Ellison v. State

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official text of the opinion.




                                                    In the
                               Supreme Court of Georgia
                                              No. S26A0752
                                            Deon Altron Ellison
                                                    v.
                                                The State

                             On Appeal from the Superior Court of Hall County
                                           No. 23CR1109APP

                                            Decided: April 21, 2026


                      PETERSON, Chief Justice.
                    Deon Altron Ellison appeals his convictions for felony
             murder and a firearm offense, stemming from the 2023 shooting
             death of his cousin, Jeremiah James Bonds. 1 Ellison argues that
             the trial court erred in denying him a new trial because (1) the
             verdicts were inconsistent, and (2) the State engaged in various
             forms of misconduct regarding its handling of a witness. He also


                      1 The crimes were committed in the early morning of August 4, 2023.
             On August 30, 2023, a Hall County grand jury returned an indictment
             charging Ellison with malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated
             assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission
             of a felony. At a trial from October 29 to November 1, 2024, a jury acquitted
             Ellison of malice murder but found him guilty of the other charges. On
             November 4, 2024, the trial court sentenced Ellison to life in prison for felony
             murder and a consecutive sentence of five years of probation for the firearm
             count; the aggravated assault count merged. Trial counsel filed a timely motion
             for new trial, which was amended by trial counsel in April 2025. Following a
             hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on December 11,
             2025. Ellison filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this
             Court’s April 2026 term of court and submitted for consideration on the briefs.
argues that the trial court erred by (3) improperly restricting voir
dire and (4) denying a motion for mistrial based on improper
closing argument by the State. We conclude that (1) any
inconsistencies among the verdicts do not present a basis for
reversal, (2) Ellison failed to make the requisite showing of
prosecutorial misconduct, (3) the claim about voir dire is not
preserved, and (4) neither is the claim that the trial court erred
in denying a mistrial over the State’s closing argument. We
affirm.
       In the early morning hours of August 4, 2023, Ellison,
Bonds, and Ellison’s girlfriend Brittney Lawrence were travelling
together in Ellison’s car from the Atlanta area towards
Gainesville, where Ellison lived. Bonds was driving. As the
vehicle exited I-985 at Exit 24 in Hall County, Ellison fatally shot
Bonds in the back of the head while Bonds was still sitting in the
driver’s seat with his seat belt on, his foot on the gas pedal, and a
gun magazine in his pocket. Ellison fled the scene and was
apprehended without incident later that day.
       Ellison admitted to officers that he shot Bonds and gave
various explanations for the shooting, including that he had acted
because he was in fear for his life. Ellison argued self-defense at
trial and testified in his own defense. According to Ellison’s
testimony, in the days leading up to the shooting, Bonds’s
behavior and comments became increasingly concerning, as he
said he put “hits” on and robbed people. Ellison found Bonds with
Ellison’s gun more than once, including on the day leading up the
shooting, at which point Bonds had the gun’s standard magazine
in his hand. Driving to Hall County, Bonds drove erratically,
ignored a request to stop the vehicle or let Ellison drive, and at
one point said, “I’m gonna show you murder.” Bonds did not stop
at the exit he was supposed to use to let himself out, instead




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traveling to the exit where he was ultimately shot by Ellison,
about a mile and a half from Ellison’s family’s home. As they got
off the exit, Ellison testified, Ellison asked Bonds to let him out of
the vehicle so the two could “squash it,” but Bonds refused to stop
and let Ellison out. Bonds told Ellison, “I’m finna put this rocket
on you, just wait and see.” When he shot Bonds, Ellison claimed,
he feared for his life and Lawrence’s safety and believed that he
was being taken to an unknown location against his will. On
cross-examination, Ellison acknowledged that Bonds had not
pointed a gun at him, that Bonds was not in possession of a gun
at the time of the shooting, and that Bonds was actively driving
the vehicle when Ellison shot him in the back of the head.
       Ellison’s girlfriend, Lawrence, told a different story at trial.
She testified during the State’s case-in-chief that, although she
was uncomfortable with Bonds’s driving style, because he was
“kind of swerving a little” and “on a race,” she otherwise did not
feel in danger until Ellison shot Bonds. Lawrence asked Ellison
to take over driving, but Ellison told her to let Bonds drive, and
she never heard Ellison ask Bonds to let him drive. At one point
on the drive, she said, Bonds called Ellison a “dumbass,” which
caused Ellison’s demeanor to change. The two men began
arguing, with Ellison asking Bonds for “respect,” and Bonds
saying that Ellison was trying to impress his girlfriend. At some
point, Ellison reached between the driver’s seat and the center
console and retrieved a gun; Lawrence heard the gun make a
“cha-cha” sound before Ellison placed it on the floorboard.
Lawrence testified that Ellison shot Bonds while Bonds was
facing forward and driving, after Bonds repeatedly failed to
respond to Ellison.
      1.     Ellison argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because the verdicts were legally inconsistent. We disagree.




