Smith v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.




                                               In the
                          Supreme Court of Georgia
                                          No. S26A0140
                                        Alex Khalil Smith
                                                v.
                                            The State

                      On Appeal from the Superior Court of Newton County
                                   No. 2020-SU-CR-000895-3

                                       Decided: April 21, 2026


                 LAND, Justice.
                Alex Khalil Smith appeals his 2022 convictions for malice
         murder and related charges stemming from the shooting death of
         Cassandra Arnold. 1 On appeal, Smith argues that the evidence
         was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court
         failed to exercise its discretion to grant a new trial pursuant to


                 1 The crimes took place on July 8, 2020. On October 14, 2020, a Newton
         County grand jury indicted Smith for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
         (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the
         commission of a felony (Count 4).
                 After a jury trial, Smith was found guilty of all charges. The trial court
         sentenced Smith to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count
         1 and five years for Count 4 (to be served consecutive to Count 1). Count 2 was
         vacated as a matter of law, and Count 3 was merged into Count 1 for sentenc-
         ing purposes.
                 Smith filed a timely motion for new trial on September 19, 2022, and
         amended that motion on September 22, 2023. After a hearing, the trial court
         denied the amended motion for new trial, and Smith filed a timely notice of
         appeal on November 7, 2024. The appeal was docketed to the term of this Court
         beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 (the “general grounds”). For the rea-
sons that follow, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial
court’s order denying Smith’s motion for new trial, and we re-
mand the case to the trial court with direction that it exercise its
discretion under the general grounds and issue an order reflecting
its ruling with respect to those grounds.
       1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the ev-
idence presented at trial showed as follows. On July 7, 2020,
Smith contacted Arnold to purchase methamphetamine. Arnold
arranged to purchase the meth for Smith from Kenneth
Cavender. Smith wanted to buy an ounce of meth, but Arnold only
had enough money to purchase 20 grams from Cavender. Be-
tween 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on July 7, Arnold arrived at Cavender’s
house to purchase the meth in a pickup truck with Smith. While
Smith waited outside, Arnold purchased the meth from Cavender
and added “flex” (a filler material which Cavender testified might
have been rock salt) so that Smith would believe he was getting a
full ounce. In other words, Arnold tricked Smith into believing he
was getting more meth than he actually was. Cavender then went
outside and Smith introduced himself and gave Cavender his
number so that he could purchase meth from Cavender directly
in the future.
       The next day, Smith called Cavender and left him a
voicemail saying that “somebody’s going to fix this shit” and that
the money he used to purchase the meth “wasn’t [Smith’s]
money.” Smith called Cavender “periodically” throughout the day
“trying to get [Cavender] to meet up with him.”
       Around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., Smith drove to Arnold’s home on
White Birch Drive. Arnold lived in a “shed” behind the main
house, while Cory Usher, Jessica Smith, and Ondrea Carter lived
in the main house. Usher went outside to meet Smith when he




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arrived, and Smith asked Usher if he had “seen Cassie,” meaning
Arnold. Smith then asked Usher if he smoked and held up a meth
pipe, and Usher “jumped in the truck” with Smith and started
smoking. During that time, Usher tried “to text Cassie and call
Cassie,” but she did not respond.
      Smith and Usher went to a gas station to get food and
passed Arnold and her boyfriend as they were returning home.
Arnold and her boyfriend returned home, and Smith and Usher
returned shortly thereafter. Arnold spoke with Smith near
Smith’s truck, and although her boyfriend testified that he did not
hear the substance of the conversation, he did not believe it was
an argument. Arnold’s boyfriend testified that, at that time,
Smith believed that Cavender had shorted him in the meth deal.
Arnold’s boyfriend offered to “make it right” and Smith indicated
he was “all good with that.” Arnold, Smith, and Arnold’s boyfriend
then began “smoking dope.”
       Law enforcement then arrived on the scene, and Arnold
and her boyfriend fled on foot, while Smith left in his truck. After
Arnold returned home later that evening, Usher texted Smith to
ask if he “[made] it out okay.” Smith texted him back “asking if
[Arnold] and [her boyfriend] were there.” Usher told him that Ar-
nold was there, but her boyfriend was not.
      Around ten to fifteen minutes later, as Usher was falling
asleep, he heard two gunshots. Usher testified that he did not “go
out back” to see what happened but instead went to a house “at
the end of the street” because he had an outstanding arrest war-
rant and knew police would respond to the gunshots. Usher told
the people at that house that he thought “[Arnold] just got shot”
because “those gunshots [came] from the back yard.”
      Jessica Smith heard the gunshots, went outside, and found
Arnold “laying on the ground with … two gunshot wounds.” She




