Ragland v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                  In the
                             Supreme Court of Georgia
                                             No. S26A0495
                                            Sheldon Ragland
                                                   v.
                                               The State

                          On Appeal from the DeKalb County Superior Court
                                          No. 21CR15915

                                          Decided: April 21, 2026


                    PETERSON, Chief Justice.
                   Sheldon Ragland appeals his convictions related to the
            shooting death of Kenneth Adair. 1 On appeal, Ragland argues
            that the trial court erred by: (1) excluding testimony that Derell
            Richardson, whom Ragland had claimed the police failed to


                    1 Adair was killed on or about June 11, 2017. In June 2021, a DeKalb
            County grand jury returned an indictment charging Ragland with malice
            murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), armed robbery (Count 3),
            aggravated assault (Count 4), possession of a firearm during the commission
            of a felony (Count 5), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6), and
            possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of certain
            crimes (Count 7). Count 7 was bifurcated for trial and later nolle prossed. At
            a jury trial in July 2022, the jury found Ragland not guilty of Count 6 and
            guilty of all remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Ragland to life in
            prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1, a consecutive life sentence
            on Count 3, and a consecutive five-year sentence on Count 5. Counts 2 and 4
            were either vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes.
            Ragland timely filed a motion for new trial, and the trial court denied it
            following a hearing. Ragland timely filed a notice of appeal, and his appeal was
            docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a
            decision on the briefs.
consider as a suspect in Adair’s death, had a 9mm handgun; (2)
admitting a recorded jail call and allowing a detective to identify
the speakers in the call despite the lack of a proper foundation;
and (3) allowing a detective to opine that Ragland’s statements in
the recorded call constituted an admission that he was there at
the time of the shooting. Ragland also argues that (4) trial counsel
was ineffective on various grounds, and that (5) the cumulative
prejudice from these errors requires a new trial. None of these
claims have merit, so we affirm.
       The trial evidence showed the following. 2 Courtney
Johnson was best friends with Adair and considered him to be
“like [a] brother.” Johnson was also friends with Justin
Cunningham, who was best friends with Ragland and introduced
him to Johnson. In November 2016, Johnson introduced Adair to
Ragland, from whom she bought drugs. Adair also began buying
drugs from Ragland, and Johnson often traveled with Adair
during his trips from Tennessee to Ragland’s residence in
Atlanta, where she often saw a black Lincoln Navigator. Johnson
said that during these drug deals, Ragland never sent someone to
do the deal for him and always did it himself.
        On the evening of June 10, 2017, Richardson picked up his
friend Adair and drove him to Atlanta in order to buy drugs.
Richardson did not know whom they were going to meet and
testified that Adair set up the meeting. According to Richardson,
he and Adair had nearly $6,000 between them, but neither of
them carried a gun.
       While Richardson and Adair traveled to Atlanta, Adair
communicated by phone with someone about where to meet,
settling on a park in DeKalb County near Ragland’s residence.
There was a black Navigator already there, with Ragland and

       2 Because this case involves a question of harm stemming from limiting
the scope of the cross-examination of a witness and assumed deficiency of
counsel, we set out the evidence in detail rather than in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Wood v. State, 316 Ga. 811, 812 n.2 (2023).




