Lakita D. Murray v. Christopher B. Punina

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

         Lakita D. Murray v. Christopher B. Punina (A-51-24) (090246)

Argued February 2, 2026 -- Decided May 6, 2026

JUSTICE FASCIALE, writing for a unanimous Court.

      In this appeal, the Court considers whether evidence of plaintiff Lakita
Murray’s future medical expenses is admissible in her personal injury trial even
though they would not exceed her personal injury protection (PIP) coverage limits.

       In August 2016, plaintiff sustained injuries as a passenger in a car accident.
She applied for PIP benefits from the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance
Guaranty Association (NJPLIGA) under the terms of the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund (UCJF). NJPLIGA approved the application, which entitled plaintiff
to medical expense benefits up to $250,000. The cost of the medical treatment
plaintiff underwent prior to trial did not exceed the limits of her PIP coverage.

       Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint against both drivers involved in the
collision. Plaintiff filed an offer of judgment for $50,000, but defendant Anthony
Marrone did not accept. Plaintiff’s medical expert opined that plaintiff’s future
medical expenses would be between $42,000 and $160,000. The jury awarded
plaintiff $250,000 in non-economic damages and $100,000 in damages for future
medical expenses. The judgment against Marrone was for $50,000 and $20,000,
respectively, plus pre-judgment interests and costs. Pursuant to the offer of
judgment rule, the trial court additionally awarded plaintiff $44,107.58.

       The Appellate Division reversed in part, finding that evidence of plaintiff’s
future medical expenses was inadmissible because those expenses were “collectible”
under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. Because it found that the future medical expenses should
have been excluded, the appellate court also modified the judgment against Marrone
to exclude that part of the damages award and to exclude the additional award under
the offer of judgment rule. The Court granted certification. 260 N.J. 313 (2025).

HELD: Future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant’s PIP
coverage limits are “collectible” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and therefore
inadmissible during a plaintiff’s personal injury trial against a tortfeasor.


                                           1
1. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, a provision of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform
Act, commonly known as the No-Fault Act, is titled “Inadmissibility of evidence of
losses collectible under personal injury protection coverage.” The provision refers
to three types of PIP coverage: a standard automobile insurance policy, a basic
automobile insurance policy, and a special automobile insurance policy. Each
provides PIP protection to passengers. The UCJF is intended to provide the kind of
protection a liability insurance policy would provide so that individuals who sustain
losses inflicted by uninsured drivers are not left remediless. The term “personal
injury protection coverage,” as used in the UCJF statute, is a general term that
encompasses the PIP benefits provided by standard, basic, and special policies, and
the statute plainly states that it applies when “[PIP] benefits under the [No-Fault
Act] would be payable.” N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1. UCJF claimants are entitled to
protection equivalent to that provided by a liability insurance policy -- no more, no
less. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to PIP benefits available from the UCJF. (pp. 9-12)

2. As originally enacted, the No-Fault statutory scheme provided for unlimited
medical benefits under no-fault insurance. But, “because of the rapidly escalating
cost of those benefits,” the Legislature subsequently “reduce[d] those benefits to a
limit of $250,000.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b). The statutory scheme thus “preserve[d]
the no-fault system [and] reduc[ed] unnecessary costs which drive premiums
higher.” Ibid. To further that objective, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 bars the admissibility of
evidence of losses collectible under PIP and reflects legislative awareness of the
need to prevent double recovery by a plaintiff eligible for PIP benefits. The Court
reviews the history of the provision and concludes that, under the plain language of
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 as it now reads, medical expense benefits are inadmissible in a
civil trial as damages against a tortfeasor if they are “collectible or paid.”
Conversely, uncompensated medical expenses that are not covered by applicable PIP
limits are admissible against a liable party under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. Future medical
expense benefits that are covered under a PIP policy are “collectible” and thus
inadmissible in a civil action under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. (pp. 12-19)

3. Here, plaintiff’s estimated future medical expenses will not exhaust her PIP
limits and are, thus, “collectible.” Those expenses are inadmissible and should not
have been presented to the jury or included in the damages award. Further, because
the inadmissible future expenses should not have been included in the award against
Marrone, the award should also not have included additional costs and fees pursuant
to the offer of judgment rule. (pp. 19-20)

      AFFIRMED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, NORIEGA, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s
opinion.
                                          2
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-51 September Term 2024
                        090246


                  Lakita D. Murray,

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                          v.