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told Carter to call 911, and Carter did so at 10:45 p.m. When law
enforcement arrived, Arnold was breathing, but she died shortly
thereafter. Law enforcement recovered two .40 caliber shell cas-
ings from the scene.
       At 9:59 p.m., 46 minutes before Carter called 911 to report
the shooting, Smith called Cavender about the meth deal. This
call lasted approximately 28 minutes. Cavender testified that
Smith said “somebody was going to pay for this because it wasn’t
[Smith’s] money, it was the cartel’s money.” During this conver-
sation, Cavender told Smith that Arnold was the one who had
“shorted” Smith on the drugs. Cavender offered to give Smith the
“5 grams left out of [his] stuff” to “fix it for [Arnold]” if Smith
would “just be cool.” Smith agreed and told Cavender to “meet
[him] at the gas station.” That meeting never happened, and Ar-
nold was shot shortly after the phone call ended.
       After speaking with several witnesses, law enforcement
identified Smith as a suspect and obtained Smith’s cell phone lo-
cation data for the date of the shooting. The location data showed
his cell phone arriving in the White Birch Drive area at 2:01 p.m.
the day of the shooting, traveling to a convenience store at around
3:30 p.m., and returning to the White Birch Drive area at around
4:00 p.m. Smith’s phone remained in the White Birch Drive area
until 10:42 p.m.
       Law enforcement also searched Smith’s residence pursu-
ant to a warrant and found sweatpants consistent with the sweat-
pants witnesses described Smith as wearing on the date of the
shooting, several unspent 9mm rounds, and evidence of drug us-
age. After Smith was arrested, law enforcement seized the black
cloth facemask he was wearing, which resembled the one wit-
nesses said he was wearing on the day of the shooting. The sweat-
pants and mask were tested for gunshot residue. Testing on the




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sweatpants revealed “two particles characteristic of gunshot pri-
mer residue,” which an expert testified “supports the possibility
that the clothing was in close proximity to a firearm upon dis-
charge.” 2 Testing on the mask revealed “one particle characteris-
tic of gunshot primer residue.”
       2. Smith argues that the evidence was constitutionally in-
sufficient to support his convictions. We disagree.
       In support of his argument, Smith argues that the cell
phone data that placed Smith at the location of the shooting
shortly before 911 was called was “imprecise,” that the evidence
identifying him as the shooter was “equivocal and tainted,” and
that the physical evidence failed to corroborate the State’s theory.
When evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as
a matter of constitutional due process, “we view the evidence pre-
sented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was
convicted.” Jackson v. State, 311 Ga. 626, 629 (2021). “This Court
does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; in-
stead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the ver-
dict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and
credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 630.
      Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, a jury could have found Smith guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Dav-
enport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 389 (2020) (observing that when re-
viewing for sufficiency of the evidence, “we must put aside any


       2 That expert also testified that “forensic significance of this small
quantity [of gunshot residue] may be limited,” but that was different from “say-
ing it has no forensic value.”




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questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses,
or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things
to the discretion of the trier of fact”). Smith had a motive to shoot
Arnold, as she had shorted him on a drug deal and he was angry
about it. In a call that ended shortly before Arnold was shot,
Smith learned that Arnold, not Cavender, shorted him on the
deal. Smith’s cell phone location data showed his phone leaving
the White Birch Drive area just three minutes before Carter
called 911 to report the shooting. See Richardson v. State, 920
SE2d 84, 88 (Ga. 2025) (finding evidence constitutionally suffi-
cient when, among other evidence of appellant’s guilt, cell phone
location placed the appellant’s phone “in the vicinity of the crime
scene around the time it occurred”). And gunshot residue testing
found residue on sweatpants and a face mask consistent with the
sweatpants and mask witnesses described Smith as wearing on
the day of the shooting.
       To the extent that Smith claims his conviction was improp-
erly based on circumstantial evidence, that argument fails. 3 “To
warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts
shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall
exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt
of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. Further,
         Questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses
         are generally to be decided by the jury which heard
         the evidence and where the jury is authorized to find
         that the evidence, though circumstantial, was suffi-
         cient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save
         that of guilt, that finding will not be disturbed un-
         less the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter

         3 The trial court properly instructed the jury on circumstantial evi-
dence.




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      of law.

Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 161, 162 (2006) (cleaned up). “Not every
hypothesis is a reasonable one, however, and the evidence need
not exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis—only those
that are reasonable.” Scott v. State, 320 Ga. 485, 487-88 (2024)
(cleaned up).
        A jury would be authorized, based on the evidence de-
scribed above, to exclude every “reasonable hypothesis” save that
of guilt. Scott, 320 Ga. at 487-88. Smith points to no other plausi-
ble suspect, and the evidence certainly supports a finding of his
guilt. Although Smith claims that the State did not investigate
other witnesses as possible suspects, he does not point to evidence
suggesting those witnesses would have any motive to shoot Ar-
nold. And, although Smith points to a potential misidentification
of Smith in a photo lineup by one witness and a Facebook post
identifying Smith as a suspect that witnesses may have seen prior
to identifying him, there is ample evidence supporting a conclu-
sion that Smith was the person who arranged a drug deal with
Arnold; that Smith was shorted in that drug deal and was upset
with Arnold as a result; that Smith spent a portion of the day at
the location of the murder doing drugs; that Smith was at the lo-
cation of the murder at the time of its occurrence; that Smith left
the scene of the murder shortly after it occurred; and that Smith’s
clothing and face mask had gunshot residue on it. Under these
facts, the jury could have concluded that it would be unreasonable
to think that someone else shot Arnold with no apparent motive,
without leaving any trace of their presence, at the same time that
Smith — who did have a motive — was at the scene of the shoot-
ing and that this other shooter then left the scene at the same
time as Smith without being seen. See, e.g., Nunnally v. State,
319 Ga. 701, 709 (2024) (jury was free to reject as unreasonable




                                 7
appellant’s theory that someone else shot the victim given lack of
evidence supporting appellant’s theory and strong circumstantial
evidence of appellant’s guilt, which included cell phone location
data placing appellant at the location the victim’s body was found
around the time of the murder). 4
       3. Smith also argues, and the State agrees, that the trial
court failed to exercise its discretion under the general grounds
when ruling upon Smith’s motion for new trial. Upon review of
the trial court’s order denying Smith’s motion for new trial, we
agree, and we vacate that order and remand the case to the trial
court with direction that it exercise its discretion under the gen-
eral grounds and issue an order reflecting its ruling.
       The general grounds provide trial courts with broad discre-
tion to grant a new trial “[i]n any case when the verdict of a jury
is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and eq-
uity” and “in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and
strongly against the weight of the evidence.” OCGA §§ 5-5-20, 5-
5-21. “When the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the
motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the
trial court has failed to exercise its discretion under the general
grounds.” Casey v. State, 310 Ga. 421, 425 (2020) (cleaned up) (ci-
tation omitted).
        The trial court’s order references the general grounds but
it fails to show that the trial court actually exercised its discretion



        4 For the same reasons, the evidence is sufficient to support Smith’s
conviction for possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Since it is
undisputed that Arnold was killed by a gunshot, and since the evidence sup-
ported the jury’s finding that Smith was the shooter, a jury would have been
authorized to find that Smith possessed a firearm during the commission of
the murder.




                                       8
under those grounds. Moreover, despite its reference to the gen-
eral grounds, the trial court order discusses only the sufficiency
of the evidence and applies only the familiar Jackson v. Virginia 5
standard for evaluating sufficiency claims. Thus, as the parties
agree, this order reflects that the trial court failed to exercise its
discretion as it was required to do under the general grounds. See
Casey, 310 Ga. at 425; Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386-87
(2011).
       Because the trial court failed to exercise its discretion un-
der the general grounds, we vacate the denial of Smith’s motion
for new trial and remand the case to the trial court with direction
that it exercise its discretion pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-
5-21 and issue an order that reflects its ruling. We express no
opinion regarding how the trial court should exercise its discre-
tion on remand. That decision is for the trial court to make. On
this issue, we simply hold that the trial court has failed to exercise
its discretion to rule on the motion for new trial on the general
grounds and that it should do so on remand. See Casey, 310 Ga.
at 425 (vacating and remanding the trial court’s order denying
the appellant’s motion for new trial because the trial court failed
to exercise its discretion under the general grounds).
       Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case re-
manded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.




      5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979).




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