Jackson v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                  In the
                            Supreme Court of Georgia
                                            No. S26A0444
                                           Kenneth Jackson
                                                  v.
                                              The State

                          On Appeal from the DeKalb County Superior Court
                                           No. 16CR2267

                                          Decided: May 5, 2026


                   WARREN, Presiding Justice.
                 Kenneth Jackson was convicted of malice murder and other
           crimes in connection with the shooting death of nine-month-old
           KenDarious Edwards, Jr., and the non-fatal shootings of Tracy
           Smith, Tanyika Smith, and Teniqua Clark. 1 On appeal, Jackson

                   1 The shootings occurred on May 10, 2014. In May 2016, a DeKalb
           County grand jury indicted Jackson alongside co-defendants Christopher Flor-
           ence and Marco Watson, as well as Eunice English, who pleaded guilty to ag-
           gravated assault and kidnapping prior to trial. Relevant here, Jackson was
           charged with malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault,
           four counts of aggravated assault (one for each victim of the shooting), and
           three counts of violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (“Gang
           Act”). Jackson, Florence, and Watson were tried together before a jury from
           October 15 to 29, 2018, and Jackson was found guilty on all counts for which
           he was charged. Jackson was sentenced to serve life in prison without the
           possibility of parole for malice murder; 20 consecutive years for each of the
           aggravated assault counts against Tracy, Tanyika, and Clark; and 15 consec-
           utive years for two of the three Gang Act counts, for a total sentence of life
           without parole plus 90 consecutive years. The felony murder count was va-
           cated by operation of law; the aggravated assault count for Edwards merged
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a di-
rected verdict of acquittal; the evidence presented was not suffi-
cient to sustain his convictions as a matter of constitutional due
process; his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective as-
sistance in several respects; the trial court plainly erred in admit-
ting evidence from unrelated gang investigations; and the trial
court made an improper comment on the evidence and erred by
denying his motion for a mistrial. Because the trial court did not
err in denying the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal; the
evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process;
trial counsel was not deficient in any of the respects Jackson
claims here; the trial court did not plainly err in admitting evi-
dence from unrelated gang investigations; and the denial of Jack-
son’s motion for a mistrial was not preserved for appellate review,
each claim fails. We thus affirm.
       1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. In May 2014,
Tracy lived in DeKalb County with her daughters, Tanyika and
N.J.; Tanyika’s friend, Clark; and Tanyika’s son, Edwards. Oth-
ers would sometimes come to the house as well, including Tracy’s
son, Oslushla Smith, and Tanyika’s friends, Kayla Dixon and
Alexis Malone. Oslushla, Dixon, and Malone were in the Sex

with malice murder; and one of the Gang Act counts merged with another Gang
Act count. (Florence was found guilty on all counts, and Watson was found not
guilty on all counts except for two bifurcated counts for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon. Their cases are not part of this appeal.)
        Jackson timely filed a motion for new trial in November 2018, which
he amended through new counsel in November 2024. In July 2025, the trial
court held a hearing on Jackson’s motion and, in August 2025, both Jackson
and the State filed supplemental briefing. On August 13, 2025, the trial court
denied Jackson’s motion. He timely filed a notice of appeal, and this case was
docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.




                                       2
Money Murder (“SMM”) gang.
        Sergeant Matthew McLendon testified that in the early
morning hours of May 10, 2014, Oslushla “lured” Malone into a
field, shot her, and “crushed” her skull with a “large rock” or “cin-
der block,” because he was concerned that she was going to
“snitch” about a murder that he had committed one week prior.
One of the State’s gang experts, Agent Joshua Thompson, testi-
fied that according to gang protocol, Oslushla would have needed
to obtain a “green light,” or authorization, from a “higher up” in
the gang before killing a fellow gang member. At the time of
Malone’s murder, that “higher up” was Jackson, who was also
known as “KG,” “Big Homie,” and “Notorious.” But because
Oslushla failed to obtain this authorization prior to murdering
Malone, he became “food” and was “put on a plate,” which, accord-
ing to Agent Thompson, meant he would be assaulted or killed by
other gang members.
      Dixon was present for Malone’s murder, afterwards fleeing
to Marco Watson’s apartment where Devin Thomas—who was
also an SMM member—was present. Dixon was “really frantic”
as she told Watson and Thomas about Malone’s murder. After
hearing about what had happened, Thomas “felt somebody would
have to get some get back for this.”
       Thomas testified that he then called a higher-ranking gang
member, Christopher Florence, to tell him about Malone’s murder
and “see what [they were] going to do about the situation.”
Thomas’s cell phone records showed that his phone placed a call
at 12:01 p.m. to a phone number ending in -3508 (the “-3508 num-
ber”), which the evidence showed was associated with Florence.
According to Thomas, Florence said that he would leave his home
in Newnan for DeKalb County that afternoon.
      Thomas testified that he also called Jackson, who at the




                                 3
time was the “High 020”—one of the highest ranking members of
SMM—“to let him know what was going on.”2 Thomas’s cell phone
records showed that he received an approximately five-minute
call from a phone number ending in -6765 (the “-6765 number”),
which the evidence showed belonged to Jackson, at 1:18 p.m. that
day. Thomas, Agent Thompson, and Investigator Pinckney testi-
fied that although Jackson was incarcerated, he maintained his
leadership position within SMM and communicated with other
gang members using contraband cell phones, and Thomas testi-
fied that Jackson had used several cell phone numbers and
“changed [them] rapidly.”
       Thomas testified that after he told Jackson about his desire
to retaliate against Oslushla, Jackson encouraged him “to inves-
tigate” and “find [Oslushla].” He said, “You see him, y’all know
what to do. Green light,” which Thomas interpreted to mean “kill
him.” Several gang members went with Thomas to look for
Oslushla, but they were unable to locate him. By then, Florence
had arrived at his brother’s apartment in DeKalb County, and
Thomas went to meet with him.
       Thomas testified that he and Florence called Jackson and
had a “really short” discussion in which they informed Jackson
that they could not locate Oslushla. Thomas’s cell phone records
reflected an approximately one-minute call to the -6765 number
at 9:41 p.m. that night. The three men discussed Thomas and
Florence going to Oslushla’s family’s home: if Oslushla was there,
they would kill him; if he was not, they would “kill everybody in
the house.” After receiving the “green light” from Jackson for this


       2 Agent Thompson and Investigator Waine Pinckney, who also testified
as a gang expert for the State, testified that the “High 020” was the highest-
ranking member of the “Ruffsex” line of SMM and that Jackson held this posi-
tion at the times relevant to this case.