               Christopher B. Punina,
            Christoph Punina, New Jersey
             Property Liability Guaranty
            Association, a/k/a NJPLIGA,

                      Defendants,

                         and

                Anthony Marrone, II,

               Defendant-Respondent.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division.

       Argued                        Decided
   February 2, 2026                 May 6, 2026


Daniel N. Epstein argued the cause for appellant (Epstein
Ostrove, and Hegge & Confusione, attorneys; Daniel N.
Epstein and Michael Confusione, on the brief).

Stephen J. Foley, Jr., argued the cause for respondent
(Campbell, Foley, Delano & Adams, attorneys; Stephen
J. Foley, Jr., on the briefs).


                          1
             Dominic R. DePamphilis argued the cause for amicus
             curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (D’Arcy
             Johnson Day, attorneys; Dominic R. DePamphilis and
             Richard J. Albuquerque, on the brief).

             Robert A. Cappuzzo argued the cause for amicus curiae
             New Jersey Defense Association (Chasan Lamparello
             Mallon & Cappuzzo, attorneys; Robert A. Cappuzzo, on
             the brief).


           JUSTICE FASCIALE delivered the opinion of the Court.


      In this appeal, we determine whether evidence of plaintiff’s future

medical expenses is admissible in her personal injury trial when those

projected expenses would not exceed her personal injury protection (PIP)

coverage limits.

      Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, a provision of the New Jersey Automobile

Reparation Reform Act, commonly known as the No-Fault Act, a plaintiff

suing a defendant for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident

cannot introduce evidence of benefits that are “collectible” under PIP

coverage. We hold that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a

claimant’s PIP coverage limits are “collectible” and therefore inadmissible

during a plaintiff’s personal injury trial against a tortfeasor.

      We affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment.




                                         2
                                        I.

      In August 2016, plaintiff Lakita Murray sustained injuries in a car

accident. She was a passenger in defendant Christopher Punina’s car when it

collided with a car driven by defendant Anthony Marrone.

      Punina’s car was uninsured, and plaintiff did not reside in a household

where either she or a family member insured a car. Consequently, in

December 2016, plaintiff applied for PIP benefits from the New Jersey

Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (NJPLIGA) under the terms

of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF). NJPLIGA approved

plaintiff’s PIP application, which entitled her to medical expense benefits up to

$250,000. The cost of the medical treatment plaintiff underwent prior to trial

did not exceed the limits of her PIP coverage.

      Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint against Marrone and Punina in

August 2018. 1 Punina defaulted and did not participate in the trial. Plaintiff

filed an offer of judgment for $50,000 pursuant to Rule 4:58-1, which allows

parties to offer to settle a civil case through a monetary judgment entered in

their favor. Marrone did not accept the offer.




1
  Plaintiff also named NJPLIGA as a defendant because, at that point,
NJPLIGA had not responded to her application for PIP benefits. NJPLIGA
later awarded plaintiff PIP benefits and did not participate in the trial.
                                        3
      Prior to trial, plaintiff’s medical expert, Dr. Arthur Perry, opined in a

deposition that plaintiff’s future medical expenses would be between $42,000

and $160,000. 2 Marrone filed a motion to redact that testimony from the

deposition. Relying on N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, Marrone argued that evidence of

those expenses was inadmissible. The trial judge denied his motion.

      The matter proceeded to trial on all issues. The jury viewed Dr. Perry’s

deposition, which included his estimated costs of plaintiff’s future medical

expenses. Following the two-day trial, the jury found Punina eighty percent

liable and Marrone twenty percent liable for the accident. The jury awarded

plaintiff $250,000 in non-economic damages and $100,000 in damages for

future medical expenses. The judgment against Marrone was for $50,000 and

$20,000, respectively. The trial court entered judgment against Marrone for

$76,736.21, representing the net damages award and pre-judgment interests

and costs. Pursuant to the offer of judgment rule, the trial court additionally

awarded plaintiff $44,107.58. 3


2
  The medical expenses were characterized as “future medical expenses”
because plaintiff elected not to have the medical treatment identified by the
expert between the time it was recommended and the time the case was tried.
Plaintiff testified that she wants to have the recommended surgeries but has not
yet undergone them.
3
  When an offer of judgment made by a claimant pursuant to Rule 4:58-1 is
not accepted, and the claimant obtains a judgment that is 120% of the offer or
more, the claimant is also entitled to recover certain costs and fees. R. 4:58-2.
                                         4
      Marrone subsequently moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(JNOV), renewing his contention that plaintiff’s future medical expenses were

