Monroe v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                              In the
                         Supreme Court of Georgia
                                         No. S26A0060
                                         Tonya Monroe
                                               v.
                                           The State

                     On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
                                      No. 18SC158564

                                      Decided: April 21, 2026


                LAND, Justice.
              Tonya Monroe appeals her 2022 convictions for malice
       murder and related charges stemming from the death of her in-
       fant grandson, Kobe Shaw. 1 Monroe argues that the evidence was


                1 The crimes are alleged to have taken place on or about March 10,
       2016. Monroe was first indicted on March 31, 2017, and was reindicted on
       April 6, 2018, by a Fulton County grand jury for malice murder (Count 1), fel-
       ony murder (Counts 2 and 3), cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 4),
       and distribution of methamphetamine (Count 5). In May 2018, Monroe’s first
       trial ended in a hung jury. At Monroe’s second trial, from November 3 to 10,
       2022, the jury found Monroe guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced
       Monroe to life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1, 20 years
       in prison for Count 4 (to be served concurrently with Count 1), and 30 years in
       prison for Count 5 (to be served concurrently with Count 1). Counts 2 and 3
       were vacated by operation of law.
                Monroe filed a timely motion for new trial on December 5, 2022, and
       amended that motion through new counsel on October 20, 2023. After a hear-
       ing on February 14, 2024, the trial court denied the amended motion for new
       trial on December 30, 2024, and Monroe filed a timely notice of appeal. Mon-
       roe’s appeal was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December
       2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
constitutionally insufficient to support her convictions and that
she was denied effective assistance of trial counsel in several re-
spects. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
       1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. Kobe,
who was nine months old at the time of his death on March 11,
2016, lived with his mother Taylor Shaw, his father Hayden
Shaw, and his maternal grandmother, Monroe, in an apartment
in Fulton County. At six months old, Kobe was diagnosed with a
genetic disorder that caused severe underdevelopment of his
brain and severely shortened his life expectancy. As a result of
this disorder, Kobe was unable to roll, crawl, or reach and grab
things, and he partially relied on a “g-tube” for feedings and med-
icine. However, Taylor and Hayden testified that at Kobe’s last
doctor’s appointment about a week prior to his death, his doctor
stated that Kobe was “looking really good and really healthy” and
that they discussed removing his feeding tube.
       On the evening of March 10, 2016, Kobe was “very fussy
and … aggravated.” Hayden went to the store and purchased
mashed potatoes, lemonade, and teething gel for Kobe. Taylor
gave Kobe the teething gel while Monroe prepared the mashed
potatoes, and Taylor then fed Kobe the mashed potatoes. Kobe
later fell asleep on Taylor’s chest, and Taylor noticed that he was
“sweating ... bad.” Between 1:00 and 2:00 am on March 11, Hay-
den placed Kobe upright on a c-shaped “boppy” pillow inside his
“pack and play” crib near his and Taylor’s bed to sleep the rest of
the night. 2
       Taylor and Hayden then fell asleep and woke up later that

       2 Taylor and Hayden testified that they used the pillow at the direction
of Kobe’s doctors to help minimize Kobe’s acid reflux but that the pillow was
never placed on Kobe’s face. Hayden testified that Kobe also slept with his
arms “wrap[ped]” in a blanket.




