Edward Ball v. State

THIRD DIVISION
                                DILLARD, P. J.,
                             GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules



                                                                      April 30, 2026




In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A26A0516. BALL v. THE STATE.

      DILLARD, Presiding Judge.

      Following a jury trial, Edward Ball appeals numerous drug and firearm

convictions, challenging the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress

evidence seized from his home. More precisely, Ball argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress because (1) it improperly considered evidence outside

the four corners of the search-warrant affidavit; (2) the search warrant was overly

broad and lacked particularity as to the items to be searched for and seized; and (3) the

search-warrant affidavit did not suggest there were drugs in the location searched. For

the following reasons, we affirm.
      Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,1 the record shows2

that in 2019, William Nelson worked for the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Office and

was an agent assigned to the Cherokee Multi-Agency Narcotics Squad (“CMANS”).

The “purpose and goal” of CMANS was to “get dealers and suppliers of drugs off

the streets.” To this end, Nelson observed “numerous”drug transactions, sometimes

with the help of confidential informants. Specifically, he observed “hand-to-hand”

transactions at places like “cars, hotels, [and] houses ... .”




      1
          See, e.g., State v. Dykes, 345 Ga. App. 721, 721 (815 SE2d 106) (2018).
      2
        In reciting the relevant facts, Ball does not provide record citations to support
a majority of his factual allegations; and in the argument section of his brief, he
provides only two record citations—“Exhibit 52” generally (i.e., the search warrant
and four-page supporting affidavit) and a single page of the trial transcript. In the
absence of proper and sufficient citations to the record, this Court will not “cull the
record in search of evidence to support the contentions of parties.”Davis v. VCP S.,
LLC, 321 Ga. App. 503, 506 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). As a result, we glean
the factual background from the trial court’s order, the search-warrant affidavit, and
the suppression-hearing transcript. Indeed, when the alleged error “is shown only the
appellant’s brief and not by the record, we must assume that the trial court’s rulings
were correct.”Austell Healthcare v. Scott, 308 Ga. App. 393, 395(1) (707 SE2d 599)
(2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). And while we believe our independent
review of the record identified the evidence necessary to decide this appeal, we
caution that “if we have missed something in the record or misconstrued an
argument, the responsibility rests with [appellant’s] counsel.”Cawthon v. State, 350
Ga. App. 741, 743 (830 SE2d 270) (2019) (quotation marks omitted).
                                            2
          In April 2019, CMANS received a tip that Reginald Foster and another

individual were selling methamphetamine and heroin in Cherokee County. During an

investigation, undercover agents worked with a confidential informant to set up an

organized buy of 3.5 grams of methamphetamine from Foster on May 10, 2019.3 Foster

requested that the undercover agent pick him up at his home address and then take

him to his supplier. After the agent picked Foster up, they drove to the pool area at the

King’s Gate subdivision, where Foster met a black male in a white Honda Civic.

Foster then returned to the agent’s car with the requested 3.5 grams of

methamphetamine, as well as .3 grams of heroin.

      Later on, CMANS agents conducted surveillance of the King’s Gate

subdivision to locate the white Civic. The vehicle was “quickly” found at 300

Wauchula Way—a residence approximately 100 feet from the subdivision’s pool area.

A black Mercedes—which was registered to Ball at that address—was also found at

the house. After observing Ball’s driver’s license photo, agents determined that he

      3
        Although Agent Nelson was the “case agent” for the investigation into Ball
and the sole witness at the suppression hearing, he was not the undercover agent who
participated in the controlled buys from Foster, which are detailed below. It appears
the undercover agent purchasing drugs from Foster was Agent Justin Carder; but
during the hearing, Agent Nelson often referred to the undercover agent at issue
without naming Agent Carder.
                                            3
was the individual who provided the drugs to Foster during the controlled buy on May

10, 2019. Law enforcement also learned that Ball lived at the Wauchula Way residence

with a few other people.

      The undercover agents then set up a second controlled buy for May 17, 2019.