inadmissible. In support of his motion, he relied on the undisputed facts that

(1) plaintiff was eligible for $250,000 in PIP benefits; (2) those benefits had

not been exhausted as of the time of trial; and (3) the projected future medical

expenses would not exhaust the remainder of the PIP benefits available to

plaintiff. The trial judge denied the JNOV motion.

      Marrone appealed to the Appellate Division. The appellate court

reversed the trial court in part, finding that evidence of plaintiff’s future

medical expenses was inadmissible because those expenses were “collectible”

under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. Because it found that the future medical expenses

should have been excluded, the appellate court also modified the judgment

against Marrone to exclude that part of the damages award and to exclude the

additional award under the offer of judgment rule. Reading the UCJF statute

together with the No-Fault Act, the Appellate Division determined that

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12’s inadmissibility provision applies to the UCJF.

      We granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 260 N.J. 313 (2025).

We also granted motions to appear as amicus curiae filed by the New Jersey



Here, with the inclusion of plaintiff’s future medical expenses, the judgment
against Marrone was over the 120% threshold.
                                         5
Association for Justice (NJAJ) and the New Jersey Defense Association

(NJDA).

                                        II.

      Plaintiff argues that evidence of her future medical expenses is

admissible in her personal injury trial, notwithstanding that the projected cost

of her future medical expenses falls within her remaining PIP limits. She

contends that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 does not apply to her case because her PIP

benefits are payable through the UCJF, and the UCJF is not “considered any of

the automobile insurance policies outlined in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12].” Even if

the statute does apply, plaintiff asserts, her future medical expenses are

admissible because they are neither “collectible” nor “paid” as they have not

yet been incurred, and the only requirement for recovery is that the medical

expenses remain unpaid.

      Marrone argues that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 renders evidence of plaintiff’s

future medical expenses inadmissible. He reiterates that those future medical

expenses would not exceed her remaining PIP limits. Therefore, under

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, those expenses are “collectible” and not recoverable as

damages in the personal injury trial. Marrone further argues that N.J.S.A.

39:6A-12 applies to PIP benefits under the UCJF.




                                        6
      NJAJ asserts that a decision barring the admission of evidence of future

medical expenses in the trial against a tortfeasor would contravene public

policy against piecemeal litigation and would force individual plaintiffs to bear

the costs of those future expenses in light of the statute of limitations (SOL)

governing PIP actions.

      NJDA contends that plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if evidence of

future medical expenses is barred because the PIP arbitration process permits

and is well-suited to address claims for future medical treatment. NJDA

emphasizes that Forthright Rules 7 and 34 provide arbitration and emergent

hearing options, respectively, that exist “exclusively” for addressing future

medical expenses when PIP coverage is not exhausted. 4 And as for SOL

concerns, NJDA asserts an injured plaintiff’s rights would be protected under

the “future treatment exception” to the PIP SOL.

                                       III.

                                       A.

      We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Wiggins v.

Hackensack Meridian Health, 259 N.J. 562, 574 (2025). To do so, “we look to



4
  Forthright is the administrator of all New Jersey PIP arbitration claims.
Those claims are governed by Forthright’s New Jersey No-Fault PIP
Arbitration Rules, as approved by New Jersey’s Department of Banking and
Insurance.
                                         7
the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s plain terms.” Ibid. “We

ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance and read

them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as

a whole.” DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citations omitted);

see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (stating that statutory “words and phrases shall be read

. . . [in] context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the

legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be

given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the

language”).