                                       2
another person sitting in it, when Richardson and Adair arrived,
and Richardson parked a few spots away. Cell-site location data
showed that cell phones belonging to Ragland and Adair pinged
off the same sector of the same tower that covered the crime scene
between 12:08 a.m. and 12:19 a.m. on June 11. Ragland’s cell
phone was not pinging off a tower that serviced his residence
during this time.
       Adair exited Richardson’s car and entered the passenger’s
side of the black Navigator. An unidentified individual who had
been sitting in the Navigator got out and smoked cigarettes with
Richardson. Richardson testified that about a minute later, Adair
and Ragland got out of the black Navigator, and Adair told
Richardson that someone else was going to bring the drugs. 3
       According to Richardson, Adair asked Richardson to “let
them hear” the motor of his car, and “they,” including Ragland,
advised him to go down the road. Richardson drove away, leaving
Adair behind, and then “floored the gas” coming back into the
park. As Richardson was driving back into the park, he heard two
gunshots and saw a muzzle flash. Richardson left the area,
retrieved his phone that had fallen under a seat of the car, and
then called his girlfriend. Despite saying that he left the area
immediately, Richardson placed the call at 12:27 a.m., and service
was provided by a tower that serviced the park. Richardson
explained that he did not call 911 because he was on parole and
did not want to get into trouble. Richardson received a call from
Adair’s fiancée and told her what happened.
       Johnson knew that Adair was going to Atlanta to buy drugs
from Ragland, and she received a call from Adair’s fiancée in the
early morning hours on June 11, reporting that Adair could not
be located. Johnson then called Ragland to ask what Ragland did


       3 At one point, Richardson testified that he had never seen Ragland
before trial, but on cross-examination he specifically confirmed Ragland was
the person who sat with Adair in the Navigator.




                                     3
and ask about Adair’s whereabouts. Ragland responded that he
did not know what happened to Adair and that he had sent
someone else to the park to meet Adair. Johnson confronted
Ragland, saying his story was “bulls**t,” and Ragland hung up on
her. A few days later, Ragland texted Johnson, telling her,
      I’m just gonna say this one time and leave it at that.
      I will spare u but take s**t out on yo kids if u keep
      playing with me. I had nothing to do with that s**t
      period. I did solid business wit bra. I don’t move like
      that. But I’m no hoe by a long shot. If you want to
      see how I get down keep f**kin wit me.

Johnson took this message as a threat.
      Richardson drove back to Tennessee following the
shooting. Upon returning, he made a plan with Adair’s fiancée,
along with a few others, to drive to Atlanta to see if they could
find Adair by visiting hospitals, but they were unable to find him
and returned to Tennessee.
       Police arrived at the park at about 1:39 a.m. on June 11,
and the responding officer discovered Adair’s body lying face
down in a pool of blood. Adair was dead and had two gunshot
wounds to his head. At the time of discovery, Adair was not
wearing pants. Police did not find a cell phone or wallet, but found
three 9mm shell casings, Adair’s identification card, and some
coins near his body. A detective testified that, based on the
circumstances, it appeared that Adair had been robbed. The GBI
tested the shell casings recovered from the scene and determined
that they were all fired from the same weapon.
       Sergeant McBride was the lead detective on this case.
After talking to Johnson, Sergeant McBride began investigating
Cunningham and learned that he was good friends with Ragland
and was in jail in Anderson County, Tennessee at the time of
Adair’s death. Sergeant McBride contacted the facility where
Cunningham was being detained to request recordings of any




                                 4
calls with Ragland’s phone number.
       Sergeant McBride identified State’s Exhibits 36 and 40 as
CDs containing the jail calls he received, and they were admitted
into evidence without objection. A call from June 12, 2017, at 3:00
p.m. — one day after Adair’s death — that is part of Exhibit 40
was played for the jury, and Sergeant McBride explained that the
call was between Ragland and Cunningham, even though the
recording announced that the inmate was someone other than
Cunningham. 4 Sergeant McBride testified that he had listened to
the call at least 15 times, and he heard “an admission” by
Ragland. When asked what the “admission” was, Sergeant
McBride explained:
        That he was there — that Kenny “got got.” He was
        there when it occurred; Kenny got got. The — Mr.
        Cunningham asked him was it 12. Meaning was it
        the police. And he was like nah, nah. And then they
        start to laugh and then Cunningham says, “Uh, was
        it nice?” And it’s an admission that he was there at
        the time of the shooting.
      According to Sergeant McBride, after that exchange,
Cunningham “realized, he just laughed also,” then said “Hell,
come get me bro.” Sergeant McBride testified that, at the time of


