State ex rel. Shannon v. Ogg

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Shannon v. Ogg, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1599.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
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      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
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                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1599
          THE STATE EX REL. SHANNON v. O GG, CLERK OF COUNCIL.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
                    may be cited as State ex rel. Shannon v. Ogg,
                          Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1599.]
Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel clerk of city council to determine
        that petitions for recall election do not meet city charter’s signature
        requirements and to certify the particulars in which the petitions are
        defective to the person who filed them—City-charter provision requires that
        a recall petition must include a number of signatures equal to at least 15
        percent of electors who voted at last regular municipal election at which
        mayor’s office was on ballot, not simply 15 percent of the electors who cast
        a vote for mayor—Writ granted.
       (No. 2026-0433—Submitted April 27, 2026—Decided May 3, 2026.)
                                       IN MANDAMUS.
                                   __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by DEWINE, SMITH, DETERS, and
HAWKINS, JJ. FISCHER, J., dissented, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, C.J.,
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




and SHANAHAN, J. JASON P. SMITH, J., of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sat
for BRUNNER, J.


        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} In this expedited election case, electors in the City of Whitehall filed
petitions to hold a recall election for Whitehall’s mayor and two of its
councilmembers. Respondent, Julie A. Ogg, the clerk of Whitehall’s city council,
certified that the petitions contained enough signatures to require a recall election.
Relator, Michael Shannon, a Whitehall elector, filed an original action in
mandamus seeking a writ ordering Ogg to determine that the petitions did not
contain a sufficient number of signatures. He argues that Ogg wrongly interpreted
Whitehall’s charter when determining how many petition signatures were required
to hold a recall election.
        {¶ 2} We conclude that Ogg improperly determined that the petitions
contained a sufficient number of signatures.        We therefore grant a writ of
mandamus ordering Ogg to determine that the recall petitions did not contain a
sufficient number of signatures and to certify the particulars in which the petitions
are defective. Under the charter, the petitioners will have ten days to cure the
deficiency and submit additional signatures to Ogg.
                                I. BACKGROUND
                               A. Legal background
        {¶ 3} Whitehall is a charter city in Franklin County. The Whitehall Charter
provides for recall elections of Whitehall’s elected officers. Electors seeking to
recall an officer must file a petition with the clerk of council demanding the
officer’s removal. Whitehall Charter § 68. To bring about a recall election to
remove the mayor or an at-large city council member from office, “[s]uch petition
shall be signed by at least that number of electors which equals fifteen percent in




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number of the electors voting at the last preceding regular municipal election for
the office of Mayor.” Id.
        {¶ 4} Within twenty days after the electors file the recall petition, the clerk
must determine whether the petition meets the requirements of the charter. Id. If
the clerk certifies that the petition is sufficient, the subject officer is given five days
to resign, and if the officer does not, city council must set a date for a recall election.
Id. The election must be held within sixty days of the subject officer’s receipt of
the certification. Id. If, however, the clerk certifies that the petition is defective,
the electors have ten days “to make the petition sufficient.” Id.
                          B. Factual and procedural history
        {¶ 5} Michael Bivens is the elected mayor of Whitehall. Lori Elmore and
Amy Harcar are elected at-large members of Whitehall’s city council. On March
11, 2026, Whitehall electors filed recall petitions against Bivens, Elmore, and
Harcar with Ogg, Whitehall’s clerk of council. Ogg forwarded the petitions to the
Franklin County Board of Elections for assistance with validating the signatures.
The board of elections notified the city that the petition against Mayor Bivens
contained 444 valid signatures and that the petitions against Councilmembers
Elmore and Harcar each contained 447 valid signatures.
        {¶ 6} The mayor of Whitehall is elected every four years and was last
elected at the 2023 regular municipal election. A total of 3,913 Whitehall electors
voted at that election. Only 2,827 electors, however, voted for the office of mayor
at that election. Ogg interpreted the charter as requiring that recall petitions contain
a number of signatures totaling at least 15 percent of the number of electors who
voted for mayor at the most recent regular municipal election. Fifteen percent of
2,827 is 425. Because each petition contained more than 425 valid signatures, Ogg
determined that each petition contained a sufficient number of signatures.
        {¶ 7} Ogg certified that each petition was sufficient and notified the officer
subject to each petition. None of the three officers resigned.