                                      2
morning when Monroe came into their room saying that Kobe was
“blue.” Hayden picked up Kobe and started “patting him on the
back.” Taylor yelled at Monroe to call 911; Monroe did so. Emer-
gency medical personnel and police officers arrived at the apart-
ment, where they found Kobe in the pack and play and observed
that he was “not breathing,” had an “arched body,” and was show-
ing signs of rigor mortis, including discoloration. Monroe told po-
lice that, when she went into Taylor’s and Hayden’s bedroom and
saw Kobe, he was “covered with a blanket mostly over [his] entire
body” and “the boppy pillow was on top of [his] body nearest the
head.” Hayden told police that Monroe’s statement that the pillow
was over Kobe’s face “was a lie” and he knew how Kobe “was sit-
ting” because he “picked his son up.”
       Hayden testified at trial that he, his wife, and Monroe reg-
ularly used meth together, but denied ever using meth in Kobe’s
presence or giving him meth. Hayden testified that no one used
meth on the day of Kobe’s death because Monroe told him “there
wasn’t any” and that he last used drugs with Monroe and Taylor
two days before Kobe died.
       The State presented testimony from several expert wit-
nesses whose testimony supported the State’s theory that Kobe
died from meth toxicity, including the testimony of two physicians
who opined that meth caused Kobe’s death.
        Dr. Karen Sullivan, a forensic pathologist who served as
the chief medical examiner for the Fulton County Medical Exam-
iner’s Office, supervised Kobe’s autopsy and testified that she in-
itially determined that Kobe’s cause of death might be asphyxia-
tion based on the information she received from investigators that
Kobe was found with a blanket and pillow over his body. Medical
examiners performed an in-house urine test, which did not test




                                3
positive for meth. As part of the autopsy, however, medical exam-
iners took samples of Kobe’s blood. Those samples tested positive
for meth, revealing that Kobe’s blood contained 8.6 nanograms of
meth per milliliter while his serum/plasma sample contained 14
nanograms of meth per milliliter. Tissue samples from Kobe’s
lungs also revealed evidence of pneumonia, which Dr. Sullivan
testified is “typical … in the lungs of a person who [has] died of
an acute drug overdose.” Dr. Sullivan testified that the positive
blood test results caused her to revise her determination as to the
cause of death with her ultimate conclusion being that he died
from meth toxicity. Dr. Sullivan determined the manner of Kobe’s
death was a homicide because “the only way he could have gotten
the [meth] was … if he was given it by someone else” as “he was
unable to crawl, stand, [or] hold a bottle by himself.”
        Dr. Christy Cunningham, the forensic medical pathologist
who conducted Kobe’s autopsy, testified that meth can cause “sud-
den cardiac death” and that “anytime that you have the presence
of an unexplained illicit drug in … [a] type of person that doesn’t
have … the ability to put those things there themselves,” it is
“considered contributory to death at that point.” Dr. Cunningham
testified that “there is no safe or therapeutic level of certain drugs
such as [meth]” and based her opinion that meth caused Kobe’s
death, in part, on “volumes” of cases she had reviewed in scientific
literature and “major pediatric forensic pathology textbooks.”
       Dr. Gaylord Lopez, a pharmacist with specialty training in
clinical toxicology and the executive director of the Georgia Poison
Center, testified that meth was “without a doubt … an accelerant”
to Kobe’s death. Dr. Lopez further testified that, based on his re-
view of Kobe’s bloodwork and scientific literature, the level of
meth in Kobe’s body was consistent with “direct administration”
of meth to Kobe, not secondary exposure. Dr. Lopez also testified




                                  4
to his opinion that Kobe’s exposure to the meth was recent be-
cause there was “no presence or measurable amount of the pri-
mary breakdown product of [meth], which is amphetamine.” He
testified that he believed this was because Kobe’s “body had not
had time to break that product down to a level that was quantifi-
able.”
        A warrant was issued for Monroe’s arrest on June 15, 2016.
Monroe could not be located for approximately one month, during
which time she stayed at several different residences, including
one residence in Alabama, disabled the GPS tracker on her vehi-
cle, altered her appearance, and used false names. One witness
testified at trial that Monroe stayed at his home for three days in
July 2016, during which she told him that all Kobe did was “squall
and squall and squall, and the only way to calm [him] down was
to blow [him] hot rails.” 3 Monroe’s friend, who was also her cell-
mate prior to Monroe’s trial, testified that Monroe told her that
Kobe “wouldn’t stop” crying and admitted to putting meth in his
mouth the night he died.
       2. Monroe argues that the evidence was constitutionally in-
sufficient to support her convictions. Specifically, she argues that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for malice
murder because the State failed to prove that meth caused Kobe’s
death or that she provided any meth to him. She also argues that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for cruelty
to children in the first degree and distribution of meth because
the State failed to prove that she “distributed” meth as defined in
OCGA § 16-13-21. We are unpersuaded.


