State ex rel. Columbus City Schools, Columbus Bd. of Edn.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Columbus City Schools, Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Brookbank-Mizer, Slip Opinion No.
2026-Ohio-1175.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1175
   THE STATE EX REL . COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOLS, COLUMBUS B OARD OF
     EDUCATION, APPELLANT, v. BROOKBANK-MIZER ET AL., APPELLEES.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
 may be cited as State ex rel. Columbus City Schools, Columbus Bd. of Edn. v.
               Brookbank-Mizer, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1175.]
Workers’       compensation—Mandamus—Temporary-total-disability                       (“TTD”)
        compensation—R.C. 4123.56(F)—Industrial Commission failed to fully
        consider and apply R.C. 4123.56(F) in awarding TTD compensation during
        summer recess to nine-month school-district employee who had elected to
        receive her salary prorated over 12 months—State ex rel. Crim v. Bur. of
        Workers’ Comp. distinguished—Court of appeals’ denial of writ reversed
        and limited writ issued directing Industrial Commission to vacate its order
        and to determine employee’s eligibility for TTD compensation during
        summer recess under R.C. 4123.56(F).
      (No. 2025-0922—Submitted January 6, 2026—Decided April 3, 2026.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                         No. 23AP-111, 2025-Ohio-2234.
                              __________________
       The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.


       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Appellee Julie A. Brookbank-Mizer sustained a work-related injury
while employed by Columbus City Schools and was awarded temporary-total-
disability (“TTD”) compensation commencing in September 2021.               Because
Brookbank-Mizer is a nine-month employee who was not scheduled to work during
the following summer recess, the school district requested a hearing to determine
her eligibility to continue receiving TTD compensation during the recess. Appellee
Industrial Commission of Ohio determined that because Brookbank-Mizer had
elected to receive stretch pay—an option for school employees to receive their
salaries spread out, or prorated, over 12 months for the work performed during the
9-month school year—she was eligible for TTD compensation during the summer.
Appellant, Columbus City Schools, Columbus Board of Education (“Columbus
Schools”), filed a complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ
of mandamus directing the commission to vacate its order. The Tenth District
denied the writ, and Columbus Schools has appealed to this court.
       {¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Tenth District’s judgment
and issue a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and to consider
and determine whether Brookbank-Mizer was eligible for TTD compensation
during the 2022 summer recess under R.C. 4123.56(F).
                               I. BACKGROUND
       {¶ 3} Brookbank-Mizer is a speech therapist employed by Columbus City
Schools. She elected to receive stretch pay, and her salary is therefore prorated
over 12 months for the work performed during the 9-month school year.



                                         2
                                   January Term, 2026




        {¶ 4} On August 30, 2021, Brookbank-Mizer was attempting to clean a
school file cabinet when two shelves collapsed and struck her on the head. The
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation allowed her claim for “concussion without loss
of consciousness,” “sprain of ligaments of cervical spine,” and “sprain of ligaments
of thoracic spine” and awarded her TTD compensation commencing September 1.
After that date—and at all times relevant to this appeal—Columbus Schools no
longer paid Brookbank-Mizer her stretch-pay wages.
        {¶ 5} In May 2022, after her treating physician certified that she “was not
released to any work” until at least August 25, 2022, Brookbank-Mizer requested
to extend her TTD compensation.1 The school district moved for a hearing, noting
that Brookbank-Mizer’s last day of scheduled work for the 2021-2022 school year
would be June 3 and that her first day of work for the 2022-2023 school year would
be August 22.
        {¶ 6} After a hearing, a district hearing officer (“DHO”) for the commission
determined that Brookbank-Mizer was not eligible for TTD compensation after
June 3. The DHO relied on R.C. 4123.56(F), the first two sentences of which
provide as follows:


        If an employee is unable to work or suffers a wage loss as the direct
        result of an impairment arising from an injury or occupational
        disease, the employee is entitled to receive compensation under this
        section, provided the employee is otherwise qualified.                  If an
        employee is not working or has suffered a wage loss as the direct
        result of reasons unrelated to the allowed injury or occupational
        disease, the employee is not eligible to receive compensation under
        this section.