        4 Although Ragland challenges State’s Exhibit 40 on appeal, it contains
16 different files, and the parties do not specifically identify which file or files
(or parts thereof) were played to the jury or which specific file is the subject of
the challenge on appeal. Nevertheless, based on phrasing referred to by the
parties, we identified one portion of a call that appears to be most applicable.
Although the call is difficult to understand, it sounds like the speaker
(Ragland) says, “They say Courtney’s [unintelligible] came down here and got,
got, got knocked off.” The other speaker (Cunningham) asked if it was “Block
12” and if “it was something nice?” During closing argument, defense counsel
represented that Ragland said, “They say Courtney’s brother came down here
and got knocked off,” by which, counsel said, “Sheldon is saying he heard about
the killing. Not that he committed the killing.”




                                         5
this call, the DeKalb Police had not yet released any information
about the shooting to the public.
      After the shooting, Ragland fled to Alabama where he
conducted numerous internet searches for information about the
shooting. Ragland also changed his phone number within ten
days after the shooting.
       Ragland did not testify at his trial or present any
witnesses. But in cross-examining witnesses, Ragland elicited the
following evidence. Richardson did not initially tell police the
purpose of the trip was to buy drugs, and he never mentioned
until trial that the drugs were not on site at the park despite
travelling all the way down from Tennessee. Richardson also told
the police he briefly left the park to buy a cigar at Adair’s request,
even though there was no evidence that he did. Richardson told
the police that, after Adair exited the Navigator, Adair told
Richardson he could leave because Adair had another ride
coming. Richardson also initially reported that he heard three
shots fired when he was driving back into the park (not the two
he had testified about), and that he was also shot at. Richardson
also told police he did not call anyone immediately (even though
the evidence showed that he did).
       In his defense, Ragland argued that there was no physical
evidence linking him to the crime such that the case rested on
Richardson’s credibility as a result, and that Richardson’s version
of events varied and did not make sense. Ragland also argued that
it made no sense for him to kill Adair and not kill Richardson, as
there was too much risk to leave a witness alive, or, alternatively,
to try to kill Richardson as he tried to enter the park rather than
when Richardson was next to Adair (according to statements
Richardson made to police). And Ragland argued that the police
rushed to judgment to conclude he was responsible for Adair’s
death, accepting Richardson’s version of events too readily and
failing to consider Richardson as the possible perpetrator.
Although Ragland said he was not accusing Richardson, he also




                                  6
argued that Richardson made up stories to protect himself,
including from the “legal implications of being involved in a new
crime. Whether it be drug dealing or homicide.”
       1.    Ragland argues that the trial court erred by
excluding testimony related to Richardson’s possession of a 9mm
handgun (the same caliber as the murder weapon). Ragland
argues that the trial court excluded this evidence by preventing
him from asking Sergeant McBride if there was a follow-up
investigation after Richardson was arrested while possessing a
9mm gun, and that this limitation hampered his defense, which
was to show that the police rushed to judgment and ignored
evidence that Richardson may have been the actual shooter.
       As an initial matter, the trial court did not “exclude”
evidence that Richardson possessed a 9mm gun. During his trial
testimony, Richardson admitted that he was being detained on a
pending domestic violence charge and testified that he did not
“really use guns or weapons.” On cross-examination, Richardson
admitted that he was found with a 9mm handgun when he was
arrested in December 2021 for the domestic violence offense, and
said he did not use guns at the time of Adair’s death. By the time
Sergeant McBride testified, Richardson already had admitted on
the witness stand that he had a 9mm gun when he was arrested.
So there was no “exclusion” of this evidence.
       To the extent Ragland argues that the trial court
improperly limited the scope of his cross-examination of Sergeant
McBride, even if this issue was contained within his enumeration
of error, 5 any error was harmless. A constitutionally improper
denial of a defendant’s opportunity to effectively cross-examine a
witness is subject to harmless-error analysis. See, e.g., Hudson v.
State, 308 Ga. 443, 448 (2020); State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 641

       5 Wallace v. State, 303 Ga. 34, 37–38 (2018) (“an appealing party may
not use its brief to expand its enumeration of errors by arguing the
incorrectness of a trial court ruling not mentioned in the enumeration of
errors” (quotation marks omitted)).




