Sneed v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.




                                                   In the
                              Supreme Court of Georgia
                                              No. S26A0409
                                              Calvin Sneed
                                                    v.
                                               The State

                          On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County
                                           No. 17SC151981

                                           Decided: April 21, 2026


                     LAGRUA, Justice.
                    Appellant Calvin Sneed appeals his convictions for malice
             murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Gregory
             Jones. 1 On appeal, Sneed argues that his convictions should be

                     1 Jones was shot on February 13, 2017, and died on the morning of
             February 14, 2017. On May 19, 2017, a Fulton County grand jury indicted
             Sneed for the following counts: malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predi-
             cated on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2); two counts of
             felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
             (Counts 3 and 4); two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
             (Counts 5 and 6); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
             (Count 7); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to OCGA § 16-
             11-131 (Count 8); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during the
             commission of another felony pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-133 (Count 9). Sneed
             was tried from November 14 to 16, 2017, and the jury found him guilty on all
             counts except Count 6. The trial court sentenced Sneed to serve life in prison
             without the possibility of parole for Count 1; five consecutive years for Count
             7; five years for Count 8, to be served concurrently with the sentence for Count
             1; and fifteen years for Count 9, to be served consecutively with the sentence
             for Count 1 and concurrently with the sentence for Count 7, for a total sentence
reversed because his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
in two ways—by failing to object when the prosecutor commented
on the veracity of a witness during the State’s closing argument,
and by failing to object during the State’s closing argument when
the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence concerning the trajec-
tory of one of the bullets and Jones’s position when he was shot.
       As an initial matter, because we conclude that the trial
court committed certain merger errors, we vacate Sneed’s convic-
tions and sentences for possession of a firearm during the com-
mission of a felony (Count 7) and possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-131 (Count 8) and remand
Sneed’s case for the trial court to correct the sentence summary
in the final disposition form. Otherwise, because we see no merit
to Sneed’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we affirm
Sneed’s remaining convictions and sentences.
       The evidence presented at trial showed that, on the night
of February 13, 2017, Sneed shot Jones four times in the front
yard of the house where Jones lived with three other people: his
mother, Antoniette Williams—who was Sneed’s mistress; Jones’s
grandmother, Mary Andrews; and Jones’s brother, Antonus Alex-
ander. Following the shooting, Jones was transported to the hos-
pital “where he was pronounced dead approximately nine hours



of life without parole plus twenty years. Counts 2 through 5 merged or were
vacated by operation of law. We address the merger issues in Division 2 below.
         Sneed filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended
through new counsel on November 29, 2023. After holding an evidentiary hear-
ing on the motion for new trial, the motion-for-new-trial court denied the mo-
tion on August 12, 2024. Sneed filed a timely notice of appeal on August 12,
2024 and an amended notice of appeal on August 13, 2024. This case was dock-
eted in this Court to the term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for
a decision on the briefs.




                                      2
after admission.” 2 At trial, Sneed claimed that he shot Jones in
self-defense after Jones “confronted” him “in an[] aggressive man-
ner and drew” a gun on him, at which point Sneed “wrestled the
gun from” Jones and “discharged the weapon three times.” Ac-
cording to Sneed, no one else was present when the shooting oc-
curred.
        In February 2017, Williams and Sneed had been in a ro-
mantic relationship for about three years. Jones did not approve
of the relationship because Sneed was married and had children
with another woman. Nevertheless, Jones and Sneed were
“friendly” to one another, and Sneed would often help Jones out
by giving him advice and rides to places he needed to go. Williams
testified that, “[a]bout a year” before the shooting occurred, Jones
and Sneed had a “scuffle,” but that was the only disagreement she
ever witnessed between the two men. Sneed similarly testified
that he had only one altercation or argument with Jones, and dur-
ing that altercation, Sneed actually “got the advance” on Jones by
“scoop[ing]” Jones up and “put[ting] him on the ground.” 3
       Around 10:15 p.m. on February 13, Jones picked up his
next-door neighbor, Shardarrious Ragland, from work. Jones and
Ragland returned to their neighborhood, and as they approached
their adjacent houses, Ragland saw Williams and Sneed sitting in



       2 The medical examiner testified that Jones sustained four gunshot
wounds—one to his chest, one to his abdomen, one to his upper back, and one
in the back side of his left arm—and she determined that his cause of death
was “gunshot wounds of the torso,” resulting from either the gunshot wound to
the chest, the gunshot wound to the abdomen, or both.
        3 Andrews testified that, after Jones and Sneed had this altercation,
she warned Jones not to “turn his back” on Sneed because if Sneed “c[a]me
after” Jones, Sneed would “come to hurt” him.




