In the Matter of Darryl J. Ferguson

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia



                                                   Decided: April 21, 2026



      S26Y0093. IN THE MATTER OF DARRYL J. FERGUSON.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and

Recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review

Board”), which adopts Special Master Delia T. Crouch’s Report and

Recommendation concluding that Darryl J. Ferguson (State Bar No.

250630) violated Rules 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii), (c) and (d) of the Georgia

Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rule”), found in Bar Rule

4-102(d). The Review Board recommended that the Court suspend

Ferguson for 60 days with his reinstatement conditioned on making

restitution. Ferguson has filed exceptions to the Review Board’s

Report and Recommendation, and the Bar has responded. Because

we conclude that the Bar has failed to prove that Ferguson violated
Rule 1.15(I) as charged, we impose no discipline and dismiss the

case.

        1. Background & Procedural History

        (a) In February 2024, the Bar filed a Formal Complaint

charging Ferguson with violations of Rules 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii), (c), and

(d).

        Rule 1.15(I) says, in relevant part:

        (b) For purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard
        a third person’s interest in funds or other property in the
        lawyer’s possession if:
              (1) the interest is known to the lawyer, and
              (2) the interest is based upon one of the following:
                    i. A statutory lien;
                    ii. A final judgment addressing disposition of
                    those funds or property; or
                    iii. A written agreement by the client or the
                    lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing
                    payment out of those funds or property.
        The lawyer may disregard the third person’s claimed
        interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a
        valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement.

        (c) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
        client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
        promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
        stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
        agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver
        to the client or third person any funds or other property

                                     2
     that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
     upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly
     render a full accounting regarding such property.

     (d) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
     possession of funds or other property in which both the
     lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the
     property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there
     is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a
     dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the
     portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer
     until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly
     distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which
     the interests are not in dispute.

     The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is
     disbarment.

     The      Bar   contends     that    Ferguson      violated    Rules

1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii), (c), and (d) by disregarding a chiropractor’s interest

in the settlement funds recovered for two of his clients after

Ferguson signed a written agreement regarding that interest.

Ferguson timely answered the complaint and denied any Rule

violations.

     (b) The undisputed facts are as follows. In 2017, Ferguson,

who has been a member of the State Bar since 2004, represented two

different clients in separate car accident cases; both clients received

                                    3
treatment for their injuries from a chiropractor. In connection with

each case, Ferguson and his clients signed a document from the

chiropractor entitled “Notice of Doctor’s Lien” (hereinafter “Notice”).

     The clients signed under the first part of the notice, which said:

“I hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney, to pay directly to

said doctor such sums as may be due owing for chiropractic/physical

therapy service rendered me … and to withhold such sums from any

settlement, judgment, or verdict which may be paid to you my

attorney, or myself, as the result of the injuries for which I have been

treated or injuries in connection therewith.”             The clients

acknowledged that they were responsible to pay for the

chiropractor’s services and that the “agreement” was “made solely

for said doctor to give additional protection and in consideration of

awaiting payment” and that, if their attorney “does not wish to

cooperate in protecting said doctor[’s] interest, the doctor will not

await payment but may declare the entire balance due and payable.”

The client promised to “promptly notify said doctor” of any change

in attorneys and “promptly deliver a copy of this lien to any

                                   4
substituted or added attorney(s).” Finally, the clients “direct[ed] my

attorney to pay said doctor the full cost of treatment in my case.”

Ferguson signed the second part of the Notice, agreeing, as the

clients’ attorney, “to observe all of the terms of the above and

agree[ing] to withhold such sums from any settlement, judgment, or

verdict as may be necessary to adequately protect and fully

compensate said doctor.”

     When Ferguson settled his clients’ cases in November 2019, he

did not notify the chiropractor of the settlements or pay or negotiate

with her for the amounts owing for his clients’ treatment. After

retaining his fees from the settlement funds, Ferguson disbursed the

remaining funds to his clients without paying the chiropractor any

amount.

     (c) Additional evidence was provided through the testimony of

Ferguson and the chiropractor at a hearing before the special

master. Ferguson testified as follows. Before the cases at issue,

Ferguson had regularly honored agreements signed with the same

chiropractor using the same language as the Notice.         However,

                                  5
unlike in prior cases, after each of the two cases at issue here settled,

Ferguson’s clients asked him not to distribute any funds to the

chiropractor. In light of this request, Ferguson conducted research

and concluded that the Notice was a notice of a lien (not, for

example, a letter of protection); his signature on the Notice was “an

acknowledgement of said notice”; and the chiropractor failed to

“take[] the adequate protocols necessary to perfect her interest”

through the lien.      Indeed, at the time the Notices were signed,

Georgia law did not allow chiropractors to secure a lien of this kind. 1

Thus, Ferguson determined that there was a valid defense to the

Notice because it was “a failed attempt at a lien because it was not

perfected” and determined that he could therefore disregard the

chiropractor’s interest under Rule 1.15(I)(b). See Rule 1.15(I)(b)

(“The lawyer may disregard the third person’s claimed interest if the

lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such



      1 Ferguson is correct that, prior to 2023, Georgia lien law did not extend

lien rights to chiropractors in relation to legal client funds. See OCGA §44-14-
470 through §44-14-477 (2023) (adding chiropractors as a class of participants
afforded lien protection).