                                    7
(2002). For a constitutional error to be deemed harmless, the
State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. See Mangum v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 577
(2001).
       Here, there was no harm in preventing Ragland from
questioning Sergeant McBride about any follow-up investigation.
Ragland makes no showing as to what Sergeant McBride would
have testified to if asked about this topic. Instead, he merely
argues that limiting this inquiry was harmful because the
evidence would have supported his defense that the police’s
investigation was incomplete insofar as they did not investigate
Richardson as the shooter. But in cross-examining Sergeant
McBride, Ragland was permitted to ask whether he had
confirmed whether certain parts of Richardson’s story about the
night of the shooting were true and whether Richardson or the
car he was driving that night were ever processed for forensic
evidence. The answer to these questions was essentially “no,” and
Sergeant McBride confirmed that Richardson had deactivated a
“drop” phone 6 the day of the murder. In other words, Ragland
conducted a thorough cross-examination of Sergeant McBride to
show that the police did not adequately investigate Richardson.
Ragland advanced this theory to the jury even without being able
to ask about any follow-up investigation about the 9mm firearm
found on Richardson several years after the crime and pointed to
trial evidence to support that argument. And the jury had already
heard from Richardson himself that he possessed a gun, which
contradicted his prior testimony that he had nothing to do with
guns, and heard about many other inconsistencies between
Richardson’s testimony and his initial statements to police.


       6 Sergeant McBride testified that a “drop” phone is a temporary phone
that is typically discarded after a short use and may be used to conceal illegal
activity because the user would not “have the phone long enough for the law
enforcement to start figuring out” who is using the phone number for the
device.




                                       8
       Ragland’s defense — the same one he asserts on appeal —
was supported by evidence in the record, and the jury simply
rejected it. We are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
result of the trial would have been the same had he been allowed
to ask about any follow-up investigation. The jury was presented
with this defense and rejected it in light of the strong evidence of
guilt. Namely, it was undisputed that Adair traveled to Atlanta
for the purpose of meeting Ragland to buy drugs, a black
Navigator associated with Ragland was at the scene of the crime,
the park where Adair was killed was near Ragland’s residence,
and cell phone location data placed both individuals’ cell phones
at the park at the same time of the shooting. Moreover, Ragland
fled the state after the shooting and changed his cell phone
number. See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (2022) (“Evidence of
flight is generally intrinsic, as the fact of an accused’s flight,
escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment,
assumption of a false name, and related conduct, is admissible as
evidence of consciousness of guilt for the charged offense, and
thus of guilt itself.” (cleaned up)).
       In sum, eliciting additional evidence that the police did not
adequately investigate Richardson would not have made a
meaningful difference given this strong evidence of guilt and
because the evidence Ragland sought to elicit was largely
cumulative of other evidence casting doubt about the police’s
investigation and showing that Richardson may have been the
shooter. See Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 754 (2019) (holding that
any error in limiting the appellant’s cross-examination on the
issue of parole eligibility was harmless, in light of the strength of
the evidence against him and substantial testimony from his
accomplice “concerning the favorable plea deal resulting in a
major reduction in the sentences [she] faced, thereby establishing
[her] potential bias toward the State”); McCord v. State, 305 Ga.
318, 324 (2019) (holding that even if admission of certain
statements violated the Confrontation Clause, any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because they were




