespass on her prop-
erty, and Deputy Donald Fowler of the Harris County Sheriff’s
Department was dispatched to investigate. At about 1:30 p.m.,
Deputy Fowler met Ruby outside her home, and she directed him
to a nearby property that was later identified as 146 Sunnyside
Church Road (the undeveloped plot owned by Moore). Once there,
Deputy Fowler met with Deputy Christopher Staton, who had
also responded to the call, and the deputies spoke to Ruby and
Bryant. Their conversation was captured by the dashboard cam-
eras on Deputy Fowler and Deputy Staton’s patrol vehicles, and
the two recordings were entered into evidence and played for the
jury. Those videos and consistent testimony from Deputies Fowler
and Stanton showed the following.




                                3
        Upon arrival, the deputies observed an older-model blue
Ford F-150 pickup truck, a trailer, a log splitter, and a stack of
logs. The Bryants, believing the truck and other items were on
their property, demanded that the Sheriff’s Department remove
them. But Deputy Fowler, who had “previous dealings” with the
Bryants, did not believe the truck was on Ruby’s property. And
Deputy Staton used his cell phone to access a GPS-enabled ver-
sion of the tax assessor’s map, which showed that the truck was
in fact on Moore’s property (i.e., 146 Sunnyside Church Road), not
Ruby’s. The Bryants remained unconvinced and became visibly
upset. Bryant demanded that the deputies confiscate the tres-
passing property and put Eldridge “in jail,” and Ruby accused the
deputies of refusing to help them because the Bryants were black.
When the deputies explained their response had “nothing to do
with white or black”; that the Sheriff’s Department could not tow
vehicles from private property; and that this was a civil matter,
Bryant demanded the deputies call Mike Jolley, the Harris
County Sheriff. The deputies declined. During the course of their
conversation, Bryant lamented that the situation with Eldridge
“ain’t going to stop ‘til ... something in the woods go on,” and
stated that “This gonna end today.” As his frustration increased,
Bryant asked, “What’s gonna happen if we set here ’til he come
back here, get his truck, and we have a shoot-out? What will hap-
pen then?”
       At about 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, Bryant went to the Har-
ris County Sheriff’s Office to speak with Sheriff Jolley. But since
Sheriff Jolley was not on-site, Chief Deputy Chris Walden invited
Bryant into his office instead. There Bryant expressed that he
was upset because Eldridge had taken some pecan wood from his
wife’s property. Bryant explained that he had spoken to the dep-
uties about the matter but wanted a second opinion. Chief Deputy
Walden pulled up the tax assessor’s website on his computer, but




                                4
they were unable to make “a clear determination on where exactly
the wood was.” Chief Deputy Walden advised Bryant that this
was a civil matter and encouraged him to have the land surveyed.
According to Chief Deputy Walden, Bryant left at about 4:00 p.m.
A few minutes later, Chief Deputy Walden “heard a dispatch call
out over the 911 system” about “an individual being shot on
Sunnyside Church Road.”
        James Blackmon testified that he and Willie Feggins were
assisting Eldridge with harvesting firewood. According to Black-
mon, he was hooking up a trailer to his truck when Blackmon told
Eldridge that someone was coming up the driveway. Eldridge and
Feggins then got in Eldridge’s golf cart, and Eldridge drove the
cart down the driveway, followed closely by Blackmon in Black-
mon’s blue pickup truck. Blackmon testified that when Eldridge
encountered Bryant, Eldridge said, “it’s Johnnie,” to which Bry-
ant responded, “Johnnie nothing” and “started firing out the win-
dow [of his truck] while [Eldridge and Feggins were] on the golf
cart.” Blackmon “thought [he] should charge him,” but Bryant
“turned and fired at [Blackmon’s] truck,” so Blackmon “jumped in
[his] truck and ... hightailed it back to [Eldridge’s] house.” Accord-
ing to Blackmon, Feggins “was sitting right beside [Eldridge]
when all the firing” started, but Feggins “made it ... off the golf
cart and ran down in the woods.” 2
      Blackmon drove “[l]ike a maniac” to Eldridge’s house,
where he told Eldridge’s romantic partner, Tessley Wells, that El-
dridge had been shot. Wells quickly got into her van and drove to
find Eldridge. Blackmon then saw Feggins come up to the house
from the woods. According to Blackmon, Feggins “was shaking,
turning colors. I mean, it was — it was a shock.” From there,