                                      4
plan, Thomas and Florence left the apartment and headed to
Oslushla’s family’s home. 3
       Upon arriving around 10:30 p.m., Thomas and Florence
kicked in the back door. Clark and Tanyika were awake at the
time and ran to Tracy’s room to alert her that “somebody [was]
trying to get [them].” The intruders “chased down” Tracy, Tan-
yika, Clark, and Edwards, who locked themselves in Tracy’s bath-
room and hid in the bathtub. Moments later, the bathtub was
riddled with gunfire. Nine-month-old Edwards was shot five
times and died as a result. Tracy was shot in the right arm, both
legs, and right knee; Tanyika was shot in the face, arm, chest,
buttocks, and side; and Clark was shot in both legs. All three
survived their injuries. Tracy testified that Oslushla, who was
hiding out at a motel, was not home during the shooting. Tanyika
later identified Thomas as one of the shooters.
       Thomas testified that he and Florence returned to Flor-
ence’s brother’s apartment, where they disposed of their guns.
Thomas called Jackson to inform him of what had happened.
Thomas’s cell phone records showed an approximately 30-second
call to the -6765 number at 11:15 p.m. that night. Florence then
took Thomas back to Watson’s apartment and returned to his
home in Newnan.
        Thomas was interviewed by law enforcement and—as he
admitted at trial—lied about his whereabouts on the night of the
shooting. He was arrested and charged with making a false state-
ment. While in prison, Thomas attempted to pass “kites,” or jail
notes using code words specific to SMM, to another SMM member
to let him know that Jackson had approved the shooting. Thomas


       3 Data from Thomas’s phone was consistent with the phone being
turned off from 9:50 p.m. until 11:06 p.m.




                                      5
wrote that he was in jail because Oslushla “killed one of our
MOETs.” 4 He noted that when he could not find Oslushla, he
“shot up” Oslushla’s family’s house after getting “the green light
from [Jackson].” Finally, he instructed the recipient of the notes
to contact “big fool KG” to confirm that Thomas had followed gang
protocol. The notes were turned over to law enforcement by an-
other inmate.
      Prior to receiving Thomas’s jail notes, law enforcement was
not aware of Jackson’s potential involvement in the shooting.
Based on the notes, investigators located a social media account
they believed to be associated with Jackson. It contained photos
of Jackson in prison displaying gang signs, posts mentioning
SMM, comments asking “Big Homie” for his number or asking
him to call the commenters, a comment wishing “Notorious” a
happy birthday, and other gang-related activity.
       When Thomas found out that law enforcement had his jail
notes, he agreed to make a proffer and later pled guilty to his role
in the shooting. 5 It was during this proffer that Thomas first im-
plicated Florence. In an effort to corroborate Thomas’s story, in-
vestigators obtained a search warrant for one of Florence’s social
media accounts, where they observed numerous photos of Flor-
ence making gang signs, as well as several messages mentioning
his rank in SMM, his aliases, and his association with Jackson.
Additionally, there were messages from the account in which the
author told people to contact him at the -3508 number, including
one message sent just four days before the shooting. Cell phone
records for the -3508 number, which were introduced at trial,


       4 Thomas and Investigator Pinckney testified that a “MOET” is a fe-
male gang member of SMM.
       5 Thomas was sentenced to serve life in prison plus 20 years.




                                     6
showed calls with Thomas’s phone on the day of the shooting and
calls with the -6765 number in the days following the shooting,
and placed the -3508 number in DeKalb County immediately be-
fore and after the shooting. 6 After Florence was arrested and in
the DeKalb County jail, he called his wife and dictated a letter for
her to send to “Big Homie,” which, as noted above, was a nick-
name from the social media account associated with Jackson. 7 In
the letter, Florence told “Big Homie” that there was “a demon
around [him] at [that] very moment who [was] telling the haters
everything,” but that Florence was “staying silent” and would
“never fold.”
       In 2016, roughly two years after the shooting, investigators
located a contraband cell phone in Jackson’s prison cell. An ex-
traction of the phone revealed, among other things, a message
sent to the phone that was addressed to “Notorious.” While the
phone number did not match the -6765 number that communi-
cated with Thomas on the day of the shooting, Investigator Pinck-
ney testified that his investigation revealed that “Jackson had
[used] different [phone] numbers at different times.”
      As part of an unrelated investigation, law enforcement per-
formed a data extraction on the cell phone of Kevin Hambrick,
another SMM member, which showed that the -6765 number was
saved under the contact name “Notorious,” which, as noted above,
was one of Jackson’s aliases. Hambrick’s phone and the -6765

       6 Investigator RL Randolph testified about the -3508 number’s location
data on the day of the shooting. The phone was in Newnan from at least 7:00
a.m. until 2:05 p.m. Then, from 3:05 p.m. until 9:51 p.m., the location data was
consistent with the phone being at Florence’s brother’s apartment. The phone
did not communicate with cell towers between 9:51 p.m. and 10:39 p.m.–
around the time of the shooting–which Investigator Randolph testified was
consistent with the phone being turned off.
        7 Thomas also testified that Jackson was known as the “Big Homie.”