                                     3
the front yard of the house Jones shared with his family. Accord-
ing to Williams, Sneed had picked her up after he got off work,
and they “went out and got some beers,” returning about 9:45 p.m.
Williams had set up a table in the front yard where they were
sitting and drinking the beer they bought. Shortly after Jones and
Ragland returned home, Ragland heard Jones tell Sneed—who
was still sitting in the front yard with Williams—“This ain’t right.
Man, you got to go.” Suddenly, Sneed stood up and “started shoot-
ing” Jones, with the first shot entering Jones “[s]omewhere in the
chest.” Williams tried to stand up, but her chair was caught in the
table. After Sneed shot Jones two or three times, Jones fell to the
ground, and as he was lying “on his side” “in a fetal position” “with
his hands up,” he said to Sneed, “Please, I got you bro, please,
please, don’t shoot me no more, please, I got you.” Sneed then shot
Jones “two, three more times” while he was on the ground. 4 After
hearing the gunshots, Alexander came outside from the house
and saw Jones lying in the front yard, and Jones said, “he shot
me, bro,” referring to Sneed. Immediately after the shooting,
Sneed “sped away” in his car. 5 The others helped Jones into the
house and called 911. Around 7:30 a.m. the next morning, Jones
died from his injuries.
       Contrary to Sneed’s trial testimony that he shot Jones in
self-defense after Jones “brandish[ed] a gun” and Sneed “dis-
armed him,” Williams and Ragland testified that Jones was not
armed and never threatened Sneed with a gun that night, and the
only person they saw in possession of a gun that night was


       4 The medical examiner confirmed that it was possible the gunshot
wounds Jones sustained to his back and his left arm were “consistent with
someone standing over someone and shooting down at them.”
       5 At trial, Sneed admitted that he fled in his car after shooting Jones
and did not call anyone for help.




                                      4
Sneed. 6 And Williams testified that she recognized the gun Sneed
used in the shooting because he kept this gun in the glove com-
partment of his car, and she had seen him carry the gun on prior
occasions. One of the investigating officers testified that, when
they interviewed Williams after the shooting, she said that Sneed
carried a “.32 revolver” and used that gun to shoot Jones. And,
although law enforcement officers never located the murder
weapon, the State’s firearm examiner testified that the bullets
extracted from Jones’s body during the autopsy were “.32 caliber,
lead bullets … fired from the same firearm,” which was a “.32 re-
volver.” Sneed was arrested for Jones’s murder on February 20,
2017.
       1. Relying on Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687–
95 (1984), Sneed argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective because, at two points during the State’s closing argu-
ment, trial counsel should have raised an objection to certain of
the prosecutor’s statements and failed to do so.
       Specifically, Sneed contends that his trial counsel per-
formed deficiently by failing to object when the prosecutor told
the jury during closing argument that it had “no reason not to
believe [Williams]” because this statement was an improper com-
ment on the veracity of a witness. Sneed also contends that his
trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object when the
prosecutor commented in closing argument on the trajectory of
the bullet that killed Jones because no evidence was presented to
demonstrate Jones’s position when the fatal bullet entered his
body and because the State was merely trying to discredit Sneed’s



       6 Williams, Ragland, Andrews, and Alexander also testified that they
had never seen Jones with a gun, and he simply “wasn’t a person who carried
guns.”