      2 Feggins did not testify at trial.




                                       5
Blackmon and Feggins got in Blackmon’s truck and drove south
to find Eldridge but were quickly stopped by responding law en-
forcement officers.
         The Sunnyside Community Center is located across the
street from the driveway leading to 146 Sunnyside Church Road.
Pamela Anderson was playing bridge at the community center
with three other women when she heard about 8 to 10 gunshots.
She then saw a pickup truck come “tearing out,” followed shortly
by a man “slumped over” on a golf cart. The man — later identi-
fied as Eldridge — “rac[ed]” up the community center and “yelled
out, ‘I’ve been shot, please help me.’” Anderson and the other
women ran to the door and unlocked it. Eldridge then “pulled him-
self up [the] ramp [leading to the front door], ... got into [the] room
... collapsed against a refrigerator and slid down with his legs ex-
tended.” He was “bleeding profusely” and became unconscious.
One of the women called 911, but was disconnected, so the women
also called Peter Byron Hawkins, a volunteer firefighter with
EMS training who lived nearby. Hawkins responded and ren-
dered aid until other first responders arrived and transported El-
dridge to a hospital for emergency surgery.
      Eldridge did not survive the surgery. Dr. Steven Atkinson,
a medical examiner for the GBI who performed Eldridge’s au-
topsy, testified that Eldridge had been shot twice: one bullet
pierced the left side of Eldridge’s abdomen and exited his lower
back, and a second bullet struck Eldridge’s left hip and exited
above the base of his penis.
       Sheriff Jolley was returning from a meeting in Columbus
when he received a call about the shooting. After arriving at the
community center and conferring with other officers, he walked
to Bryant’s home and asked Bryant to come outside. Bryant com-
plied and was taken into custody. With assistance from Bryant




                                  6
and Bryant’s adult son, Brandon Bryant, officers also retrieved
the firearm used in the shooting. During the subsequent investi-
gation, an officer photographed a bullet hole in the driver’s side
door of Blackmon’s truck and retrieved bullet fragments from in-
side the door frame.
       Wells testified that Eldridge did not take a firearm with
him when he left the house to harvest wood, and Blackmon testi-
fied that Eldridge did not have a firearm on him during the day.
Anderson and Hawkins each testified that Eldridge did not have
a firearm at the community center and that no firearm was visible
in his golf cart or the immediate vicinity. And Lieutenant Kyle
Senette, who responded to the shooting and rendered additional
aid to Eldridge, testified that there were no firearms on or near
Eldridge at the time.
        (b) Bryant, Ruby, and Brandon testified for the defense.
Brandon testified that Eldridge and Bryant had “bad blood” from
their very first encounter. According to Brandon, after Bryant and
Eldridge’s initial conversation went poorly, Eldridge returned to
his property and “shot off probably about 30 or 40 rounds in the
air,” and Eldridge continued to fire guns “randomly” for the re-
mainder of the week until Brandon called the police. Brandon tes-
tified that the gunfire was not “target practice,” but rather “some
kind of intimidation.” Brandon also reported that Eldridge and
Bryant got into “five to 10” arguments and that Eldridge some-
times had a pistol with him during these encounters.
      Bryant also testified that he had multiple arguments with
Eldridge. According to Bryant, one time his great-grandchildren
were playing outside with firecrackers when Eldridge came out
“with a[n] AK and [a .]40 caliber pistol in his britches.” Bryant
reported that Eldridge “cut it off a few times, pow, pow, pow,” and




                                7
asked the children if “they want[ed] to play[?]” On a different oc-
casion, Eldridge “tore [Bryant’s] fence down that had been up [for]
15 years.... [Eldridge] took off about three or four” feet of it. Bry-
ant called the police, but when they responded, Eldridge hid in
the bushes “laughing” and would not come out to talk to them.
       Bryant testified that on the day he shot Eldridge, he went
to the Sheriff’s Office “to get them to tell [Eldridge] that[ ] he
didn’t have [a] right-of-way in there before” Eldridge purchased
the property. According to Bryant, he did not leave the Sheriff’s
Office with an intent to kill Eldridge, and he did not know El-
dridge would be on the property when he returned there. Bryant
described their encounter as follows.
       As Bryant drove up the driveway in his pickup truck with
Ruby in the front passenger seat, Eldridge and Feggins came
down it in Eldridge’s golf cart. Eldridge said, “[H]ey, Mr. John-
nie,” but before Bryant could reply, Eldridge continued past him.
Eldridge stopped his cart about a car length behind Bryant’s
truck and Feggins got out and put both of his hands on the front
of the cart, “where he would make sure you [could] see” them.
      Then Eldridge, who was still seated in the golf cart, made
a movement suggesting he was trying to retrieve a pistol from his
waistband. Bryant told Ruby, “[L]ay down, he’s going to shoot us,”
and then Bryant got out of his truck and shot at Eldridge. El-
dridge then “took off” and ran into the woods, leading Bryant to
think he’d “missed him.”
       Bryant then “heard a truck coming,” “running ... hard,
spinning, kicking up gravel” and “coming straight” at him. Bryant
moved towards the front of his truck and fired once, hitting the
side of Blackmon’s truck. Bryant testified that “if [he had] stayed”
where he was, he “would have been nailed good.”