                                       7
number exchanged several phone calls and text messages just five
days after the shootings.
       2. Jackson contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the evidence
was not sufficient to sustain his convictions under Georgia’s ac-
complice-corroboration statute, which provides in pertinent part
that in “felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the
testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient [to establish
a fact]. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense
with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness[.]” OCGA
§ 24-14-8. For the reasons explained below, this claim fails.
       “The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a di-
rected verdict of acquittal is the same as for determining the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.” Render v. State,
320 Ga. 890, 894 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). In assessing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence pre-
sented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was
convicted. Id. at 894–95. “[I]n order to sustain a felony conviction
under Georgia law, testimony by an accomplice to a crime must
be corroborated by other evidence implicating the defendant.”
McGarity v. State, 308 Ga. 417, 420 (2020) (citing OCGA § 24-14-
8). 8 Such corroborating evidence “must either directly connect



        8 We have said that “although Georgia law requires independent cor-
roboration of an accomplice’s testimony to secure a conviction, federal law does
not require such corroboration and, thus, a failure to corroborate accomplice
testimony does not offend constitutional due process.” Copeland v. State, 314
Ga. 44, 48 (2022) (cleaned up). We have nevertheless applied the accomplice-




                                       8
the defendant with the crime or justify an inference that he is
guilty, and must corroborate both the identity of the defendant
and the fact of his participation in the crime.” Bowdery v. State,
321 Ga. 890, 896 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). It “may be
circumstantial, it may be slight, and it need not of itself be suffi-
cient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged.” Yarn v. State,
305 Ga. 421, 423 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). “Nor must
the corroborating evidence match the testimony of the accomplice
in every detail.” Bowdery, 321 Ga. at 896 (cleaned up). The rele-
vant question is “whether there was at least slight independent
corroborating evidence to support a finding that the defendant
committed the crimes of which he was convicted.” Id. (cleaned
up). 9 “Once the State adduces such evidence, it is peculiarly a
matter for the jury to determine whether the evidence sufficiently
corroborates the accomplice’s testimony and warrants a convic-
tion.” Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 901 (2014) (quotation
marks omitted).
      Jackson claims that Thomas’s testimony was the only evi-
dence of Jackson’s participation in the shootings. Although he
acknowledges that the State presented evidence of his gang mem-
bership and use of cell phones in prison, he argues that Thomas’s



corroboration requirement in reviewing denials of a motion for directed ver-
dict—see, e.g., Render, 320 Ga. at 895—and assume without deciding for pur-
poses of our analysis that it applies here. See Stitts v. State, 323 Ga. 109, 112–
13 (2025) (assuming that OCGA § 24-14-8 applied in a sufficiency analysis and
concluding that it was satisfied).
        9 Although we conclude below that no evidence relevant to this analysis
was improperly admitted by the trial court, we also note that “in considering
sufficiency of the corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony, we must consider
all the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless of whether that evi-
dence was admitted erroneously.” Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 47 (2022)
(quotation marks omitted).




                                        9
cell phone records do not sufficiently corroborate Thomas’s testi-
mony because the -6765 number “cannot be tied to Jackson with
certainty,” Thomas is the only witness who connected that num-
ber to Jackson, and other evidence connected Jackson to different
cell phone numbers.
       In so arguing, Jackson misapprehends the applicable legal
standard: that there be “at least slight independent corroborating
evidence,” Bowdery, 321 Ga. at 896 (cleaned up), to support the
jury’s finding that Jackson was a party to the crimes of murder,
aggravated assault, and violations of the Gang Act. See OCGA §
16-2-20 (describing when a person is a party to a crime). We con-
clude that the evidence in this case met that standard. As to the
-6765 number belonging to Jackson, testimony from the State’s
gang experts, data extracted from the phone in Jackson’s cell, and
social media evidence showed that Jackson went by several nick-
names, including “Notorious.” Ample evidence also showed that
Jackson had access to cell phones while he was in prison and that
he used these phones to maintain communication with and au-
thority over fellow gang members. Contrary to Jackson’s asser-
tion, there was independent evidence showing that the -6765
number belonged to him: the -6765 number was saved in SMM
member Hambrick’s phone under the contact “Notorious,” and
data from Hambrick’s phone showed that he had been in contact
with this number just five days after the shootings. Although
there was also evidence connecting Jackson to other phone num-
bers, Investigator Pinckney testified that Jackson had used sev-
eral phone numbers at “different times,” which corroborated
Thomas’s testimony on the same point. Thus, the State adduced
sufficient independent evidence from which a reasonable jury
could infer that the -6765 number was used by Jackson at the
time of the shooting.




                               10
       As to Jackson’s involvement in the shooting, Thomas’s
phone records showed that, in addition to calling the -6765 num-
ber on the day of the shooting before beginning his initial search
for Oslushla, he also called the -6765 number both shortly before
and shortly after the shooting, corroborating his testimony that
he called Jackson before going to Oslushla’s family’s home to get
the “green light” and afterwards to inform him the plan had been
carried out. See Crawford, 294 Ga. at 902 (holding that phone
record evidence was sufficient to corroborate accomplice’s testi-
mony despite the fact that the records “neither reveal[ed] the con-
tent of the [phone] conversations nor even confirm[ed] that [the
appellant] himself, as opposed to some other person using his
phone, was a party to the calls,” where the evidence showed that
the phone in question actually belonged to the appellant); Threatt
v. State, 293 Ga. 549, 552 (2013) (concluding that accomplice’s tes-
timony was sufficiently corroborated because, among other
things, phone records showed that the appellant and his accom-
plice were in contact before the crimes and in the hours after-
wards). The State’s gang experts testified that gang protocol re-
quired a leader of a certain rank to authorize the murder of a fel-
low gang member and that Jackson, who was the “High 020” of
SMM, was the person with the necessary rank to give that au-
thorization. This corroborated Thomas’s testimony that SMM
protocol required him to get the “green light” from Jackson before
acting on his plan to kill Oslushla or anyone else in the house.
The State’s gang experts further testified that if a gang member
did not get this authorization before killing another gang mem-
ber, that person would be subject to retaliation, which corrobo-
rated Thomas’s testimony that the shooting was a gang-moti-
vated response to Oslushla having killed Malone, as Oslushla had
not gotten the requisite authorization before killing Malone ear-
lier that day. Finally, the State presented evidence of Florence’s