      “If the plain language of a statute is clear, our task is complete.” Savage

v. Township of Neptune, 257 N.J. 204, 215 (2024). However, “if there is

ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible

interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative history,

committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.’” DiProspero, 183 N.J.

at 492-93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75

(2004)).

                                         B.

      We first consider whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to PIP benefits

available through the UCJF. Plaintiff argues that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 does not

apply to her case because PIP coverage through the UCJF is not expressly

                                         8
mentioned in the text of that statute. That argument is belied by both the plain

text and the purpose of the UCJF and the No-Fault Act.

      N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 is titled “Inadmissibility of evidence of losses

collectible under personal injury protection coverage.” The provision

specifically refers to three types of PIP coverage: a standard automobile

insurance policy, a basic automobile insurance policy, and a special

automobile insurance policy. See Sanders v. Langemeier, 199 N.J. 366, 375-

76 (2009) (describing the differences among those policy types). Each of

those policies provides PIP protection to passengers. Ibid.

      The UCJF is intended “to provide the kind of protection a liability

insurance policy would provide” so that individuals who sustain losses

inflicted by uninsured drivers are not left remediless. Jimenez v. Baglieri, 152

N.J. 337, 342 (1998) (quoting Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. N.J.

Mfrs. Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 185, 189 (1994)). The Fund accordingly provides for

recovery of PIP benefits. Caballero v. Martinez, 186 N.J. 548, 555 (2006).

When qualified individuals, like plaintiff here, suffer “bodily injury . . . caused

by a motor vehicle . . . for which [PIP] benefits under the [No-Fault Act]

would be payable[,] . . . the [UCJF] shall provide . . . [p]ayment of all medical

expense benefits . . . in an amount not exceeding $250,000 per person per

accident.” N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1(a).

                                         9
      We have held that the plain language of the UCJF statute and the No-

Fault Act “compels us to conclude that the term ‘personal injury protection

coverage,’ as used in the UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, is a general term

that encompasses . . . the ‘personal injury protection’ benefits provided by

standard[,] . . . basic[,] . . . [and] special policies.” Sanders, 199 N.J. at 377.

We see no reason to depart from that conclusion here.

      The same statutory language underlying our conclusion in Sanders

informs our conclusion here. The UCJF statute plainly states that it applies

when “[PIP] benefits under the [No-Fault Act] would be payable.” N.J.S.A.

39:6-86.1. It refers “generally to PIP benefits” and, in describing those

benefits, “refers generally to the [No-Fault Act] rather than to any specific

provision within that larger statutory framework.” Sanders, 199 N.J. at 375,

378. The use of the term “personal injury protection” throughout the No-Fault

Act similarly reflects that the Legislature uses the phrase “as a general term.”

Id. at 379; see also Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 138 N.J. at 189

(“In virtually all respects, the PIP provisions in the [UCJF Law] track those in

the No-Fault Law.”).

      The legislative history of the UCJF statute and the No-Fault Act further

supports that the Legislature intended for “PIP” to have the same meaning in

both statutes. See Craig & Pomeroy, N.J. Auto Insurance Law § 30:2-5 (2023)

                                         10
(noting that the UCJF was adopted to provide “parallel personal injury

protection” and that “each time . . . PIP provisions have been amended in [the

No-Fault Act], conforming amendments have been made to the[] UCJF PIP

rules”); see also Sanders, 199 N.J. at 378 (“Had the Legislature intended that

the reference to ‘[PIP] coverage’ include only the standard and basic policies,

it would have amended the UCJF statute to refer to those coverages

specifically rather than leaving in place the reference to PIP coverage

generally.”). In accordance with our longstanding jurisprudence interpreting

these two statutes in harmony, we cannot conclude that the Legislature

intended different evidentiary standards to apply to PIP benefits under the

UCJF than under the No-Fault Act.

      Interpreting those statutes in harmony is particularly warranted here

because different interpretations would result in different remedies for those

covered by UCJF PIP benefits and those covered by No-Fault PIP benefits. If

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 did not apply to UCJF PIP benefits, UCJF claimants would

be entitled to greater recovery: they could recover both from PIP and from the

tortfeasor, whereas those covered by No-Fault PIP benefits could recover only

from PIP. But as noted above, in enacting the UCJF, the Legislature “created

the Fund ‘to provide the kind of protection a liability insurance policy would

provide,’” clearly intending to “offer some measure of relief” to those who

                                       11
would otherwise be left remediless. Jimenez, 152 N.J. at 342-43 (emphases

added) (quoting Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd., 138 N.J. at 189). It

would be inconsistent with that purpose for UCJF claimants to receive double

recovery, thereby granting them compensation greater than the kind available

to those with No-Fault insurance.