                                  8
       Bryant testified that even though he never saw Eldridge’s
gun, he believed Eldridge “was going to shoot” him. Bryant stated
that Eldridge had “showed that gun to [him] about five or six
times” and that Bryant “never [saw] him without” it. Bryant fur-
ther testified that he shot at Blackmon because he was trying to
keep Blackmon from running him over.
       At trial, Ruby also testified that Bryant told her to get
down on the floor of the truck because Eldridge had a gun. On
cross-examination, Ruby admitted that Bryant was upset when
he left the Sheriff’s Office because the officers would not arrest
Eldridge.
       2. In two related enumerations of error, Bryant contends
that the evidence was not sufficient as a matter of constitutional
due process to support his convictions and that the State failed to
disprove his defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt.
We do not agree.
        When an appellant challenges the constitutional suffi-
ciency of the evidence on appeal, “this Court asks whether the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational
trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Holloway v. State, 320
Ga. 668, 669 (2025) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319
(1979)). And when making this determination, we “view[ ] the ev-
idence in the light most favorable to the verdicts.” Upshaw v.
State, 323 Ga. 257, 262 (2025). This view preserves the jury’s role
as the fact-finder by requiring us to “defer to the jury’s assess-
ment of the weight and credibility of the evidence,” rather than
“weigh[ing] the evidence on appeal or resolv[ing] conflicts in trial
testimony” ourselves. Id. See Jackson, 443 US at 319.
      Here, Bryant conceded that he shot and killed Eldridge and
that he shot in the direction of Feggins and Blackmon but claimed




                                 9
that he was justified in doing so. “When a defendant presents ev-
idence that he was justified in using deadly force, the State bears
the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Allen v. State, 322 Ga. 417, 422 (2025). “But it is the role of the
jury to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is free
to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and to
accept the evidence that the defendant did not act in self-defense.”
Id. at 423 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
       Though Bryant testified that he believed Eldridge was
reaching for a weapon to shoot him and that Blackmon was charg-
ing Bryant with his truck, the evidence at trial was sufficient to
authorize the jury to reject Bryant’s claim of self-defense and in-
stead find him guilty of the crimes charged. Video evidence of Bry-
ant’s encounter with the deputies showed that Bryant was visibly
frustrated, that he said his dispute with Eldridge was “gonna end
today,” and that Bryant suggested there would be a “shoot-out.”
Bryant then went to the Sheriff’s Office for a “second opinion,” but
when Chief Deputy Walden gave him essentially the same re-
sponse as Deputy Fowler and Deputy Staton, Bryant left upset
and shot Eldridge and shot at Feggins and Blackmon only a few
minutes later. Blackmon testified that Bryant shot Eldridge with-
out warning. And Blackmon, Wells, Anderson, Hawkins, and
Lieutenant Senette all testified that they did not see a firearm on
or near Eldridge. Additionally, Blackmon testified that he drove
his truck past Bryant to escape, rather than to strike Bryant
(though Blackman acknowledged contemplating charging Bryant
before getting in his truck). And Bryant himself testified that Feg-
gins made his hands visible when exiting Eldridge’s golf cart such
that Bryant could see Feggins was unarmed. Based on this evi-
dence, the jury was authorized to discredit Bryant’s claim of self-
defense and instead credit evidence supporting the State’s theory
that Bryant acted without legal justification; that same evidence




                                10
also authorized the jury to infer that Bryant shot Eldridge with
malice and that he shot at Feggins and Blackmon with an intent
to cause violent injuries. See Allen, 322 Ga. at 423 (holding that
the jury was authorized to reject the appellant’s justification de-
fense, where the appellant had claimed a taxi driver had attacked
him for being bisexual, but other evidence showed that the killing
was part of an attempted armed robbery). See also Upshaw, 323
Ga. at 262–63 (holding that the jury was authorized to reject the
appellants’ justification defense even though there was evidence
that the victims had driven by the appellants’ home multiple
times in succession with firearms while wearing ski masks, where
other evidence showed that after the victims’ vehicle passed the
defendants’ home, the defendants went outside, waited for the ve-
hicle to pass again and fired when it did so). Bryant’s sufficiency
claims therefore fail.
       3. Bryant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because
the jury’s verdict was “contrary to evidence and the principles of
justice and equity,” and “decidedly and strongly against the
weight of the evidence” under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, respec-
tively. But these claims present nothing for us to review, as ex-
plained below.
       In raising these grounds for a new trial — commonly
known as the “general grounds” — Bryant reiterates verbatim the
claims he made in his motion for new trial and asks us to consider
those claims as if they were being made for the first time. 3 We do


        3 Bryant’s principal appellate brief is virtually identical to his brief in
support of his motion for new trial. And in submitting a recycled brief, Bryant
failed to recast his claims for relief from the trial court below as claims of error
for which he now seeks review from this Court. Bryant’s request for a new trial
on the general grounds is one example of this failure. Another appears at the