                                 9
cumulative of other evidence and the evidence of guilt was
strong).
       2.     Ragland argues that the trial court plainly erred (1)
in admitting State’s Exhibit 40 (recorded jail calls) because a
sufficient foundation was not laid and (2) in allowing Sergeant
McBride to identify Ragland and Cunningham when the detective
had no basis for making this determination. This claim fails.
       Ragland did not object to the admission of State’s Exhibit
40 or to Sergeant McBride’s testimony regarding it, so we review
his claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). See also
Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (2019) (plain error review under
OCGA § 24-1-103(d) is available for unpreserved challenges to
evidentiary rulings). To establish plain error, Ragland must show
that the trial court made a legal error that was not affirmatively
waived, was “clear and obvious,” likely affected the outcome of the
trial, and “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Dees v. State, 322 Ga. 498,
500–01 (2025). The failure to meet one element of this test dooms
a plain error claim. See State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259,
264 (2018).
       The State argues that Ragland’s claim fails because he
affirmatively waived any error. “For purposes of plain error
review, an affirmative waiver is the intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.” Holloway v. State, 320 Ga.
668, 671 (2025) (cleaned up). Generally, trial counsel’s failure to
object, by itself, does not constitute an affirmative waiver, but it
can amount to an affirmative waiver if an “appellate court can
discern” from the record that the failure was a considered choice.
See Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 230 (2019).
      Here, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel said
he did not object because he wanted the call to be admitted for
two reasons. Trial counsel first explained that the State was
“throwing this balloon up about motive,” and he could use the
recording to rebut that claimed motive and show that Ragland




                                10
had no reason to kill Adair. In particular, the State argued at trial
that Ragland had a motive to rob and kill Adair because he
wanted money to post Cunningham’s bond, and in closing
argument, referred to Ragland’s statement in the recorded call
about having money and Cunningham’s statement to “come get
me” as evidence to support this motive. Defense counsel
challenged that motive in closing argument, arguing that
Ragland never said he would bail Cunningham out of jail in the
call and that there was no evidence he ever went to Anderson
County, Tennessee for that purpose.
       Trial counsel’s second reason for not objecting was that he
wanted to use the evidence to support Ragland’s denial of
culpability. Trial counsel explained that Ragland’s statement in
the call that “they say” that Adair was shot and killed in Atlanta
was used to show that Ragland was not present for the shooting
and was merely repeating what others told him. In closing
argument, trial counsel argued that Ragland heard about the
shooting before any news was released to the public because
Johnson called him on the night Adair went missing to ask about
his whereabouts and to say that some people were looking for
Adair at hospitals. Counsel argued that Ragland made the
natural deduction that Adair was probably dead.
       In the light of trial counsel’s testimony at the motion for
new trial hearing and his conduct at the trial itself, we can discern
that counsel had a tactical reason for not objecting to the
admission of Exhibit 40 or to Sergeant McBride’s testimony that
Ragland and Cunningham were the individuals on the call.
Accordingly, this claim of error fails at the first step of plain error
review. See Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 231 (2019) (because the
record reflected that trial counsel elected not to request an
accomplice-corroboration jury instruction as part of conscious
defense strategy, any request for that jury instruction was
intentionally waived).
       3.     Ragland argues that the trial court plainly erred in




                                  11
allowing Sergeant McBride to testify that Ragland’s statements
in the recorded jail call constituted an admission that he was in
the park at the time of the shooting. Ragland argues that other
than the reference to “12,” the speakers used plain language in
the call, and it was improper for Sergeant McBride to interpret
this plain language under OCGA § 24-7-701(a). 7 We disagree.
       Even if there was clear and obvious error in allowing
Sergeant McBride to offer his opinion about what Ragland meant
in the recorded call, Ragland cannot establish plain error because
any error did not affect the outcome of his trial. Ragland relies on
United States v. Hawkins, 934 F3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019), to
support his argument that the error affected the outcome of his
trial. But in that case, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
agent’s improper testimony contributed to the verdict because his
testimony was extensive, it constituted the crux of the
government’s case as he was the principal witness, there were
several examples of improper opinion testimony, and he was the
only witness who specifically testified about the defendant. Id. at
1263–64, 1266–67 (comparing to other cases where reversal was
not warranted based on improper opinion testimony). Here,
Sergeant McBride was not the sole or primary witness, his
testimony was limited and was not emphasized or mentioned
again, and he was not the only witness who provided
incriminating evidence against Ragland. Cf. United States v.
Pendergrass, 995 F3d 858, 881 (11th Cir. 2021) (even if agent’s
testimony “strayed into realm of improper interpretation,” the
circumstances were distinguishable from Hawkins because the
agent “was neither the sole nor the primary witness in the case”).