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      Ellison was charged with malice murder, felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated assault, as well
as a firearm count. Both the felony murder and aggravated
assault counts alleged assault by use of a deadly weapon by firing
a handgun at Bonds. The jury was instructed on justification and
voluntary manslaughter. The jury acquitted Ellison of malice
murder but convicted him of felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault, declining the option on the verdict form to
find Ellison guilty of voluntary manslaughter as an offense
included within malice murder and felony murder.
       Ellison appears to argue that, based on this record, the jury
needed to find essentially the same intent as to malice murder,
felony murder, and aggravated assault, such that an acquittal on
malice murder is inconsistent with verdicts of guilty as to felony
murder and aggravated assault. But this Court abolished the
inconsistent verdicts rule in Georgia decades ago, “based on the
principle that it is not generally within the trial court’s power to
make inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about
the reasons for any inconsistency between guilty and not guilty
verdicts.” Dugger v. State, 297 Ga. 120, 122 (2015) (cleaned up).
We have said that repugnant verdicts of conviction must be
vacated, but repugnant verdicts occur only when, “in order to find
the defendant not guilty on one count and guilty on another, the
jury must make affirmative findings shown on the record that
cannot logically or legally exist at the same time.” Feder v. State,
319 Ga. 66, 68 (2024); see also Turner v. State, 283 Ga. 17, 19–21
(2008) (reversing felony murder and aggravated assault
convictions where jury in acquitting on malice murder charge
expressly found on jury verdict form that the appellant had been




                                 4
justified in his action). 2
        Here, the jury made no such affirmative finding of
justification, and it did not exercise the option to find Ellison
guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of malice murder.
Although Ellison suggests that the jury’s acquittal on malice
murder may mean that it necessarily found that he was justified
in his actions, “we cannot know and should not speculate why a
jury acquitted on one offense and convicted on another offense.
The reason could be an error by the jury in its consideration or it
could be mistake, compromise or lenity.” Feder, 319 Ga. at 69
(cleaned up).
       2.      Ellison argues that the State engaged in various
forms of misconduct in its handling of the testimony of Lawrence,
Ellison’s girlfriend. Specifically, Ellison argues that the State (a)
knowingly presented and failed to correct false and misleading
testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959), 3 (b)
engaged in improper mid-trial contact with Lawrence, and (c)
suppressed impeachment evidence regarding that meeting in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963). We conclude
that the trial court did not err in denying Ellison’s request for a
new trial on these grounds.


        2 The United States Supreme Court has decided that under the federal
Double Jeopardy Clause, only the verdicts of conviction may be vacated under
our repugnant-verdict doctrine; the verdicts of acquittal must stand. See
McElrath v. State, 319 Ga. 539, 540 & n.2 (2024) (citing McElrath v. Georgia,
601 US 87, 96–98 (2024)). Whether that warrants reconsideration of our
repugnant-verdict doctrine altogether is an important question that does not
arise here, as the verdicts are not repugnant, and no party has asked us to
reconsider that doctrine.
        3 Ellison also states in his briefing on appeal that the State’s actions in
this regard violated “Georgia Law,” but he makes no independent argument
about Georgia law.




                                        5
       Early in Lawrence’s trial testimony, when the prosecutor
asked Lawrence what had happened right before Bonds called
Ellison a “dumbass,” Lawrence, crying, stated that she couldn’t
remember, at which point the trial court asked Lawrence if she
needed a break, and she said yes. Lawerence’s direct testimony
continued following the break, with Lawrence testifying about
Ellison and Bonds arguing about respect and Ellison shooting
Bonds after Bonds failed to respond to Ellison. During discussion
of a defense objection to a question the prosecution posed to
Lawrence, defense counsel suggested that Lawrence was
“emotional” because earlier in the week the State had played for
her recorded jail calls between Ellison and another woman “to
turn her and piss her off[.]” In response, the prosecutor said, “I
didn’t play any jail calls”; the trial court cut off defense counsel’s
attempt to inquire further.
       At the outset of cross-examining Lawrence, defense counsel
asked her about a meeting with the prosecution over the break in
her testimony. Lawrence initially appeared to acknowledge that
she remembered more after the break in her testimony, saying, “I
had to refresh my memory.” Asked whether that occurred “after
meeting with [the prosecutor] in her office,” Lawrence said, “No,”
but then stated she had met with the prosecutor, albeit not “in
her office.” Lawrence testified that “[n]obody” refreshed her
recollection and “[n]obody in the district attorney’s office” told her
what to say, explaining that she remembered more because, “I
would sit and think.” Additionally, when asked by defense counsel
whether Lawrence had called Ellison the prior week and told him
“about recorded jail calls that you heard that were played to you
by the prosecutor’s office,” Lawrence replied, “Nothing was played
to me.” Asked how she knew of the calls, Lawrence responded that
“[t]hey were told to [her]” by the trial prosecutor.