                                        11
not consider such claims on appeal, however. See Ward v. State,
316 Ga. 295, 299 (2023) (explaining that “as an appellate court,
we do not independently review the record” to assess general
grounds claims). This is because the statutory language on which
Bryant bases his request for a new trial vests the “decision to
grant or refuse to grant a new trial ... solely in the trial court.” Id.
See OCGA § 5-5-20 (authorizing “the judge presiding” to grant a
new trial on the grounds specified therein); OCGA § 5-5-21 (au-
thorizing the “presiding judge” to grant or refuse a new trial on
the grounds specified). Because we do not consider general
grounds claims in the first instance and because Bryant has not
asserted that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion, this
enumeration presents nothing for us to review. See Kimbro v.
State, 317 Ga. 442, 446 (2023).
      4. In his next claim, Bryant argues that the trial court
erred by admitting photographs of Eldridge’s autopsy into evi-
dence and by allowing the State’s medical examiner to testify
about those photos. Bryant contends that the photographs and
testimony were inadmissible because they were “unnecessary to
show any facts not already before the jury,” and that the photo-
graphs (but not the testimony) were so “extremely graphic and
inflammatory,” that they prejudiced the jury against him. As ex-
plained below, Bryant’s claim fails.
        (a) When the State announced it would call Dr. Atkinson
as its next witness, defense counsel stated outside the presence of
the jury that he would “stipulate that [Eldridge] is deceased, and


conclusion of his appellate brief, where he inappropriately asks the Court to
“grant the Appellant’s Amended Motion for New Trial.” This vestige of his mo-
tion-for-new-trial brief ought to have been removed, as this is “a court of re-
view, not of first view.” Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 653
(2025).




                                      12
that the gunshots from [his] client used that day caused his
death.” The State responded that it would “accept the stipula-
tion,” but asked that Dr. Atkinson nevertheless be able “to testify
to everything.” Defense counsel responded, “absolutely.”
       Dr. Atkinson then took the stand and was qualified as an
expert in pathology. He testified that he performed Eldridge’s au-
topsy and used photographs of the procedure, which the State ten-
dered as Exhibits 3 through 30, to explain Eldridge’s cause of
death. Dr. Atkinson began by explaining that each autopsy is as-
signed a case number, and that this number is displayed on two
plaques, one large and one small. Exhibit 3 shows the large
plaque with Eldridge’s case number on it and a smaller version of
the plaque is visible in each of the other autopsy photos to estab-
lish that those photos are of the same person. Next, Dr. Atkinson
used Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 to show the condition of Eldridge’s body
at the time it was received by his office. Exhibit 4 depicts El-
dridge’s face and upper chest, Exhibit 5 shows his chest and groin,
and Exhibit 6 includes the lower half of his body. Because El-
dridge died during surgery, the photos show the medical devices
that were attached to him at the time of his death, including an
endotracheal tube (Exhibit 4), EKG leads (Exhibits 4 and 5), and
various catheters (Exhibits 4–6). Exhibit 5 shows a large “football
shaped surgical incision” that had been packed with “vacuum
dressing.” And Exhibit 6 includes one catheter in Eldridge’s penis
and two others in the adjacent femoral regions. Dried blood is vis-
ible in each photo.
       Dr. Atkinson used Exhibits 8–11, and 13–16 to show the
location of Eldridge’s gunshot wounds to the jury and to explain
Eldridge’s cause of death. Dr. Atkinson stated that one bullet
pierced Eldridge in the left side of his abdomen (Exhibits 8–10)
and exited from his lower back (Exhibit 16), and another bullet




                                13
struck him in the left hip (Exhibit 13–14) and exited above his
penis (Exhibits 8, 11). Because the vacuum dressing and other
signs of medical intervention were removed during his autopsy,
Eldridge’s intestines can be seen protruding from the incision in
his abdomen (Exhibits 8–9, 11–12), and a second surgical incision
is visible near his left femoral region (Exhibits 8, 11, 16). Exhibit
15 4 shows a close-up of Dr. Atkinson’s “loose dissection” of the
surgical incision in his femoral region. In describing the photos of
Eldridge’s autopsy, Dr. Atkinson explained that the gunshot that
hit Eldridge’s hip caused an injury to his femoral region, and that
any injury to this area can “lead to significant blood loss.” On this
basis of his examination, Dr. Atkinson opined that Eldridge’s
cause of death was “gunshot wounds of [the] torso.”
       The State tendered, but did not publish, Exhibits 7, 12, and
17–30. Exhibit 7 depicts Eldridge’s face after the medical devices
had been removed. Exhibit 12 shows a close-up of the exit wound
above Eldridge’s penis and includes a portion of the surgical inci-
sion in his abdomen. Exhibit 17 contains another view of the exit
wound in Eldridge’s back. Exhibits 18–25 show some of Eldridge’s
organs after they were removed from his body, and Exhibits 26
and 27 show the cavity in Eldridge’s abdomen created by the re-
moval of those organs. Exhibits 28, 29, and 30 are X-rays of El-
dridge’s body. Though these exhibits were not published, they
would have been available to the jury during its deliberations.
       Although the parties seemingly agreed to stipulate both
that Eldridge was deceased and that Bryant caused his death,
that is not ultimately what happened. After Dr. Atkinson testi-
fied, the trial judge expressed his understanding of the parties’
stipulation outside the presence of the jury, stating “a stipulation

       4 The prosecutor mistakenly refers to this photograph as Exhibit 16,
but context makes clear that he and Dr. Atkinson are referring to Exhibit 15.