                                11
jail call to his wife, made after he was arrested, in which he di-
rected her to write a letter to “Big Homie,” which was another
nickname of Jackson’s. In the letter, Florence said that there was
“a demon … who is telling the haters everything,” and assured
“Big Homie” that Florence was “staying silent” and would “never
fold.” This evidence, albeit circumstantial, was independent of
Thomas’s testimony and sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer
that Jackson participated in the murder of Edwards and the ag-
gravated assaults of Tracy, Tanyika, and Clark, and violated the
Gang Act in doing so. See Bowdery, 321 Ga. at 896–97 (conclud-
ing that cell phone records, evidence of the appellant’s participa-
tion in the same gang as his accomplice, and testimony about the
gang-related motive for the shooting provided at least slight cor-
roboration of the accomplice’s testimony and was thus sufficient
under OCGA § 24-14-8); see also Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807, 809
(2017) (“The necessary corroboration may consist entirely of cir-
cumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct be-
fore and after the crime was committed may give rise to an infer-
ence that he participated in the crime.” (cleaned up)).
       3. Jackson relatedly argues that the evidence presented
was insufficient to sustain his convictions as a matter of constitu-
tional due process. We disagree.
       When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence as a matter of constitutional due process under Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 US 307, 318-19 (1979), we view the evidence pre-
sented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask
whether any rational trier of fact could have found that defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was
convicted. See Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 47 (2022). “We leave
to the trier of fact the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in
the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences




                                 12
to be derived from the facts, and we do not reweigh the evidence.”
Id. (cleaned up). And when “we consider the legal sufficiency of
the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, we consider all the evi-
dence presented at trial, without regard to whether some of that
evidence might have been improperly admitted.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
       Jackson claims that the evidence was “thin and circum-
stantial”; that Thomas was not a credible witness; and that with-
out what he claims was improper hearsay testimony from the
State’s gang experts, the evidence was, at best, “anemic.”
       Viewing the evidence presented at Jackson’s trial under
the applicable legal standard and in the light most favorable to
the verdicts, we conclude that the evidence presented was suffi-
cient for “any rational trier of fact” to have found “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” the “essential elements” to support Jackson’s con-
victions for malice murder, aggravated assault, and violations of
the Gang Act. Jackson, 443 US at 319. The jury was authorized
to accept Thomas’s testimony as true, and between his testimony
and the circumstantial evidence recounted above in Division 2,
the evidence presented satisfies the due process demands of the
United States Constitution. See Moss v. State, 323 Ga. 143, 146
(2025) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence alone can be constitutionally
sufficient.” (quotation marks omitted)); Crawford, 294 Ga. at 902
(concluding that accomplice’s testimony and phone records were
sufficient as a matter of federal due process to sustain the appel-
lant’s convictions). Accordingly, this claim fails.
       4. Jackson contends that his trial counsel rendered consti-
tutionally ineffective assistance because he did not properly pre-
pare Jackson for trial or timely object to portions of Agent Thomp-
son’s testimony that Jackson claims were impermissible hearsay.
As explained below, counsel did not perform deficiently, so each




                                13
claim fails.
       To prevail on these claims, Jackson must establish that
trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and
that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 US 668, 687 (1984); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 81
(2025). To establish deficient performance, Jackson must show
that trial counsel performed his duties “in an objectively unrea-
sonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of
prevailing professional norms.” Reddick, 321 Ga. at 81. This “is
no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong presumption that
counsel performed reasonably,” and Jackson “bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “To
carry this burden, he must show that no reasonable lawyer would
have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what
his lawyer did not.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
“counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to make a merit-
less objection.” Id. at 84.
       To establish prejudice, Jackson “must prove that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency,
the result of the trial would have been different.” Reddick, 321
Ga. at 81 (quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. (quotations marks omitted). We need not address both parts
of the Strickland test if Jackson does not meet his burden of es-
tablishing one. See Strickland, 466 US at 697; Reddick, 321 Ga.
at 81.
       (a) Jackson asserts that his trial counsel performed defi-
ciently in not adequately preparing him for trial and not taking
more time to review the evidence with him prior to jury selec-
tion—specifically, the audio recording of Thomas’s prior interview




                                14
with investigators. Because counsel’s performance was objec-
tively reasonable, he was not deficient, and this claim fails.
       Prior to trial, Jackson was housed at the Georgia Diagnos-
tic Prison in Jackson. The trial transcript shows that on the
morning of jury selection, Jackson’s trial counsel informed the
trial court that because of security restrictions imposed by the
Department of Corrections, counsel was not able to bring his lap-
top to meet with Jackson and had not been able to review certain
digital discovery with him, including an audio recording of
Thomas’s prior interview with investigators. Counsel told the
trial court that he was “ready to go forward with trial” and did
not move for a continuance, but he requested that the trial court
provide him extra time to meet with Jackson and review this evi-
dence that day and over the course of trial. The trial transcripts
show that the same evening—after jury selection but prior to the
start of trial—counsel reviewed this digital evidence with Jack-
son. At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified that
although he did not have as much time to “digest” and “plan” with
Jackson as he would have liked because of the security re-
strictions, he had taken the following steps, among others, in pre-
paring Jackson for trial: he copied the paper discovery for Jackson
and reviewed it with him; he “thoroughly” reviewed the recording
of Thomas’s interview and “fully summariz[ed]” its contents in
written notes, which he reviewed with Jackson at the Georgia Di-
agnostic Prison in advance of trial; he spoke with Jackson on the
phone even when he was not able to visit him in person; and he
reviewed the recording of Thomas’s interview with Jackson on the
evening before trial.
      The record shows that counsel’s efforts to meet and review
discovery with Jackson prior to trial were objectively reasonable.
Counsel visited Jackson at the Georgia Diagnostic Prison and