1. Brookbank-Mizer’s treating physician later certified that she could not return to work until
November 25, 2022.




                                              3
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The DHO found that Brookbank-Mizer was a nine-month employee, that she did
not work during the 2021 summer recess, and that she had not presented evidence
indicating that she intended to work during the 2022 summer recess. Therefore,
the DHO concluded that she was ineligible for TTD compensation during the 2022
summer recess because the reason she was not working during the recess was
unrelated to her injury—i.e., she had not been scheduled to work during the recess.
The DHO further ordered that any TTD compensation paid to Brookbank-Mizer
after June 3, 2022, be recouped under R.C. 4123.511(K).
          {¶ 7} Brookbank-Mizer appealed the decision administratively.      After
another hearing, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the commission affirmed the
DHO’s decision, though on different grounds. The SHO concluded—incorrectly—
that Brookbank-Mizer had received her normal stretch-pay wages during the 2022
summer recess and therefore was not entitled to TTD compensation during the
recess.
          {¶ 8} The commission originally refused to hear Brookbank-Mizer’s appeal
of the SHO’s order. But after she moved for reconsideration, the commission
exercised its continuing jurisdiction and granted her request for reconsideration,
finding that the SHO’s order included mistakes of both fact and law. Specifically,
the SHO erred, the commission concluded, by finding that Brookbank-Mizer had
received her normal wages during the 2022 summer recess and by determining that
R.C. 4123.56(F) barred her from receiving TTD compensation during the recess.
The commission instead relied on this court’s reasoning in State ex rel. Glenn v.
Indus. Comm., 2009-Ohio-3627, in which we determined that an injured teacher
who had elected to receive stretch pay was entitled to TTD compensation during
the summer recess if she was not receiving her normal wages, id. at ¶ 7. Purporting
to follow Glenn, the commission found that the SHO had erred in terminating TTD
compensation as of June 3, 2022; ordered that TTD compensation be awarded



                                         4
                                January Term, 2026




through the date of the commission’s hearing, December 15, 2022; and authorized
it to continue thereafter upon Brookbank-Mizer’s submission of appropriate
evidence.
       {¶ 9} Columbus Schools filed this mandamus action in the Tenth District,
seeking a writ directing the commission to vacate its order awarding Brookbank-
Mizer TTD compensation during the 2022 summer recess.                   A magistrate
recommended that the Tenth District deny the writ, finding that Brookbank-Mizer
was entitled to TTD compensation during the recess under the first sentence of R.C.
4123.56(F) and under the reasoning of Glenn. 2025-Ohio-2234, ¶ 33, 42-46 (10th
Dist.). After Columbus Schools filed objections, the Tenth District adopted the
magistrate’s decision, overruled the objections, and denied the writ. Id. at ¶ 17.
Columbus Schools has filed this direct appeal.
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
       {¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must show by clear
and convincing evidence that he or she has a clear legal right to the requested relief,
that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and that the relator
has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana
Industries, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2021-Ohio-3669, ¶ 10. An order awarding TTD
compensation is not appealable under R.C. 4123.512(A) and may be challenged by
a mandamus action. State ex rel. AutoZone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2024-
Ohio-5519, ¶ 12.
       {¶ 11} In a workers’ compensation mandamus appeal, a writ of mandamus
may lie when there is a legal basis to compel the commission to perform its duties
under the law or when the commission has abused its discretion in carrying out its
duties. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2008-Ohio-1593, ¶ 9.
“Where a commission order is adequately explained and based on some evidence,
even evidence that may be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record,
the order will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel.




