William Bernard White v. State

FIRST DIVISION
                               BARNES, P. J.,
                           MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules



                                                                      April 28, 2026




In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A26A0027. WHITE v. THE STATE.

      MARKLE, Judge.

      The State charged William Bernard White with a single count of possession of

fentanyl. He now appeals from the trial court’s denial of his plea in bar, asserting his

immunity under the Georgia 9-1-1 Medical Amnesty Law, OCGA § 16-13-5. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

             The burden of proving entitlement to immunity by a
      preponderance of the evidence falls on the defendant. On appeal of an
      order granting or denying a motion for immunity from prosecution, we
      review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
      and we accept the trial court’s findings with regard to questions of fact
      and credibility if there is any evidence to support them. The trial court’s
      application of the law is subject to de novo appellate review.
Purdee v. State, 376 Ga. App. 836, 837 (921 SE2d 88) (2025) (citation modified).

      So viewed, the record shows that, late one night in March 2022, a law

enforcement officer responded to a 911 call that a vehicle was stopped in a turning lane

with an unconscious driver at the wheel. The officer was able to wake the driver, who

identified himself as White. Paramedics evaluated White and confirmed that he was

not having a medical emergency, and then left the scene. The officer noted White was

disoriented, and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, but detected no odor of alcohol

or any other signs of impairment. White claimed he suffered from narcolepsy and that

he had taken Xanax two days earlier. The officer ran White’s license and discovered

an outstanding warrant for a probation violation. After confirming the warrant, the

officer arrested White. And, upon searching him, the officer recovered a small bag

containing white powder that was later identified as fentanyl.

      White was charged with possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to

OCGA § 16-13-30(a). He filed his plea in bar, asserting his immunity from prosecution

because he was the subject of a call for medical assistance related to a drug overdose,

pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-5. Following a hearing, the trial court denied White’s




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request for immunity.1 White filed his application for interlocutory appeal, which we

granted, and this appeal followed.

      In related enumerations of error, White contends the trial court erred by

misconstruing OCGA § 16-13-5, and concluding that he was not entitled to the

protections under that statute because the drug charge did not arise solely from the

call for medical assistance. We disagree.

      Our review of the interpretation of a statute is de novo. Purdee, 376 Ga. App. at

837(1). And,

      [w]hen we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the
      General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that
      end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we
      must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we
      must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
      ordinary speaker of the English language would. If the statutory text is
      clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and
      our search for statutory meaning is at an end. And, when interpreting a
      statute, all its words must be given due weight; we are forbidden to “read
      out” any words in the statute unless a clear reason appears for doing so.



      1
        At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the evidence, including the officer’s
body-cam recording, the transcript of the 911 call placed by the concerned citizen, and
the officer’s written report.
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      We must, therefore, avoid a statutory construction that will render some
      of the statutory language mere surplusage.


Id. at 837-838(1) (citation modified).

      Relevant to the case at hand, OCGA § 16-13-5(b) (2014) provides:

      Any person who is experiencing a drug overdose and, in good faith, seeks
      medical assistance for himself or herself or is the subject of such a
      request shall not be arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a drug violation
      if the evidence for the arrest, charge, or prosecution of such drug
      violation resulted solely from seeking such medical assistance.[2]


      White contends that the term “solely” in the above Code section is ambiguous,

and must be strictly construed against the State. See Hale v. State, 262 Ga. App. 710,



      2
         The statute defines a drug overdose as “an acute condition, including, but not
limited to, ... decreased level of consciousness ... resulting from the consumption or
use of a controlled substance or dangerous drug by the distressed individual ... or that
a reasonable person would believe to be resulting from the consumption or use of a
controlled substance or dangerous drug.” OCGA § 16-13-5(a)(1). Medical assistance
is defined as “aid provided to a person by a health care professional licensed,
registered, or certified under the laws of this state who, acting within his or her lawful
scope of practice, may provide diagnosis, treatment, or emergency medical services.”
OCGA § 16-13-5(a)(3). And the phrase “seeks medical assistance” is defined as
“accesses or assists in accessing the 9-1-1 system or otherwise contacts or assists in
contacting law enforcement or a poison control center and provides care to a person
while awaiting the arrival of medical assistance to aid such person.” OCGA §
16-13-5(a)(4).
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711 (586 SE2d 372) (2003). He thus insists that OCGA § 16-13-5(b) must be read to

signify that there can be no intervening or subsequent cause to authorize a search that

may then lead to a drug charge if the initial cause for police presence is responding to

an overdose.

      But this interpretation does not conform to a natural and reasonable reading of

OCGA § 16-13-5(b). See Purdee, 376 Ga. App. at 837-838(1). Read in this way,

“solely” modifies the term “resulted” in the phrase “resulted solely from seeking

such medical assistance.” OCGA § 16-13-5(b). See Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460,

467(3) (851 SE2d 564) (2020) (“a qualifying phrase should ordinarily be read as

modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”(citation omitted)).

Contrary to White’s expansive reading of this section, when properly construed,

OCGA § 16-13-5(b) limits its protection to only one instance: when the incriminating

evidence       is   the   fruit    of    the    call   for    help.    See     Solely,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solely (last accessed April 2, 2026)

(“to the exclusion of all else”). In so limiting the origin of the evidence, the statute

necessarily contemplates there may be any number of circumstances resulting in the

recovery of incriminating evidence to which immunity would not apply. And, under


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the present circumstances, there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding that

the fentanyl was the fruit of the outstanding arrest warrant — not of the seeking of

medical assistance.3

      This construction aligns with the text of OCGA § 16-13-5(c), which provides:

      Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to limit the admissibility
      of any evidence in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a
      crime with regard to a defendant who does not qualify for the protections
      of subsection (b) of this Code section or with regard to other crimes
      committed by a person who otherwise qualifies for protection pursuant
      to subsection (b) of this Code section.


(Emphasis added.) See also Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 181(2) (477 SE2d 583)

(1996) (“Where possible, effect is to be given to all the words of a statute, and it is

firmly established that courts should not interpret a statute so as to render parts of it

surplusage or meaningless.”); Purdee, 376 Ga. App. at 838(1). Here, White had

committed another crime — a parole violation. Incident to his arrest for that crime, the


      3
       White’s reliance on State v. Mercier, 349 Ga. App. 536 (826 SE2d 422) (2019)
(physical precedent only), is unpersuasive as that case is distinguishable. There, the
drug charge unquestionably arose from law enforcement’s search of the defendant’s
vehicle in the course of responding to calls for medical assistance — with no
intervening events. Id. at 537-540. Thus, the term “resulted solely from seeking such
medical assistance” was not at issue. OCGA § 16-13-5(b) (emphasis added).
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officer’s search revealed the narcotics in White’s pocket. Thus, White was not

entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-13-5(b) or (c).

      Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Hodges, J., concur.




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