        3 A police officer testified that “hot rails” are when “you cut a line of
crystal meth,” “heat the end of [a] glass straw,” and “stick the end of the glass
[straw] up your nose and you snort the crystal [meth]” so that the meth “goes
from a solid state to a gas state immediately” and you “inhale the fumes.”




                                       5
       “When evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence as a matter of constitutional due process, we view the evi-
dence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts
and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
he was convicted.” Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626, 629 (2021) (cita-
tion and punctuation omitted). “This Court does not reweigh evi-
dence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is re-
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to
the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evi-
dence.” Id. at 630 (citation and punctuation omitted). When we
review evidence for constitutional sufficiency, we consider “all ev-
idence, whether admissible or not.” Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. 579,
580 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
       a. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, a jury could have found Monroe guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of malice murder. The State presented testimony
from several expert witnesses who concluded that meth caused or
contributed to Kobe’s death. And the State likewise presented suf-
ficient evidence that Monroe gave Kobe the meth that killed him,
as Monroe’s friend and cellmate testified that Monroe admitted
she put meth in Kobe’s mouth the night he died, testimony which
was corroborated by Dr. Lopez’s testimony that the level of meth
in Kobe’s body was consistent with direct administration (as op-
posed to secondary exposure), which could only be done by an-
other person given Kobe’s condition. This evidence is sufficient to
support Monroe’s conviction. See United States v. Benjamin, 958
F3d 1124, 1132 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding evidence was suffi-
cient for a jury to find that fentanyl distributed by the defendant
was a “but-for cause” of the victim’s death).
      b. Monroe argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain her




                                 6
convictions for distribution of meth under OCGA § 16-13-30 and
cruelty to children predicated on distribution of meth because the
State failed to prove that Monroe “distributed” meth as defined in
the statute. We disagree.
       In pertinent part, OCGA § 16-13-30(b) makes it “unlawful
for any person to manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, ad-
minister, sell, or possess with intent to distribute any controlled
substance,” including meth. See OCGA § 16-13-26(3)(B) (defining
“[a]ny substance which contains any quantity of [meth]” as a
Schedule II controlled substance). “Distribute” is defined as “to
deliver a controlled substance, other than by administering or dis-
pensing it,” and “deliver” is defined as “the actual, constructive,
or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled
substance.” 4 OCGA § 16-13-21(11), (7). Thus, to be criminally lia-
ble for distribution of meth under OCGA § 16-13-30(b), a defend-
ant must make an “actual, constructive, or attempted transfer” of
meth to another person.
       Relying on Glispie v. State, 300 Ga. 128 (2016), Monroe con-
tends that this definition of “distribute” only contemplates the
sale of drugs. 5 Monroe’s interpretation of our holding in Glispie is



        4 Monroe did not “administer” meth under OCGA § 16-13-21(1) because
the statute defines “administer” as the “direct application” of a controlled sub-
stance by a “practitioner or … authorized agent” or by the “patient or research
subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner.” There is no
evidence in the record that Monroe was a “practitioner” or “authorized agent”;
thus, administration under OCGA § 16-13-21 does not contemplate the activity
alleged to have taken place here.
        5 Monroe specifically relies on the following language from Glispie to
argue that a “distribution” only contemplates sales activity:




                                       7
incorrect, however, because we did not hold or even suggest in
that case that a distribution of a controlled substance only occurs
when a defendant attempts to sell that substance. See id. at 131–
32 (contents of defendant’s pockets were “consistent with an in-
tent to sell or distribute” drugs (emphasis supplied)). Moreover,
there is nothing in the statutory text that supports Monroe’s con-
tention, and we must apply that text as it is written. See Allen v.
Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 12 (2007) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of pow-
ers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be
strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction be-
longs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. We can not add
a line to the law.” (citation omitted)).
       While we have not previously determined whether the def-
inition of “distribute” under OCGA § 16-13-30(b) encompasses the
type of activity at issue here, placing meth in a baby’s mouth
and/or causing a baby to ingest the fumes of heated meth, we have
no problem concluding that it does. In interpreting the language
of a statute, we generally presume
       that the General Assembly meant what it said and
       said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the
       statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we
       must view the statutory text in the context in which
       it appears, and we must read the statutory text in