                                15
spoke with him on the phone several times prior to trial; provided
copies of, and was able to review, all paper discovery with him;
thoroughly reviewed Thomas’s recorded interview several times
and “fully summariz[ed]” its contents, which he shared with Jack-
son well before jury selection; and, at least before opening state-
ments and the presentation of any evidence, listened to the re-
cording with Jackson. We conclude that trial counsel’s perfor-
mance in reviewing the discovery with Jackson and preparing
him for trial was objectively reasonable. See Henry v. State, 307
Ga. 281, 283 (2019) (concluding that trial counsel’s performance
was not deficient where he met with the defendant just once prior
to jury selection and the defendant did not personally review the
recorded interview of a key witness against him or the GBI’s case
file, but the record showed that counsel communicated with the
defendant through other means and discussed the contents of the
GBI case file with him). See also Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167,
173 (2022); Mitchell v. State, 279 Ga. 158, 160 (2005).
       (b) Jackson contends that trial counsel was deficient for
not making a hearsay objection to Agent Thompson’s testimony
about the proliferation of cell phones in Georgia prisons and by
not making a timely hearsay objection to Agent Thompson’s tes-
timony about the history of SMM and the United Blood Nation
(“UBN”) gang, of which SMM was a subset. He claims such ob-
jections would have succeeded because Agent Thompson’s testi-
mony on these matters was based on information he learned from
other people. Because a hearsay objection to this testimony would
have been meritless, counsel was not deficient, and this claim
fails.
      Agent Thompson testified as an expert in criminal street




                                16
gangs and street gang activity. 10 As to cell phones, Agent Thomp-
son testified that they were being smuggled into Georgia prisons
at an increased rate and that they allowed for inmates—and par-
ticularly gang members—to engage in criminal activity from
prison. He also described the methods by which cell phones were
smuggled into prisons. He testified that this information was
based on cases he had worked on or assisted agents with at the

        10 Jackson asserts in passing, without any argument or citation to au-
thority, that his trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to Agent Thomp-
son’s qualifications to testify as an expert. It is not clear whether he attempts
to assert that as an enumeration of error on appeal, but in any event, any such
assertion would fail. Agent Thompson testified about his training and experi-
ence as follows: at the time of trial, he was the Assistant Special Agent in
Charge with the Georgia Department of Corrections over the Special Investi-
gation section and he was assigned to the FBI Safe Streets Gang Task Force;
he had been in law enforcement in Georgia for 19 years; he was previously
assigned to the U.S. Marshals Service Fugitive Task Force, where he helped
start a gang unit and focused on “working gangs, getting intelligence, getting
crimes, [and] getting fugitives”; he had been through over 100 hours of gang
training, both at the state level and through the Department of Justice; he was
a certified gang investigator with the Georgia Gang Investigator’s Association;
and he had interviewed over 500 gang members, listened to over 2,000 hours
of gang members’ jail calls, and listened to over 1,000 hours of wire-tapped
conversations involving gangs. Jackson’s trial counsel examined Agent
Thompson during voir dire before indicating that he had no objection to his
qualifications as an expert. And even if trial counsel had objected, the trial
court would not have abused its discretion by overruling such an objection—
especially “[g]iven the evidence of the agent’s training, education, and consid-
erable experience”—and “counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to
make a meritless objection.” Cf. Reddick, 321 Ga. at 85 (rejecting a similar
claim under former OCGA § 24-7-707, which governed expert qualifications in
criminal cases at the time of Jackson’s trial but was repealed in 2022). See
also Davis v. State, 301 Ga. 397, 406–07 (2017) (noting that, to qualify as an
expert under former OCGA § 24-7-707, “all that is required is that a person
must have been educated in a particular skill or profession; his special
knowledge may be derived from experience as well as study” (quotation marks
omitted)).




                                      17
Department of Corrections and other law enforcement agencies.
Trial counsel eventually objected to this testimony on grounds of
non-responsiveness, the narrative nature of the testimony, and
relevance. The trial court overruled the objection but directed the
prosecutor to “break up” his questions to prevent narrative testi-
mony.
       Later, Agent Thompson testified about the history of the
UBN and SMM gangs. After establishing that he had worked on
cases involving SMM in the past, Thompson testified about the
founding, different “lines,” and leadership structures of the gangs.
He described how many of the prominent leaders in the gangs are
incarcerated but still able to manage and control members who
are not in prison. Thompson explained that he knew this infor-
mation from gang member writings he had seized, interviews
with gang members, and jail calls and wire taps that he had per-
sonally reviewed. After Agent Thompson provided this testimony,
trial counsel objected on the basis of hearsay, and the trial court
overruled the objection.
       Jackson argues that trial counsel was deficient for not ob-
jecting to the cell phone testimony on the basis of hearsay and for
not timely objecting to the gang history testimony on the basis of
hearsay.
        Trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to lodge
a hearsay objection to Agent Thompson’s cell phone testimony or
in failing to lodge a timely hearsay objection to Agent Thompson’s
testimony about gang history, because the trial court would not
have abused its discretion by overruling either of these objections.
Even to the extent that Thompson’s expert testimony was based
on information beyond his own personal knowledge, Georgia law
“allows experts to base their opinion testimony on inadmissible




