Peavy v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                    In the
                              Supreme Court of Georgia
                                            No. S26A0455
                                      Ja’Mychael Quintrez Peavy
                                                  v.
                                             The State

                           On Appeal from the Superior Court of Forsyth County
                                            No. 23CR-0356-2

                                             Decided: May 5, 2026


                      BETHEL, Justice.
                   Ja’Mychael Quintrez Peavy was convicted of felony murder
             and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his
             coworker Hamilton Darwin following a workplace dispute. 1 On
             appeal, Peavy argues that: (1) the verdict form and related jury
             instructions violated Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992), and its
             progeny and were misleading; (2) the trial court erred in


                      1 The crimes occurred on May 17, 2023. On July 10, 2023, a Forsyth
             County grand jury indicted Peavy for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
             (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and two counts of possession of a
             firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 4 and 5). At a jury trial in
             March 2025, Peavy was found not guilty on Counts 1 and 5 but guilty on the
             remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Peavy to serve life in prison on
             Count 2 and five years consecutive on Count 4. Count 3 merged into Count 2.
                     Peavy filed a timely motion for new trial on March 18, 2025, which he
             amended twice. Peavy waived a hearing on the motion, and the trial court
             entered an order denying the motion, as amended on September 9, 2025. Peavy
             then filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to the term of
             this Court beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the
             briefs.
excluding proffered defense testimony; and (3) the “guilty”
verdicts for felony murder and aggravated assault were
repugnant when considered in light of the “not guilty” verdict for
possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated
assault. For the reasons that follow, Peavy’s claims fail, so we
affirm.
       1. The evidence admitted at trial showed the following. On
the morning of May 17, 2023, shortly after Peavy arrived at work,
he confronted Darwin, his coworker, about his concern that
Darwin was speaking poorly of him to their manager. During the
course of that confrontation, which began as a verbal argument,
Darwin punched Peavy. Peavy fell, got up, and began walking to
his car. Darwin followed, yelling to Peavy, “F**k, n***er, you ain’t
going to get that gun.” One of Peavy’s coworkers grabbed Darwin
and tried to keep him from pursuing Peavy. Darwin broke away
and followed Peavy toward Peavy’s car. Once Peavy reached his
car, Darwin began moving away from Peavy. Peavy then grabbed
a gun from his car and, in view of several coworkers, fired it at
Darwin multiple times. Darwin, who was also armed, then
returned fire, striking Peavy in the abdomen. When the shooting
stopped, Peavy entered his workplace and dropped his gun on the
floor, which was secured by the manager until police arrived.
Peavy told his manager that he had shot Darwin. Darwin suffered
gunshot wounds to his leg, shoulder, and chest, and ultimately
died as a result of his wounds.
        At trial, a fellow inmate who was incarcerated with Peavy
testified that Peavy told him he was tired of Darwin belittling him
at the job and wanted to put an end to it. According to the inmate,
Peavy told him that he initially fired two shots at Darwin, who
then ran, and that he pursued the fleeing Darwin and shot him
three more times. Peavy argued justification at trial and asserted,




                                 2
alternatively, that he acted in the heat of passion, such that the
jury should find him guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter.
       2. Peavy first argues that the verdict form, as well as the
related jury instructions, constituted an improper sequential jury
instruction in violation of this Court’s decision in Edge v. State,
261 Ga. 865 (1992). He also asserts that the verdict form was
misleading. Because Peavy did not object to the verdict form and
related instructions at trial, we review this claim only for plain
error. See Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 682–83 (2012);
OCGA § 17-8-58.
       To show plain error, the appellant must demonstrate that
the instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious
beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Satisfying all four
prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be.


      State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 219 (2021) (quotation marks
omitted). Peavy has failed to demonstrate any error, much less
clear and obvious error, in the verdict form or related
instructions.
       In Edge, this Court held that a jury instruction is
improperly sequential if it requires “the jury to consider voluntary
manslaughter only if it has considered and found the defendant
not guilty of malice murder and felony murder.” 261 Ga. at 867.
Peavy understands that holding to require that the jury conducts
its deliberations in a particular order, beginning with voluntary
manslaughter before proceeding to the charged counts. And he
asserts that, because voluntary manslaughter was listed as an




