Hills v. State

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                                                  In the
                            Supreme Court of Georgia
                                            No. S26A0499
                                          Eric Bernard Hills
                                                  v.
                                              The State

                       On Appeal from the Superior Court of Chatham County
                                       No. SPCR2103324J3

                                          Decided: May 5, 2026


                    LAGRUA, Justice.
                 Appellant Eric Bernard Hills appeals his convictions for
           malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of
           Branden Lewis. 1 On appeal, Hills argues that his convictions
           should be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his
           request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. For the

                    1 Lewis was shot and killed on November 11, 2020. On July 22, 2021,
           a Chatham County grand jury indicted Hills for the following counts: malice
           murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2);
           aggravated assault (Count 3); and possession of a firearm during the
           commission of a felony (Count 4). Hills was tried from March 11 to 14, 2024,
           and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Hills to
           serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count 1 (malice murder)
           and five consecutive years for Count 4 (possession of a firearm during the
           commission of a felony). The remaining counts merged or were vacated by
           operation of law. Hills filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later
           amended through new counsel on November 12, 2024. After holding an
           evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court denied the
           motion on August 4, 2025. Hills timely filed a notice of appeal on August 22,
           2025. The case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December
           2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
reasons that follow, we affirm.
       The evidence presented at trial showed that, around 8:00
a.m. on the morning of November 11, 2020, Hills shot Lewis six
times inside the house Lewis formerly shared with Destiney
Lewis, his estranged wife, and their two children. Lewis died at
the scene. 2 At the time of the shooting, Lewis and Destiney had
been separated for several months, and Destiney—who was then
26 years old—was in a romantic relationship with Hills—who was
17 years old at the time. According to Destiney, Lewis knew of
and was angry about the relationship, and he told Destiney she
was “messing with a guy that was too young for [her]” and, if he
“ever saw” Hills, he was “going to beat his a**.”
       On the night of November 10, 2020, Lewis stayed at
Destiney’s house to take care of their children and to pack up the
rest of his belongings. 3 That same night, unbeknownst to Lewis,
Destiney and Hills stayed together in a hotel, and Destiney
returned home early the next morning so Lewis could go to work.
Before arriving at the house, Destiney told Hills—who was
driving them in her car—to drop her off and then drive around
until she contacted him, so Lewis would not see him. When Lewis
left for work a short time later, Destiney texted Hills that the
“coast was clear,” and Hills could come back to the house.
       When Hills returned, he was armed with a 9mm handgun,

       2 The medical examiner testified that Lewis sustained six gunshot
wounds—two entry wounds in the neck, one entry wound in the back of the
right shoulder, one entry wound in the right side of the back, and one entry
wound on the right side of the body—and she determined that Lewis’s cause of
death was “multiple gunshot wounds.” During the autopsy, the medical
examiner removed five 9mm bullets from Lewis’s body, which were all fired
from the same firearm.
        3 Destiney testified that Lewis was “supposed to pack all his stuff that
night” because they “were done.”




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which he had also carried with him to the hotel the night before.
Destiney and Hills went into her bedroom to “chill[],” and while
they were in the bedroom, Lewis texted Destiney that he had
accidentally left his firearm at the house and needed to come back
to get it. 4 Destiney testified that she did not see Lewis’s text
message right away, and by the time she saw it, Lewis had
already arrived at the house. Destiney heard the front door open,
and she exited the bedroom, closed the bedroom door, and saw
Lewis coming through the front door. Destiney testified that, as
Lewis started walking down the hallway towards the bedroom,
she tried to hold him back, but Lewis “threw” her “out of the
way.” 5 Lewis opened the bedroom door and entered the bedroom,
and Destiney immediately heard “maybe five” gunshots, “back-to-
back.” Destiney ran into the bedroom, and Hills was “stepping
over” Lewis’s body, saying that Lewis had “raised his hand” at
Hills. Destiney started screaming and called 911.
       Hills exited the house, and a short time later, he was
arrested by responding officers as he tried to flee the scene in a
vehicle he ordered moments after the shooting. Officers
ultimately recovered a 9mm Luger pistol from under the front
passenger seat of that vehicle. In the bedroom where Lewis was
shot, police officers recovered six 9mm shell casings. The State’s
ballistics and firearms expert testified that the cartridge casings
recovered from the scene and the bullets removed from Lewis’s
body during the autopsy were fired from the 9mm Luger
recovered from the vehicle Hills had ordered.
       Hills was arrested at the scene, and after being advised of


       4 Police officers later recovered an “inoperable” firearm from the top
drawer of a dresser in the primary bedroom of the house.
       5 Destiney testified that she did not think Lewis knew Hills was in the
bedroom, and she was not sure Hills knew Lewis had returned to the house.