                                 18
‘facts or data,’ so long as these ‘facts or data’ are ‘of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opin-
ions or inferences upon the subject.” Smith v. State, 307 Ga. 106,
116 (2019) (quoting OCGA § 24-7-703 (“Rule 703”)). 11 Jackson
does not dispute, “and we see no reason to doubt, that the sources
on which” Thompson “relied as a basis for [his] opinions—includ-
ing gang-related training, participation in gang-related investiga-
tions, information from other police officers, and conversations
with gang members—are reasonably relied upon by gang ex-
perts,” so the trial court would have been well within its discre-
tion in overruling a timely hearsay objection to this testimony.12
Id. See United States v. Steed, 548 F3d 961, 975–76 (11th Cir.
2008) (concluding that even if expert officer’s testimony was based
on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, it did not violate Federal Rule

       11 OCGA § 24-7-703 says:
        The facts or data in the particular proceeding upon which an
        expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
        or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
        type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
        in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, such facts
        or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opin-
        ion or inference to be admitted. Such facts or data that are oth-
        erwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
        proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court deter-
        mines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evalu-
        ate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudi-
        cial effect.
        12 Jackson points to Cobb v. State, in which this Court said that an
expert “must base his opinion on facts supported by evidence in the case; he
cannot base his opinion on what he has heard in private conversations with
others.” 283 Ga. 388, 391 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). But that case was
decided under the old Evidence Code, and to the extent it contradicts OCGA §
24-7-703, it has been abrogated by the current Evidence Code. See Smith, 307
Ga. at 117 n.14 (recognizing that, to the extent an old Evidence Code case con-
tradicted Rule 703, it was abrogated by the current Evidence Code).




                                      19
of Evidence 703 because “general training and experience, discus-
sions with other law enforcement officers, participation in
searches and arrests of criminal suspects, and literature about
trends in law enforcement” are sources that are “reasonably relied
upon by experts in the law enforcement field”). 13 Because the
hearsay objections would have been meritless, counsel was not
deficient in failing to lodge them.
      5. Jackson contends that the trial court plainly erred un-
der OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) 14 by admitting a gang-related
document found during the search of SMM member Cordarius
Wyatt’s bedroom and Agent Thompson’s testimony as to that doc-
ument, and by allowing Agent Thompson’s and Investigator
Pinckney’s testimony about unrelated investigations into other
SMM members. For the reasons explained below, this claim fails.
       At trial, Agent Thompson testified that Wyatt was arrested
for murder in May 2014 while he was on parole. As a part of his
job, Agent Thompson searched Wyatt’s bedroom after he was ar-
rested and found a multi-page document with SMM’s “history,
their lingo, the protocol, who is in charge, and things to follow
generally.” When the State attempted to admit the document,
Jackson’s attorney objected on several grounds—but not on the


       13 “Rule 703 is substantially similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 703.
We have explained that, when we consider the meaning of provisions in the
[current] Evidence Code that are borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence,
‘we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying
the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and the Eleventh Circuit.’” Smith, 307 Ga. at 116 n.13 (quoting Olds v. State,
299 Ga. 65, 69 (2016); citing State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 558 (2018)).
         14 Rule 403 says: “Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”




                                      20
basis of Rule 403—and the trial court overruled the objections.
Agent Thompson proceeded to testify as to some of the document’s
contents.
        Agent Thompson then made a brief reference to another
SMM member, Brenton Carson, whose home had been searched,
yielding three guns and “some drugs,” and whose cell phone rec-
ords also had been extracted by law enforcement officials. Agent
Thompson testified that he found “a bunch of stuff” related to
SMM on Carson’s phone, as well as a phone number—but not the
-6765 number—saved under “KG da god.” As Agent Thompson
began to describe another investigation into a separate murder
alleged to have been committed by an SMM member, Jackson’s
trial counsel objected to the testimony as irrelevant and improper
character testimony—but not on the basis of Rule 403. Before the
trial court ruled, the State indicated it would not ask about the
underlying details of the investigations involving other SMM
members, but would instead focus on the cell phone record extrac-
tions that occurred as a result of those investigations that related
to Jackson’s case. Jackson’s trial counsel agreed to this approach,
stating: “[t]hat does let us move on.”
        As Jackson acknowledges, he did not object to this evidence
recounted above on the basis of Rule 403, so we review his claim
for plain error only. See Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 160 n.12
(2022) (“Because [appellant] did not object to this evidence at trial
under Rule 403 … our review of his claim of error on [that basis]
is for plain error only.”); OCGA § 24-1-103(d). To establish plain
error, Jackson “must point to a legal error that was not affirma-
tively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute,
affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Carter v.
State, 317 Ga. 689, 693 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). And




                                 21
“to establish that the error affected his substantial rights, he
must demonstrate that it caused him harm, meaning that the out-
come of the trial court proceedings was likely affected.” Id. (quo-
tation marks omitted). “We need not analyze all of the elements
of this test when, as in this case, the defendant has failed to es-
tablish one of them.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 15
       Pretermitting the other prongs of the plain error test, we
conclude that Jackson has not carried his burden of demonstrat-
ing that the admission of this evidence “caused him harm, mean-
ing that the outcome of the trial court proceedings was likely af-
fected.” Carter, 317 Ga. at 693 (quotation marks omitted). Jack-
son claims that this evidence was highly prejudicial, but does not
explain how that was so. And in any event, the record shows oth-
erwise. Any harmful effect that the document or Agent Thomp-
son’s accompanying testimony may have had was diminished be-
cause its pertinent contents—SMM’s history, lingo, leadership,
and protocol—were cumulative of testimony from Thomas, Inves-
tigator Pinckney, and Agent Thompson at other points during