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        {¶ 8} On April 9, 2026, Shannon, a Whitehall elector, filed his amended
complaint for a writ of mandamus. Shannon seeks a writ “ordering Respondent to
determine that the recall petitions do not meet the signature requirement of the City
of Whitehall Charter, and to certify the particulars in which the petition[s are]
defective to the person who filed the petition[s].”1
        {¶ 9} Shannon argues that Ogg used the wrong number to determine
whether the petitions contained a sufficient number of signatures. Shannon argues
that the charter requires a number of signatures equal to at least 15 percent of all
electors who voted at the last regular election at which the mayor was elected,
including those electors who did not vote for the office of mayor. That number of
electors was 3,913, of which 15 percent is 587. Because none of the recall petitions
contained at least 587 valid signatures, Shannon argues that Ogg was required to
determine that the petitions were insufficient.
        {¶ 10} At the time Shannon filed his amended complaint, city council had
not yet set the date of the recall election, but on April 14 it scheduled the election
for May 28.
                                II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
                                 A. Mandamus standard
        {¶ 11} To obtain a writ of mandamus, Shannon must establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal
duty on the part of the Ogg to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Valentine v. Schoen, 2024-Ohio-3439,
¶ 7. Shannon lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law due to the
proximity of the election. See id.



1. In his amended complaint, Shannon requested an award of attorney fees. He does not request
attorney fees in his brief, however, and he has therefore waived the request. See State ex rel.
Valentine v. Schoen, 2024-Ohio-3439, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor
Council v. Cleveland, 2007-Ohio-3831, ¶ 83.




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        {¶ 12} A writ of mandamus may issue compelling a clerk of city council to
determine that a petition filed with the clerk is sufficient. State ex rel. Julnes v. S.
Euclid City Council, 2011-Ohio-4485, ¶ 45; State ex rel. Gil-Llamas v. Hardin,
2021-Ohio-1508, ¶ 46. Here, Shannon seeks a writ compelling the clerk to
determine that a petition is insufficient. But this does not mean that what Shannon
actually wants is a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction. See State ex
rel. Obojski v. Perciak, 2007-Ohio-2453, ¶ 13 (court lacks jurisdiction over a
mandamus action when the real objects sought are declaratory judgment and
prohibitory injunction). Rather, a writ compelling Ogg to determine that the
petitions are insufficient would require Ogg to take affirmative action, including
providing the petitioners with a certification of the particulars in which the petitions
are defective, so mandamus is an appropriate mechanism to compel Ogg to perform
that duty. Providing the certificate triggers a ten-day period in which the petitioners
may make the petitions sufficient.
        {¶ 13} To show the remaining requirements for a writ of mandamus to
issue, Shannon must show that Ogg abused her discretion or disregarded clearly
applicable law when certifying the petitions. See Julnes at ¶ 10, 28.
                         B. Required number of signatures
        {¶ 14} Shannon claims that Ogg used an improper number of required
signatures when she certified that the recall petitions contained a sufficient number
of signatures. Whitehall’s charter provides, in relevant part, that a recall “petition
shall be signed by at least that number of electors which equals fifteen percent in
number of the electors voting at the last preceding regular municipal election for
the office of Mayor.” Whitehall Charter § 68.
        {¶ 15} Ogg interpreted the charter as requiring that the recall petitions be
signed by at least 15 percent of the number of electors who voted for mayor at the
last preceding regular municipal election at which the office of mayor was on the
ballot. Such an interpretation meant that the petitions needed 425 valid signatures.