                                 3
option at the bottom of the verdict form, after the five charged
counts, 2 and because the trial court instructed the jurors that
they could consider “all of these offenses in any order that you
wish,” the rule against sequential instructions, as he understands
it, was violated here. Peavy is incorrect.
              As we have explained, “when the evidence presented
in a criminal trial warrants a jury instruction on a lesser-included
offense, the trial court errs if it instructs the jury that it may
consider the lesser offense only if it first unanimously finds the
defendant not guilty of the indicted greater offense.” Stewart v.
State, 311 Ga. 471, 473–74 (2021) (emphasis added). Neither
listing voluntary manslaughter after the charged offenses nor
instructing the jury that it could consider the offenses in any
order it wished is the equivalent of an improper sequential
instruction that the jury could consider voluntary manslaughter
only after unanimously finding Peavy not guilty of malice murder
and felony murder. See Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 198 (2018)
(“There is no ‘exact formula’ that trial courts must follow in this
context so long as the charge as a whole ensures that the jury will
consider whether evidence of provocation and passion might
authorize a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.” (quotation marks
omitted)); Van v. State, 294 Ga. 464, 467 (2014) (“Merely listing
the offenses on the verdict form in the order of malice murder,
felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter [does] not constitute
reversible error.”). There likewise is no requirement that the jury
be instructed to consider the lesser offense before the charged

       2 The preprinted verdict form listed each of the five counts of the
indictment with a blank to the left of each count where the jury could write
“guilty” or “not guilty.” Below the charged counts, the verdict form separately
listed an option for voluntary manslaughter, also with a blank to the left where
the jury could enter its verdict. The voluntary manslaughter option was
separated from the indicted counts by several blank lines and the word “OR.”




                                       4
offenses. In fact, we have approved an instruction to the contrary.
See Morris, 303 Ga. at 198 (“A trial court may instruct a jury to
consider a greater offense before it considers a lesser offense.”
(quotation marks omitted)). The only prohibition in this context
is that the trial court may not “instruct the jury that it must reach
a unanimous verdict on the greater offense before considering the
lesser offense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And because
neither the verdict form nor the trial court’s related instruction
required the jury here to reach a unanimous verdict on the
greater offenses before considering the lesser offense, the charge
was not sequential and, thus, was not erroneous, much less
plainly so.
        Peavy further complains that the verdict form was
misleading because, by listing voluntary manslaughter after all
the charged offenses, it failed to ensure that the jury considered
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of both malice murder
and felony murder. But a preprinted verdict form is “treated as
part of the jury instructions.” Cheddersingh, 290 Ga. at 683. And
“it is axiomatic that we do not assess jury charges in isolation;
rather, we consider them as a whole to determine whether there
is a reasonable likelihood the jury improperly applied a
challenged instruction.” Locklear v. State, 317 Ga. 115, 122 (2023)
(quotation marks omitted). See also Owens, 312 Ga. at 217–20
(considering the verdict form along with the jury instructions and
noting that “it is critical to consider the jury instructions as a
whole”).
       Considering the jury instructions here as a whole, it is clear
that the instructions correctly informed the jury that it could find
Peavy guilty of voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to
either malice murder or felony murder. Specifically, the trial
court instructed the jury that the verdict form was not sequential




                                 5
and that voluntary manslaughter is “the lesser offense of murder”
and that “[i]n considering the malice and felony murder charges,
you must decide whether the defendant was sufficiently provoked
and acted out of passion.” The trial court further instructed that,
if the jury found “the defendant was sufficiently provoked and
acted out of passion,” it “may not return a verdict of guilty of
malice or felony murder, but … would be authorized to return a
verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter.” Because the
instructions as a whole informed the jury that voluntary
manslaughter was a lesser-included alternative to both the
malice murder and felony murder counts, Peavy cannot establish
any error, let alone plain error, in this respect. See Johnson v.
State, 300 Ga. 665, 669 (2017) (no error when jury charge, as a
whole, correctly informed jury it could find defendant guilty of
malice murder or voluntary manslaughter).
        3. Peavy next argues that the trial court erred by excluding
the testimony of an expert witness that would go to Peavy’s
justification defense. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court’s
analysis of the testimony’s admissibility was deficient in several
respects. He also argues, for the first time on appeal, that by
excluding the expert testimony the trial court violated his
constitutional right to present a complete defense. For the
reasons discussed below, both arguments fail.
      The State filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude the
testimony of an expert witness who would testify in the areas of
defensive tactics, active shooter situations, and firearms; the
witness had previously testified at an evidentiary hearing on
Peavy’s motion for pretrial immunity, which was denied. The
State moved to exclude the testimony under OCGA §§ 24-7-702,
24-4-402, and 24-4-403, arguing that the testimony was not
relevant to any issue in the case and would not assist the trier of