                                       6
lien, judgment, or agreement.”). Ferguson opined at the hearing

that if the chiropractor wanted to protect her interest independent

of a lien, she should have gotten a letter of protection, which is “an

entirely separate agreement from a lien” that serves as “an

independent agreement between the treatment provider and the

attorney.”

      The chiropractor testified that she was owed $4,300 for one of

Ferguson’s clients and $7,841 for the other, 2 and that she had not

been paid any of it.          She agreed that Ferguson had honored

agreements similar to the Notice in the past. She testified that she

“always thought this lien served as a letter of protection.”

      (d) After the hearing, the Special Master entered her Report

and Recommendation. She rejected Ferguson’s argument that he did

not have a duty to pay the chiropractor a portion of the settlement

funds. The Special Master concluded that Ferguson should not have

relied on the title of the Notice to treat it as an imperfectible lien,



      2 The amount owed for the second client was disputed, and the Special

Master found that the cost owed for each client was $4,300, for a total of $8,600.

                                        7
but should instead have honored the substance, finding: “There is

nothing in the document that limits [Ferguson’s] promise to observe

the terms of the agreement if, and only if, [the chiropractor] perfects

a lien.”    And the Special Master concluded that Ferguson’s

“unilateral decision that [the chiropractor] had no interest in the

settlement funds is not supported by the evidence.”

     The Special Master noted that Ferguson “presented no

evidence” that “there was an industry practice that created a

significant difference between the words contained in the Notice of

Doctor’s Lien and a Letter of Protection” that allowed him to

disregard the Notice if it represented a lien, but not if it was a letter

of protection. The Special Master found that Ferguson “knew when

he executed the agreement [the chiropractor] could not perfect a

lien,” which meant “[h]e either relied on the terms of the agreement

to protect [the chiropractor’s] outstanding bill or he was

intentionally deceptive and allowed [the chiropractor] to treat his

clients and provide medical records to him with no intention of

paying her out of the settlement proceeds.” She further concluded

                                   8
that the “only reason” for Ferguson to sign the Notice was “to

indicate his cooperation in protecting [the chiropractor’s] interest,”

observing that the Notice made clear that if Ferguson was unwilling

“to cooperate in protecting [the chiropractor’s] interest,” the

chiropractor could have demanded payment at the time of service.

     The Special Master thus concluded that Ferguson violated

Rule 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii) when he failed to negotiate payment of the

chiropractor’s bills and Rule 1.15(I)(c) when he failed to notify her of

the settlement and/or to deliver any settlement funds to her. She

also concluded that Ferguson violated Rule 1.15(I)(d) by not

segregating the settlement funds and by “disburs[ing] all of the …

settlement funds in his possession without protecting [the

chiropractor’s] interest or at least encouraging [the clients] to

resolve the matter.”

     As to discipline, the Special Master cited the framework set out

in the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) and

concluded that Ferguson violated his ethical duty to safeguard

property of a third party, concluding: “Although [Ferguson] relies on

                                   9
black letter law to determine his responsibility to [the chiropractor],

he has not considered his higher obligation under the Rules of

Professional Conduct in his dealing with her.” The Special Master

determined that Ferguson acted knowingly and intentionally in his

interactions with the chiropractor and concluded that his actions

caused an actual injury to her in that she relied on Ferguson’s

assurances in the Notices to provide services without requiring

contemporaneous payment and she had not been paid for the

treatment she provided to Ferguson’s clients. In mitigation, the

Special Master noted that Ferguson had been a member of the Bar

since 2004 with no prior disciplinary history; that he did not benefit

financially from his actions; and that he participated in the

disciplinary process and treated it seriously and with respect. See

ABA Standards 9.32 (a), (b), and (e). In aggravation, the Special

Master noted that Ferguson had substantial experience in the

practice of law (personal injury law in particular), and that he failed

to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. See ABA

Standards 9.22 (g) and (i). Further, the Special Master concluded

                                  10
that Ferguson’s “insistence that he had no duty to honor the [Notice]

suggests this conduct will continue unabated.”

     The Special Master recommended that Ferguson be suspended

for a period of four months unless he provided within 180 days

sufficient evidence to the Office of General Counsel that he made

restitution to the chiropractor—in which case his suspension would

be reduced to a Review Board reprimand. See Matter of Cherry, 305

Ga. 667 (2019) (imposing a public reprimand in a case with similar

facts after the attorney showed that she had paid the injured third

party in full).

     (e) Both parties filed exceptions to the Special Master’s Report

and Recommendation, with the State Bar challenging the

recommended discipline as too lenient, and Ferguson again arguing

that he owed no duty to the chiropractor because he reasonably

concluded that there was a defense to her interest under Rule

1.15(I)(b) and arguing that, even if he violated Rule 1.15(I), the

Special Master’s recommended sanction was disproportionate and



                                 11
improperly characterized his good-faith belief that there was a

legitimate legal dispute as a “lack of remorse.”

