Nuckles v. State

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official text of the opinion.




                                                In the
                           Supreme Court of Georgia
                                         No. S26A0321
                                     Trevor Lamont Nuckles
                                               v.
                                            The State

                      On Appeal from the Superior Court of Cherokee County
                                         No. 12CR0911

                                        Decided: April 21, 2026


                  LAGRUA, Justice.
                 Trevor Lamont Nuckles appeals an order of the trial court
          denying his motion seeking post-judgment relief. After reviewing
          the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Nuck-
          les’s motion, and thus, we affirm.
                 1. Pertinent to this appeal, the record shows that Nuckles
          was indicted by a Cherokee County grand jury for malice murder,
          felony murder, and other crimes arising out of the shooting death
          of Nuckles’s girlfriend, Dejanirra Elrod. On December 12, 2012,
          Nuckles entered a negotiated guilty plea to felony murder, aggra-
          vated assault, cruelty to children, family violence, and other
          charges and was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, to run
          consecutively.
                 On December 15, 2014, Nuckles filed a pro se petition for
          habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Chattooga County (the
          “habeas court”), claiming, among other things, that his guilty plea
          was invalid because he did not enter it knowingly, freely, will-
          ingly, or intelligently. The habeas court denied Nuckles’s habeas
petition, concluding that Nuckles failed to meet his burden to
show that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and in-
telligently made, given that the record reflected that Nuckles: (1)
signed the “Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty”; (2) testified that
he understood the charges against him; (3) testified that he was
advised of and understood he was waiving his rights under
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238 (1969); and (4) testified that he
understood the possible sentences he could receive. The habeas
court also noted that, when Nuckles’s plea counsel testified at the
habeas hearing, plea counsel confirmed that Nuckles wanted to
enter a guilty plea; that he never indicated he had changed his
mind; and that, after a review of his constitutional rights, he
agreed to waive those rights. Following the habeas court’s ruling,
Nuckles filed an application for a certificate of probable cause to
appeal to this Court, which the Court denied. See Nuckles v.
Crickmar, Warden, S15H1435 (Ga. Nov. 15, 2018).
       On March 24, 2020, Nuckles returned to the trial court,
where he filed a pro se motion to quash the indictment, alleging
that his convictions were void because (1) the charges against him
were not properly heard by the grand jury; (2) the indictment was
not perfect in form and substance; and (3) the indictment was de-
fective, as it was not properly presented to the grand jury and
recorded in the minutes of the trial court. On May 7, 2020, the
trial court denied Nuckles’s motion to quash the indictment as
untimely, observing that Nuckles entered a guilty plea eight
years before he sought to quash the indictment and, after enter-
ing a guilty plea, Nuckles—who was entitled to timely pursue an
appeal or move to withdraw his guilty plea—failed to do either
one. Nuckles appealed the trial court’s ruling to this Court, and
we dismissed Nuckles’s appeal in an unpublished order on the ba-
sis that he was “essentially seeking to vacate his convictions as




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void, which is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” cit-
ing Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (2010) and Harper v. State,
286 Ga. 216, 218 (2009). See Nuckles v. State, S20A1372 (Ga. July
15, 2020).
      On August 7, 2025, Nuckles filed the motion for post-judg-
ment relief at issue in this appeal, seeking (1) leave to file an out-
of-time appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-39.1; (2) vacatur of the
judgment of conviction as void due to an allegedly defective in-
dictment; (3) withdrawal of his guilty plea as involuntary under
Boykin; and (4) appointment of counsel to represent him in all
future proceedings. On September 19, 2025, the trial court issued
an order denying Nuckles’s motion.
        In denying the motion, the trial court first concluded that,
because OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b) primarily remedied denials of out-of-
time appeals based on Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), and
Nuckles’s prior motions were denied on substantive grounds—not
due to Cook’s jurisdictional bar—OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b) was inappli-
cable. 1 Additionally, the trial court concluded that, under OCGA




      1 OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b) provides:
      In a criminal case, after a judgment of conviction, a defendant
      whose motion seeking an out-of-time motion for new trial or
      notice of appeal or whose granted out-of-time motion for new
      trial or notice of appeal was dismissed based upon the Supreme
      Court’s decision in Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022), and its
      progeny, shall have the right to move for leave to file an out-of-
      time motion for new trial or notice of appeal until June 30,
      2026, pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section. Any filing
      made pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to the
      100-day time limitation in subsection (a) of this Code section.