                                  6
fact. The trial court subsequently entered an order granting the
State’s motion. After noting the State’s previous agreement that
the expert was qualified to testify in the areas of defensive tactics,
active shooters, firearms, and training for defensive tactics, the
court turned its attention to the relevance of the expert’s
testimony to supporting Peavy’s defense of self-defense. In its
order, the court highlighted some examples of the proffered expert
testimony. The highlighted testimony generally related to the use
of defensive training and tactics, including testimony as to
whether height and weight affects defensive tactics, whether
flight demonstrates escalation or de-escalation, whether having a
weapon escalates a confrontation, whether a punch to the face is
an active threat, and how defensive tactics and training assist in
dealing with such a situation. The court ultimately held that the
“questions concerning defensive training and tactics” were not
relevant because there was no evidence that Peavy had received
any such training. The court further determined that the expert’s
testimony would not be helpful to the trier of fact, with the
exception of testimony “concerning the way in which a Glock
works, how shell casings are ejected, and other information
concerning shell casings and their locations.” 3
      (a) Peavy argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by excluding the expert’s testimony under OCGA § 24-7-702
(“Rule 702”) because, he says, the court’s admissibility analysis
was flawed in several respects. We are not persuaded.
       Subsection (b) of Rule 702 lays out the standards governing


       3 The court also excluded the expert’s testimony concerning the
psychological effects of the confrontation on Peavy under OCGA § 24-7-704(b)
on the basis that Peavy had not raised “any of the mental defenses recognized
by Georgia law.” Peavy does not appear to challenge that portion of the trial
court’s ruling on appeal, so we do not address it.




                                     7
the admissibility of expert testimony. It provides:
        A witness who is qualified as an expert by
        knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
        may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
        (1) [t]he expert’s scientific, technical, or other
        specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
        understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
        issue; (2) [t]he testimony is based upon sufficient
        facts or data; (3) [t]he testimony is the product of
        reliable principles and methods; and (4) [t]he expert
        has reliably applied the principles and methods to
        the facts of the case.

       OCGA § 24-7-702(b). This standard requires the trial court
to “act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure the relevance and reliability of
expert testimony,” applying the principles identified in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 (1993), and its
progeny. 4 Dubois v. Brantley, 297 Ga. 575, 585 (2015). As the
Eleventh Circuit has explained, 5 subsection (b)’s standard


        4 Effective July 1, 2022, the General Assembly extended to criminal
cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in
Daubert and its progeny. See Ga. L. 2022, p. 201, § 1 (amending OCGA § 24-7-
702). The Daubert standard has been applicable in civil actions in this state
since 2005, when the General Assembly enacted the predecessor statute to
OCGA § 24-7-702. See Ga. L. 2005, p. 8, § 7.
        5 Subsection (b) of OCGA § 24-7-702 is identical to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, so in applying this rule, we may look for guidance to federal case
law, especially that of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh
Circuit of Appeals. See Miller v. Golden Peanut Co., LLC, 317 Ga. 22, 26 (2023)
(“[B]ecause our Rule 701 and Rule 702 are modeled after Rules 701 and 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, we look to the decisions of federal appellate
courts, especially the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit,
that have construed and applied these Rules.”).




                                       8
embodies three “basic requirements” for the admissibility of
expert testimony under Rule 702: “qualification, reliability, and
helpfulness.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F3d 1244, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004). And the burden is on the proponent of the expert
testimony to establish that it meets these three requirements. See
Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight, 299 Ga. 286, 293 (2016)
(citing Frazier, 387 F3d at 1260). Finally, we review a trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 702 for abuse of
discretion. Miller v. Golden Peanut Co., LLC, 317 Ga. 22, 30
(2023) (“[A] trial court has broad discretion under Rule 702 to
admit or exclude expert testimony.”). With these principles in
mind, we turn our attention to Peavy’s complaints about the Rule
702 analysis the trial court undertook here.
              (i) Peavy asserts that the trial court erred by
excluding the expert testimony as irrelevant because, he says,
Rule 702 does not provide for the exclusion of evidence based on
relevance and, in any event, the State failed to prove that his
expert’s testimony “would be completely irrelevant.” But as we
have already noted, the Rule 702 standard requires a trial court
to assess the relevance of proffered expert testimony as part of its
admissibility analysis. Indeed, the “touchstone” of the
“helpfulness” inquiry — that is, whether the expert testimony will
help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue — “is the concept of relevance.” Prosper v. Martin, 989
F3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2021). See also Daubert, 509 US at 591
(“The Rule’s requirement that the testimony ‘assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue’
goes primarily to relevance by demanding a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility.”). As Daubert itself recognizes, if expert testimony
does not relate to any issue in the case, it is “not relevant and,
ergo, non-helpful.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In the context