      The Review Board adopted the Special Master’s factual

findings and legal conclusions but rejected the Special Master’s

recommendation as to the appropriate level of discipline. With the

exception of one member (who dissented), the Review Board

recommended a 60-day suspension with payment of $8,600 in

restitution as a condition precedent to reinstatement. 3 In support of

its conclusion, the Review Board noted that in Matter of Cherry, 305

Ga. 667 (2019), this Court accepted a reprimand under similar

circumstances “in no small part because restitution had already

been paid,” citing Cherry, 305 Ga. at 667, whereas here Ferguson

not only “failed to pay [r]estitution, but he also intends to not pay it”

and maintains that he did not violate Rule 1.15(I).4


      3 One member of the Review Board recommended a one-year suspension

because of Ferguson’s failure to admit wrongdoing.
      4 As explained further below, we conclude that no discipline is warranted

in this case, but we remind the Bar, the Special Master, and the Review Board
that “[a]ttorneys in disciplinary proceedings have the right, like all litigants,
to advance good-faith, colorable arguments supporting their position” and that

                                       12
      Ferguson timely filed exceptions to the Review Board’s Report

and Recommendation, again contending that he could disregard the

chiropractor’s interest under Rule 1.15(I)(b) because there was a

valid defense to the Notice and that the Special Master erred in

relying on a lack of remorse or failure to acknowledge wrongdoing to

aggravate his punishment where he acted in reasonable reliance on

of the plain text of Rule 1.15(I)(b). In its response, the Bar requests

that the Court uphold the Review Board’s determination that

Ferguson violated Rules 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii), 1.15(I)(c), and 1.15(I)(d) by

not honoring the terms of the written agreement with the

chiropractor and that the Court impose at least a 60-day suspension

with readmission conditioned on restitution in light of Ferguson’s

failure to show remorse.




“refusing to admit guilt from the outset generally means the mitigating effect
of showing remorse—one factor among many—is absent, not that the
aggravating effect of refusing to ‘acknowledge [the] wrongful nature of [one’s]
conduct’ is present.” In the Matter of Taylor, 323 Ga. 214, 235-36 (2025).

                                      13
     2. Analysis

     We have reviewed the record in this case, deferring to the

Special Master’s factual findings that “are supported by the record,”

but “review[ing] de novo the conclusions of law reached below on

what rules were violated and what level of discipline is appropriate.”

Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 258 (2023) (noting that “because this

Court recognizes that the special master is in the best position to

determine the witnesses’ credibility, it generally defers to the

factual findings and credibility determinations made by the special

master unless those findings or determinations are clearly

erroneous” (emphasis removed)). Based on our review, we conclude

that the State Bar has not carried its burden to prove “by clear and

convincing evidence” that Ferguson violated any part of Rule 1.15(I)

through his conduct. See Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. at 271 (“[T]he

State Bar has the burden of proving violations of the GRPC by clear

and convincing evidence, see Bar Rule 4-221.2 (b).”).

     The key questions in this case are (1) did Ferguson “reasonably

conclude that there is a valid defense” to the Notice under Rule

                                 14
1.15(I)(b), and (2) if he reached such a conclusion, did he have any

remaining obligations regarding the chiropractor’s interest under

Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d). We address each of these questions in turn.5

     (1) Did Ferguson reasonably conclude that there was a valid
     defense to the Notice?

     As laid out above, Rule 1.15(I)(b)(iii) mandates that lawyers

“not disregard” a third party’s interest in funds in the lawyer’s

possession if the interest “is known to the lawyer” and is based on

“[a] written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the

client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.” Here,

the chiropractor’s interest satisfied Rule 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii): it was

known to Ferguson and was based on the Notice, which is a “written

agreement” by Ferguson and his client “guaranteeing payment out

of [settlement] funds or property.”

     But Rule 1.15(I)(b) concludes by providing that “[t]he lawyer

may disregard the third person’s claimed interest if the lawyer



     5 This Court requested supplemental briefing on these questions from

the parties, and we have considered their responses in the analysis that
follows.

                                   15
reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such …

agreement.” Ferguson contends that he satisfied the portion of Rule

1.15(I)(b) that allows him to “disregard” the chiropractor’s interest

because he “reasonably conclude[d] that there is a defense” to the

Notice: the Notice was notice of a lien against a plaintiff’s “cause[] of

action” for the provision of medical care, which is a statutory lien

provided for in OCGA § 44-14-470 and must be perfected as provided

in OCGA § 44-14-471, and the chiropractor undisputedly did not

(and at that time could not) perfect such a lien under Georgia law.

The Bar argues that Ferguson was not permitted to disregard the

chiropractor’s interest because there is no valid defense to the

Notice, which it contends was a written agreement imposing an

obligation independent of a lien.

     (a) In answering whether Ferguson was permitted to disregard

the chiropractor’s interest under Rule 1.15(I)(b), we consider the text

of the Notice as well as the relevant factual findings of the Special

Master. Turning first to the text of the Notice, we acknowledge that

in isolation—that is, when removed from the full context of the

                                    16
Notice—some of the Notice language appears to support the Bar’s

position that the Notice created an independent obligation to pay

the chiropractor. 6 For example, the portion of the Notice signed by

the client stated that it “authoriz[ed] and direct[ed] you, my

attorney, to pay directly to said doctor such sums as may be due

owing for chiropractic/physical therapy service … and to withhold

such sums from any settlement, judgment, or verdict which may be

paid to you, my attorney.” And Ferguson signed a portion of the

Notice in which he agreed “to observe all the terms of the above and

agree[d] to withhold such sums from any settlement, judgment, or

verdict, as may be necessary to adequately protect and fully

compensate said doctor above named.”