       Here, Glispie had an assortment of drugs and drug parapher-
       nalia in his pocket at the time that he was arrested. Officers
       familiar with the drug trade testified that the amount of crack
       cocaine, the drugs’ packaging, possession of more than one cell
       phone, possession of cash in small denominations, and absence
       of a device to ingest crack with were all consistent with an in-
       tent to sell or distribute[.]

300 Ga. at 131–32.




                                      8
      its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary
      speaker of the English language would .... [And] if
      the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we at-
      tribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our
      search for statutory meaning is at an end.

White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 114–15 (2019) (citation omitted).
Here, a natural reading of the text of the statute indicates that a
“distribution” of meth as contemplated in OCGA § 16-13-30 does
not occur only when there is a sale of meth because the statute
makes it “unlawful for any person” to “distribute” or “sell” a con-
trolled substance. Walton Electric Membership Corp. v. Georgia
Power Co., 320 Ga. 740, 747 (2025). If “distribution” of a controlled
substance only occurred when it was sold, it would not make sense
for the statute to separately list “selling” a controlled substance
as a criminal offense. See Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498,
509 (2023) (“[I]t is well settled that in interpreting statutory text,
courts generally should avoid a construction that makes some lan-
guage mere surplusage.” (cleaned up)). This interpretation is con-
sistent with how our Court of Appeals has interpreted this provi-
sion. See, e.g, Capers v. State, 273 Ga. App. 427, 428 (2005) (“[T]he
offense of distribution of cocaine does not require that the offender
receive a payment.”); Dorsey v. State, 212 Ga. App. 479, 480 (1994)
(“[A] sale is a distribution by definition, although a distribution
may or may not be a sale.”); State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 158
(1992) (defining “deliver” as “[t]o give or transfer; to yield posses-
sion or control of; to part with (to); to make or hand over; to make
delivery of”).
       Thus, the definition of “distribute” covers more than just
selling a controlled substance because it encompasses “the actual,
constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of
a controlled substance.” OCGA § 16-13-21(11). Accordingly, we




                                  9
conclude that distribution under OCGA § 16-13-30(b) does not re-
quire a sale to occur and can occur when an individual intention-
ally transfers a controlled substance to another individual. There
was evidence presented to the jury in this case that Monroe did
just that, as Monroe told a friend that she placed meth in Kobe’s
mouth the night he died and told another witness that the only
way to calm Kobe down was to blow him “hot rails.” Accordingly,
we reject her argument that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the jury’s verdict.
       4. Monroe argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by (a) failing to object to the admission of Kobe’s blood
test results, (b) failing to object to testimony from the State’s ex-
perts as to Kobe’s cause of death, (c) failing to request a limiting
instruction as to testimony of Monroe’s parole officer, and (d) fail-
ing to question Taylor about Hayden’s drug use on the day of
Kobe’s death. These claims fail.
       A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
prove deficient performance by his counsel and resulting preju-
dice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To
prove deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment.” Id. This requires Monroe to “overcome the strong pre-
sumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of
reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions
were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Wilson v. State, 313 Ga. 319, 322 (2022) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
        “An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a
question of trial strategy.” Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 62 (2015)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “Unless the choice of strategy