        15 Jackson does not identify any testimony from Investigator Pinckney
that he challenges under this enumeration and has thus failed to carry his
burden of showing plain error with respect to the admission of that testimony.
Additionally, Jackson conclusorily asserts that the evidence addressed above–
relating to the gang document and other investigations–was “bolstering” and
“impermissible hearsay” that should have been excluded under Rule 403. But
he makes no argument in support, instead focusing his argument in this enu-
meration exclusively on Rule 403. It is unclear if he intends to assert such
claims on appeal, but to the extent he does, he has failed to carry his burden of
showing error. See Williams v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0389, slip op. at
5 (Ga. Mar. 17, 2026) (2026 WL 739103) (“It is the appellant’s burden to show
error by identifying in the record the thing that he challenges on appeal and
citing authority to show why that thing represents error.”); Jacobs v. State, 306
Ga. 571, 575 (2019) (“[I]t is not this Court’s responsibility to cull the record to
find support for a defendant’s claims.”).




                                       22
trial. See Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 245 (2022) (“Appellant has
not met his burden under the plain error standard to show a rea-
sonable probability that the outcome would have been different,
as the improperly admitted [evidence] was merely duplicative of
other properly admitted evidence.”); Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529,
538 (2020) (concluding that any harmful effect of evidence that
the appellant claimed was improperly admitted was diminished
because it was “cumulative of other properly admitted evidence”).
Any such harm was likewise diminished because trial counsel
made effective use of the document on cross-examination, elicit-
ing testimony from Agent Thompson that it said “nothing …
about this case,” which fit into the defense’s theory that although
the State may have been able to show Jackson was a member of
SMM, the evidence that he actually participated in the charged
crimes was weak. See White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 123 (2019) (con-
cluding that the erroneous admission of certain evidence did not
likely affect the outcome of the proceedings where “defense coun-
sel was able to mitigate” any potential prejudice “by using the ev-
idence … to [appellant’s] advantage during his cross-examina-
tion”).
       As to Agent Thompson’s testimony about Wyatt being in-
volved in an unrelated murder and Carson possessing drugs and
guns, it was very brief and merely provided background on how
Agent Thompson came to obtain their cell phones to perform the
extractions. Although Agent Thompson testified that Jackson,
Wyatt, and Carson were members of the same gang, he did not
testify that Wyatt’s and Carson’s respective cases were related to
Jackson or that Jackson had any involvement in them. And the
State made no argument about the underlying details of these in-
vestigations in opening or closing arguments. See Smith v. State,
322 Ga. 881, 885 (2025) (acknowledging that any harmful effect
the challenged evidence may have had was lessened by the State




                                23
not mentioning it during opening, closing, or at other points dur-
ing trial). Jackson therefore has not shown that the admission of
this evidence likely affected the outcome of his trial and therefore
“affected his substantial rights,” so this claim fails. Carter, 317
Ga. at 693. See Fox v. State, 321 Ga. 411, 419 (2025) (concluding
that appellant did not show that the challenged error likely af-
fected the outcome of her trial and thus failed to show plain er-
ror). 16
       6. Finally, Jackson contends that the trial court made an
improper comment on the evidence and erred by denying his mo-
tion for a mistrial. See OCGA §§ 17-8-57(a)(1) (“It is error for any


        16 Jackson appears to raise two other claims related to this evidence
and Rule 403. First, Jackson asserts that this evidence was admitted at trial
pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-418 (“Rule 418”), which provides that in criminal
proceedings “in which the accused is accused of conducting or participating in
criminal gang activity … evidence of the accused’s commission of criminal gang
activity … shall be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant,” and, relying on our decision in McKinney v.
State, 318 Ga. 566, 572 (2024), which held that evidence admissible pursuant
to Rule 418 may nevertheless be excluded under Rule 403, that the trial court
was required to sua sponte apply Rule 403’s balancing test before admitting
this evidence. As an initial matter, it is not clear from the record that Rule 418
was the basis for the admission of the challenged evidence here; the evidence
does not involve Jackson’s prior commission of criminal gang activity, and Rule
418 addresses “evidence of the accused’s commission of criminal gang activity”
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above, Jackson has
not shown plain error because he has failed to demonstrate that, even if the
trial court erred by not applying Rule 403’s balancing test to this evidence, any
such error likely affected the outcome of Jackson’s trial.
         Jackson also asserts in passing that his trial counsel performed defi-
ciently in failing to object to the admission of this evidence under Rule 403.
Considering the above analysis, Jackson “has not established that any such
deficiency resulted in prejudice, given that the test for prejudice in the ineffec-
tive assistance analysis is equivalent to the test for harm in plain error review.”
Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 442 (2023) (cleaned up).




                                       24
judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or inti-
mate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue
has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.”);
(a)(2) (“After [the party alleging a violation of paragraph (1)
makes a timely objection], and if it is sustained, it shall be the
duty of the court to give a curative instruction to the jury or de-
clare a mistrial, if appropriate.”). We conclude that this claim is
not preserved for appellate review.
       During Florence’s counsel’s cross-examination of Investi-
gator Pinckney, counsel thoroughly questioned him about
Thomas’s cell phone records. Relevant here, counsel asked Inves-
tigator Pinckney about an alleged call from Dixon to Thomas on
the day of the shooting. Investigator Pinckney asked if counsel
could refresh his recollection as to Dixon’s phone number so he
could try to find it in the records, which he was able to review as
he testified. Counsel responded: “No. I’m asking do you, as an
investigator who’s investigating this case, have a recollection of
the phone number of the witness who sparked all of this?” Inves-
tigator Pinckney answered that he could not recall. The State
objected on the basis that Florence’s counsel was “saying [Dixon]
sparked all this. He’s putting that into evidence. That — that’s
not the evidence in this case.” In other words, the State objected
to counsel’s insinuation that Dixon, who had witnessed Malone’s
murder and first reported it to Thomas, was the impetus behind
the shooting. The trial court then said:
      I’m going to sustain the objection, but my normal po-
      sition on that, the jury will remember what they did
      and did not hear during the course of the trial. But
      I think we — and I think in all fairness to any wit-
      ness, nobody remembers every telephone number
      they may or may not have ever seen. So I’m going to




                                25
      direct that if you’re going to ask him about a partic-
      ular number, you need [to] put a name with it or
      somebody with that, in all fairness.