     But these terms must be viewed in context of the Notice as a

whole. See Langley v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321, 324 (2019)



     6 In deciding this case, we focus on the conclusions of the Special Master

and the arguments made by the parties. Notably, the Special Master
concluded—and the Bar has consistently argued—that the Notice is a written
agreement creating an obligation to pay, independent of any lien. The Bar has
never argued, and the Special Master did not conclude, that the Notice
constitutes a contractual lien as the dissenting opinion contends.

                                     17
(“[I]t is axiomatic that contracts must be construed in their entirety

and in a manner that permits all of the terms contained therein to

be consistent with one another.”). And viewed in that light, these

agreements to pay the chiropractor could be interpreted—as

Ferguson contends—as secured by a lien, as provided for in OCGA

§ 44-14-470, rather than existing as an independent obligation.7

Specifically, the Notice is titled “Notice of Doctor’s Lien,” and the

Notice is again referenced as a “lien” in which the client promises

that if she changes attorneys, she will “promptly deliver a copy of

this lien to any substituted or added attorney(s).” If the obligation




      7 OCGA § 44-14-470 provides liens to certain medical providers for “the

reasonable charges” for “care and treatment of an injured person,” and the “lien
shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the
care was furnished.” Although the dissenting opinion argues that Ferguson
could not have reasonably concluded that the chiropractor was attempting to
create a lien under this statute because chiropractors were not eligible for such
a lien at the time, the title “Doctor’s Lien,” the directive to pay “to said doctor,”
and the fact that the financial obligation is for medical care and against “any
settlement, judgment, or verdict” supports our conclusion that it was
reasonable for Ferguson to conclude that the chiropractor was attempting
(unsuccessfully) to create a lien under OCGA § 44-14-470. See also Med-Care
Sols., LLC v. Bey & Associates, LLC, 362 Ga. App. 861, 866–67 (2022) (“Liens
against a plaintiff’s cause of action for the charges of his medical care are
specifically established in OCGA § 44-14-470 et seq., which requires strict
compliance with rules for the creation and perfection of such liens.”).

                                         18
is best understood as secured by a statutory lien, then Ferguson’s

promise to “observe all the terms of the above” and his agreement to

withhold sums “necessary to adequately protect and fully

compensate” the chiropractor could be read as limited to that which

is necessary to protect the chiropractor’s lien. Such an agreement

could then be nullified by a defense that the lien was not valid under

Georgia law.

     In reaching this conclusion, we need not definitively decide as

a matter of law whether the Notice created only an obligation

secured by a statutory lien.     We are sufficiently convinced that

Ferguson’s argument—that it was reasonable for him to conclude

that the interest created by the Notice is limited to a statutory lien

that was not perfected—is supported by the text of the Notice. We

are convinced that the text of Rule 1.15(I)(b) allowed Ferguson to

assert that defense, and the Bar has not presented clear and

convincing evidence that Ferguson’s assertion of the defense was not

supported by the text of the Notice and by the text of Rule 1.15(I)(b).



                                  19
     (b) Turning to the Special Master’s factual findings, we see

none that mandate the conclusion that Ferguson did not reasonably

conclude that there was a valid defense to the Notice. As noted

above, the Special Master’s finding that “[t]here is nothing in the

document that limits [Ferguson’s] promise to observe the terms of

the agreement if, and only if, [the chiropractor] perfects a lien”

accurately describes the express terms of the agreement. However,

when read in full context, other language contained in the Notice

indicates that it is secured by a lien. So this finding does not answer

the ultimate question of whether Ferguson reasonably concluded

that he had a valid defense to the Notice under Rule 1.15(I)(b). For

the same reason—that is, because the Special Master did not

construe the terms of the Notice in full context—we reject the

Special Master’s conclusion that Ferguson’s “unilateral decision that

[the chiropractor] had no interest in the settlement funds is not

supported by the evidence.” The language in the Notice indicating




                                  20
that it is a lien is evidence that supports Ferguson’s conclusion that

there was a valid defense to the Notice under Rule 1.15(I)(b).8

      Notably, we do defer to some of the Special Master’s credibility

and factual findings. But as explained more below, none of those

findings mandates the conclusion that Ferguson did not reasonably

conclude that he had a valid defense to the Notice under Rule

1.15(I)(b).

      First, we defer to the Special Master’s finding that Ferguson

failed to present evidence that there is “an industry practice” of

treating a notice of a lien and a letter of protection differently. But

that finding does not prevent Ferguson from reasonably concluding

that he had a valid defense to the Notice based on the language of


      8 Notably, Ferguson does not argue that he was permitted to disregard

the chiropractor’s interest simply because his clients told him to, nor has he
purported to “arbitrate a dispute” between his clients and the chiropractor. See
Comment 3 to Rule 1.15(I) (explaining that a lawyer “may have a duty under
applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference
by the client” and “should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute
between the client and the third party”) and Comment 3A (directing attorneys
to hold funds in dispute for a reasonable period of time while the interested
parties attempted to resolve the dispute and, if no resolution could be reached,
to interplead the disputed funds). Instead, Ferguson asserts that he conducted
research at the instruction of his clients and that research led him to conclude
that there was a valid defense to the Notice under Rule 1.15(I)(b).

                                      21
the Notice. And the Bar—the party with the burden of proof—has

not presented any evidence that a notice of a lien always creates a

legally enforceable obligation even if the third party fails to perfect

the lien.