And once again, Foster requested that the same agent pick him up at his home and

take him to the King’s Gate subdivision’s pool area to meet his supplier. But this time,

CMANS agents also monitored several areas of the neighborhood and observed Ball

exit the Wauchula Way residence, enter his black Mercedes, and drive to the pool

area. After the agent and Foster arrived, Foster pointed to the black Mercedes and

told the agent that the individual in the car was his supplier. One of the agents

surveilling the area identified Ball as the driver and sole occupant of the car. Foster

exited the vehicle, entered the Mercedes, and a short time later, he returned with a

half ounce of methamphetamine and .3 grams of heroin. Agents then observed Ball

drive back to and enter the Wauchula Way residence. Ultimately, the undercover

agent confirmed that Ball was Foster’s supplier because the agent heard Foster’s side

of the conversation when he called Ball to buy drugs.




                                           4
      Undercover CMANS agents continued surveillance of Ball’s residence, the

pool area of his subdivision, and both the Honda Civic and Mercedes. During this

time, on a few occasions, agents observed both vehicles leave Ball’s residence and

drive to the subdivision’s pool area, where the drivers would meet with unidentified

individuals for a short amount of time and immediately return to the Wauchula Way

home. On one of those occasions in June 2019, agents performed a traffic stop of a

Buick after the driver had a brief interaction inside the white Civic and found the

driver in possession of .4 grams of heroin.

      As they continued their investigation, CMANS agents learned that Ball had

been arrested on June 26, 2019, for trafficking methamphetamine and was being held

in the Fulton County jail. The next day, Agent Nelson obtained a search warrant for

the 300 Wauchula Way residence, and along with other agents, executed it the same

day. During the search, CMANS agents discovered “trafficking amounts” of heroin

and methamphetamine, as well as Ball’s belongings. In fact, the search of Ball’s home

was the “largest heroin bust in Cherokee County to date[,]” and later, agents

determined that some of the heroin had been mixed with fentanyl. Agents also found

three firearms, cash, and drugs “packaged for sale.”


                                          5
      Ball was later charged, via indictment, with numerous drug and firearm

offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence found in his residence.4 After a hearing,

the trial court denied his motion. Although Ball was represented by counsel at the

hearing on his motion to suppress, he elected to represent himself at the jury trial.

Ultimately, Ball was convicted of eight charged offenses. This appeal—in which Ball

is represented by post-conviction counsel—follows.

      When the facts material to a motion to suppress are disputed, it is generally for

the trial judge to “resolve those disputes and determine the material facts.”5 In this

regard, our Supreme Court has “identified three corollaries of the principle, which

limit the scope of review in appeals from a grant or denial of a motion to suppress in




      4
         In total, Ball filed three motions to suppress evidence; but relevant here, he
sought to suppress the evidence found in the search of his home. Specifically, his first
motion merely requested a hearing. The second motion contended the evidence
should be suppressed because statements in the search-warrant affidavit were false.
And in his third, two-page motion, Ball listed several conclusory allegations as to why
the warrant was invalid. For ease of reference, we address his motions collectively as
a single motion to suppress evidence.
      5
       Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746(1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). Accord State v.
Brogan, 340 Ga. App. 232, 234 (797 SE2d 149) (2017).
                                           6
which the trial court has made express findings of disputed facts.”6 Specifically, an

appellate court must construe the evidentiary record “in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s factual findings and judgment[,] ... accept the trial court’s factual

findings unless they are clearly erroneous, ... and ... limit its consideration of the

disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court.”7 Finally, although we owe

“substantial deference to the way in which the trial court resolved disputed questions

of material fact, we owe no deference at all to the trial court with respect to questions

of law, and instead, we must apply the law ourselves to the material facts.”8 With

these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Ball’s specific claims of error.

      1. Ball first argues the trial court erred in improperly considering evidence

outside the four corners of the search-warrant affidavit in concluding there was

probable cause to authorize the search of his home. We disagree.