      UCJF claimants are entitled to protection equivalent to that provided by

a liability insurance policy -- no more, no less. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 thus applies

to PIP benefits available pursuant to the UCJF.

                                       C.

      We next consider whether medical expenses that do not exceed the limits

of applicable PIP coverage are admissible in a civil action.

                                       1.

      New Jersey law prescribes a no-fault system for payment of medical

expenses incurred by injuries sustained in automobile accidents. See N.J.S.A.

39:6A-1 to -35. Enacted in 1972 based on the recommendations of the

Automobile Insurance Study Commission, the No-Fault statutory scheme had

the primary goals of providing automobile accident victims prompt

compensation for their economic losses regardless of fault and reducing

reliance on the Judiciary, all while keeping insurance costs manageable. See

Auto. Ins. Study Comm’n, Reparation Reform for New Jersey Motorists 7

                                       12
(Dec. 1971); see also Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos., 86 N.J. 100, 105-07

(1981).

      As originally enacted, the No-Fault statutory scheme provided for

unlimited medical benefits under no-fault insurance. See L. 1972, c. 70. But,

because of the “rapidly escalating cost of those benefits,” the Legislature

subsequently “reduce[d] those benefits to a limit of $250,000.” N.J.S.A.

39:6A-1.1(b). The Legislature has explained that “[t]he principle underlying

the philosophical basis of the no-fault system is that of a trade-off of one

benefit for another; in this case, providing medical benefits in return for a

limitation on the right to sue for non-serious injuries.” Ibid.

      The statutory scheme thus “preserve[d] the no-fault system [and]

reduc[ed] unnecessary costs which drive premiums higher.” Ibid. To further

that objective, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 bars the admissibility of evidence of losses

collectible under PIP and “reflects legislative awareness of the need” to

“prevent double recovery by a plaintiff eligible for PIP benefits.” Adams v.

Cooper Hosp., 295 N.J. Super. 5, 11-12 (App. Div. 1996).

      In Haines v. Taft, this Court was called upon to review orders that

prohibited the plaintiffs from admitting into evidence medical expenses that

exceeded the limits of their $15,000 PIP policies. 237 N.J. 271, 274 (2019).

At that time, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 read as follows:

                                        13
             Except as may be required in an action brought
             pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1], evidence of the
             amounts collectible or paid under a standard . . . [,] . . .
             a basic . . . [, or] a special automobile insurance policy
             . . . is inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of
             damages for bodily injury by such injured person.

             The court shall instruct the jury that, in arriving at a
             verdict as to the amount of the damages for
             noneconomic loss to be recovered by the injured
             person, the jury shall not speculate as to the amount of
             the medical expense benefits paid or payable by an
             automobile insurer under personal injury protection
             coverage payable under a standard[,] . . . a basic[,] . . .
             or . . . a special automobile insurance policy . . . , nor
             shall they speculate as to the amount of benefits paid or
             payable by a health insurer, health maintenance
             organization or governmental agency . . . .

             Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
             right of recovery, against the tortfeasor, of
             uncompensated economic loss sustained by the injured
             party.

             [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 (2018) (emphases added).]

We upheld the orders based on that statutory language and the legislative

history of the No-Fault Act, Haines, 237 N.J. at 292-94, but we invited the

Legislature to provide “greater clarity” and “make its intention to introduce

fault-based suits into the no-fault medical reimbursement scheme more

explicit,” id. at 295.




                                         14
      In response, the Legislature overturned Haines and amended N.J.S.A.

39:6A-12. 5 In the amended version, the language in the first two paragraphs

remains, but the third paragraph was changed to read:

            Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
            right of recovery, against the tortfeasor, of
            uncompensated economic loss as defined by [N.J.S.A.
            39:6A-2], including all uncompensated medical
            expenses not covered by the personal injury protection
            limits applicable to the injured party and sustained by
            the injured party. All medical expenses that exceed, or
            are unpaid or uncovered by any injured party’s medical
            expense benefits personal injury protection limits,
            regardless of any health insurance coverage, are
            claimable by any injured party as against all liable
            parties.