     Second, we defer to the Special Master’s factual findings—

which she seems to have weighed heavily—that Ferguson “knew

when he executed the agreement [the chiropractor] could not perfect

a lien” and that the “only reason” for Ferguson to sign the Notice

was “to indicate his cooperation in protecting [the chiropractor’s]

interest.” However, even deferring to those findings, we do not view

them as controlling our legal analysis.      In light of the Special

Master’s findings in this respect, we see at least two possible

scenarios. In one scenario, Ferguson “tricked” the chiropractor into

relying on an unenforceable agreement, pretending that he would

protect her interest to induce her to treat his clients (but knowing

he would not facilitate payment from the clients). Such conduct

might well be a violation of some other rule or law, but it would not



                                  22
be a violation of Rule 1.15(I).9 In a second scenario, which seems

equally plausible, Ferguson intended to pay the chiropractor at the

time he signed the Notice because he viewed the Notice—at the time

he signed it—as imposing an obligation beyond a lien (that is, he

viewed it as a written agreement to pay but not as a technical lien),

but then later discovered that there was a strong legal case for the

document being an unenforceable lien—something he did not realize

until his clients instructed him not to pay the chiropractor. Under

that scenario, Ferguson’s late discovery would not prevent him from

asserting that there was a valid defense under Rule 1.15(I)(b) that

would allow him to follow his clients’ instructions not to pay.

     Finally, we consider the Special Master’s suggestion that

Ferguson cannot rely on “black letter law” to conclude that he has a

valid defense to the Notice because he has a “higher obligation”

under the Rules of Professional Conduct.               That extra-textual


     9 In its supplemental brief, the Bar asserted that if Ferguson entered an

agreement he believed was unenforceable “to induce a medical provider to
provide services that they might otherwise withhold,” it would “border[] on
fraudulent conduct, potentially sanctionable under Rule 8.4(a)(4).” Notably,
however, the Bar has not charged Ferguson with a Rule 8.4(a)(4) violation.

                                     23
interpretation of Rule 1.15(I) presents tension with Rules 1.1 and

1.3, which require that lawyers represent their clients competently

and diligently. At the very least, we conclude that a lawyer should

be permitted to rely on the text and context of the Rules of

Professional Conduct, as well as the law governing a third-party

interest, in determining whether there is a valid defense to an

agreement that allows a lawyer to disregard a third-party interest

under Rule 1.15(I)(b).

     (c) In light of the analysis above, we conclude that the Bar has

not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ferguson’s

conclusion that he had a valid defense to the Notice was

unreasonable under Rule 1.15(I)(b), and therefore has not proven by

clear and convincing evidence that Ferguson violated Rule

1.15(I)(b).   To be clear, we do not decide definitively whether

Ferguson’s argument that the Notice was limited to a statutory lien

(and was therefore unenforceable here) would succeed if, for

example, the chiropractor filed a lawsuit against Ferguson seeking

payment; that is not the question presented here. The question here

                                 24
is limited to whether the Bar has proven by clear and convincing

evidence that Ferguson violated Rule 1.15(I)(b) by choosing to

“disregard” the chiropractor’s interest. Because the Bar has failed

to carry its burden, we conclude that Ferguson did not violate Rule

1.15(I)(b)(iii) by “disregarding” the chiropractor’s interest after

reasonably concluding that there was a defense to the Notice under

Rule1.15(I)(b).

      (2) Did Ferguson have any remaining obligations regarding the
      chiropractor’s interest under Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d)?

      Because we have concluded that Ferguson did not violate Rule

1.15(I)(b) by “disregard[ing]” the chiropractor’s interest given that

Ferguson reasonably concluded there was a defense to the Notice,

we must now address whether Ferguson still had any obligations to

protect and satisfy that interest under Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d) that

he failed to fulfill.

      In this respect, Rule 1.15(I)(b) says a lawyer “may not

disregard” a third-party interest if it “is known to the attorney” and

is based on “[a] statutory lien,” “[a] final judgment addressing


                                 25
disposition of those funds or property,” or “[a] written agreement by

the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment

out of those funds or property.” And subsections (c) and (d) impose

specific requirements on lawyers regarding third-party interests.

See Rule 1.15(I)(c) (requiring that a lawyer notify the third party

upon receiving funds in which the “third person has an interest” and

that a lawyer “promptly deliver” the funds the “third person is

entitled to receive,” and, if requested “render a full accounting”);

Rule 1.15(I)(d) (requiring that if the lawyer “is in possession of funds

… in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim

interest,” the lawyer must keep the property separate “until there is

an accounting and severance of their interests,” and requiring the

lawyer to “promptly distribute all portions of the funds … as to

which the interests are not in dispute”).

     In determining whether Ferguson had remaining obligations

under Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d) after he concluded that there was a

“valid defense” to the Notice under Rule 1.15(I)(b), we consider first

the text and structure of the Rule and then the Bar’s proposed

                                  26
interpretation, which we reject. See Matter of Brown, 319 Ga. 465,

471 (2024) (“In construing the Georgia Rules of Professional conduct,

we first look to the text of the relevant Rules, which we construe

according     to   the   principles     that    ordinarily    apply     in   the

interpretation of legal text.” (cleaned up)).