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§ 5-6-39.1(a), 2 out-of-time appeals may only be sought within 100
days of the missed deadline with the State’s consent, excusable
neglect, deficient counsel, or good cause. But, here, Nuckles pro-
vided no evidence of such circumstances, and his motion was filed
well beyond the 100-day limit. The trial court also summarily de-
nied Nuckles’s requests to vacate the judgment, withdraw his
guilty plea, and appoint counsel, noting that reopening this “long-
closed case” would—absent “compelling justification” which did
not exist here—undermine “judicial finality and contribute to de-
lays,” particularly given “the documented plea process.” On Octo-
ber 6, 2025, Nuckles filed a direct appeal of the trial court’s order
denying his motion for post-judgment relief. 3
      2. On appeal, Nuckles alleges that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for post-judgment relief on several grounds,
none of which have merit.
       (a) Nuckles first contends that his indictment was “juris-
dictionally void,” and thus, his conviction and sentence are like-
wise void and must be vacated. Nuckles asserts that he is entitled



        2 Under OCGA § 5-6-39.1(a),
         a defendant may move for leave to file an out-of-time … notice
         of appeal within 100 days from the expiration of the time period
         for the filing of such motion or notice: (A) With the consent of
         the state; (B) By showing excusable neglect; (C) By showing
         that the failure to timely file such motion for new trial or notice
         of appeal was attributable to the deficient performance of such
         defendant’s counsel; or (D) For other good cause shown.
         3 On the same date, Nuckles also filed a discretionary application seek-
ing appellate review of the trial court’s September 19 order, which we dis-
missed because a discretionary application is not the proper vehicle in which
to seek review of the denial of such a motion and because Nuckles was entitled
to appeal by filing a notice of appeal, which he had already done. See Nuckles
v. State, S26D0304 (Ga. Oct. 30, 2025).




                                       4
to challenge his void conviction under OCGA § 17-9-4, 4 alleging
that this statute “allows individuals in custody to challenge void
judgments at any time, including those entered via guilty plea.”5
        Nuckles is not entitled to relief under this claim. “Regard-
less of the nomenclature,” Nuckles’s motion “seeks to set aside or
vacate his criminal convictions.” Roberts, 286 Ga. at 532. And we
have said that “[a] motion to vacate a conviction … is not one of
the established procedures for challenging the validity of a judg-
ment in a criminal case.” Id. See Harper, 286 Ga. at 218 (holding
that “[a] petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is
not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case”). Because Nuckles
is not authorized to seek relief from his criminal convictions pur-
suant to a motion to vacate or correct a void conviction, there is
nothing for this Court to review, and this claim fails. See Roberts,
286 Ga. at 532.
        (b) Nuckles next contends that he is entitled to a with-
drawal of his guilty plea because “his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently as required by Boykin[].”
This claim fails because Nuckles’s request to withdraw his guilty
plea was untimely. See Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299, 299 (2005)
(“It is well settled that when the term of court has expired in


       4 OCGA § 17-9-4 provides that “[t]he judgment of a court having no
jurisdiction of the person or subject matter, or void for any other cause, is a
mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the
interest of the parties to consider it.”
        5 Nuckles is not asserting a void sentence claim, which would allow
him to challenge his sentence in a properly brought proceeding. See Carter v.
State, 317 Ga. 322, 323 (2023); Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 373 n.11
(2019) (recognizing that, although a trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the
withdrawal of a guilty plea after expiration of the term of court in which a
defendant was sentenced pursuant to that plea, “the trial court retains ongoing
jurisdiction to correct a void or illegal sentence”).