        7 That code section provides that if a witness is not testifying as an
expert, the witness’s testimony in the form of “opinions or inferences” is limited
to those that are “(1) [r]ationally based on the perception of the witness; (2)
[h]elpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue; and (3) [n]ot based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of” OCGA § 24-7-702. OCGA § 24-
7-701(a).




                                       12
Although the State made reference to the phone call in closing
argument, arguing that it was evidence of motive, it did not
emphasize the nature of the call as an “admission” that Ragland
was present for the shooting.
       Moreover, our review of the recorded call does not show
that Ragland made a clear admission that he was present when
Adair was killed. And even if the jury deferred to Sergeant
McBride’s assessment of the call based on being unable to discern
the contents of the call (since the recording itself is difficult to
understand), such an “admission” of mere presence at the scene
of the crime pales in comparison to the other strong evidence of
guilt that was presented, as discussed above. Given the limited
nature of Sergeant McBride’s testimony and the strong evidence
of guilt, Ragland has failed to establish that any error in
admitting the “admission” opinion testimony likely affected the
outcome of the trial.
        4. Ragland argues that trial counsel was ineffective on
several grounds. None of these grounds have merit.
       To prevail on any of his claims, Ragland must show both
that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and
that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient
performance, Ragland must “overcome the strong presumption
that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Mims v. State,
304 Ga. 851, 855 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). Our inquiry
focuses on the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance,
not counsel’s subjective state of mind. See Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga.
704, 714 (2017). To demonstrate prejudice, Ragland must
establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mims, 304 Ga. at 855




                                13
(quotation marks omitted). The failure to meet either of the
prongs is fatal to an ineffectiveness claim. See Smith v. State, 296
Ga. 731, 733 (2015). In considering an ineffectiveness claim, we
review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 534 (2010).
       (a)    Ragland argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of the recorded call between
Ragland and Cunningham and to the testimony that they were
the speakers on the call. As discussed above, trial counsel testified
that he wanted the call to be admitted in order to rebut the State’s
proffered motive and to show that Ragland was merely repeating
what he had heard about Adair. Given this testimony, Ragland
fails to establish that trial counsel’s chosen defense strategy of
attacking the State’s case by using the evidence rather than
objecting to its admission was objectively unreasonable. See
Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 459 (2017) (counsel’s decision not to
object to expert testimony as in violation of discovery rules but
instead to show the jury that the testimony was at odds with other
evidence was not “patently unreasonable”); Johnson v. State, 294
Ga. 86, 92–93 (2013) (“[C]ounsel’s decision not to object to
[witness’s] testimony and to instead cross-examine [the witness]
... was a matter of trial strategy and was not so patently
unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have made the
same decision.”).
       (b)    Ragland next argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to Sergeant McBride’s opinion
testimony that Ragland made an admission in the recorded call.
We disagree.
        At the motion for new trial hearing, although trial counsel
testified that he had no specific recollection of why he did not
object to this testimony, counsel stated that that he might not
have been concerned about a passing comment such that he would
not have wanted to draw more attention to it by objecting.
Moreover, during closing argument, trial counsel urged jurors to
listen to the tape themselves and to draw their own conclusions