       Florence’s counsel asked to be heard outside the presence
of the jury and moved for a mistrial, which Jackson joined. Flor-
ence’s counsel said that it was “unlawful for the Court to express
or intimidate [sic] an opinion about anything related to the evi-
dence, anything related to … the case that’s before the jury.” And
“whether intentional or unintentional, the statement as to what
somebody remembers or doesn’t remember about a phone record
constitutes a deviation from that rule.” The trial court denied the
motion for a mistrial but gave the following curative instruction
to the jury:
      You are to try all facts and … you will make the ul-
      timate decision on whether or not the State meets
      its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is
      strictly within your province to make that determi-
      nation, period.

None of the defendants, including Jackson, objected to the cura-
tive instruction or renewed their motion for a mistrial. Florence’s
counsel continued with his cross-examination.
       To preserve the denial of a motion for a mistrial for appel-
late review after the trial court denies the motion and instead
gives a curative instruction, the moving party must either object
to the curative instruction as inadequate or renew the motion for
mistrial. See Robinson v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S26A0282,
slip op. at 1 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (2026 WL 583026); Bates v. State,
317 Ga. 809, 818 (2023); Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 886
(2014). Here, after the trial court denied the motion for a mistrial
and instead gave a curative instruction, Jackson did not object to




                                26
the curative instruction or renew his motion for a mistrial. Thus,
the claim is not preserved for appellate review. 17 See Robinson,


        17 Prior to July 2015, OCGA § 17-8-57 provided, in relevant part, that
“[s]hould any judge [in a criminal case express or intimate his opinion as to
what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused], the violation
shall be held by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to be error and the
decision in the case reversed, and a new trial granted in the court below[.]”
Relying on case law interpreting this pre-amendment version of the statute,
Jackson asserts that the trial court’s comment here automatically mandates a
new trial. See, e.g., Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 415 (2007) (“[T]he law is well-
established that instructions given to the jury by the trial court cannot cure a
violation of OCGA § 17-8-57. … It follows that no waiver of this issue occurred
when defense counsel failed to renew the motion for mistrial after the giving
of legally-ineffective instructions.”).
         Importantly, however, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 17-8-
57 effective July 1, 2015. See Ga. L. 2015 at 1050. The statute now provides:

        (a)      (1) It is error for any judge, during any phase of any
                 criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the
                 judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has
                 not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.
                 (2) Any party who alleges a violation of paragraph (1)
                 of this subsection shall make a timely objection and in-
                 form the court of the specific objection and the grounds
                 for such objection, outside of the jury’s hearing and
                 presence. After such objection has been made, and if it
                 is sustained, it shall be the duty of the court to give a
                 curative instruction to the jury or declare a mistrial, if
                 appropriate.
        (b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section,
        failure to make a timely objection to an alleged violation of par-
        agraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude
        appellate review, unless such violation constitutes plain error
        which affects substantive rights of the parties. Plain error may
        be considered on appeal even when a timely objection inform-
        ing the court of the specific objection was not made, so long as




                                       27
2026 WL 583026 at *1; Bates, 317 Ga. at 819; Hartsfield, 294 Ga.
at 886. 18
        Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.



        such error affects substantive rights of the parties.
        (c) Should any judge express an opinion as to the guilt of the
        accused, the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or the trial
        court in a motion for a new trial shall grant a new trial.

        Thus, under OCGA § 17-8-57 (as amended in 2015), in situations like
the one presented in this appeal, where a judge may have “express[ed] or inti-
mate[d]” his opinion as to “whether a fact at issue ha[d] or ha[d] not been
proved”—as opposed to a situation in which a judge had “express[ed] an opin-
ion as to the guilt of the accused”—a new trial is no longer automatically re-
quired. Instead, in scenarios like the one presented here, a party must make
a timely objection, and a trial court then has the discretion to issue a curative
instruction or grant a mistrial. Cf. State v. Cleveland, 321 Ga. 375, 384–85
(2025) (holding that a new trial was required under OCGA § 17-8-57 when the
trial court instructed the jury that the defendants were accomplices, thereby
commenting on their guilt).
        Patel relied on case law interpreting the pre-amendment language of
the statute—which, as discussed above, always mandated a new trial—in con-
cluding that curative instructions were per se legally inadequate such that a
motion for a mistrial could not be waived even when a party failed to renew his
motion after the giving of a curative instruction. See Patel, 282 Ga. at 415.
But the amendment to OCGA § 17-8-57 added language expressly providing a
curative instruction as a possible remedy for a court’s expression of opinion as
to whether a fact has been proven. In light of this amended statutory text, we
conclude that Patel has been abrogated by OCGA § 17-8-57 on this issue.
        18 We pretermitted two trial court errors and assumed one trial counsel
deficiency related to the introduction of Wyatt’s gang document and Agent
Thompson’s testimony about investigations into other SMM members. For the
reasons discussed above in Division 5, we conclude that Jackson “has failed to
establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these [pretermitted] trial court
errors and assumed deficient performance of trial counsel denied him a funda-
mentally fair trial.” Williams v. State, 318 Ga. 83, 97 (2024). See State v. Lane,
308 Ga. 10, 23 (2020).




                                       28