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his Miranda 6 rights, which Hills agreed to waive, Hills was
interviewed by Savannah Police Detective Jacob Hildebrand, the
lead detective in this case. 7 At the beginning of the interview,
Hills denied knowing Destiney, possessing any weapons, or
knowing about or having any involvement with the shooting of
Lewis, claiming that he was in the area to visit a girl who lived
nearby. However, later in the interview, Hills admitted that he
and Destiney had been “together” for several months; that he was
“inside of the house at the time the shooting occurred”; and that
“he [was] the one who shot … Lewis.” Hills told Detective
Hildebrand that, on the morning of the shooting, he and Destiney
had been “laying in Destiney’s bed” when they heard the front
door open, at which point Destiney “got up,” opened the bedroom
door, “pushed [Hills] back into the room,” and closed the bedroom
door. Hills then “heard someone say, ‘Man, get out of the way,’”
and seconds later, Lewis “storm[ed] in” the bedroom. Hills said
that Lewis “raised his hand at [Hills], and [Hills] shot … Lewis.”
Hills told Detective Hildebrand that Lewis “didn’t have a gun”
when he entered the bedroom, but Destiney had warned Hills that
Lewis was “going to fight” him if Lewis ever saw him. Hills
initially said that the 9mm handgun he used to shoot Lewis
belonged to Destiney, and Hills grabbed the gun from underneath
Destiney’s bed when he heard someone enter the house. However,
Hills later “admitted that it was his firearm”; that he found the
firearm about three months before the shooting; that “he had the
firearm the day before, when they were at the hotel”; and that “he
brought the firearm to the Lewis residence.” At the conclusion of
the interview, Hills agreed to submit to a gunshot residue test,


        6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
        7 Hills’s custodial interview was audio- and video-recorded and played
for the jury at trial.




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which tested positive for the presence of gunshot residue.
       1. In Hills’s sole enumeration of error, he contends—
relying largely on Allen v. State, 319 Ga. 415, 419–21 (2024)—that
the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct the jury
on voluntary manslaughter because, given the “sexual nature” of
Hills’s relationship with Destiney and her warning that Lewis
threatened to beat up Hills if they ever met, the evidence
supported a finding that Hills acted with provocation and passion
in shooting Lewis six times when Lewis rushed into Destiney’s
bedroom on the morning of November 11. See OCGA § 16-5-2(a)
(providing that “[a] person commits the offense of voluntary
manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being
under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he
acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite
such passion in a reasonable person”).
       In his written requests to charge, Hills requested a jury
charge on voluntary manslaughter. At the charge conference, the
trial court ruled that a voluntary manslaughter charge was not
appropriate in this case, explaining that,
      [t]o warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter,
      there must be at least slight evidence that the
      accused w[as] so influenced and excited that he
      reacted passionately, rather than simply in an
      attempt to defend himself. The [c]ourt, considering
      the evidence that I’ve heard, supports finding that I
      did not hear slight evidence of that.

The trial court further explained that no evidence had been
presented to demonstrate that, at the time of Lewis’s shooting,
Hills




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      was angry or mad or had any other response
      showing that [Hills] might have reacted
      passionately, as opposed to acting based on fear or
      in self-defense. So given the justification charge,
      because I do think that is warranted based on … the
      evidence and that … it would be in the jury’s
      provenance [sic] to consider that. I don’t see any
      slight evidence that would warrant the
      manslaughter charge, based on my reading of the
      law.