                                 10
is objectively unreasonable, such that no competent trial counsel
would have pursued such a course, we will not second-guess coun-
sel’s decisions in this regard.” Id. See also Hurt v. State, 298 Ga.
51, 57 (2015) (“If a reasonable lawyer might have done what the
actual lawyer did—whether for the same reasons given by the ac-
tual lawyer or different reasons entirely—the actual lawyer can-
not be said to have performed in an objectively unreasonable
way.”). And “[i]mportantly, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus
insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
Wilson, 313 Ga. at 322 (citation and punctuation omitted). “To
show prejudice, [the appellant] must establish a reasonable prob-
ability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the trial would have been different.” Palmer v. State, 303
Ga. 810, 816 (2018). “If either Strickland prong is not met, this
Court need not examine the other prong.” Id. at 816.
       a. Monroe argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the admission of the blood test
results on chain-of-custody grounds. We are unpersuaded.
        “When blood samples are handled in a routine manner and
nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood sought to
be admitted is not the blood tested, the blood is admissible and
the circumstances of each case need only establish reasonable as-
surance of the identity of the sample.” See Johnson v. State, 271
Ga. 375, 382 (1999) (cleaned up). Here, trial counsel chose not to
challenge the chain of custody of the blood but instead focused on
two theories of defense: either the quantity of meth in Kobe’s sys-
tem was insufficient to kill him, or Kobe ingested the meth “pas-
sively” by simply “being around it.” At the hearing on Monroe’s
motion for new trial, Monroe’s trial counsel testified that he “con-
sidered” whether he could exclude the results of the blood tests at




                                11
trial but “did not see” a way to do so, particularly given that chain
of custody issues “go[] more to … weight [of the evidence] than
admissibility.” (cleaned up).
       As trial counsel correctly noted, “[challenges] to the chain
of custody [go] to the weight rather than the admissibility of the
evidence.” McDowell v. State, 309 Ga. 504, 507 (2020) (citation
and punctuation omitted). “When there is only a bare speculation
of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt
remains go to the weight.” Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2009).
Here, there was no evidence that the blood samples had been the
subject of tampering. Monroe’s only argument on that issue is
that tampering could be inferred from the fact that the in-house
urine drug test came back negative while the blood tests came
back positive for meth. This argument is meritless, as the evi-
dence revealed that the two types of tests at issue (urine and
blood) were different tests and that the alleged “discrepancy” in
the results was explained by the nature of the tests and not tam-
pering. »Accordingly, we cannot say that trial counsel’s decision
not to object to the chain of custody of the blood samples was ob-
jectively unreasonable. Counsel’s actions were not deficient, and
this claim fails.
      b. Monroe argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective as-
sistance by failing to object to the State’s expert witnesses’ opin-
ions as to Kobe’s cause of death under Daubert 6 because those
opinions were not based on reliable scientific principles and meth-
ods. We disagree.
       Under OCGA § 24-7-702, which adopts the standard set
forth in Daubert,



      6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579 (1993).




                                   12
       a trial court must evaluate the reliability of the ex-
       pert’s proffered testimony; proper considerations in-
       clude whether a theory or technique can be tested,
       whether it has been subjected to peer review and
       publication, the known or potential rate of error for
       the theory or technique, the general degree of ac-
       ceptance in the relevant scientific or professional
       community, and the expert’s range of experience and
       training.

Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287, 300 n.6 (2022) (citation and punctu-
ation omitted). 7 Daubert’s reliability inquiry is “flexible,” with the
specific factors “neither necessarily nor exclusively applying to all
experts in every case.” HNTB Georgia, Inc. v. Hamilton-King, 287
Ga. 641, 643 (2010) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 US
137, 141 (1999)).
       In the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
trial counsel’s decisions on
       how to respond to the presentation of an expert wit-
       ness by the opposing side, such as whether to pre-
       sent counter expert testimony, to rely upon cross-ex-
       amination, to forego cross-examination and/or to
       forego development of certain expert opinion, is a
       matter of trial strategy that, if reasonable, cannot
       successfully establish a claim of ineffective assis-
       tance of counsel.




       7 OCGA § 24-7-702 extends the Daubert standard to criminal trials
commenced on or after July 1, 2022. Hayes v. State, 320 Ga. 505, 516 (2024).
Monroe’s trial commenced in November 2022.