                                 9
of Rule 702, “[r]elevance means there must be a fit between the
inquiry in the case and the testimony” and “[t]he opinion must
concern matters that are beyond the understanding of the
average lay person.” Johnson v. BLC Lexington SNF, LLC, 478
FSupp3d 578, 583 (ED Ky. 2020). See also Miller, 317 Ga. at 31.
Establishing relevance under Rule 702’s helpfulness prong is
therefore a higher burden than meeting the “liberal, baseline
standard” set forth in Rule 402. U.S. v. Bays, 2014 WL 3764876,
at *5-*6 (ND Tex. 2014). See also Aquila v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 2009 WL 82499, at *2 (ED Pa. 2009). Accordingly, assessing
relevancy is part and parcel of the trial court’s role in
determining, in the first instance, the admissibility of expert
evidence under Rule 702, and the court is authorized to exclude
evidence on that basis. Moreover, because Peavy was the
proponent of the expert testimony at issue, he bore the burden of
proving that the testimony was relevant. See Scapa Dryer
Fabrics, 299 Ga. at 293. The burden was not, as he argues, on the
State to prove that the expert testimony was “completely
irrelevant.”
       Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding the proffered expert testimony on the
bases identified in its order. As to general testimony about
defensive tactics and training, Peavy does not dispute the finding
that he never received such training, and in the absence of
evidence that he did, testimony about defensive tactics and
training has no bearing on his self-defense claim. See McDowell
v. Brown, 392 F3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Under Daubert,
scientific testimony does not assist the trier of fact unless the
testimony has a justified scientific relationship to the pertinent
facts.”). And the remaining testimony highlighted in the trial
court’s order concerned issues that a layman could resolve
through the application of simple common sense. Cf. Kilpatrick v.




                               10
State, 308 Ga. 194, 196–97 (2020) (trial court acted within its
discretion under former OCGA § 24-7-707 in excluding
defendant’s proffered expert testimony regarding “use of force,
fight-flight-freeze responses, and human physiology during high-
stress and life-threatening situations” because it was not beyond
the ken of the jury to determine if defendant was justified in
shooting victim given the evidence at trial). While Peavy
generally insists that the trial court underestimated the value of
his expert’s testimony to aid the jury’s understanding of “real-
time threat perception, firearm mechanics, and human reaction
time,” he fails to demonstrate with citation to the record that
these were material aspects of the case or that his expert in fact
offered testimony relevant to these issues. See Suggs v. State, 310
Ga. 762, 767 (2021) (“[T]he burden is on the party alleging error
to show it by the record.” (quotation marks omitted)); Soto v.
State, 303 Ga. 517, 523 (2018) (“[I]t is not this Court’s
responsibility to cull the record in search of support for the
appellant’s claims[.]”). See also Scapa Dryer Fabrics, 299 Ga. at
293 (proponent of expert testimony bears the burden that it meets
the requirements for admissibility under Rule 702). Thus, on this
record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the testimony as irrelevant under Rule 702, and this
claim fails.
              (ii) Peavy also complains that the trial court failed
to engage in a “full reliability analysis.” Peavy is correct that the
trial court did not explicitly address the reliability prong of the
Rule 702 analysis. But the State’s motion in limine did not
challenge the reliability of the expert testimony. Instead, the
State moved to exclude the testimony solely on relevance grounds,
and the trial court’s order granted the motion solely on that basis.
Peavy cites no authority requiring a trial court to consider
reliability and engage in an on-the-record analysis where the




                                 11
issue is not raised by the parties and the court determines that
exclusion is warranted on a different basis. See U.S. v. Hall, 165
F3d 1095, 1103 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Where expert scientific
evidence is properly excludable under the second prong of
Daubert, the [trial] court is not required to undertake an inquiry
into the reliability of the proffered testimony. Since the [trial]
court can exclude reliable expert testimony under Rule 702,
requiring the [trial] court to first decide whether the proffered
testimony satisfies Daubert’s reliability prong would be a
needless exercise.”). See also Walker v. Spina, 359 FSupp3d 1054,
1071 (D. N.M. 2019) (if the expert’s proffered testimony fails the
relevance prong of a Daubert analysis, the court does not need to
consider its reliability). As such, Peavy has failed to show that the
trial court abused its discretion in this respect.
              (b) Peavy also contends that, by excluding his
expert’s testimony, the trial court violated his right to present a
complete defense under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Peavy did not object on this basis at trial, so
we review this claim only for plain error. See Wood v. State, 320
Ga. 466, 471 (2024); OCGA § 24-1-103(d). Here, Peavy has failed
to establish that the trial court committed a clear or obvious error.
       “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, but a
defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is subject to
reasonable restrictions.” Wood, 320 Ga. at 471 (quotation marks
omitted). As we have recognized, state-law rules excluding
evidence from criminal trials “do not abridge an accused’s right to
present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or
‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’”
State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 122 (2019) (quoting United States v.