                                     14
has been offered and been made and accepted by the defense that
the deceased is Dylan Eldridge.” When asked to confirm whether
this was correct, defense counsel responded affirmatively. And so
when the trial judge later read the jury charge, it only instructed
the jury that the parties had stipulated that “[t]he State of Geor-
gia’s exhibits numbered 3 through 30 depict Dylan Eldridge.”
        (b) Because Bryant’s trial counsel did not object to the ad-
mission of Eldridge’s autopsy photos, we review Bryant’s claim for
plain error only. Burns v. State, 323 Ga. 402, 414 (2026) (applying
plain error review to an unpreserved claim regarding the admis-
sibility of autopsy photos). To establish plain error, an appellant
must show a legal error “that was not affirmatively waived, ... was
clear and obvious, and ... affected h[is] substantial rights, which
in the ordinary case means [ ]he must demonstrate that it affected
the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fox v. State, 321 Ga.
411, 416 (2025) (internal punctuation marks omitted). Where an
appellant makes such a showing, we have the “discretion to rem-
edy the error, but only if the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. And if
“one prong of the plain error test is not satisfied, we need not ad-
dress the other prongs of the test.” Id.
       “Under our current Evidence Code, we generally evaluate
the admissibility of autopsy photographs under OCGA
§§ 24-4-401, 24-4-402, and 24-4-403.” 5 Burns, 323 Ga. at 414 (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, to show error,



       5 OCGA § 24-4-401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” And OCGA § 24-4-402 provides in relevant part that “[a]ll rele-




                                      15
Bryant must demonstrate that the photographs and related tes-
timony were not relevant as defined in Rule 401 and therefore
inadmissible under Rule 402, or, insofar as Bryant claims that the
photos were prejudicial, he must show that their “probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” as
provided in Rule 403. OCGA § 24-4-403.
       To the extent Bryant argues that the photographs and Dr.
Atkin’s testimony were inadmissible because they were made ir-
relevant by his trial counsel’s stipulation, Bryant misrepresents
the record. As mentioned above, despite trial counsel’s attempt to
stipulate that the autopsy photos depicted Eldridge and that Bry-
ant caused Eldridge’s death, the trial court only instructed the
jury that the parties had stipulated Exhibits 3 through 30 “depict



vant evidence shall be admissible, except ... as prescribed pursuant to ... stat-
utory authority, applicable in the court in which the matter is pending. Evi-
dence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.” As relevant here, Rule
403 provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
        In Bryant’s brief, his appellate counsel cites Whitaker v. State, 275 Ga.
521 (2002) for the rule that “[p]ost-incision autopsy photographs of a victim are
admissible if necessary to show some material fact that becomes apparent only
due to the autopsy.” Whitaker, 275 Ga. at 522. We have since held that this
rule, which we first announced in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862 (1983), was ab-
rogated by the enactment of the Evidence Code in 2013. See Venturino v. State,
306 Ga. 391, 395 (2019).
        Bryant nevertheless relies on Whitaker and cites it as a 2022 case,
when in fact it was issued in 2002 — before the enactment of the 2013 Evidence
Code. His counsel made the same error in Bryant’s motion-for-new-trial brief,
which the trial court identified in a footnote explaining that Whitaker was “no
longer valid law.” We require that all counsel be conscientious in their repre-
sentations to the Court. Counsel are expected to exhibit the highest standards
of professionalism.




                                      16
Dylan Eldridge.” With respect to Bryant’s charges for malice mur-
der and felony murder, the State was therefore still required to
prove that Bryant caused Eldridge’s death. See OCGA § 16-5-1(a),
(c); Melancon v. State, 319 Ga. 741, 746 (2024). And so Eldridge’s
autopsy photos, which Dr. Atkinson used to explain how Eldridge
had died, were therefore relevant and material evidence of causa-
tion. See OCGA §§ 16-5-1(a), 24-4-401. Fournier v. State, __ Ga.
__, *9 (Feb. 17, 2026) (slip opinion) (rejecting the argument that
an unaccepted stipulation as to the victim’s cause of death ren-
dered autopsy photographs not relevant); Burns, 323 Ga. at 414–
15 (holding that pre- and post-incision autopsy photos were rele-
vant because they “illustrated the medical examiner’s testimony
about the cause of death”). And as relevant evidence, the photo-
graphs were admissible under Rule 402 unless they were inad-
missible by virtue of some other rule. See OCGA § 24-4-402.
        Bryant further argues that the autopsy photos were preju-
dicial because they were “extremely graphic and inflammatory.”
To the extent Bryant’s argument can be construed as a claim that
the photos were inadmissible under Rule 403, Bryant fails to
carry his burden to show a legal error on appeal. Bryant’s brief
cites the autopsy photographs generally and does not specify
which of the photos he contends were graphic or make any argu-
ment about how the photos prejudiced the jury against him. While
some of the photos may be fairly described as graphic, other pho-
tos to which Bryant cited, such as those showing the plaque used
by the medical examiner and Eldridge’s X-rays, were not graphic
at all, and the photos of Eldridge’s gunshot wounds that omitted
his surgical incisions were not particularly gruesome. Though the
photographs depicting Eldridge’s surgical incisions, his organs,
and his empty abdominal cavity may be considered graphic, it was
clear from Dr. Atkinson’s testimony that what they depicted was
the result of Eldridge’s surgery and the autopsy itself, rather than