                                  6
       Later, in the middle of the defense case, the defense
announced that it was “making a motion for a Napue violation”
based on allegedly false testimony by Lawrence that, in defense
counsel’s words, she had “no clue what recorded calls we were
talking about.” The trial court indicated it would take up the
matter later. The matter was discussed further during the charge
conference, with the trial court rejecting the defense’s request to
instruct the jury that the State knew that Lawrence had given
false testimony such that Lawrence’s testimony would be stricken
from the record. After the verdicts but before sentencing, Ellison
made a “Motion for Mistrial and [Judgment] Notwithstanding
[the] Verdict” 4 based on grounds of both inconsistent verdicts and
prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel argued that the State
had allowed Lawrence to testify falsely as to her knowledge of the
recorded calls in violation of Napue; engaged in “tampering with
witnesses,” apparently by meeting with Lawrence in the middle
of her testimony; and violated Brady by failing to turn over to the
defense the contents of that mid-testimony conversation. Defense
counsel introduced as a record exhibit a recording of a
conversation between Lawrence and Ellison in which she
apparently referenced romantic conversations between Ellison
and other women and reminded Ellison that his jail calls are
recorded. The trial court denied the motions, saying the Napue
and Brady claims had “already been addressed several times[.]”
        In his motion for new trial, Ellison continued to argue that
the State had violated Napue and Brady and engaged in
“tampering with a witness.” In addition to alleging that Lawrence
testified falsely about jail calls between Ellison and other women,


       4 A defendant cannot obtain a mistrial after a verdict is returned. See
Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 90 (2020), disapproved on other grounds by Clark
v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 435 & n.16 (2023).




                                     7
the motion alleged that Lawrence testified falsely about meeting
with the prosecution over the break in her testimony. 5 At the
motion for new trial hearing, Ellison introduced into evidence
courthouse surveillance video of the two trial prosecutors and two
other people entering a probation room during the day that
Lawrence testified at trial and then leaving together about 10
minutes later. 6 In its order denying the motion for new trial, the
trial court found that Ellison had “failed to establish the fact of
any false testimony from Ms. Lawrence as to the subjects he
raises in his amended motion for new trial” and that “the Court
cannot find upon the record before it that the State knowingly
elicited materially false testimony, nor that the State failed in its
duty to correct it.” The trial court found that Ellison could “not
show that the prosecution discussed [Lawrence’s] testimony nor
attempted to influence her statement in any way[,]” finding that
“[a]ny change in the witness’s demeanor can be just as readily
attributed to the change in the positioning of the podium during
questioning,7 and any alleged inconsistencies in the witness’s
statements were allowed to be explored through cross-
examination.” The trial court also found that, “as there has been


       5 The motion also alleged that Lawrence testified falsely in other
respects not pursued on appeal.
        6 It is not clear that the time of this meeting shown on the video
corresponded with the time of Lawrence’s testimony, but that was not raised
at the motion for new trial hearing.
        7 In his brief to this Court, the District Attorney recounts that when
Lawrence retook the witness stand after the break in her testimony, counsel
for the State had moved the podium so that Lawrence’s “gaze would be away
from” the defendant and the people in the gallery. The transcript merely
reflects that the trial prosecutor stated, “I’m going to stand over here,” the
defense objected that the prosecutor was blocking the jury’s view of the
witness, and the trial court overruled the objection, saying, “She’s not in the
way.”