Following this ruling, Hills’s trial counsel noted his objection for
the record. However, after the final charge was given to the jury,
Hills did not object to the trial court’s omission of a charge on
voluntary manslaughter.
       We have held that “[a]n objection voiced at the charge
conference does not preserve for ordinary appellate review a
party’s objection to the charge as subsequently given.” Jivens v.
State, 317 Ga. 859, 861 (2023). “Rather, to preserve an objection
to a jury charge for ordinary appellate review, the defendant must
restate his objection after the court gives its instructions and
before the jury retires to deliberate.” Id. And an appellant’s
“failure to object … to the omission of an instruction[] precludes
appellate review of the instruction unless such portion of the jury
charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of
the parties.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). See also OCGA § 17-
8-58(b) (“Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this
Code section shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the
jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes
plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.”). In
this case, because Hills failed to object after the trial court
instructed the jury, our review of the trial court’s omission of the




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voluntary manslaughter charge is for plain error only. See Jivens,
317 Ga. at 861. See also State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (2011)
(“[U]nder OCGA § 17-8-58(b), appellate review for plain error is
required whenever an appealing party properly asserts an error
in jury instructions.”).
       To demonstrate plain error, Hills must show that “the
instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious
beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Clark v. State, 321 Ga.
732, 734 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). “For an error to be
obvious for purposes of plain error review, it must be plain under
controlling precedent or in view of the unequivocally clear words
of a statute or rule.” Hill v. State, 322 Ga. 700, 708 (2025)
(quotation marks omitted). Here, Hills’s claim fails because there
was no clear or obvious error in the trial court’s refusal to charge
the jury on voluntary manslaughter since no evidence supporting
such a charge was presented at trial. See Metz v. State, 321 Ga.
402, 409 (2025) (“As we have explained, a request to charge must
be legal, apt, and … be authorized by the evidence.” (cleaned up)).
See also Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56, 61 (2024) (concluding that,
when a defendant requests a jury charge, the trial court “must
give the instruction if there is ‘slight evidence’ to support it,” and
“[t]he existence, or not, of that ‘slight evidence’ is a question of
law”).
      Voluntary manslaughter is committed when a
      person causes the death of another under
      circumstances which would otherwise be murder
      and if he acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent,
      and irresistible passion resulting from serious
      provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a




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      reasonable person. Under this objective standard,
      the reasonable person remains our barometer in this
      analysis, and we put aside any peculiar response the
      defendant may have had.

Jivens, 317 Ga. at 861–62 (cleaned up). Our case law addressing
the propriety of giving a voluntary manslaughter charge is
extensive and clear. “[F]or a voluntary manslaughter charge to be
warranted, there must be at least slight evidence that the
defendant, in killing the victim, acted under a serious provocation
that could excite a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a
reasonable person.” Henderson v. State, 322 Ga. 304, 307 (2025)
(quotation marks omitted).
       In this case, no evidence was presented to show that Hills
“acted solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion resulting from serious provocation” when he shot Lewis.
Jivens, 317 Ga. at 862 (quotation marks omitted). Although Hills
argues, in reliance on Allen, that Hills’s act of shooting Lewis
“showed provocation” because of the “sexual” relationship
between Hills and Destiney “involving infidelity and prior
threats,” the circumstances of this case are completely different
from Allen, where we held that “a defendant’s discovery of a
partner’s sexual infidelity can be the sort of provocation necessary
to authorize a voluntary manslaughter charge.” 319 Ga. at 422.
Here, Hills shot Lewis, not the other way around, and that
shooting was not in response to the discovery of any infidelity. We
also note the difficulty inherent in a person knowingly engaging
in infidelity and then claiming the sort of provocation we have
previously held to be sufficient. See id. We have never described
the circumstances here as constituting the “serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person,” OCGA §
16-5-2(a), and Hills has pointed to no legal authority to




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demonstrate otherwise.
       Additionally, the evidence shows that Lewis had never
threatened Hills directly; Lewis was not armed when he entered
Destiney’s bedroom; and Lewis did not say anything to Hills when
he walked into the bedroom. In fact, Destiney testified that Lewis
was likely unaware that Hills was inside the bedroom when he
entered it, and Hills was similarly unaware that Lewis was the
person entering the bedroom when Hills immediately opened fire
on him. Moreover, Hills told the lead detective that he shot Lewis
out of fear after Lewis “raised his hand” at Hills. Such evidence
demonstrates that Hills was, “at most, … fearful and attempting
to defend himself” when he shot Lewis, “not that he was angered
or impassioned.” Henderson, 322 Ga. at 307.
       Because there was no evidence that Hills was “provoked in
a way that supported a voluntary manslaughter instruction”
when he shot Lewis, Henderson, 322 Ga. at 307, “it was neither
clear nor obvious that a voluntary manslaughter charge was
required.” Jivens, 317 Ga. at 863. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not plainly err in refusing to give such a charge,
and this claim fails. See id.
        Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P. J., not participating.




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