                                 14
about the conversation, arguing that it was not an admission but
was merely a statement of what Ragland heard about the killing.
Given that Sergeant McBride’s testimony was limited, a decision
to not draw attention to McBridge’s characterization of the
conversation and instead use the call to argue that Ragland was
actually not present for the crime was reasonable trial strategy.
See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 642 (2020) (trial counsel’s
decision not to object to testimony that defendant admitted to
killing someone was reasonable where the objection would have
drawn attention to the testimony and trial counsel instead
wanted to pursue a strategy that supported a possible acquittal);
Jacobs v. State, 306 Ga. 571, 575–76 (2019) (trial counsel’s
decision not to object to testimony was not deficient performance
where counsel did not want to “overemphasize any of the
testimony to the jury by objecting to it”).
     (c)      Ragland next argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s cell-site location
evidence by consulting with a qualified expert or presenting
expert testimony. This claim fails.
        At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified
that when he learned the State had intended to use a new FBI
technology that generated more precise cell-site location data, he
began to search for an expert on the subject in order to review and
advise him about the data. Counsel identified Larry Daniel as a
potential expert, and the two discussed Daniel’s qualifications,
experience, and ability to help in this case. Trial counsel then sent
Daniel the discovery and a description of his theory of the case,
along with the problems involving the data showing that
Ragland’s and Adair’s cell phones were together in one place
during the crime. After Daniel and his associate analyzed all the
cell-site location data, they informed trial counsel that the
techniques used by the State were valid and the way in which
they were applied to Ragland’s case was reliable and accurate.
Trial counsel learned that both phones pinged off the same sector
of the same tower that serviced the same area of the park at the




                                 15
same time, meaning that the two phones were in the same
location. Daniel essentially told trial counsel, “You don’t want me
to testify.”
       Ragland acknowledges that trial counsel took some steps
to assess the evidence, but that counsel should have nevertheless
asked for a second opinion, like the opinion of the expert Ragland
presented at the motion for new trial hearing. 8 But under this
Court’s precedent, “the testimony of the new expert could not
show deficient performance because the trial lawyer[] consulted
with a qualified expert, [his] consultations gave [him] no basis for
objecting to the conclusion reached by [the State’s expert], and [he
was] under no obligation to search further than [he] did for an
expert who would give [him] an opinion otherwise.” Yancey v.
State, 292 Ga. 812, 820 (2013). Thus, Ragland’s claim fails.
          5.    Ragland argues that that his convictions should be
reversed due to the cumulative prejudice resulting from the trial
court’s errors and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. See State v.
Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 14 (2020) (courts are to ‘‘consider collectively
the prejudicial effect of trial court errors and any deficient
performance by counsel — at least where those errors by the court
and counsel involve evidentiary issues”). We assumed two
instances of error — improper limitation of cross-examination
and allowing Sergeant McBride to opine about an “admission” —
but found no others. These assumed “errors addressed entirely
different issues in the case.” Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 120
(2021). As explained above, each assumed error produced very
little, if any, harm. Although we have yet to decide how multiple
standards for assessing prejudice are to be considered
cumulatively, we need not do so here, because Ragland’s
cumulative prejudice claim fails even under the higher standard

       8 Ragland’s expert witness testified that given how close the crime
scene was to Ragland’s home, the two identified towers could service both
locations, and it was “completely likely that” Ragland’s phone did not move at
all.




                                     16
implicated by these errors (proof that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt). 9 Given the strength of the properly
admitted evidence against Ragland, we are persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the cumulative prejudice of the assumed
errors did not deny him a fair trial. See Platt v. State, 319 Ga. 1,
12 (2024) (holding that, because two assumed “errors produced
very little, if any, harm[,] ... given the strength of the evidence,
even if these assumed errors could be considered cumulatively,
the cumulative prejudice did not deny [the appellant] a fair trial”);
Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 367 (2020) (the combined actual and
assumed evidentiary errors and deficiencies by counsel did not
warrant a new trial, because “even when considered as a whole
under the most demanding standard that applies to any of the
alleged errors, the cumulative prejudicial effect of the actual and
assumed evidentiary errors and counsel’s deficiencies is not
sufficient to outweigh the strength of the properly admitted
evidence of [the a]ppellant’s guilt”).


       Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.




       9 One assumed error in this case was constitutional in nature, and the
other one was not. In other cases, we assumed that the more stringent
constitutional prejudice standard applied without having to determine how
different standards may apply together. See, e.g. Quintanar v. State, 322 Ga.
61, 75 & n.6 (2025); Pender, 311 Ga. at 120.




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