                                          5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 1997-Ohio-181, ¶ 16. However, a writ of mandamus may
be issued against the commission if it “has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.” State
ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65 (1975).
                                 III. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 12} Columbus Schools raises three interrelated propositions of law. It
first asserts that under a proper application of R.C. 4123.56(F), Brookbank-Mizer
was not entitled to TTD compensation during the 2022 summer recess. As for its
second and third propositions of law, Columbus Schools contends that our decision
in State ex rel. Crim v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2001-Ohio-1268, controls this case
and that the commission and the Tenth District erred by relying on Glenn.
       {¶ 13} We conclude that all three propositions of law have some merit and
demonstrate that the appropriate remedy here is a limited writ directing the
commission to apply R.C. 4123.56(F) to Brookbank-Mizer’s case.
                 A. Proposition of Law No. 1: R.C. 4123.56(F)
       {¶ 14} As its first proposition of law, Columbus Schools asserts that a
proper application of R.C. 4123.56(F) requires consideration of division (F)’s first
and second sentences and that under these two sentences of the statute, Brookbank-
Mizer was not eligible for TTD compensation during the 2022 summer recess. We
agree that the commission did not properly consider the first and second sentences
of R.C. 4123.56(F).
                                  1. R.C. 4123.56
       {¶ 15} R.C. 4123.56 provides for compensation for workers who suffer
injuries that result in a temporary disability. Significant for this appeal, R.C.
4123.56(A) states that in the case of temporary disability, an employee shall receive
compensation—based on a formula involving the employee’s average weekly
wage—as long as the disability is total. R.C. 4123.56(A) then provides:




                                         6
                                  January Term, 2026




        Payments shall continue pending the determination of the matter,
        however payment shall not be made for the period when any
        employee has returned to work, when an employee’s treating
        physician has made a written statement that the employee is capable
        of returning to the employee’s former position of employment, when
        work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made
        available by the employer or another employer, or when the
        employee has reached the maximum medical improvement.


2020 Am.Sub. H.B. No. 81 (effective Sept. 15, 2020).2
        {¶ 16} R.C. 4123.56(B) relates to the separate concept of “wage loss”
compensation and provides a formula for temporary-disability compensation when
an injured worker either (1) “suffers a wage loss as a result of returning to
employment other than the employee’s former position of employment due to an
injury” or (2) “suffers a wage loss as a result of being unable to find employment
consistent with the employee’s disability resulting from the employee’s injury.”
Thus, R.C. 4123.56(B) requires the payment of compensation for lost wages when
an injured worker is receiving lower pay after returning to employment in another
position because of the injury or the worker has suffered a wage loss as a result of
being unable to find employment consistent with his or her physical capabilities.
        {¶ 17} Division (F) of R.C. 4123.56 was added in 2020. It provides, in full:


                If an employee is unable to work or suffers a wage loss as
        the direct result of an impairment arising from an injury or
        occupational disease, the employee is entitled to receive
        compensation under this section, provided the employee is

2. All references to R.C. 4123.56 are to the version that was in effect in August 2021 when
Brookbank-Mizer sustained her injury.




                                            7
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        otherwise qualified. If an employee is not working or has suffered
        a wage loss as the direct result of reasons unrelated to the allowed
        injury or occupational disease, the employee is not eligible to
        receive compensation under this section. It is the intent of the
        general assembly to supersede any previous judicial decision that
        applied the doctrine of voluntary abandonment to a claim brought
        under this section.


        {¶ 18} We first interpreted and applied R.C. 4123.56(F) in AutoZone, 2024-
Ohio-5519. As we explained in that case, division (F)’s first sentence provides that
to be entitled to receive TTD or wage-loss compensation, an employee’s inability
to work or wage loss “must be the ‘direct result of’ an impairment arising from an
allowed injury.” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting the statute. “The second sentence of R.C.
4123.56(F) states the converse of that principle: if an employee’s ‘not working’ or
‘wage loss’ is ‘the direct result of reasons unrelated to the allowed injury . . . the
employee is not eligible to receive compensation’ under R.C. 4123.56.” (Ellipsis
in original.) Id. at ¶ 29, quoting the statute. The phrase “as the direct result of” in
both sentences describes “the causal relationship that must exist between the
employee’s injury and the employee’s claimed inability to work, ‘not working,’ or
wage loss.” Id. at ¶ 26.
        {¶ 19} The third sentence of R.C. 4123.56(F) declares the legislature’s
intent to replace our caselaw applying the voluntary-abandonment doctrine.3 Id. at
¶ 36. By including the third sentence in division (F), however, the legislature did