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Shannon, however, argues that the charter requires that each petition be signed by
15 percent of the number of electors who voted at the last preceding regular
municipal election at which the office of mayor was on the ballot, regardless of
whether the electors actually voted for mayor. Shannon’s interpretation means that
the recall petitions needed 587 valid signatures.
       {¶ 16} “[W]hen this court construes a city charter, general rules of statutory
interpretation apply.” State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-
Ohio-2585, ¶ 12. The court begins by reviewing the plain language of a provision.
State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2026-Ohio-966, ¶ 22. It reads
words and phrases in context and construes them in accordance with rules of
grammar and common usage. Id.
       {¶ 17} Shannon bases his interpretation of the charter provision on the
grammatical rule of the last antecedent. Under that rule, “‘a limiting clause or phrase
. . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.’ ” (Ellipsis added in Look Ahead Am.) Look Ahead Am. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 2024-Ohio-2691, ¶ 20, quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26
(2003); see Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 2014-Ohio-2440, ¶ 26 (“It is an
accepted rule of construction that in the absence of an expressed contrary intention,
referential and qualifying words and phrases refer solely to the last antecedent.”).
Applying the rule to the charter provision, which states that a recall “petition shall
be signed by at least that number of electors which equals fifteen percent in number
of the electors voting at the last preceding regular municipal election for the office
of Mayor,” Whitehall Charter § 68, Shannon argues that the clause “for the office
of Mayor” modifies the immediately preceding phrase “at the last preceding regular
municipal election.” Under the Whitehall Charter, the mayor and several other
officers are elected every four years. See Whitehall Charter § 3(e) and 23(a); see
also id. at § 69. But regular municipal elections are held every two years for the
election of city officers, id. at § 69—so the mayor is not on the ballot in every




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regular municipal election. Shannon argues that the effect of the phrase “for the
office of Mayor” is to limit “the last preceding regular municipal election” to the
last preceding regular municipal election at which the mayor was on the ballot.
        {¶ 18} For her part, Ogg argues that interpreting the charter provision to
require a number of signatures equal to 15 percent of electors who voted for mayor
at the most recent regular municipal election is the most natural reading of the
provision. She argues that this interpretation “most naturally links the subject—the
electors—to the act that they performed—voting for the office of Mayor.” Ogg
notes that the charter provision uses the language “for the office of Mayor” rather
than language such as “at the last preceding regular municipal election at which the
office of the Mayor was on the ballot.” (Emphasis added.) Ogg points out that we
have interpreted a petition-signature charter provision that used the language “the
total number of electors voting for the candidates for Councilmember” as meaning
electors voting for that specific office, State ex rel. Blackman v. Hitte, 5 Ohio St.3d
156, 158 (1983). But in that case, the charter language was structured differently
than the language in Whitehall’s charter.         Here, “for the office of Mayor”
immediately follows “at the last preceding regular municipal election.”
        {¶ 19} Ogg further supports the distinction between “for” and “at” by citing
to the Whitehall Charter’s definition of a regular municipal election. Section 69 of
the Whitehall Charter provides, “A regular municipal election for the purpose of
the election of officers provided for in this Charter shall be held on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November in odd numbered years. Elections so held shall
be known as regular municipal elections.” “A regular municipal election”—written
in the singular—is held to elect multiple officers, and multiple officers are elected
at each of those elections, see Whitehall Charter § 3(e), 23(a), 26(a), 41(a), and
45(a). Thus, arguably, a regular municipal election is not held for a specific office.
Rather, one or more officers are elected at a regular municipal election. Ogg argues
that if the clause “for the office of Mayor” is read as identifying the last municipal