                                17
injuries caused by Bryant. And so while these photographs may
have been graphic, it is unclear — in absence from any argument
by Bryant — how they were unfairly prejudicial to him.
       As stated above, Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of preju-
dicial evidence, but only where the evidence’s “probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
OCGA § 24-4-403. And we have explained that the exclusion of
evidence on this basis is “an extraordinary remedy that should be
used only sparingly.” Albury v. State, 314 Ga. 459, 461 (2022). Be-
cause Bryant does not specify which photographs he contends
were graphic and omits any argument about how such photo-
graphs were unfairly prejudicial to him, he has failed to meet his
burden on appeal to establish a legal error, and his plain error
claim therefore fails.
       5. Bryant further contends that the State improperly badg-
ered Ruby during cross-examination and that the trial court erred
by failing to take corrective action. Specifically, Bryant argues
that the prosecutor’s improper conduct prejudiced the jury
against him. 6 But Bryant did not preserve this claim for ordinary
appellate review by making a contemporaneous objection. See
Williams v. Harvey, 311 Ga. 439, 442 (2021) (explaining the na-
ture and importance of the contemporaneous objection rule). On
review, we assume without deciding that plain error review ap-
plies to Bryant’s unpreserved claim and conclude that Byrant has
failed to show plain error.
      During Ruby’s cross-examination, the prosecutor asked her
whether Bryant was angered by Eldridge’s behavior and by the
unwillingness of the Sheriff’s Department to assist or understand


       6 Bryant does not contest the admissibility of the testimony that re-
sulted from this alleged badgering.




                                      18
him. When Ruby gave non-responsive or otherwise tangential an-
swers, the prosecutor continued to ask her whether Bryant was
angry until she finally answered affirmatively.7 Once the prose-
cutor secured her response, his questioning ended.


      7 The exchange between Ruby and the prosecutor occurred as follows:


      RUBY: Every time I would talk to [law enforcement], they
      would tell me this — this Dylan’s [property] right here, this his.
      PROSECUTOR: Okay.
      RUBY: That — you know, like that. But I couldn’t never ex-
      plain to them that this was mine.
      PROSECUTOR: They wouldn’t let you explain?
      RUBY: No, no, no.
      PROSECUTOR: This — this made Mr. Bryant mad, right? He
      was upset, wasn’t he, Johnnie?
      RUBY: No. I’m talking about this — I’m talking about —
      PROSECUTOR: No. I’m asking about your husband. He was
      mad about it, right, that they wouldn’t listen?
      RUBY: They wouldn’t listen, the police.
      PROSECUTOR: And your husband was mad about it, right?
      You can answer. He was mad, let’s be honest. He was mad
      about it. He was mad at Dylan, right?
      RUBY: But see this was my — my property.
      PROSECUTOR: Okay. I understand.
      RUBY: It was my property.
      PROSECUTOR: I understand.
      And your husband was mad that he was going on the property,
      right?
      RUBY: And all — all this wasn’t about property at the end.
      Dylan had done started going up to my property doing just like
      he wanted to do.
      PROSECUTOR: Okay. And your — and your husband didn’t
      want Dylan to do what he wanted to do, right?
      RUBY: What?
      PROSECUTOR: Right, he was mad? He didn’t want Dylan to




                                     19
       do what he wanted to do to go on your property. He was mad
       about it, right?
       RUBY: I — you know —
       PROSECUTOR: I mean, I would like you to answer.
       Mr. Patterson called you to the stand, so I’d like for you to an-
       swer, Ms. Bryant. He was mad about it, right? You can tell the
       jury the truth. They’re over here. They’re ready to listen. Tell
       us, he was mad. And you were mad, too, because you — you
       were cussing and yelling at — at the sheriff’s deputies because
       they wouldn’t arrest Mr. Eldridge?
       RUBY: No, no, no. The sheriff deputy — I ain’t cussed at no
       sheriff deputy.
       PROSECUTOR: Ms. Bryant, we heard the tape. You said
       you’re tired of this sh*t, right? Isn’t that what you told the dep-
       uty?
       RUBY: I might of did.
       PROSECUTOR: Yeah. you told him you’re tired of this sh*t,
       right?
       RUBY: Uh-huh.
       PROSECUTOR: You were mad, too. You and Mr. Bryant were
       mad. Let’s be honest. We heard it. I mean, the jury — the jury
       heard the tape. You said you’re tired of this sh*t, right?
       RUBY: Yeah. Yeah.
       PROSECUTOR: Okay. Okay. Well, let’s be honest. And Mr.
       Bryant was mad, too, because he wanted Mr. Eldridge arrested
       that day.
       RUBY: See, see, see, every time Mr. Eldridge – when Mr. El-
       dridge came over there, when I would call the police, the police
       would tell me he had the right to shoot when he get ready, but
       I was — I was going through some sick. That gun, it would
       cause me — I had diarrhea and I had it for three years, and
       I’ve been sick, and now I got pancreatic cancer and stuff, and
       so.