      (a) Although none of the language in Rules 1.15(I)(c) or (d)

expressly defines the third-party interest covered by those

provisions as the third-party interest defined in Rule 1.15(I)(b),10 the

structure and text of the rule indicates that Rule 1.15(I)(b) provides

the parameters of a third-party interest that a lawyer must heed,

and subsections (c) and (d) impose certain requirements as to that

third-party interest. The practical result is that only an interest

that meets the criteria laid out in Rule 1.15(I)(b) is an interest that

is subject to the requirements set forth in (c) and (d).




      10 See Rules 1.15(I)(c) (requiring that a lawyer provide notice when
receiving funds in which a “third person has an interest”), (d) (imposing certain
requirements when a lawyer is in possession of funds in which “a third person
claim[s] interest”).

                                       27
     Interpreting Rule 1.15(I)(b) as limiting what third-party

interests are implicated by Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d) prevents an

untenable interpretation of those rules under which lawyers would,

for example, be required to segregate funds under subpart (d) for

any asserted third-party interest—no matter how frivolous—and

delay delivering these funds to their clients and third parties with

valid interests because of the requirement in subpart (d) that when

a lawyer is in possession of funds “in which both the lawyer and a

client or a third person claim interest” and “a dispute arises

concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be

kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.” This

construction also gives meaning to subsection (b) by allowing

subsections (c) and (d) to define what obligations a lawyer has to a

third party interest he “may not disregard”: if subsections (c) and (d)

applied to all claimed third-party interests, regardless of whether

they are interests that “may not [be] disregard[ed]” under subsection

(b), it is not clear what different or additional obligations would

apply to the specifically enumerated third-party interests that “may

                                  28
not [be] disregard[ed]” in Rule 1.15(I)(b). See Brown, 319 Ga. at 476

(applying the canon of statutory interpretation that “statutes

relating to the same subject matter, including subsections therein,

should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible”).

     Notably, this Court in Matter of Brown, 319 Ga. 465, took a

similar approach to interpreting Rule 1.15(I) as we do today. There,

we “constru[ed] all of the subsections of Rule 1.15(I) together in

harmony,” and concluded that earlier subsections of Rule 1.15(I)

informed later subsections. 319 Ga. at 476. Specifically, we held

that although the duties in subsection (c) were not explicitly limited

to duties performed during the practice of law, “when construed

together and viewed in context, subsections (b) through (d) build on

a lawyer’s duties and responsibilities generally described in

subsection (a)” and concluded that subsections (b) through (d) were

“constrained by the language of subparagraph (a) that is reasonably




                                 29
read as limiting the Rule to lawyers acting in the course of their legal

representation of clients.”11 319 Ga. at 476.

      From this understanding of the interaction between the

relevant subprovisions of Rules 1.15(I)—that is, subprovisions (b),

(c), and (d)—it follows that if a third-party interest can be

“disregarded” under Rule 1.15(I)(b), it can be “disregarded” as to

Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d) as well, meaning a lawyer can “fail to

consider or pay attention to” that interest for purposes of Rule

1.15(I) and has no obligations flowing from it under Rules 1.15(I)(c)

and (d). See Disregard, Oxford American Dictionary and Thesaurus

(2nd ed. 2009) (“fail to consider or pay attention to something”).12




      11 Rule 1.15(I)(a), which Ferguson was not charged with violating,
requires that a lawyer hold funds of “third persons that are in a lawyer’s
possession in connection with a representation” separate from a lawyer’s own
funds.
      12 The relevant language allowing a lawyer to “disregard” a third-party

interest in certain circumstances was added in 2011. See Georgia Advance
Sheets, Vol. 4, No. 23 (Dec. 8, 2011). See also Docs of CT, LLC v. Biotek Servs.,
LLC, 321 Ga. 588, 592 (2025) (explaining that this Court may “look to
dictionaries from around the time the relevant legal text is enacted as a helpful
starting point for understanding the meaning of that text”).

                                       30
     (b) The Bar largely agrees with our interpretation of Rule

1.15(I)(b) through (d) as laid out above, with one important

exception. The Bar argues that the notice requirement in Rule

1.15(I)(c) applies even to an interest the lawyer may disregard under

Rule 1.15(I)(b) because there is not “contrary or qualifying language”

to the notice requirement. The Bar does not clearly explain this

theory, but it may be relying on the presence of “qualifying”

language elsewhere in Rule 1.15(I)(c). Specifically, Rule 1.15(I)(c)

requires funds to be “promptly deliver[ed]” “[e]xcept as stated in this

rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client.”

The notice requirement in (c) does not contain this type of caveat.

     The presence or absence of such, however, does not change the

meaning of “disregard” in Rule 1.15(I)(b) or change the fact that, as

explained above, Rule 1.15(I)(c) depends on Rule 1.15(I)(b) to define

the scope of third-party interests that are governed by the Rule. And

in any event, we conclude that the language the Bar points to in Rule

1.15(I)(c), “[e]xcept as stated in this rule,” serves a different purpose:

this language helps ensure that the delivery requirement in

                                   31
subsection (c) does not conflict with the mandate in subsection (d) to

separate and hold funds when more than one party claims an

interest in such funds. Compare Rule 1.15(I)(c) (“[A] lawyer shall

promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other

property that the client or third person is entitled to receive.”) with

(d) (“If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the

portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the

dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions

of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in

dispute.”). In this way, the qualifying language in subsection (c)

may affect the interaction of subsections (c) and (d), but it does not

change that subsection (b) determines the parameters of a third-

party interest for purposes of the requirements contained in

subsection (c).