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election at which the mayor was elected, such a reading would improperly narrow
the definition of a regular municipal election. Rather, Ogg argues, the clause should
be read to specify those electors who voted for mayor.
       {¶ 20} Ogg argues that the rule of the last antecedent is inapplicable because
it does not apply when a provision expresses a contrary intention. See Hedges v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2006-Ohio-1926, ¶ 24, quoting Carter v. Youngstown,
146 Ohio St. 203, 209 (1946) (“‘[r]eferential and qualifying words and phrases,
where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent’ ”). Ogg
argues that the charter provision’s most natural reading, as evidenced by its use of
the clause “for the office of Mayor” rather than “at which the office of the Mayor
was on the ballot” and the ordinary usage of “for” and “at” in election statutes, is
that only electors voting for the office of mayor are counted.
       {¶ 21} Both parties point to Ohio Constitution and Revised Code provisions
related to petition signatures that they argue support their respective interpretations.
The Ohio Constitution provides that the number of signatures required for a
statewide initiative or referendum petition shall be determined based on “the total
number of votes cast for the office of governor at the last preceding election
therefor.” Ohio Const., art. II, § 1g; see also art. X, § 4 (same language defining
the petition-signature requirement to choose a county-charter commission and
adopt a county charter). These sections clearly provide that the number of required
signatures is based on the number of electors who voted for governor at the last
election at which that office was elected. The parties point to Revised Code
sections that contain similar language.        See, e.g., R.C. 519.12(H) (minimum
signature requirement for a township-zoning-referendum petition).
       {¶ 22} In contrast, other statutes provide that the number of required
signatures is based on the number of electors voting at an election without
specifying a particular office. See, e.g., R.C. 1332.05(A)(2) (petition regarding
referendum on public-cable-service ordinance or resolution). Notably, one of these




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statutes governs recall elections for elected officers of statutory municipalities.
R.C. 705.92(A) provides that a recall petition be “signed by qualified electors equal
in number to at least fifteen per cent of the total votes cast at the most recent regular
municipal election.”
          {¶ 23} But overall, these statutes and constitutional provisions do not
provide significant support for either party’s argument; rather, they show that
Whitehall chose a different (and less clear) sentence structure when drafting its
recall provision. Neither party points to a statute or charter with the same sentence
structure as Whitehall’s recall provision, which includes the phrase “number of the
electors voting at the last preceding . . . election for [a specific] office,” Whitehall
Charter § 68, but does not include an earlier clause tying the votes to a specific
office.
          {¶ 24} The recall provision is not a model of clarity. But in our opinion,
the best interpretation of the provision is that a recall petition must include a number
of signatures equal to at least 15 percent of electors who voted at the most recent
election at which a mayor was elected, regardless of whether the electors voted for
mayor.
          {¶ 25} Reading the clause “for the office of Mayor” as modifying only the
preceding clause “the last preceding regular municipal election” complies with the
grammatical canons of construction. As an initial matter, although Shannon
identifies the applicable canon as the rule of the last antecedent, the sentence
structure of the recall provision more accurately falls under the nearest-reasonable-
referent canon. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts, 152-153 (2012). The rule of the last antecedent applies to pronouns or
demonstrative adjectives, and the sentence or statute involved usually contains a
parallel list or series. See id. at 144, 152. In contrast, the nearest-reasonable-
referent canon applies to adverbial and adjectival phrases and provides that “a




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prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable
referent,” id. at 152.
        {¶ 26} Regardless of the exact terminology of the canon, “‘a limiting clause
or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows,’ ” (ellipsis added in Look Ahead Am.) id., 2024-Ohio-2691, at
¶ 20, quoting Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26. Applying the rule to the recall provision, the
phrase “for the office of Mayor” modifies the immediately preceding phrase “the
most recent regular municipal election.” It does not modify the earlier word “voting.”
Such a reading is not unnatural. See Scott, 2014-Ohio-2440, at ¶ 26 (applying rule
of last antecedent and reading statute according to “the natural and most obvious
import of the statutory language”).
        {¶ 27} The Whitehall Charter defines a regular municipal election as an
election at which multiple officers are elected, see Whitehall Charter § 69, so
describing such an election as an election “for” a specific office is a bit of a
misnomer. But the recall provision’s use of the words “for the office of Mayor”
rather than “at which the mayor was elected” does not override the natural reading
of the provision as shown by the nearest-reasonable-referent canon.
        {¶ 28} Moreover, adopting Ogg’s preferred interpretation would require us
to add language to the recall provision. If the charter is interpreted to require
signatures equal to 15 percent of electors who voted for mayor “at the last preceding
regular municipal election” and is read literally, zero signatures could be required.
Here, the petitioners filed their petitions in March 2026. The last preceding regular
municipal election was in November 2025. But the office of mayor was not on the
ballot in November 2025, so no electors voted for mayor.            Adopting Ogg’s
interpretation would require us to add words to the charter provision to clarify that
the relevant election is the most recent election at which the mayor was elected;
that is, the provision would have to be modified to identify “the electors voting at
the last preceding regular municipal election at which the mayor was elected for the