                                       5
which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea, the
trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea.”).
        Under Georgia law, a motion to withdraw a guilty
        plea must be filed within the same term of court as
        the sentence entered on the guilty plea…. This well-
        established rule is merely the application of a bed-
        rock common-law principle that applies equally to
        other criminal motions and in civil cases. And, if a
        defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after ex-
        piration of the term of court in which the sentence
        was imposed, the defendant must pursue such relief
        through habeas corpus proceedings.

Harvey v. State, 315 Ga. 395, 397–98 (2022) (citing Schoicket v.
State, 312 Ga. 825, 827 (2021) (cleaned up)). Although OCGA §
17-7-93 has been amended to allow an individual to file a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea within 30 days after entry of judgment
or within the term of court, whichever is later, Nuckles’s motion
is not timely under this statute. Nuckles filed the motion to with-
draw his guilty plea in August 2025, almost 13 years after he
pleaded guilty and was sentenced in December 2012. The motion
was, therefore, untimely, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
hear it on the merits. See Harvey, 315 Ga. at 398. Accordingly,
the trial court properly denied Nuckles’s motion. 6
       (c) While Nuckles also requested the appointment of coun-
sel in his motion for post-judgment relief, which the trial court


        6 Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, it should have dismissed
Nuckles’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, because the trial court
denied the motion without addressing the merits, it is not necessary for us to
remand the case for the trial court enter a dismissal order. See, e.g., Bonner v.
State, 310 Ga. 426, 426–27 (2020); Harvey, 315 Ga. at 398.




                                       6
denied, Nuckles offers absolutely no argument about or context
for this claim on appeal. Additionally, Nuckles cites no legal au-
thority in support of this claim in his briefing; he includes no ci-
tations to the record; and he fails to identify any error in the rec-
ord. As such, Nuckles has failed to meet his burden of showing
trial court error on this claim. See Clark v. State, ___ Ga. ___
(2026), S26A0250, slip op. at 12–13 (Ga. Feb. 3, 2026) (concluding
that, in the context of OCGA § 24-4-404(b), the appellant made
“no cogent argument on appeal that any of the requirements of
Rule 404(b) are not met” and, thus, “has not met his burden to
show that the evidence did not satisfy those requirements”). We
have long held that “it is not the function of the appellate court to
prosecute an appeal on [an] appellant’s behalf.” Brown v. Fra-
chiseur, 247 Ga. 463, 464 (1981) (concluding that, the appellant
“failed to meet his burden of showing error” and “failed to present
the appellate court with a record sufficient to enable it to deter-
mine whether the trial court committed reversible error,” and
thus, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed).
       (d) Finally, in his motion for post-judgment relief, Nuckles
also requested leave to file an out-of-time appeal under OCGA §
5-6-39.1(a) and (b), and the trial court denied that request. How-
ever, on appeal, Nuckles does not reference that request for relief
or the trial court’s denial of the request. Nevertheless, assuming
without deciding that OCGA § 5-6-39.1 applies to out-of-time ap-
peals from a guilty plea, 7 Nuckles’s claim would fail because he
has not carried his burden to show that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for leave to file an out-of-time appeal under
OCGA § 5-6-39.1. See Clark, slip op. at 12–13; Brown, 247 Ga. at


       7 In his briefing on appeal, Nuckles does not offer any substantive ar-
gument that OCGA § 5-6-39.1 should apply in this context, nor does he include
any legal authority in support of such a claim.




                                     7
464. Moreover, the record reflects that Nuckles never filed a mo-
tion seeking an out-of-time appeal that was dismissed under Cook
v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (2022). See OCGA § 5-6-39.1(b). And Nuck-
les’s present motion was filed well outside the 100-day window
provided by OCGA § 5-6-39.1(a). As such, Nuckles was not enti-
tled to file a motion for out-of-time appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1,
and the trial court properly denied his request to do so.
       Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P. J. and Pinson, J., not participating.




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