                                    5
defense that he shot and killed Jones in self-defense. Sneed ar-
gues that his trial counsel’s deficient performance in these re-
spects prejudiced the outcome of Sneed’s case. These arguments
are unavailing.
      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
      counsel, a defendant generally must show that coun-
      sel’s performance was deficient and that the defi-
      cient performance resulted in prejudice to the de-
      fendant. In reviewing either component of the in-
      quiry, all factual findings by the trial court will be
      affirmed unless clearly erroneous.

Saunders v. State, 323 Ga. 136, 139 (2025) (citations and quota-
tion marks omitted).
       “To prove deficient performance, a defendant must show
that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way
considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing pro-
fessional norms.” Saunders, 323 Ga. at 139 (quotation marks
omitted). We have said that “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s
conduct is examined from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial
and under the particular circumstances of the case.” Nesbit v.
State, 321 Ga. 240, 247 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). And
“decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis
for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unrea-
sonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a
course.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “To satisfy the prejudice
prong, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that,
in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
trial would have been different.” Saunders, 323 Ga. at 140 (quo-
tation marks omitted). If this Court concludes that the appellant
has failed to meet his burden to prove either deficiency or preju-
dice, we do not have to examine the other prong. See id.




                                 6
       In denying Sneed’s motion for new trial, the motion-for-
new-trial court determined that Sneed failed to show his trial
counsel performed deficiently by failing to object during closing
argument when the prosecutor said the jury had no reason not to
believe Williams or when the prosecutor described the trajectory
of one of the bullets and the position of the victim at the time he
was shot. The trial court concluded that an objection in either in-
stance would have been meritless and that there was no prejudice
because overwhelming evidence had been presented of Sneed’s
guilt. We agree.
      First, we have held that
      a closing argument is to be judged in the context in
      which it is made, and a prosecutor is granted wide
      latitude in the conduct of closing argument and
      within the scope of such latitude is the prosecutor’s
      ability to argue reasonable inferences from the evi-
      dence, including any that address the credibility of
      witnesses.

Lee v. State, 317 Ga. 880, 887 (2023) (cleaned up). “Moreover,
whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing ar-
gument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make
an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of
deficient performance.” Id. (cleaned up).
       With respect to Sneed’s first argument, we note that the
comment at issue—i.e., that the jury had “no reason not to believe
[Williams]”—is taken out of context. The record reflects that this
statement was part of a lengthier argument in which the State
informed the jury that the trial court would instruct the jury that
the testimony of a single witness, if believed, was sufficient to
prove the guilt of the defendant. The prosecutor then stated:




                                 7
      If you believe just Ms. Williams alone, and you have
      no reason not to believe her, because she is consistent
      and she’s corroborated by science, you’re authorized
      to convict [Sneed] on everything in that indictment.
      But that’s not all we gave you … and you get to de-
      termine the credibility of Ms. Williams.

Here, the prosecutor’s statements pertaining to the testimony of
Williams were “permissible since they were the conclusion the
prosecutor wished the jury to draw from the evidence and not
statements of the prosecutor’s personal belief as to the veracity of
the witnesses.” Lee, 317 Ga. at 887–88 (cleaned up). Accordingly,
“[b]ecause the prosecutor’s comment was within the wide latitude
offered to the State during closing argument, an objection was un-
warranted, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
make one.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 774, 776 (2017).
        Additionally, as to Sneed’s second ineffectiveness claim—
namely, that his trial counsel should have objected during closing
argument after the prosecutor allegedly argued facts not in evi-
dence when discussing the trajectory of a bullet—we conclude
that the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible inference
drawn from the evidence presented at trial, and thus, Sneed’s
trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to it. See Faust
v. State, 302 Ga. 211, 220 (2017) (concluding that, where the pros-
ecutor’s argument was based on permissible inferences and sup-
ported by the facts in evidence, trial counsel’s failure to make a
meritless objection to the State’s closing argument did not show
that counsel’s performance was professionally deficient).
        At trial, the medical examiner testified that Jones suffered
a gunshot wound to his upper back where the bullet traveled
through the tissue without entering the body cavity. Photographs
of this injury were admitted into evidence, including a picture