                                 12
Scheffer, 523 US 303, 308 (1998)). We held above that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Peavy’s expert
testimony under Rule 702. See Burns, 306 Ga. at 122 (“[A]
defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited,
but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions,” and a defendant
“does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is
incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under
standard rules of evidence.” (cleaned up)). And Peavy cites no
authority to show how the trial court’s enforcement of Rule 702
prevented him from presenting a complete defense. In light of
these circumstances, Peavy has failed to establish that the trial
court committed a clear or obvious error. See Wood, 320 Ga. at
471; Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga. 855, 859 (2024) (“For an error to
be obvious for purposes of plain error review, it must be plain
under controlling precedent or in view of the unequivocally clear
words of a statute or rule.” (cleaned up)). This claim therefore
fails.
       4. Finally, Peavy argues that the guilty verdicts on his
felony murder and aggravated assault counts (Counts 2 and 3)
are repugnant because he was found not guilty of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, namely aggravated
assault (Count 5). In the indictment, Count 5 alleged that Peavy
had “within arm’s reach of his person, a pistol, a firearm, during
the commission of the crime of [a]ggravated [a]ssault … of
Hamilton Darwin.” He argues that when the jury found him not
guilty on that count, the jury necessarily found that he did not
have a gun within arm’s reach. And if he did not have a gun
within arm’s reach, then he could not have used that gun to
commit the aggravated assault alleged in Count 3 or the felony
murder premised on that aggravated assault alleged in Count 2.
Accordingly, he argues that the not guilty verdict on possession of
a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault




                                13
required a not guilty verdict on the aggravated assault and felony
murder counts and that those verdicts were repugnant as a
result. 6 We disagree.
       A repugnant verdict is one in which the jury finds the
defendant not guilty on one count and guilty on another count,
but where it is clear from the appellate record that the jury
reached that verdict by making affirmative findings “that cannot
logically or legally exist at the same time.” Montgomery v. State,
323 Ga. 119, 121 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). Under our
precedent, when a verdict is truly repugnant, the guilty verdict
must be vacated. Id. But not all inconsistent verdicts are
repugnant. Where the jury returns seemingly incompatible
verdicts on different counts, but without contradictory affirmative
findings, those verdicts are allowed to stand. See Owens, 312 Ga.
at 216–17. That is because we are not permitted to make inquiries
into the jury’s deliberation process. See id. We therefore cannot
speculate about whether the jury reached the inconsistent
verdicts by making findings “that cannot logically or legally exist
at the same time” or whether it did so due to mistake,
compromise, or lenity. Feder v. State, 319 Ga. 66, 69 (2024). To
put it simply, repugnant verdicts – those where the guilty verdict
must be vacated – occur “in the rare instance where, instead of
being left to speculate as to the jury’s deliberations, the appellate
record makes transparent the jury’s rationale.” Guajardo v. State,
290 Ga. 172, 174 (2011).
      Here, the record does not reflect any affirmative findings
by the jury as to its rationale in returning a not guilty verdict on
the possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated

       6 Neither Peavy nor the State have asked us to revisit the repugnant
verdict doctrine in light of McElrath v. Georgia, 601 US 87, 95 (2024), and we
decline to do so here. See Ward v. State, 318 Ga. 884, 896 n.12 (2024).




                                     14
assault count and guilty verdicts on the felony murder and
aggravated assault counts. See Guajardo, 290 Ga. at 174. In the
absence of such affirmative findings, determining the basis for the
jury’s not guilty verdict on the second firearm possession count
and the guilty verdicts on the felony murder and aggravated
assault counts “would be based either on pure speculation, or
would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberation that the courts
generally will not undertake.” Feder, 319 Ga. at 69. See also
Owens, 312 Ga. at 216–17. We do not know and will not speculate
why the jury found Peavy not guilty of possession of a firearm
during the commission of an aggravated assault but guilty of
felony murder and aggravated assault. 7 Accordingly, Peavy’s
repugnant verdict claim fails.
        Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P. J., not participating.




       7 It is worth noting that the jury did return a guilty verdict on Count 4
of the indictment, which also charged Peavy with possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony and alleged that Peavy had “within arm’s
reach of his person a pistol, a firearm, during the commission of the crime of
Murder[.]”




                                     15