            [(emphases added).]

      The current statute thus retains the prohibition against admitting

evidence of “amounts collectible or paid” under an applicable insurance

policy, but it expressly distinguishes from those “amounts” “all

uncompensated medical expenses” that exceed or are uncovered by the PIP

limits.




5
  Governor Philip D. Murphy signed into law L. 2019, cc. 244 and 245, which
amended N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, on August 15, 2019. Governor’s Statement Upon
Signing S. 2432 and S. 3963 (Aug. 15, 2019). L. 2019, c. 244 provides that
the act “shall take effect immediately and apply to causes of action pending on
that date or filed on or after that date.” L. 2019, c. 244 applies here because
plaintiff’s case was pending on the effective date.
                                          15
      Although the phrase “amounts collectible or paid” is undefined by

statute, our courts have understood it to mean those which are “legally due” for

payment as PIP benefits. See, e.g., Amaru v. Stratton, 209 N.J. Super. 1, 9

(App. Div. 1985); Tullis v. Teial, 182 N.J. Super. 553, 558 (App. Div. 1982);

Mokienko v. Greenan, 178 N.J. Super. 657, 660 (Law Div. 1981) (quoting

Wagner v. Transam. Ins. Co., 167 N.J. Super. 25, 33 (App. Div. 1979)). The

terms “uncompensated,” “exceed,” and “uncovered” are similarly not defined,

but their meaning is also significant to understanding the legislation as a

whole. As ordinarily understood, “uncompensated” means to not be

compensated; to compensate is defined as “counterbalancing payment to the

victims for their loss.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 253 (11th

ed. 2020). “Exceed” is defined as “to be greater than” or “to go beyond a limit

set.” Id. at 434. Lastly, “uncovered” relates to not being covered by

insurance, with “coverage” defined as “inclusion within the scope of an

insurance policy or protective plan.” Id. at 288.

                                        2.

      As the plain text and legislative history of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 confirm,

the Legislature clearly intended to distinguish between medical expenses that

are payable by applicable PIP benefits and those that are not. Under the plain

language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, medical expense benefits are inadmissible in a

                                       16
civil trial as damages against a tortfeasor if they are “collectible or paid.”

Conversely, uncompensated medical expenses that are not covered by

applicable PIP limits are admissible against a liable party under N.J.S.A.

39:6A-12. These amounts are neither “collectible” (as they are uncovered and

not legally due), nor “paid” (as they are uncompensated). In contrast, medical

expenses that are covered by applicable PIP limits are “collectible” because

they are eligible to be paid when incurred. Notably, medical expense benefits

may be “unpaid” but still “collectible” -- for example, projected medical

expenses that have not yet been incurred are not “paid” but remain eligible for

payment.

      Legislative history further supports our reading of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.

Upon signing the 2019 amendments, L. 2019, cc. 244 and 245, into law,

Governor Murphy stated that the bills permit “a party injured in an automobile

accident to recover, as part of the recovery of uncompensated economic loss,

unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed the party’s . . . [PIP] limits.” See

Governor’s Statement Upon Signing S. 2432 and S. 3963 (Aug. 15, 2019)

(emphases added). The Governor explained that the bills were intended to

overturn this Court’s decision in Haines and “ensure that low-income drivers,

who must settle for lesser PIP coverage options because they cannot afford




                                        17
better coverage, will not be denied the ability to recover their unreimbursed

medical expenses from those who caused their injuries.” Ibid.

      When L. 2019, c. 244 was first introduced, the language allowed an

injured party to recover only “uncompensated medical expenses between the

personal injury protection limits applicable to the injured party and $250,000.”