3. The voluntary-abandonment doctrine recognized “‘that a complete abandonment of employment
can, under certain circumstances, break the chain of cause and effect necessary to demonstrate that
an injured worker actually is unemployed because of the injury.’” AutoZone at ¶ 20, quoting State
ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 2000-Ohio-168, ¶ 27. The doctrine focused in part on whether an
employee’s decision to depart the workforce was “voluntary” and thereby had severed the causal
connection between the employee’s injury and subsequent loss of earnings. Id. at ¶ 35.




                                                8
                                January Term, 2026




not eliminate the requirement of a causal relationship between the allowed injury
and an actual loss of earnings. Id. at ¶ 36-37. The inquiry is no longer whether an
employee’s departure from the workforce was “voluntary” or “involuntary.” Id. at
¶ 36. Instead, R.C. 4123.56(F) “replaces the voluntary-abandonment decisions
with a ‘direct result’ requirement, clarifying that the claimed loss of wages or
inability to work must be directly caused by an ‘impairment arising from an injury’
and not by ‘reasons unrelated to the allowed injury.’” Id. at ¶ 37, quoting the
statute.
     2. The Commission Failed to Fully Consider and Apply R.C. 4123.56(F)
           {¶ 20} Regarding the applicability of R.C. 4123.56(F), the commission
stated only that the SHO had “erroneously found [that Brookbank-Mizer] was
barred from receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C.
4123.56(F).” The commission did not further engage with division (F)’s language
or explain how the division—or its individual sentences—applied or did not apply
to Brookbank-Mizer’s case. Instead, the commission relied on our reasoning in
Glenn to award her TTD compensation during the 2022 summer recess.
           {¶ 21} The Tenth District agreed that Glenn, 2009-Ohio-3627, was
applicable but also relied on R.C. 4123.56(F)’s first sentence to conclude that
Brookbank-Mizer was eligible for TTD compensation during the 2022 summer
recess. 2025-Ohio-2234 at ¶ 7, 15-16 (10th Dist.). Specifically, the Tenth District
said that it was “undisputed that Ms. Brookbank-Mizer’s injury was the direct
reason for her inability to work,” citing her physician’s report certifying that she
was unable to engage in any work throughout the summer recess. Id. at ¶ 7. And
“[f]or the same reason,” the Tenth District concluded, the “second sentence of R.C.
4123.56(F) does not apply.” Id. at ¶ 8.
           {¶ 22} Thus, the commission did not conduct any analysis under R.C.
4123.56(F), and the Tenth District appeared to conclude that because a physician




                                          9
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had certified that Brookbank-Mizer was unable to work throughout the 2022
summer recess, R.C. 4123.56(F)’s second sentence was inapplicable.
       {¶ 23} We made clear in AutoZone, 2024-Ohio-5519, however, that both
the first and second sentences of R.C. 4123.56(F) must be considered. In that case,
an employee sustained a work-related injury to his shoulder and was placed on
light-duty work. The employer then terminated the employee for reasons unrelated
to his injury. He later underwent shoulder surgery, and his doctor certified that he
could not return to work until further evaluation. The employee applied for TTD
compensation for the period he could not work after his surgery, and the
commission awarded it under R.C. 4123.56(F)’s first sentence, finding that his
inability to work was a direct result of an impairment arising from his work-related
injury. Id. at ¶ 2-8, 38. The employer filed a mandamus action, arguing that the
commission had misapplied R.C. 4123.56(F) because the employee had been
terminated for reasons unrelated to his injury. Id. at ¶ 9.
       {¶ 24} On appeal to this court, the employee argued that “so long as his
injury was a proximate cause of his inability to work, the mere presence of another
causative factor for his not working during that period [wa]s immaterial.” Id. at
¶ 30. In response, we said:


       [T]he language of R.C. 4123.56(F) contemplates that the employee
       is “unable to work” as “the direct result of” the employee’s injury
       (first sentence), or that the employee is “not working” as “the direct
       result of reasons unrelated to” that injury (second sentence). Both
       sentences must be considered.


(Emphasis added.) Id. After considering both sentences of division (F), we found
that when the employee had his shoulder surgery, he was “not working” as the
direct result of reasons unrelated to his injury. Id. at ¶ 40. Therefore, under the



                                          10
                                January Term, 2026




plain language of R.C. 4123.56(F), he was not entitled to receive TTD
compensation for the period after his surgery. Id. at ¶ 40.
       {¶ 25} Here, if the commission had properly considered both sentences of
R.C. 4123.56(F) in Brookbank-Mizer’s case, it could have reached a different
result. If she was “not working” during the 2022 summer recess because she was
not scheduled to work during the summer, then she was arguably “not working . . .
as the direct result of reasons unrelated to the allowed injury,” R.C. 4123.56(F),
making her ineligible for TTD compensation. In other words, if she was “not
working” because she had no intention of obtaining summer employment, there
would be no direct causal connection between the work-related injury and her “not
working” during the summer.
       {¶ 26} The commission, however, did not attempt to conduct the analysis
required by the plain language of R.C. 4123.56(F). Even on appeal, neither the
commission’s nor Brookbank-Mizer’s merit brief adequately accounts for division
(F)’s second sentence. The commission argues that because Brookbank-Mizer’s
physician certified that she was unable to work throughout the 2022 summer recess
and there was no other cause under R.C. 4123.56(A) breaking her entitlement to
TTD compensation, the sole cause of her inability to work during the summer was
her injury. Brookbank-Mizer does not cite division (F)’s second sentence in her
brief, let alone explain why it does not apply. Rather, she cites only division (F)’s
first sentence as well as Glenn, 2009-Ohio-3627.
       {¶ 27} The second sentence of R.C. 4123.56(F), however, cannot be
ignored. As we recognized in AutoZone, division (F)’s second sentence “calls for
an analysis of whether the employee is ‘not working . . . as the direct result of
reasons unrelated to the allowed injury.’” (Emphasis added; ellipsis in original.)
Id., 2024-Ohio-5519, at ¶ 41, quoting the statute. Thus, a causation analysis is
required to determine whether Brookbank-Mizer’s “not working” during the 2022
summer recess is “the direct result of reasons unrelated to the injury.”




                                         11
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




          {¶ 28} Columbus Schools has a clear legal right to have the commission not
only apply the relevant statute, R.C. 4123.56(F), but also apply it correctly, and the
commission had a clear legal duty to do so. See State ex rel. McDonald v. Indus.
Comm., 2023-Ohio-1620, ¶ 20; Zarbana, 2021-Ohio-3669, at ¶ 10. Therefore, a
writ of mandamus is appropriate to compel the commission to conduct a proper
application of R.C. 4123.56(F) in the first instance.
B. Proposition of Law No. 2: Intent to Work a Summer Job and State ex rel.
                          Crim v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp.
          {¶ 29} As for its second proposition of law, Columbus Schools asserts that
under Crim, 2001-Ohio-1268, Brookbank-Mizer’s intent to work a summer job was
relevant to her eligibility for TTD compensation and that the Tenth District
misinterpreted Crim by concluding that that intent was irrelevant. We agree with
Columbus Schools that whether Brookbank-Mizer intended to work a summer job
is relevant but not because of Crim. Rather, R.C. 4123.56(F) controls the analysis.
          {¶ 30} In Crim, an employee who worked as a swimming instructor during
the nine-month school year sustained a work-related injury and applied for TTD
compensation based on her inability to work a separate summer job, as she had the
previous summer. See id. at ¶ 2. The commission determined that she was not
entitled to TTD compensation during the summer recess, because she had continued
to receive her swimming-instructor stretch pay over the summer and therefore could
not establish a loss of earnings. On appeal, we said that the case presented two
issues.
          {¶ 31} The first issue was whether a teacher who has contracted to teach
during a nine-month school year should be considered to have voluntarily
abandoned his or her employment at the end of the school year for purposes of TTD
compensation. Id. at ¶ 7. We answered that question in the negative, id. at ¶ 8,
stating that “it is axiomatic that a teacher who is required to leave her teaching
position at the end of the school year does not do so voluntarily” and that holding