     (c) In light of the above analysis, we conclude that an attorney

who can “disregard” a third-party interest under Rule 1.15(I)(b) has

no further obligations to that interest under Rules 1.15(I)(c) and (d).

Because, as discussed above, the Bar has failed to show by clear and

                                  32
convincing evidence that Ferguson violated Rule 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii)

when he disregarded the chiropractor’s interest, the Bar has

similarly failed to prove that Ferguson violated Rules 1.15(I)(c) and

(d).

       3. In conclusion, we note that this opinion should not be read

as approval of Ferguson’s actions in this case. Even so, the Bar has

failed to prove that Ferguson violated Rules 1.15(I)(b), (c), and (d)

with these actions. Thus, we impose no discipline and dismiss the

case. See Matter of Mignott, 317 Ga. 764, 767 (2023) (imposing no

discipline and dismissing the case where the Bar failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer violated the Rules as

charged).

     No discipline imposed, and case dismissed. All the Justices
concur, except McMillian, J., who dissents.




                                  33
     MCMILLIAN, Justice, dissenting.

     Because I believe that the “Notice of Doctor’s Lien” for each

client constituted contractual liens and that Ferguson could not

reasonably conclude that he had a defense to those contractual liens,

I respectfully dissent.

     A “lien” is generally “used to denote a legal claim or charge on

property, either real or personal, for the payment of any debt or

duty.” 1 Ga. Jur. Property § 10:1 (February 2026 update). Georgia

law recognizes liens created by operation of law or by contract. See,

e.g., OCGA § 44-14-325 (“All transfers and assignments of …

evidences of indebtedness which are secured either by contract lien

or out of which a lien springs by operation of law shall be sufficiently

technical and valid where the transfer or assignment plainly seeks

to pass the title to any of the papers in writing from one person to

another.” (emphasis added)). A lien created by statute requires strict

compliance and is strictly construed against the creditor. See, e.g.,

Horner v. Robinson, 299 Ga. App. 327, 329 (2009) (“Because lien

statutes are in derogation of the common law, we must construe

                                  34
them against a lien claimant[,]” and “a lien claimant who seeks to

take advantage of a statute must strictly comply with its

provisions.”).

      However, a contractual lien, sometimes referred to as an

“equitable lien” does not require a particular form. See, e.g., Country

Greens Village One Owner’s Assoc., Inc. v. Meyers, 158 Ga. App. 609,

611 (1981) (“No particular form is required for an agreement to

constitute a lien.”). A security interest arising by agreement is

generally “effective according to its terms between the parties,

against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.”13 Med-

Care Solutions, LLC v. Bey & Assocs., LLC, 362 Ga. App. 861, 863

(2022) (punctuation omitted). See also Routon v. Woodbury Banking

Co., 209 Ga. 706, 708 (1953) (“A special or equitable lien is … simply

a right of a special nature over the [property], which constitutes a


      13 Although not relevant here, an equitable lien may also be available

when a party was entitled to a statutory lien but was prevented from perfecting
the lien. See, e.g., Clover Cable of Ohio v. Heywood, 260 Ga. 341, 344 (1990)
(“When a party entitled to a statutory lien has been prevented from perfecting
such lien by the acts of the adverse party, it has been held that such party is
entitled to an equitable lien for the improvements made on a quantum meruit
theory.” (punctuation omitted)).

                                      35
charge or encumbrance upon the [property].”); Chapple v. Hight, 161

Ga. 629, 632 (1926) (“[A] special lien on specific property may be

decreed whenever under the rules of equity the circumstances

require this remedy.”).

     A contractual lien on personal property is governed by Article

9 of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) unless the lien

is “given by statute or other rule of law for services” or some other

statute “expressly governs the creation, perfection, or priority.” See

OCGA § 11-9-109(a)(1) (providing that Article 9 of the UCC applies

to a “transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security

interest in personal property or fixtures by contract”); OCGA § 11-9-

109(c)(2) (“This article does not apply to the extent that: [a]nother

statute of this state expressly governs the creation, perfection, or

priority.”); OCGA § 11-9-109(d)(2) (Article 9 of the UCC does not

apply to a “lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or

other rule of law for services or materials”). See generally Georgia

Law of Damages § 24:3 (“The secured transactions provisions of the

Uniform Commercial Code do not generally apply to liens created by

                                 36
statute, such as mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens. These liens are

governed by OCGA §§ 44-14-360 et seq., which sets out procedures

for perfecting and foreclosing them.”). Under the UCC, a security

interest attaches to collateral when “(1) there is a written security

agreement signed by the debtor and containing a description of the

collateral; (2) the secured party has given value to the debtor; and

(3) the debtor has ‘rights’ in the collateral.” Med-Care Solutions, 362

Ga. App. at 864. See also OCGA § 11-9-203(a)-(b).

     With this legal background in mind, I now turn to the question

of whether Ferguson was permitted to disregard the chiropractor’s

interest under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(I)(b),

which provides in relevant part that “[t]he lawyer may disregard the

third person’s claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes

that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement.”

The majority opinion holds that it was reasonable for Ferguson “to

conclude that the interest created by the Notice is limited to a lien

that was not perfected” as “supported by the text of the Notice.” As

best I can tell, Ferguson is asserting that the Notices were an

                                  37
attempt to assert a statutory lien under OCGA § 44-14-470 through

§ 44-14-477 because they were entitled “Notice of Doctor’s Lien” and

that because chiropractors were not afforded protection under those

lien statutes at that time, the chiropractor could not perfect the lien

and it could be ignored.