                                      8
no showing that the witness made any material statement during
her time in the hallway conference room, the Court cannot find
any statement that was required to have been provided to the
defense. As such, the State did not violate any such duty to
disclose such information to Defense or to the Court.”
        (a) Under Napue, “a conviction obtained through use of
false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State,
must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” 360 US at 269.
“To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show that the
prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly
allowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared.” Glossip v.
Oklahoma, 604 US 226, 246 (2025) (cleaned up). “Even if a
defendant makes this showing, a new trial is warranted only if
the false testimony may have had an effect on the outcome of the
trial[,] that is, if it in any reasonable likelihood could have
affected the judgment of the jury.” Hart v. State, 322 Ga. 1, 18
(2025) (cleaned up). Additionally, we note that “the trial court’s
findings of fact on motion for new trial are upheld unless clearly
erroneous.” Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 850 (2019) (quotation
marks omitted).
       On appeal, Ellison claims two instances of false testimony
by Lawrence. First, he argues that “Lawrence denied having been
shown or told about recorded jail calls involving” Ellison. Second,
he argues that Lawrence “denied having any mid-trial contact
with the prosecution during a break in her testimony.” But the
trial court found that Ellison “has failed to establish the fact of
any false testimony from [] Lawrence as to the[se] subjects[.]” We
cannot say that finding is clearly erroneous, because the record
does not support Ellison’s characterization of Lawrence’s
testimony as including denials that she met with the prosecution
on a break and that the prosecutor had told her about recorded




                                9
jail calls involving Ellison. Asked at trial about “recorded jail
calls,” Lawrence replied, “Nothing was played to me.” But asked
how she knew of the calls, Lawrence indicated that the prosecutor
had told her about them. And although Lawrence initially gave a
response that suggested that she had not met with the prosecutor
on a break in the prosecutor’s office, she then clarified that she
had met with the prosecutor, albeit not “in her office.” Therefore,
Ellison’s Napue claim is without merit. See Strother, 305 Ga. at
850–51 (Napue claim without merit where record supported the
trial court’s finding that witness did not testify falsely).
       (b) Although Ellison includes in his enumerations of error
an argument that the prosecution’s contact with Lawrence during
trial was itself “improper,” he has not met his burden to show
reversible error on this basis, either. Citing Geders v. United
States, 425 US 80 (1976), Ellison argues that “[i]mproper
influence or coaching of a witness during testimony may implicate
due process concerns.” (Emphasis supplied.) 8 But he offers no
specific argument, let alone authority, that the prosecution’s
actions in meeting with Lawrence here provide a basis for
reversal.
       It is true that “[a]n attorney must respect the important
ethical distinction between discussing testimony and seeking
improperly to influence it.” Geders, 425 US at 90 n.3, quoted in
Glossip, 604 US at 251 n.9. But whether a prosecutor improperly
coaches a witness is a question of fact. See Jones v. State, 302 Ga.
488, 494 (2017). And here the trial court specifically found that


       8 Geders involved facts very different from those presented here. See
425 US at 91 (holding that order preventing criminal defendant from
consulting with his lawyer “about anything” during an overnight recess
impinged on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, while stating “we do not
deal with limitations imposed in other circumstances”).




                                    10
Ellison did not “show that the prosecution discussed her
testimony nor attempted to influence her statement in any way.”
Rather, the trial court found that “the witness was taken to a
conference room in the courthouse hallway to regain her
composure during [] emotional testimony.” The trial court also
found that “[a]ny change” in Lawrence’s demeanor “can be just as
readily attributed to the change in the positioning of the podium
during questioning” and “any alleged inconsistencies” in
Lawrence’s testimony “were allowed to be explored through cross-
examination.” We cannot say the trial court’s findings in this
regard were clearly erroneous on this record. On appeal, Ellison
does not point to any particular way in which Lawrence’s
testimony changed after the break to give rise to an inference of
improper influence; he merely states that counsel “proffered” at
trial material changes in Lawrence’s testimony, while citing to a
portion of the transcript that does not contain such allegations. It
is not obvious from the transcript that Lawrence’s testimony
changed in a material way after the break, and her testimony was
that “[n]obody” in the DA’s office told her what to say. Therefore,
any claim that the prosecution improperly coached Lawrence
during a break fails. See Jones, 302 Ga. at 494 (no abuse of
discretion in denying a mistrial, where there was sufficient
evidence to support trial court’s finding regarding witness
coaching).
       (c) Ellison also appears to suggest that the State may have
violated Brady 9 when it did not disclose the prosecution’s meeting
with Lawrence during her testimony. To prevail on a Brady claim,

        9 Ellison appears to back away from this claim both in a “Corrected
Brief” that he filed before the State filed its responsive briefing and more
explicitly in his Reply Brief, stating in his Reply Brief that he is not actually
making a “freestanding Brady claim” but merely “preserves the issue as a
credibility problem[.]”