      6
       Serdula v. State, 356 Ga. App. 94, 107(3) (845 SE2d 362) (2020). Accord
Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746(1).
      7
        Westbrook v. State, 308 Ga. 92, 96(2) (839 SE2d 620) (2020) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). Accord Serdula, 356 Ga. App. at 107(3).
      8
          Hughes, 296 Ga. at 750(2). Accord Serdula, 356 Ga. App. at 107(3).
                                           7
      Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (as well as its

equivalent provision in the Georgia Constitution),9 a search warrant “may issue only

upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has

been committed.”10 And when the judge who issues a warrant determines whether

probable cause exists, they must

      make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
      circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [them], including the
      “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
      information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
      crime will be found in a particular place.11


      9
        See U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. . . .”). See also GA. CONST. Art. 1, Sec. 1, Par. XIII (“The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or
places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”).
      10
        State v. Yearwood-Cabbel, 370 Ga. App. 471, 476(1) (897 SE2d 876) (2024)
(footnote and quotation marks omitted). Accord Whitfield v. State, 337 Ga. App. 167,
169 (786 SE2d 547) (2016); State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 77 (673 SE2d 237) (2009).
      11
        Bibbs v. State, 375 Ga. App. 308, 313–14(2)(a) (915 SE2d 918) (2025). Accord
Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 57, 60(2) (810 SE2d 113) (2018). See, e.g., Pugh v. State, 318
Ga. 706, 714(2)(a) (899 SE2d 653) (2024) (“Considering the totality of the
circumstances outlined in the affidavit, the magistrate was authorized to make certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior, and infer that [defendant] was
                                            8
Our duty, then, is to review the issuing judge’s decision and “determine whether

there was a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the

search warrant.”12 And as a reviewing court, we must give “substantial deference to

the finding of probable cause.”13 Moreover, the test for probable cause is “not a

hypertechnical one to be employed by legal technicians, but is based on the factual and

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.”14

So, in making this determination, the judge “may draw reasonable inferences from the




somehow involved in [victim’s] murder, that evidence of his location and
communications in the time surrounding the murder might be found in his cell phone
records, and that the target phone number belonged to [defendant].” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)).
      12
        Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 314(2)(a) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Taylor,
303 Ga. at 60(2).
      13
         Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 314(2)(a) (quotation marks omitted). See Taylor, 303
Ga. at 60(2) (“A magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of
probable cause is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.” (quotation
marks omitted)).
      14
        Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 314(2)(a) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Taylor,
303 Ga. at 60–61(2).
                                          9
material supplied by applicants for a warrant.”15 Significantly, even doubtful cases

should “be resolved in favor of upholding a warrant.”16

      Here, Ball argues the trial court erred in improperly considering evidence

outside the four corners of the search-warrant affidavit in concluding there was

probable cause to search his home.17 In the search warrant, the magistrate noted that

oral testimony was not “considered[,] received[,] or recorded.” And when a

magistrate’s finding of probable cause is based solely on an officer’s affidavit, we

“focus on the information set forth within the four corners of the affidavit.”18 Indeed,

when the magistrate “only considered the evidence in the warrant applications in



      15
        Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 314(2)(a) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Taylor,
303 Ga. at 61(2).
      16
        Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 314(2)(a) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Taylor,
303 Ga. at 61(2).
      17
         Ball provides no record citations to support his numerous factual allegations
related to this claim of error—not even to the search warrant, the supporting affidavit,
or to the specific evidence he contends the trial court improperly considered. We
reiterate that this Court will not “cull the record in search of evidence to support the
contentions of parties.” Davis, 321 Ga. App. at 506 (quotation marks omitted).
      18
        State v. Haynes, 373 Ga. App. 154, 155(1) (907 SE2d 222) (2024) (quotation
marks omitted). Accord Coleman v. State, 337 Ga. App. 304, 306(1) (787 SE2d 274)
(2016).
                                          10
issuing the search warrants, our analysis is confined to the four corners of those

documents.”19

      Ball alleges that several critical facts “connecting [his residence] to the drug

deals were cited in the [trial court’s] order [that] are nowhere in the affidavit.” And

then—without citing to the record—Ball lists factual statements he contends were not

contained in the search-warrant affidavit but were mentioned in the trial court’s order.