                                  8
with a rod that demonstrated the bullet’s trajectory. The medical
examiner also conceded during direct examination that this in-
jury could be consistent with someone standing over Jones and
firing down at him.
        During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor ar-
gued:
        I want you to look at that picture and I want you to
        look at this demonstrative that [the medical exam-
        iner] used. That gunshot in the back and in the pic-
        ture, it went through and through. It was on the
        skin. It entered on one side. It was parallel. If [Jones]
        is falling down, it’s going to be at an angle. It’s not
        going to go from one side to the other directly in a
        straight line. But if [Jones] is lying down and [some-
        one is] standing over him and … shooting down at
        him, it’s going to go straight down from that angle.
        And you’ll see the picture. In one of the exhibits,
        there is a rod that [the medical examiner] used to
        show the path of that bullet in Mr. Jones’ back. It’s
        straight down, parallel to the surface of the skin.

The State’s argument about the trajectory of one of the bullets
and its argument concerning Jones’s position at the time he was
shot did not introduce facts that were not in evidence. Instead,
the State directed the jury to consider the pictures of Jones’s in-
juries, along with the medical examiner’s testimony, to draw a
conclusion about the position of Jones’s body when he was shot—
a conclusion that matched the testimony of Ragland and Wil-
liams, who testified that Sneed shot Jones after he fell and was
lying on the ground.
        The State is permitted “wide latitude to argue reasonable




                                   9
inferences from the evidence.” Styles v. State, 308 Ga. 624, 629
(2020). Because the State made a proper argument based on the
evidence admitted at trial, including inferences taken from an ex-
pert’s opinion, Sneed’s trial counsel was not constitutionally defi-
cient in failing to object to the argument as any such objection
would have been meritless. See id. See also Glover v. State, 309
Ga. 102, 106 (2020) (concluding that, because the appellant
“pointed to no basis … on which counsel could have successfully
objected to the prosecutor’s comment” and because the “failure to
make a meritless objection to the State’s closing argument is not
evidence of ineffective assistance,” appellant’s ineffectiveness
claim failed) (quotation marks omitted). For these reasons,
Sneed’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail.
        2. We now address the merger errors noted above under
Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696 (2017) (holding that, “[e]ven when
no party raises a merger error, if we note such an error” and the
defendant is harmed by the error, “we have the discretion to cor-
rect it on direct appeal”). In this case, Sneed was convicted of mal-
ice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated as-
sault with a deadly weapon (Count 2); two counts of felony murder
predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts
3 and 4); one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
(Count 5); possession of a firearm during the commission of a fel-
ony (Count 7); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursu-
ant to OCGA § 16-11-131 (Count 8); and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon during the commission of another felony pur-
suant to OCGA § 16-11-133 (Count 9). The trial court sentenced
Sneed to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for
Count 1; five years for Count 7, to be served consecutively with
the sentence for Count 1; five years on Count 8, to be served con-
currently with the sentence for Count 1; and fifteen years for
Count 9, to be served consecutively with the sentence for Count 1




                                 10
and concurrently with the sentence for Count 7. 7 Counts 2
through 5 merged or were vacated by operation of law.
       As established in Marshall v. State, 309 Ga. 698, 701 (2020)
and Atkinson v. State, 301 Ga. 518, 520–21 (2017), Count 7 (pos-
session of a firearm during the commission of a felony) and Count
8 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to OCGA
§ 16-11-131) should have merged with Count 9 (possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of another fel-
ony pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-133), and because the trial court
failed to merge these counts, we vacate Sneed’s convictions and
sentences on Counts 7 and 8.
       Additionally, while the final disposition form reflects that
the trial court sentenced Sneed to 15 years for Count 9, which is
the statutorily required sentence for this charge, see OCGA § 16-
11-133(b)(5) (requiring punishment “by confinement for a period
15 years, such sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence
which the person has received”), the final disposition form states
that Sneed is sentenced to life without parole plus 20 years (it
should instead be 15 years). Accordingly, we must remand the
case for the trial court to correct the sentence in the record.
       Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
for resentencing. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P. J., not
participating.




       7 The sentences on Counts 7 and 9 were suspended, but that does not
impact our analysis.




                                   11