        At this point, the prosecutor asked Ruby a series of other questions
covering about six pages of the transcript, but at the end of his cross-examina-
tion, he returned to the subject of Bryant’s anger.




                                      20
       The trial court has a duty to “exercise reasonable control
over the mode ... of interrogating witnesses ... so as to [p]rotect
witnesses from undue harassment.” OCGA § 24-6-611(a)(3). The
Advisory Committee notes on Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a)(3),
which is materially identical to OCGA § 24-6-611(a)(3), state that
this rule “calls for a judgment under the particular circumstances
whether interrogation tactics entail harassment or undue embar-
rassment. Pertinent circumstances include the importance of the
testimony, the nature of the inquiry, its relevance to credibility,
waste of time, and confusion.” FRE 611(a)(3) (Advisory Commit-
tee Notes). 8 See also Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 435 n.8 (2016)
(noting that OCGA § 24-6-611 “mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence
611 as that rule read in 2011,” and referencing the Advisory Com-
mittee notes on FRE 611). As a general matter, “[t]he extent of
cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of in-
quiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court[, and i]t may
exercise a reasonable judgment in determining when the subject
is exhausted.” Alford v. United States, 282 US 687, 694 (1931).
      Here, the prosecutor asked Ruby whether Eldridge’s be-
havior and the response of the Sheriff’s Office had angered Bry-
ant. Ruby’s testimony on the subject was highly important be-




        PROSECUTOR: But that day that Mr. Eldridge was shot, you
        agree with me that Mr. Bryant was upset that he wouldn’t —
        that the Harris County Sheriff’s Department wouldn’t arrest
        him, fair enough? We agree on that?
        RUBY: (Nods in the affirmative)
        MR. JACKSON: Okay. Thank you. Thank you.
        8 We have explained that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal
Rules of Evidence are “highly persuasive,” but that they “are not binding prec-
edent and cannot change the plain meaning of the law or rules.” Harris v. State,
314 Ga. 238, 291 n.83 (2022).




                                      21
cause it spoke directly to Bryant’s state of mind immediately be-
fore he shot Eldridge. Though the prosecutor’s demeanor was
somewhat pointed and he repeated his question several times in
various forms, this repetition was related to Ruby’s unwillingness
to give him a responsive answer. And because the prosecutor re-
peated his question until he secured an answer and stopped his
questioning when he finally received one, there was no danger of
wasting time or confusion. As such, Bryant has not established
that the trial court erred, let alone clearly and obviously erred, in
declining to exercise his discretion under Rule 611 to take correc-
tive action with respect to the prosecutor’s questioning. And be-
cause Bryant has not shown a legal error, his plain error claim
fails.
       6. In several related enumerations of error, Bryant con-
tends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by (1)
failing to object to the admission of the State’s autopsy photo-
graphs; (2) failing to object to the State’s “horrific badgering” of
Ruby during cross-examination, and (3) for making a “very weak
and anemic closing argument.” We address each argument in
turn. All fail.
       (a) “To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, a defendant must show deficient performance by trial coun-
sel and resulting prejudice.” Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409
(2024) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984)).
“To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate
that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasona-
ble way considering all the circumstances and in the light of pre-
vailing professional norms.” Rosenau v. State, 321 Ga. 299, 307
(2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The law recog-
nizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably,




                                 22
and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presump-
tion.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish
prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable prob-
ability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial
would have been different.” Cooper v. State, 321 Ga. 349, 351
(2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 634 (2025) (quoting
Strickland, 466 US at 694). “When evaluating whether an appel-
lant has established prejudice[,] we review the record de novo and
weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have
done.” Kingdom v. State, 321 Ga. 363, 369 (2025) (cleaned up). “If
a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prej-
udice, we need not address the other part of the Strickland test.”
Cooper, 321 Ga. at 351–52.
        (b) Bryant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the autopsy photographs. But even assum-
ing that his counsel performed deficiently in this regard, Bryant
fails to show that his counsel’s decision not to object prejudiced
the jury against him. As explained above, Bryant makes no argu-
ment about how the autopsy photographs were prejudicial, and it
was clear from Dr. Atkinson’s testimony which defects in El-
dridge’s body were caused by Bryant and which were instead the
result of surgical intervention or the autopsy itself. The risk of the
jury mistakenly attributing Eldridge’s surgical and autopsy-re-
lated defects to Bryant was therefore very low. And, as noted
above, the State presented strong evidence that Bryant shot El-
dridge unlawfully and with malice. Bryant was visibly upset
when speaking to the deputies prior to the shooting, intimated
there would be a shoot-out later in the day, left Chief Deputy Wal-
den’s office angry, and shot at Eldridge, who was unarmed, in re-
sponse to Eldridge’s greeting. In light of the low risk of prejudice