                                      11
a defendant must show that (1) the State possessed evidence
favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the
favorable evidence and could not obtain it himself with any
reasonable diligence; (3) the State suppressed the favorable
evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would
have been different. Anglin v. State, 312 Ga. 503, 510 (2021). “In
the case of an untimely disclosure, a defendant must show that
an earlier disclosure would have benefited the defense and that
the delayed disclosure deprived him of a fair trial.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). “On appeal, a trial court’s factual findings on a
Brady claim are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard,
and its application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.”
Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 863 (2021).
       To the extent that Ellison argues that the State violated
Brady merely by failing to disclose the fact of its meeting with
Lawrence in the middle of her testimony, it is obvious that
defense counsel was aware of, or suspected, the existence of the
meeting itself, as he asked Lawrence about it at the start of cross-
examination, and she confirmed that the meeting happened. To
the extent that Ellison argues that the State somehow should
have informed defense counsel of this meeting prior to defense
counsel learning of it, he has not even argued how this delay
deprived him of a fair trial. And to the extent Ellison argues on
appeal that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose some
material statement that Lawrence made in her meeting with
prosecutors, the trial court found in its order denying the motion
for new trial that “there has been no showing that [Lawrence]
made any material statement during her time in the hallway
conference room[.]” In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
cannot say that finding is clearly erroneous. Thus, Ellison’s Brady
claim fails.




                                12
       3. Ellison argues that the trial court erred by improperly
restricting voir dire. This claim is not preserved.
        Prior to voir dire, the parties each gave the trial court
written proposed voir dire questions, although the proposals
apparently were not filed and are not in the record. The parties
briefly discussed the defense’s proposed questions with the trial
court, referring to the proposals by number. Although the exact
wording of the proposed questions is not contained in the record,
the discussions surrounding them suggests that they generally
concerned defense counsel’s desire to get background knowledge
about the jurors, including relationships with their families, and
to ensure that jurors understood that a person was not guilty of
murder simply by virtue of having killed someone. For several
questions the trial court ruled that it would not allow them,
soliciting the State’s input. Ellison did not make
contemporaneous objections to any of the trial court’s rulings as
to these questions prior to voir dire. And when the trial court
sustained the State’s objection in the midst of voir dire to a
question proposed by Ellison, asking something along the lines of
whether “anybody has ever been in a situation where they were
put in danger or stuck in that situation,” defense counsel stated
that he was “okay” with the trial court’s ruling.
       Ellison now argues that the trial court erred by restricting
voir dire. But Ellison’s claim is not preserved for review. Ellison
does not cite any objection on his part to a ruling by the trial court
as to proposed voir dire questions. And the transcript of the trial
court’s colloquy with the parties about the parties’ proposed
questions prior to voir dire does not reveal any instance in which
Ellison objected to any of the rulings of the trial court disallowing
certain questions proposed by the defense. Although there was a
later instance during voir dire in which the parties put on the




                                 13
record information about a side-bar discussion about a particular
question proposed by the defense, defense counsel indicated he
was “okay” with the trial court’s adverse ruling. We have not
found any point during voir dire where defense counsel objected
to a trial court ruling disallowing a defense question. Because this
unpreserved claim is not the type of claim that is subject to plain
error review, there is nothing for this Court to review. See
Brandon v. State, 311 Ga. 258, 259 (2021); Ledford v. State, 289
Ga. 70, 81–82 (2011), disapproved on other grounds by Willis v.
State, 305 Ga. 686, 706–07 & n.3 (2018).
      4. Finally, Ellison argues that the trial court erred by
denying a motion for mistrial based on improper closing
argument by the State. This issue also is not preserved.
       In his separately-listed enumerations of error, Ellison
argues only that “[t]he trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion for mistrial where the State engaged in improper and
prejudicial closing argument.” But in his briefing in support of
this enumeration, Ellison does not cite to any point in the record
where the trial court denied a motion for mistrial based on the
State’s closing, or even mention further a putative request for a
mistrial. Because Ellison does not appear to have made a motion
for mistrial based on any portion of the State’s closing argument,
the argument that the trial court should have declared a mistrial
based on the State’s closing argument was not preserved for
appellate review. See Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. 579, 581–82 (2020)
(to preserve issue, defendant must make a contemporaneous
motion for a mistrial at the time the defendant becomes aware of
the matter giving rise to the motion); Bedford v. State, 263 Ga.
121, 121–22 (1993) (where trial court did not actually rule that
the Appellant could not produce a good character witness, “there
[was] no ruling upon which this [C]ourt [could] pass”). And to the




                                14
extent that Ellison argues in his briefing that the trial court erred
by overruling his objections to aspects of the State’s arguments to
the jury and that any such rulings themselves provide a basis for
reversal even in the absence of a request for a mistrial, “an
appealing party may not use its brief to expand its enumerations
of error by arguing the incorrectness of a trial court ruling not
mentioned in the enumeration of errors.” Wallace v. State, 303
Ga. 34, 37–38 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
       Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.




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