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office of Mayor.” But the italicized language does not appear in the charter
provision, see Whitehall Charter § 68, and we will not rewrite the provision to such
an extent.
        {¶ 29} Ogg makes several additional arguments in support of her preferred
interpretation, but we do not find these arguments persuasive. Ogg argues that the
rule of the last antecedent (or nearest-reasonable-referent) does not apply, because
of a different interpretative canon—the series-qualifier canon. “‘When there is a
straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a
prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.’ ”
Elmore, 2025-Ohio-2585, at ¶ 31, quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 147.
Reading Law offers an illustrative example of the canon, explaining that the phrase
“[i]nstitutions or societies that are charitable in nature” (italics deleted) should be
understood as meaning that “the institutions as well as the societies must be
charitable.” Reading Law at 148; see Elmore at ¶ 31. Ogg argues that, in the charter
provision, the “introductory phrase . . . ‘electors voting’ refers to and represents the
single, unified concept of those who cast votes, and the latter phrase ‘for the office
of Mayor’ naturally qualifies this entire concept rather than simply the temporal
phrase ‘last preceding regular municipal election.’ ”
        {¶ 30} However, the series-qualifier canon does not apply. Simply put,
“electors voting at the last preceding regular municipal election” is not a series, and
thus there is no series that “for the office of Mayor” could qualify. For purposes of
the canon, a series generally includes two or more nouns or verbs, which are
separated by the conjunctive “and” or the disjunctive “or.” See Reading Law at
147-149. A series need not consist solely of either nouns or verbs, see Elmore at
¶ 32, but the logic of the canon requires that a series consist of two or more distinct
items. Here, in the phrase “electors voting at the most recent municipal election,”
there is no series. We will not apply the canon if there is not a clause to which the
canon would apply. See Allen v. United States, 83 F.4th 564, 572 (6th Cir. 2023).




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       {¶ 31} Finally, Ogg argues that past practice in Whitehall supports that the
number of signatures a recall petition must contain is calculated based on the
number of electors who voted for mayor at the last regular election for the office of
mayor. In addition to recall petitions, Whitehall’s charter allows for initiative and
referendum petitions, and those provisions contain similar signature requirements
as the recall provision. See Whitehall Charter § 15 and 16. Ogg submitted evidence
showing that in 2021, a referendum petition was filed challenging a Whitehall
ordinance. Ogg asserts that the city attorney at that time calculated the required
number of signatures based on the number of electors who voted for mayor at the
last election—not all electors voting for any office at that election—and Ogg argues
that this historical practice supports her interpretation of the recall provision. But
even assuming the city attorney did so determine the necessary number of signatures
for that referendum petition, that determination makes little difference to the analysis
here. Because conventional tools of statutory construction are adequate to determine
the charter’s meaning, we need not consider practice-based arguments.
       {¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the charter requires that
a recall petition must include a number of signatures equal to at least 15 percent of
electors who voted at the last regular municipal election at which the office of
mayor was on the ballot—not simply 15 percent of the electors who cast a vote for
the office of mayor. The most recent such election was in 2023, and 3,913 electors
voted at that election. Fifteen percent of 3,913 is 587. None of the three recall
petitions at issue here contained at least 587 valid signatures. Therefore, Ogg
abused her discretion and disregarded clearly applicable law when she certified that
the petitions contained a sufficient number of signatures.
                                III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 33} Ogg abused her discretion and disregarded clearly applicable law
when she certified that the petitions contained a sufficient number of signatures.
Therefore, we issue a writ of mandamus ordering Ogg to determine that the recall