This claim is belied by the record. For example, Ball notes that none of the drug deals

took place at his home, and he was never seen taking drugs in or out of the house; but

the court’s order never mentions that drug deals took place inside his home or that he

was seen taking drugs. Instead, the court merely noted that the magistrate court had

evidence that Ball was “supplying drugs out of his home.”20 Ball also contends that,

in the affidavit, there was “no recitation of ‘training and experience’ establishing that

persons involved in these types of hand[-]to[-]hand drug deals might keep quantities

of drugs in their homes.” But in the search-warrant affidavit, Agent Nelson detailed

his extensive experience in drug-related investigations, including his time working


      19
       Landers v. State, 355 Ga. App. 69, 72 (842 SE2d 525) (2020) (quotation marks
omitted). Accord State v. Perez, 349 Ga. App. 707, 709 (824 SE 2d 804) (2019).
      20
           (Emphasis added).
                                           11
with the Cherokee County narcotics squad; and he averred that, in his view, there was

probable cause to show there were illegal drugs inside Ball’s residence.21

      Simply put, Ball has identified no factual statements in the trial court’s order

denying his motion to suppress that are materially different from the facts Agent

Nelson included in the search-warrant affidavit. And importantly, harm as well as

error “must be established by an appellant in order to secure a reversal of his

conviction.”22 In sum, given our significant deference to the trial court’s probable-

cause determination (which should be upheld even in doubtful cases),23 Ball has not

established that the trial court improperly considered evidence outside the four




      21
         The trial court’s order included a single sentence regarding Agent Nelson’s
experience, noting Nelson stated that, in his experience, Ball’s behavior was indicative
of the distribution of illegal drugs. We are unconvinced this statement is materially
different from the information included in his affidavit.
      22
          Newsome v. State, 287 Ga. App. 356, 358 (651 SE2d 764) (2007). See Madison
v. State, 281 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b) (641 SE2d 789) (2007) (“[H]arm as well as error must
be shown to authorize a reversal by this [C]ourt. When a plaintiff in error brings a case
here, he must show error which has hurt him. This [C]ourt is not an expounder of
theoretical law, but it administers practical law, and corrects only such errors as have
practically wronged the complaining party.” (quotation marks omitted)).
      23
           See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
                                           12
corners of the search-warrant affidavit. And even if we assume the trial court did so,

Ball cannot show that he was harmed.

      2. Ball next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence because the search warrant was overly broad and lacked particularity as to

the items to be searched and seized. Again, we disagree.

      Ball filed several motions to suppress evidence obtained from his home; and in

one of them, he included a single conclusory sentence that the search warrant lacked

particularity. Ball never claimed—either in writing or at the suppression hearing—that

the search warrant was overly broad. And Ball made no further mention of these

allegations before or during trial, much less provide a legal argument to support them.

      As we have explained, a constitutional challenge “may not be raised for the first

time in a motion for new trial.”24 Indeed, in challenging a trial court’s denial of a

motion to suppress, a defendant “may not argue on appeal grounds that he did not

argue (and obtain a ruling on) below.”25 Still, even when a defendant does not move


      24
       Maxwell v. State, 367 Ga. App. 302, 306(1) (885 SE2d 39) (2023) (quotation
marks omitted).
      25
         Maxwell, 367 Ga. App. at 306(1) (quotation marks omitted). In its order
denying Ball’s motion for a new trial, the trial court only addressed what it considered
to be the “crux” of his argument, which was that law enforcement lacked probable
                                           13
to suppress the search warrant “based on particularity [or overbreadth], [the] claim

must be reviewed on appeal under the plain-error standard.”26 And as our Supreme

Court has explained, there are four prongs to consider when applying plain-error

analysis:

      First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of a deviation from a
      legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned,
      i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must
      be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the
      error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the
      ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome
      of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three
      prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the
      error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously
      affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
      proceedings.27


cause to seek a search warrant for his home.
      26
         Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 494(2) (883 SE2d 733) (2023). See Goins v.
State, 310 Ga. 199, 204(4) (850 SE2d 68) (2020) (reviewing the admissibility of
evidence obtained during a search of a cell phone for plain error when trial counsel
failed to obtain a ruling on a motion to suppress or object when the evidence was
admitted during the trial).
      27
          State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32(2)(a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (quoting Puckett v.
United States, 556 U.S. 129(II)(a) (29 SCt 1423, 173 LE2d 266) (2009)). See Roundtree
v. State, 358 Ga. App. 140, 145–46(2) (854 SE2d 340) (2021) (“[R]eversal based on
                                          14
       Turning to this case, Ball argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because the language in the search warrant was overly broad. In this respect,