                                          12
                                January Term, 2026




otherwise “would disqualify an entire class of claimants simply because of the
unique terms of their employment,” id. at ¶ 13.
       {¶ 32} The second issue in Crim was whether a teacher receiving 12-month
stretch pay was entitled to TTD compensation for summer employment that he or
she is unable to perform because of the injury. Id. at ¶ 7. We concluded that such
a teacher was not precluded from receiving TTD compensation solely because the
teacher continued receiving stretch-pay wages over the summer recess. Id. at ¶ 18.
In Crim, the swimming instructor had worked for a different employer the previous
summer and intended to resume that summer job but was unable to do so because
of her injury. Id. at ¶ 2. Based on her “intent and previous history of summer
employment,” we concluded that she suffered a loss of earnings and therefore was
entitled to TTD compensation even though she continued to receive stretch-pay
wages over the summer. Id. at ¶ 17.
       {¶ 33} In the Tenth District, Columbus Schools argued that under Crim, the
pertinent issue was whether Brookbank-Mizer intended to work during the 2022
summer recess. The Tenth District rejected this argument, concluding that the
swimming instructor’s intent in Crim “was relevant only to [this court’s] discussion
of the voluntary abandonment doctrine” and that R.C. 4123.56(F) now precludes
the application of that doctrine. 2025-Ohio-2234 at ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). But as noted
above, the swimming instructor’s intent to work a summer job was relevant beyond
our discussion of the voluntary-abandonment doctrine. Thus, Columbus Schools
is correct that the Tenth District adopted an unduly narrow reading of Crim.
       {¶ 34} Regardless, whether Brookbank-Mizer intended to work during the
2022 summer recess is relevant—but not, as Columbus Schools argues, because of
the precedent established in Crim, which is factually distinguishable from this case.
Rather, as noted above, the second sentence of R.C. 4123.56(F) requires “an
analysis of whether the employee is ‘not working . . . as the direct result of reasons
unrelated to the allowed injury.’” (Emphasis added; ellipsis in original.) AutoZone,




                                         13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




2024-Ohio-5519, at ¶ 41, quoting the statute.        If Brookbank-Mizer was not
scheduled to teach during the summer for Columbus Schools and had no intention
to seek other summer employment, then her “not working” during the summer
might be the direct result of reasons unrelated to her injury. However, if she
intended to work during the summer and her injury prevented her from doing so,
then she might be eligible for TTD compensation under R.C. 4123.56(F).
       {¶ 35} In sum, Brookbank-Mizer’s intent regarding summer employment
remains a relevant issue—but not because of Crim. A limited writ is appropriate to
compel the commission to conduct a proper application of R.C. 4123.56(F).
       C. Proposition of Law No. 3: State ex rel. Glenn v. Indus. Comm.
       {¶ 36} As for its third proposition of law, Columbus Schools contends that
the commission and the Tenth District erred by relying on our reasoning in Glenn,
2009-Ohio-3627, to award Brookbank-Mizer TTD compensation during the 2022
summer recess. We agree. The commission’s analysis should have been guided
by R.C. 4123.56(F), not Glenn.
       {¶ 37} In Glenn, a teacher was injured after being assaulted by a student,
resulting in conditions that left her unable to return to the classroom for two school
years. The commission awarded her TTD compensation for her inability to work
during the school year but denied her compensation during two summer recesses
even though she had elected to receive stretch pay. After the teacher filed a
mandamus action, we granted a limited writ. Noting that the purpose of TTD
compensation is to compensate an injured worker for the loss of earnings, we said
that if the teacher had not received her regular stretch-pay wages during the
summer, she would be eligible for TTD compensation based on the fact that she
had lost earnings—the wages earned during the school year but deferred until the
summer. Id. at ¶ 7.
       {¶ 38} In this case, the commission relied exclusively on Glenn to conclude
that because Brookbank-Mizer had not received stretch-pay wages during the 2022