                                    13
McIver v. State, 321 Ga. 565, 569–70 (2025) (citation and punctu-
ation omitted).
        Here, the record demonstrates that Monroe’s trial counsel
thoroughly cross-examined each of the State’s expert witnesses in
an attempt to show the weakness of their opinions. And, a reason-
able attorney could conclude that this cross-examination was ef-
fective, as appellate counsel later concluded that there was no
need to call these experts at the motion for new trial hearing be-
cause the experts were “repeatedly asked to give the scientific ba-
ses of their determinations and were unable to do so” and “[t]here
is no reason to think this testimony would have changed had the
experts been recalled to the motion for new trial hearing.” More-
over, trial counsel presented his own rebuttal expert in support of
Monroe’s defense, Dr. James Downs, who testified that he did not
see a set of symptoms in Kobe that would indicate meth toxicity,
that he was unaware of any child who died due to a level of meth
that was “this low,” and that he believed that Kobe died either as
a result of his genetic disorder or from undetermined causes.
       Here, in light of the testimony given by the State’s experts,
which included their explanations of how their opinions were sup-
ported by the medical literature and their own experience, we
cannot say that no objectively reasonable attorney would have
foregone a Daubert motion and instead chosen to rely on a thor-
ough cross-examination and the presentation of a rebuttal expert.
Accordingly, Monroe’s claim that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient fails. See Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882, 892 (2020)
(no deficient performance in failing to call a rebuttal expert when
trial counsel instead decided to “destroy” the State’s expert on
cross-examination and the record reflected that cross-examina-
tion was “thorough and sifting”); Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 52–
53 (2019) (no deficiency in failing to call an opposing expert when




                                14
counsel reasoned that the “same conclusions” that experts would
testify to could be drawn out in cross-examination). See also Gaw-
lak v. State, 310 Ga. App. 757, 759 (2011) (no deficient perfor-
mance because the decision not to call a rebuttal expert and in-
stead to rely on cross-examination was a matter of trial strategy);
Al-Attawy v. State, 289 Ga. App. 570, 573–74 (2008) (“Not object-
ing to testimony but instead subjecting it to cross-examination
may be part of a reasonable trial strategy.”). 8
       c. Monroe argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction for the trial
testimony of Monroe’s parole officer, after the court had indicated
it would provide one if requested. This enumeration fails.
        Prior to trial, Monroe’s trial counsel filed a motion to ex-
clude the testimony of her parole officer, Wayne Dyer, who the
State intended to call as a witness to establish that Monroe used
meth the day of Kobe’s death and that Monroe fled following her
making of this confession to Dyer. Monroe argued that calling
Dyer as a witness would necessarily imply to the jury that Monroe
was a convicted felon. The trial court withheld its ruling, indicat-
ing that it believed Dyer’s testimony was intrinsic because it ex-
plained why Monroe was “making these statements [regarding
her meth use] to the parole officer” but that it “would be more
than happy to do a stern limiting instruction to the jury that they
can’t take it into consideration.” At trial, the State called Dyer as
a witness, and trial counsel did not request a limiting instruction.

        8 We acknowledge that these decisions were all rendered prior to Geor-
gia’s adoption of the Daubert standard in criminal cases. Nonetheless, their
holdings are persuasive and show that an attorney’s decision to forgo a possible
objection to expert testimony in lieu of vigorous cross-examination and the
presentation of rebuttal expert testimony is a classic strategic decision that we
will not lightly second-guess when evaluating an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim.