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petitions do not meet the signature requirements of the Whitehall Charter, and, in
accordance with Section 68 of the Whitehall Charter, for each petition, “certify the
particulars in which the petition is defective, deliver a copy of the certificate to the
person who filed the petition, and make a record of such delivery.” Under the charter,
the petitioners “shall be allowed a period of ten days after the day on which such
delivery was made in which to make the petition[s] sufficient,” id.
                                                                         Writ granted.
                                __________________
        FISCHER, J., joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and SHANAHAN, J., dissenting.
        {¶ 34} In this case, the court must interpret the meaning of Section 68 of the
Whitehall Charter to determine the number of electors’ signatures needed on a
petition to remove an elected city officer by a recall election. The charter provision
states that a recall “petition shall be signed by at least that number of electors which
equals fifteen percent in number of the electors voting at the last preceding regular
municipal election for the office of Mayor.” The majority opinion concludes that
this provision means that the number of electors’ signatures needed is based on the
number of voters who participated in the last preceding election at which the mayor
was on the ballot, not the number of voters who actually voted for mayor. But this
interpretation is incorrect.
        {¶ 35} Contrary to our well-established rule that we will neither delete nor
add words to a legislative provision, see, e.g., State ex rel. Dudley v. Yost, 2024-
Ohio-5166, ¶ 14, the majority does both. The majority’s interpretation specifically
replaces the word “for” with “at which” and adds additional language to the
provision that does not exist. The majority’s interpretations would have the
provision read: “Such petition shall be signed by at least that number of electors
which equals fifteen percent in number of the electors voting at the last preceding
regular municipal election for at which the office of Mayor was on the ballot.”
(Strikethrough and italics added to indicate changes.) These deletions and additions




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change the meaning of the provision, as one cannot vote at an election for “the
office of Mayor” simply by participating in other elections that also happen to be
on the ballot at the same time and in the same election at which the office of mayor
was on the ballot—either a vote is cast at an election for the office of mayor or it is
not.
       {¶ 36} To conduct the appropriate analysis, we need to look no further than
the plain language of the Whitehall Charter. The defined term “regular municipal
election,” Whitehall Charter § 69, is modified in Section 68 by two clauses: (1)
“last preceding,” which establishes a temporal requirement, and (2) “for the office
of Mayor,” which limits the type of election. The “for the office of Mayor” clause
modifies “regular municipal election” to tie the votes cast at that regular municipal
election to a particular election—the mayoral election—rather than to one of the
other offices in that election or to the election as a whole. See Whitehall Charter
§ 69 (the purpose of a “regular municipal election” is to elect Whitehall officials).
Based on that understanding, the provision does require respondent, Julie A. Ogg,
Whitehall’s clerk of council, to look at the number of electors who voted for
mayor—i.e., the number of electors who cast a vote in the mayoral election—rather
than the total number of electors who voted in the overall election at which the
mayor was merely one of the offices on the ballot. And contrary to the majority’s
assertion, this interpretation does not add words to the statute; it in fact gives
meaning to every word in the statute.
       {¶ 37} The majority also claims that this interpretation is incorrect because
it would allow for the possibility that zero signatures would be required if the last
preceding regular municipal election did not have the mayor on the ballot. But this
misreads the argument. I agree with the majority that the number of signatures is
based on the last election that had the mayor on the ballot. We both conclude that
if the mayor is not on the ballot for the last preceding regular municipal election,




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then that is not the election that is reviewed for purposes of Section 68 of the
Whitehall Charter.
       {¶ 38} This case is all about which number to use—the number of electors
who voted at the regular municipal election at which the mayor was on the ballot
or the number of electors who voted at the regular municipal election for the office
of mayor, i.e., voted in the mayoral election. And the plain language supports the
latter interpretation, since “for the office of Mayor” modifies “regular municipal
election” and thus includes only those who voted “at” the election “for” mayor.
       {¶ 39} Because Ogg used the right number to determine whether the
petitions contained a sufficient number of signatures, I would deny the writ of
mandamus. Because the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent.
                               __________________
       McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., J. Corey Colombo, Stacey N. Hauff, and
Helen G. Lohre, for relator.
       Bradley S. Nicodemus, Whitehall City Attorney; and Brunner Quinn,
Patrick M. Quinn, and Morgan L. McDermott, for respondent.
                          ________________________




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