our Supreme Court has explained that “a warrant suffering from overbreadth

describes in both specific and inclusive generic terms what is to be seized, but it

authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no probable cause.”28 So, even if

the search warrant were overly broad (which we doubt), Ball must still show he was

harmed by it.29 And here, Ball has not identified any specific items seized as a result

of the allegedly overly broad nature of the search warrant. Instead, he appears to


plain error is authorized only if the instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious,
the [error] likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”(quotation
marks omitted)).
      28
         Pugh, 318 Ga. at 718(2)(c). See United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four
Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents ($92,422.57), 307 F3d 137,
149(IV)(A) (3d Cir. 2002) (“An overly broad warrant describes in both specific and
inclusive generic terms what is to be seized, but it authorizes the seizure of items as
to which there is no probable cause.” (quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
      29
         See Serdula, 356 Ga. App. at 113(3)(b) n.77 (holding that even if a search
warrant is overly broad, a defendant must still show he was harmed by it); Johnson v.
State, 320 Ga. App. 231, 235(3) (739 SE2d 718) (2013) (“[E]ven if the warrant could
be so construed as authorizing an overly broad seizure, [the defendant] has failed to
show that any such broader seizure occurred and thus has failed to show any harm.”).
See also West v. State, 300 Ga. App. 583, 584–85(1) (685 SE2d 486) (2009) (“In order
to constitute reversible error, there must be harm as well as error.”).
                                           15
primarily take issue, generally, with the warrant authorizing the search and seizure of

financial records and cell-phone data. Setting aside that the warrant limited seizure of

those items only to the extent they concerned “the secreting of drug proceeds and/or

drug transactions[,]” Ball has not identified any incriminating evidence gleaned from

a search of his cell phone’s data or financial records. As a result, he has not shown any

harm by the potential overbreadth of the search warrant, which is required under

plain-error review.30

      Even so, Ball also maintains the search warrant was unconstitutional because

it lacked sufficient particularity. The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and




      30
          See Pugh, 318 Ga. at 719(2)(c) (“Assuming without deciding that [the
defendant] is correct that the warrant was overbroad in the respects he contends, his
claim nonetheless fails on the third prong of plain error review because he has not
shown harm from the inclusion of the allegedly overbroad portions of the warrant.”);
Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 318(2)(b) (upholding the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence when, even assuming the search warrant was overly
broad, there was no evidence that an improperly broad search occurred); State v.
Santiago, 371 Ga. App. 720, 726(c) (902 SE2d 715) (2024) (“There is nothing to
indicate that a broader seizure in fact occurred in this case and thus nothing to indicate
any harm. Indeed, where a search as it was actually conducted is lawful, it is not
rendered invalid merely because the warrant pursuant to which it was made was
overbroad.” (quotation marks omitted)).
                                           16
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized.”31 In

this respect, we have explained that “although a warrant cannot leave the

determination of what articles fall within its description and are to be seized entirely

to the judgment and opinion of the officer executing the warrant, the degree of

specificity in the description is flexible and will vary with the circumstances

involved.”32 And the “particularity requirement” only demands that “the executing

officer be able to identify the property sought with reasonable certainty.”33 Simply put,

in addition to “requiring that officers have enough guidance to locate and seize only

those items the warrant authorizes them to seize, this particularity requirement also

prevents general searches—that general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings




      31
        Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 316(2)(b). Accord U.S. Const. Amend. IV. See also Ga.
Const. Art. I, § I, ¶ XIII (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.”).
      32
         Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 316–17(2)(b). Accord Serdula, 356 Ga. App. at
111(3)(b).
      33
        Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 317(2)(b) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Serdula,
356 Ga. App. at 111–12(3)(b).
                                            17
by the government that has been rejected since the founding as a violation of

fundamental rights.”34

      Here, contrary to Ball’s assertions, the search warrant was extremely detailed

as to the items to be searched and potentially seized in his home, all of which related

to what appeared to be his participation in drug trafficking. Indeed, the search warrant

specified the following items to be searched and seized:

      Controlled substances, specifically heroin, methamphetamine and any
      other controlled substances, weapons, U.S. currency, receipts of sale,
      packaging materials, scales and materials used in the manufacturing,
      cultivation[,] and distribution of illegal drugs. As well as financial
      documents, bank records, investment records, checking and savings
      account records, receipts of purchases and other financial documents, as
      well as cell phones and cell phone records, text and voice mail messages
      pertaining to secreting of drug proceeds and/or drug transactions.35

      34
         State v. Wilson, 315 Ga. 613, 614 (884 SE2d 298) (2023) (citation and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Accord State v. Black, 370 Ga. App. 18,
24(2) (893 SE2d 517) (2023).
      35
         (Emphasis added). See Civil v. State, 375 Ga. App. 31, 34–35(1) (912 SE2d
709) (2025) (holding that a search warrant satisfied the particularity requirement
when it sought electronic data but concluded by stating that officers were limited to
searching for evidence that the particular crime at issue had been or was being
committed). Cf. Wilson, 315 Ga. at 615 (holding that a search warrant did not satisfy
the particularity requirement when it “broadly authorize[d] the seizure of any and all
stored electronic information on the phones, including but not limited to various kinds
                                           18
      In a single paragraph, Ball claims the warrant failed to satisfy the particularity

requirement because there was no limiting language in the search warrant. But as

shown above, the warrant expressly provided that the items to be searched and seized

must relate to the suspected crimes at issue—secreting of drug proceeds and drug

transactions. Other than this bare, inaccurate allegation, Ball fails to present any

cogent legal argument that the search warrant was unconstitutional based on a lack of

particularity. As a result, Ball has abandoned any argument that the search warrant

lacked sufficient particularity.36

      3. Lastly, Ball argues the trial court erred in finding there was probable cause to

support the issuance of the search warrant when the accompanying affidavit did not

suggest drugs would be found in his home. This claim is likewise without merit.




of electronic information” (quotation marks omitted)).
      36
         See Gunn v. State, 342 Ga. App. 615, 623–24(3) (804 SE2d 118) (2017)
(explaining that “mere conclusory statements are not the type of meaningful argument
contemplated by our rules” (quotation marks omitted); Brittain v. State, 329 Ga. App.
689, 704(4)(a) (766 SE2d 106) (2014) (explaining that an appellant must support
enumerations of error with argument and citation of authority, and “mere conclusory
statements are not the type of meaningful argument contemplated by our rules”
(quotation marks omitted)).
                                           19
      In support of this argument, Ball attempts to distinguish this case from several

others in which this Court found there was probable cause to support a search of a

residence based on “trash pulls” at or near the residence in which law enforcement

found evidence that drugs would be located inside. But Ball provides no legal authority

suggesting that evidence other than trash pulls can never provide probable cause to

support a search of a residence. As detailed above, Agent Nelson stated that two

cars—one of which was registered to Ball at the residence searched—drove to and

from his home and the pool area of the subdivision, where Foster and others

purchased drugs from the cars’ occupants. Ball was identified as Foster’s dealer, and

those transactions occurred regularly. So, we reject Ball’s implicit suggestion that the

search warrant lacked probable cause merely because it was not based on evidence

obtained from trash near his residence.

      And while Ball argues there was no probable cause to search his home because

the agents never observed drugs coming in or out of his home, the magistrate judge

was permitted to make “a practical, common-sense decision . . . , given all the

circumstances . . . , [that] there [was] a fair probability that contraband or evidence of




                                           20
a crime [would] be found in [his home].37 So, because Ball left his home immediately

before each drug transaction took place at the pool area inside of his car and then

immediately returned home, we are persuaded the circumstances suggest there was

a fair probability drugs would be found in the residence.

      For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Ball’s motion to

suppress evidence.

      Judgment affirmed. Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ., concur.




      37
           Bibbs, 375 Ga. App. at 314(2)(a).
                                               21