                                 23
from the autopsy photos and other, strong evidence of Bryant’s
guilt, Bryant has not established a reasonable probability that
the result of his trial would have been different had the photos
been excluded. This claim of ineffective assistance therefore fails.
See Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 190 (2016) (holding that Appel-
lant’s ineffective-assistance claim failed because the appellant
had not shown a reasonable probability that an objection to the
admission of autopsy photos would have changed the outcome of
his trial, among other reasons).
        (c) Bryant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the State’s alleged badgering of Ruby during
her cross-examination. But, as we explained in Division 5, the
State did not badger Ruby: the prosecutor repeated his questions
only until Ruby gave a responsive answer. And because an objec-
tion on witness-badgering grounds would have been meritless,
Bryant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. Red-
dick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 85 (2025) (explaining that trial counsel
cannot be constitutionally deficient for failing to make a meritless
objection).
       (d) In his last ineffective-assistance claim, Bryant argues
that his trial counsel was deficient for failing “to point to evidence
presented and not presented at trial in his closing argument” and
that this failure was prejudicial. We disagree.
       The record shows that Bryant’s trial counsel focused his
closing argument on the law of self-defense and the State’s bur-
den of proof. Because Bryant’s trial counsel was not asked about
his strategy with respect to his closing argument during the mo-
tion-for-new trial hearing, we presume his related actions were
strategic. Reddick, 321 Ga. at 86 (“In the absence of testimony to
the contrary, counsel’s actions are presumed strategic.”). And “de-
cisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for




                                 24
an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasona-
ble that no competent attorney would have followed such a
course.” Id. Here, trial counsel stressed that under the law of self-
defense, a person is justified in using lethal force to defend him-
self if the person reasonably believes that such force is necessary
to prevent imminent death and that the person does not neces-
sarily need to see a gun for his belief to be reasonable. Counsel
further explained the concept of reasonable doubt and told the
jury that the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Bryant did not act in self-defense. Counsel emphasized
that if the jury did not find the State had met its burden, it had a
duty to acquit him. Given the “wide latitude” permitted to trial
counsel during closing arguments, we cannot say counsel’s choice
to focus on the law of self-defense and the State’s burden of proof
was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would
have done the same. Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 298 (2021). As
such, this ineffective assistance claim fails.
       7. In his final claim of error, Bryant argues that the prose-
cutor improperly expressed his personal belief in Bryant’s guilt
during the State’s closing argument and that the trial court erred
by failing to rebuke the prosecutor. But because defense counsel
did not object at trial, Bryant’s claim is not preserved for ordinary
appellate review, and plain error review does not apply to state-
ments made during closing arguments. See Brock v. State, 319
Ga. 765, 772 (2024). This claim therefore presents nothing for us
to review. See id.
       8. Although Bryant does not raise any issues with his sen-
tences on appeal, we have identified two errors and exercise our
discretion to correct them. See Hood v. State, 315 Ga. 809, 813
(2023) (quoting Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (2017)). First, the
trial court purported to merge Bryant’s felony murder conviction




                                 25
(Count 2) into his malice murder conviction (Count 1), but Count
2 was instead vacated by operation of law. See Carter v. State, __
Ga. __, __ n.1 (Feb. 17, 2026) (citing Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49,
53 (2014)). Because this is a matter of nomenclature only and does
not affect Bryant’s sentence, we simply note that Count 2 was va-
cated by operation of law. See id. (citing Manner v. State, 302 Ga.
877, 890–91 (2017)). The second error is more significant, how-
ever: the trial court sentenced Bryant to 20 years in prison for the
aggravated assault of Eldridge (Count 3), even though that of-
fense merged as a matter of fact into Bryant’s conviction for mal-
ice murder. Where, as here, “there is no evidence to suggest the
occurrence of an aggravated assault [against the deceased victim]
independent of the act which caused th[at] victim’s death ... a
jury’s guilty verdict on the aggravated assault merges as a matter
of fact with the malice murder verdict for sentencing purposes.”
Hood, 315 Ga. at 813. Accordingly, we vacate Bryant’s conviction
and sentence for aggravated assault against Eldridge (Count 3). 9
        Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Jus-
tices concur, except Warren, P. J., not participating.




        9 We note that the “Sentence Summary” on Bryant’s final disposition
sheet states that “The Defendant is sentenced for a total of life without parole
plus 75 years.” (Capitalization altered). Because we vacate Bryant’s conviction
and 20-year sentence for aggravated assault as charged in Count 3, Bryant is
now sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus 55 years. Nothing
in this opinion should be read to preclude the trial court from taking any addi-
tional actions necessary to ensure that Bryant’s sentence is correctly reflected
on his final disposition sheet or other related documents and that his corrected
sentence is conveyed to the Department of Corrections. See OCGA § 17-10-1(f)
(providing that the sentencing court has jurisdiction “to correct” any sentence
“within 120 days after receipt by the sentencing court of the remittitur upon
affirmance of the judgment after direct appeal”).




                                      26