                                         14
                                  January Term, 2026




summer recess, she was entitled to TTD compensation during the recess. Glenn,
however, was decided more than 11 years before R.C. 4123.56(F) became effective.
See 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 81. And we did not analyze in Glenn whether the
teacher was “not working” during the summer for reasons unrelated to her injury.
Rather, we summarily concluded, without citing any statute or caselaw, that
because the teacher had elected stretch pay and suffered an injury that rendered her
unable to teach, she was entitled to either her stretch-pay wages or TTD
compensation during the summer. Glenn at ¶ 7.
          {¶ 39} Neither the Tenth District’s opinion nor appellees’ merit briefs
adequately explain why Glenn, rather than R.C. 4123.56(F), provides the proper
framework for this case. Therefore, we agree with Columbus Schools that the
commission erred by relying exclusively on Glenn to award TTD compensation to
Brookbank-Mizer during the 2022 summer recess. The commission should have
conducted the analysis required by R.C. 4123.56(F).
                           D. The Appropriate Remedy
          {¶ 40} In its complaint, Columbus Schools requested a writ of mandamus
ordering the commission to simply vacate its order awarding Brookbank-Mizer
TTD compensation during the 2022 summer recess. We conclude, however, that a
more limited writ is warranted.
          {¶ 41} On appeal, Columbus Schools acknowledges that the commission
never conducted the analysis required by R.C. 4123.56(F), although Columbus
Schools maintains that Brookbank-Mizer did not work during the five summers
prior to her injury and presented no evidence indicating that she intended to work
during the 2022 summer recess. However, pointing out that she worked for the
school district during 18 of the prior summers (in her 23-year career at the district),
Brookbank-Mizer claims that the commission had at least some evidence to
conclude that but for her injury, she would have worked during the 2022 summer
recess.




                                          15
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




         {¶ 42} Because the commission did not conduct the proper analysis under
R.C. 4123.56(F), we grant a limited writ for the purpose of sending this matter back
to the commission to determine Brookbank-Mizer’s eligibility for TTD
compensation under the plain language of R.C. 4123.56(F). See State ex rel.
Heilman v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-5518, ¶ 45 (noting this court’s “long-
standing practice of granting a limited writ when a relator fails to demonstrate
entitlement to the full relief sought in mandamus and evidentiary questions
remain”).
                                IV. CONCLUSION
         {¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Tenth District’s judgment
and grant a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and to consider
and determine whether Brookbank-Mizer was eligible for TTD compensation
during the 2022 summer recess under R.C. 4123.56(F).
                                                                  Judgment reversed
                                                            and limited writ granted.
                                __________________
         Scott Scriven, L.L.P., and Karla S. Soards, for appellant.
         Nager, Romaine, and Schneiberg Co., L.P.A., Jerald A. Schneiberg,
Catherine Lietzke, and C. Bradley Howenstein, for appellee Julie Brookbank-
Mizer.
         Dave Yost, Attorney General, and David M. Canale, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.
                                __________________




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