S. 2432 (2018) (emphasis added). The Legislature later revised that provision

to include all medical expenses that exceed any injured party’s PIP limits. See

Craig & Pomeroy, § 16:2-4 (“New Jersey insureds . . . may now seek recovery

of unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed their PIP coverage, whether that

amount is the default $250,000 standard policy coverage or one of the lesser

amounts permitted under the [No-Fault Act].”). The revision expanded the

ability of injured parties to recover medical expenses and, importantly, did not

alter or amend the statutory provisions designating evidence of “amounts

collectible [by PIP] inadmissible.” L. 2019, c. 244.

      Plaintiff’s submission that future medical expenses payable under an

injured party’s applicable PIP benefits are “unpaid” and not “collectible” runs

afoul of the No-Fault Act and the UCJF statute. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 is “part of

an overall legislative design to curtail litigation in the area of automobile

personal injury claims,” Adams, 295 N.J. Super. at 12, and its “principal goal

. . . is to avoid double recovery for a loss,” Bardis v. First Trenton Ins. Co.,

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199 N.J. 265, 279 (2009). If we were to categorize the future expenses as

“unpaid,” plaintiffs could enhance their personal injury damage awards by

deferring treatment until after trial. Instead of the Fund incurring those

expenses -- which it was designed to do -- defendants would face greater

exposure. Such a conclusion would defeat the statutory scheme’s purpose of

“prohibit[ing] an injured person from seeking to recover from a tortfeasor

medical expenses [payable] under PIP coverage from the injured person’s own

automobile insurer.” Lambert v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 447 N.J. Super.

61, 71-72 (App. Div. 2016). Permitting plaintiffs to evade the statutory

restrictions would encourage inefficient outcomes and perpetuate the double-

dipping that the UCJF statute and the No-Fault Act seek to eliminate.

      Accordingly, future medical expense benefits that are covered under a

PIP policy are “collectible” and thus inadmissible in a civil action under

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.

                                        3.

      Applying N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to the present matter, plaintiff’s future

medical expenses are not admissible. It is undisputed that plaintiff has not

exhausted her PIP benefits and that her future medical expenses will not

exceed her available PIP benefits. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, her future

medical expenses are not “unpaid” because those debts or claims do not

                                       19
presently exist -- plaintiff has not undergone the surgeries and treatments for

her injuries. Rather, such expenses are collectible because they will be legally

due as PIP benefits when she undergoes the surgeries recommended by Dr.

Perry. Because the entirety of plaintiff’s estimated future medical expenses

will not exhaust her PIP limits and are, thus, “collectible,” those expenses are

inadmissible and should not have been presented to the jury in her personal

injury trial or included in the damages award.

      Further, because the inadmissible future expenses should not have been

included in the award against Marrone, the award should also not have

included additional costs and fees pursuant to the offer of judgment rule.

                                       4.

      The SOL concerns invoked by NJAJ here are unfounded because the

applicable SOL contemplates PIP claims for future medical expenses.

Generally, PIP claims must be commenced within two years. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-

13.1. That SOL, however, can be extended:

            [W]hen a carrier has made PIP payments in connection
            with a compensable injury and is chargeable with
            knowledge at the time of its last payment that the injury
            will probably require future treatment, then the “two-
            year after payment” provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1
            will not bar an action brought within a reasonable time
            after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of
            additional medical expenses for such treatment.


                                       20
            [Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App.
            Div.) (emphases added), aff’d, 98 N.J. 30 (1984).]
See also Rahnefeld v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 115 N.J. 628, 636 (1989)

(explaining that the PIP SOL will not bar claims when “[t]he injuries [are] of

such a nature that future treatment [is] contemplated and reasonably

necessary” (first alteration in original) (emphasis removed) (quoting Lind v.

Ins. Co. of N. Am., 174 N.J. Super. 363, 369 (Law Div. 1980), aff’d o.b., 193

N.J. Super. 303 (App. Div. 1983))). Accordingly, when future medical

treatment is reasonably expected, PIP claims for that future treatment are not

strictly subject to a time-limited SOL and need only be brought within a

reasonable time.

                                       IV.

      The undisputed evidence demonstrates that plaintiff’s projected future

medical expenses fall within her PIP limits and are therefore “collectible”

under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. The Appellate Division correctly determined that

evidence of plaintiff’s future medical expenses was inadmissible in the

personal injury trial and directed the trial court to modify the judgment

accordingly.

      The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.




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      CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, NORIEGA, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s
opinion.




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