      However, the parties appear to agree, as does the majority

opinion, that chiropractors could not assert a statutory lien under

OCGA § 44-14-470 at the time the Notices were created.14 And

Ferguson has not asserted that another statute creates the lien that

is evidenced by the Notices. Moreover, the Notices themselves by

their text do not refer to a statute or imply that the lien originated

by statute. And, as described above, there is ample caselaw,


      14 At the time of settlement of the claims, OCGA § 44-14-470(b) (2009)

provided in relevant part:


      Any person, firm, hospital authority, or corporation operating a
      hospital, nursing home, or physician practice or providing
      traumatic burn care medical practice in this state shall have a lien
      for the reasonable charges for ... care and treatment of an injured
      person, ... upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person
      to whom the care was furnished ... subject, however, to any
      attorney’s lien.


                                      38
statutory law, and treatises that explain that liens created by

statute are distinct from liens created by contract. Thus, it was not

reasonable for Ferguson to disregard the chiropractor’s interest in

the settlement proceeds on the grounds that OCGA § 44-14-470 – a

statute that did not apply – did not allow the chiropractor to perfect

the liens.

      Instead, a reasonable attorney in Ferguson’s position should

have been able to determine after some basic research that the

Notices constituted contractual liens and that they may be governed

by Article 9 of the UCC.15 The Notices here sufficiently described


      15 To the extent that the majority opinion concludes that the Bar failed

to carry its burden by not making this argument, I respectfully disagree. In the
Formal Complaint, the Bar alleged: “The signed ‘Notices of Doctor’s Lien’ are
‘written agreements’ as contemplated by GRPC 1.15(I)(b)(iii).” Also, in its brief
in response to Ferguson’s exceptions, the Bar argued:

      The State Bar has never asserted that Respondent disregarded a
      statutory lien under Rule 1.15(I)(b)(2)(i). Rather, Respondent
      violated Rule 1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii) because he violated the written
      agreement by the client and the lawyer guaranteeing payment out
      of the respective settlements.

Rather, the Bar argued that the chiropractor’s interest is based on contract:

      Respondent continues to argue that the written agreements he
      signed were ineffective because no liens were filed or recorded.

                                       39
the debt (payments owed for chiropractic treatment) and the

property against which the debt was secured (the plaintiffs’

settlement proceeds), which caselaw has long recognized are

contractual liens. See Wylly v. Screven, 98 Ga. 213 (1896)

(concluding agreement constituted a lien where it clearly described

the debt to secure and the property upon which it was to take effect);

Meyers, 158 Ga. App. at 611 (“It is sufficient if [the agreement]

clearly indicates the intention to create a lien, the debt to secure

which it is given, and the property upon which it is to take effect.”

(punctuation omitted)). Moreover, a review of well-known treatises

on Georgia law would have shown that contractual liens are



      (Respondent’s Supplemental Brief, p. 3). This argument conflates
      the separate types of interests protected under Rule 1.15(I), and
      that are set forth in the disjunctive in Rule 1.15(I)(b)(2). The State
      Bar has never alleged that Respondent disregarded a statutory lien
      or a final judgment. Rather, Respondent violated Rule
      1.15(I)(b)(2)(iii) because he ignored two written agreements by his
      clients which he himself also signed guaranteeing payment out of
      the settlements.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, despite the majority opinion’s conclusion that the Bar
has never argued that the Notices evidenced contractual liens, the Bar clearly
made the argument that the Notices did not constitute statutory liens and that
instead the liens were created by contracts.

                                       40
recognized in Georgia, that contractual liens are distinguished from

statutory liens, and that contractual liens on personal property may

be governed by Article 9 of the UCC. 16 See 1 Ga. Jur. Property § 10:1

(describing the types of liens and how they are created); Georgia Law

of Damages § 24:3 (liens created by statutes like OCGA § 44-14-470

are not covered under Article 9 of the UCC).

      Because Ferguson has not asserted any reasonable basis to

conclude that he had a defense to the contractual liens; his actions

involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and we have

an obligation to insure that “other lawyers will be deterred” from

similar conduct and that “the public will be given confidence that

this Court will maintain the ethics of the legal profession,” In the

Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 219 (2021) (Nahmias, P.J., dissenting),

I would accept the Special Master’s recommendation to suspend



      16 I recognize that lien law and secured transactions are complex legal

subjects, but it is reasonable to require an attorney seeking to disregard a third
party’s interest under Rule 1.15(I)(b) to conduct basic research on whether
there is a valid defense. If the lawyer is unsure about the proper disposition
due to the complexity of the law, Rule 1.15(I)(c) and (d) provide a mechanism
by which to resolve any dispute over the funds.

                                       41
Ferguson for a period of four months unless he provides within 180

days sufficient evidence to the Office of the General Counsel that he

made restitution to the chiropractor – in which case his suspension

would be reduced to a Review Board reprimand. See In the Matter of

Cherry, 305 Ga. 667, 670–71 (2019) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline and ordering that Cherry be administered a public

reprimand after she voluntarily paid the chiropractor’s bill in full).

I therefore respectfully dissent.




                                    42