                                      15
Dyer testified that when Monroe met with him on March 12, 2016,
he was “shocked” by her appearance, that she appeared to be “on
substance abuse,” and that after Dyer told her he “was going to
do a drug screen,” Monroe admitted to using “meth about two
days” earlier. Monroe then “fled” after speaking to Dyer.
        During the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel tes-
tified that he did not have a reason for failing to request a limiting
instruction but he elected to “[lean] into” Dyer’s testimony to “ex-
plain [Monroe’s] flight” for the month prior to her arrest. Because
Dyer’s testimony tended to show that Monroe could have fled be-
cause she was in trouble with her parole officer and not because
of Kobe’s death, and because a limiting instruction may have re-
sulted in drawing extra attention to Monroe’s criminal history, we
cannot say that trial counsel’s failure to request a limiting in-
struction was objectively unreasonable. Thus, Monroe has not
shown that trial counsel performed deficiently under the circum-
stances. See Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 148 (2019) (“A defendant
who contends a strategic decision constitutes deficient perfor-
mance must show that no competent attorney, under similar cir-
cumstances, would have made it.” (citation and punctuation omit-
ted)); Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 220 (2009) (trial counsel’s de-
cision not to request a limiting instruction was strategic because
“he did not wish to draw attention to the prior convictions”).
       d. Monroe argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffec-
tive assistance by failing to question Taylor about Hayden’s meth
use in the apartment around the time of Kobe’s death and to im-
peach Taylor with her testimony from Monroe’s first trial that
Hayden used meth the night after Kobe died. We disagree.
      In advance of trial, the State filed a motion in limine to ex-
clude hearsay testimony from Taylor implicating Hayden in
Kobe’s death. The trial court granted the State’s motion, ruling




                                 16
that if Monroe intended to present evidence that Hayden or any-
one else caused Kobe’s death, trial counsel was ordered “to bring
this to the attention of the [c]ourt outside the presence of the jury
and prior to asking such questions” so that the trial court could
rule on its admissibility.
        During trial counsel’s cross-examination of Taylor, counsel
asked her whether she had seen “Hayden with a large amount of
[meth] on his person” on the day Kobe died. The State objected,
and, outside of the presence of the jury, the court ruled that Mon-
roe’s trial counsel could ask Taylor whether she saw “meth in the
apartment that day,” and whether “she used [meth] with Hayden
… in the weeks leading up to [Kobe’s] death” but could not “intro-
duce evidence implicating Hayden as the one who distributed the
[meth]” to Kobe.
      When the jury returned and trial resumed, the trial court
instructed the jury to disregard trial counsel’s last question. Trial
counsel then asked Taylor whether she saw meth in the apart-
ment “the day of Kobe’s passing,” and Taylor responded “yes.” No
further questions were asked concerning Hayden’s alleged drug
use on the day or night of Kobe’s death.
       “[T]he extent of cross-examination [is a matter] of trial
strategy and tactics, and such strategic and tactical decisions do
not amount to deficient performance unless they are so unreason-
able that no competent attorney would have made them under
similar circumstances.” Washington v. State, 294 Ga. 560, 566
(2014). And, generally, “[t]he decision whether to impeach a wit-
ness is a matter of trial strategy that typically will not support a
claim of ineffective assistance.” Bryant v. State, 306 Ga. 687, 697
(2019).
       The record reflects that Monroe’s counsel did question
Taylor about the presence of meth in the apartment the day of




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Kobe’s death. Monroe provides no evidence suggesting that had
her trial counsel questioned Taylor further, Taylor would have
provided more specific and helpful information about meth use in
the apartment the day of Kobe’s passing. 9 See Bonner v. State,
314 Ga. 472, 476 (2022) (finding no deficient performance in fail-
ing to cross-examine a witness when the appellant “failed to
demonstrate how cross-examination of these witnesses would
have been helpful to him”). Monroe likewise points to no incon-
sistencies between Taylor’s testimony during the first trial and
her testimony during the second trial that would have allowed
trial counsel to impeach her, nor does she establish how counsel
would have been deficient in failing to impeach Taylor given his
impression that Taylor was favorable to the defense. For these
reasons, Monroe has failed to show that trial counsel performed
deficiently.
       e. Monroe argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged
errors committed by her trial counsel and the trial court warrant
a new trial. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (2020). “In considering
a claim of cumulative error, we evaluate only the effects of mat-
ters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-er-
rors.” O’Neal v. State, 316 Ga. 264, 271 (2023). Because none of
Monroe’s claims of error have succeeded and she has not shown
that her counsel performed deficiently, “there are no errors to ag-
gregate, and [her] claim of cumulative error also fails.” Id.
       Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.




       9 At Monroe’s first trial, Taylor testified that Hayden used meth the
night of the 11th, after Kobe died. Kobe was found dead on the morning of the
11th.




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