Allan v. Allan

[Cite as Allan v. Allan, 2026-Ohio-1187.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

RAIDA ALLAN,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
                                                              No. 114193
                 v.                               :

TAREQ ALLAN, ET AL.,                              :

                 Defendants-Appellees.            :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-18-907570


                                            Appearances:

                 RaslanPla & Company, LLC, Jorge Luis Pla, Nadia R.
                 Zaiem, and Erika Molnar, for appellant.

                 Dinn, Hochman & Potter, LLC, Edgar H. Boles, and
                 Andrew J. Yarger, for appellees Qais Allan, 871 Rocky
                 River Drive, Inc., and Pearl Road, Inc.


LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

                   Plaintiff-appellant Raida Allan (“Raida” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from

two judgment entries issued by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in a

fraudulent-transfer action she brought against defendants-appellees, Tareq Allan
(“Tareq”), Tareq’s brother Qais Allan (“Qais”), and two corporate gas-station entities

— 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc. and Pearl Road, Inc. (together, “the Gas Stations”).

The first judgment entry, dated April 29, 2024, granted judgment notwithstanding

the verdict (“JNOV”) in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations. The second judgment

entry, dated April 25, 2025, denied Raida’s motion for JNOV as to Tareq. After a

thorough review of the facts and the law, we reverse both judgments and remand

the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.   Background and Procedural History

               This case concerns allegations of the fraudulent transfer of two gas-

station businesses during the course of Raida and Tareq’s marital separation and

divorce. This is the second appeal this court has heard in this case. The following

facts are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

      A. Raida and Tareq’s Separation and Divorce

               Raida and Tareq were married in October 2002.             During the

marriage, Tareq acquired two gas-station businesses. The first gas station, located

on Pearl Road in Middleburg Heights, was owned by Pearl Road, Inc. which, in turn

was originally owned by Raida and was transferred to Tareq through a corporate-

stock transfer of certificated shares during their marriage. The second gas station,

located at 871 Rocky River Drive in Berea, was purchased by Tareq in 2004 through

the entity 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc., which Tareq wholly owned. That same year,

Tallan, LLC — a business solely owned by Tareq — purchased the real property on

which the 871 Rocky River Drive gas station is situated.
               Raida filed for divorce in 2010. She dismissed her divorce action in

2011. In 2015, Tareq filed for divorce. A trial was had in that divorce case that lasted

14 days and spanned the months July, September, and November 2017.

               On April 20, 2018, a final judgment and divorce decree was entered

by the domestic relations court. In its judgment entry following trial, the domestic

relations court stated that, in addition to addressing what constituted marital and

separate property of Raida and Tareq, “the issue that involved the court’s time in

trial was the question of . . . whether [Qais] purchased the two gas stations owned

during the marriage for fair market value or at all.” (Emphasis added.) The court

emphasized the difficulty it faced in making sense of the evidence, noting that the

testimony and exhibits presented by Tareq and Qais were contradictory, confusing,

and, overall, not credible. The court also noted the late disclosure of key documents,

stating, “In addition, some documents appeared very late in the litigation, such as

the corporate resolution relating t0 the transfer of Pearl Road Inc.”

               The domestic relations court further noted that if the gas station

business at 871 Rocky River Drive had in fact been transferred to Qais, such a

transfer would have violated a court order staying any sale of the property during

the first divorce proceeding filed by Raida in 2010 but ultimately dismissed in 2011.

The court noted that Tareq refused to acknowledge his violation of the stay order

during his testimony, even though Tareq testified that the business was transferred

during that time.
               After providing an extensive explanation of the confusing nature of

the evidence and the difficulty in determining whether the Gas Stations had been

transferred, and if so, whether they were transferred for fair market value, the court

ultimately concluded that Tareq “has engaged in financial misconduct in that he

transferred the two gas station businesses with convenience stores and the liquor

licenses to his brother to avoid an equitable division of property” in the divorce. The

court further found that it was “not desirable to split the businesses between [Tareq

and Raida] even if it was appropriate to divest Qais of title in [domestic relations]

court,” because the court found that doing so would require the sale of the

businesses, which, in turn, would only diminish their value. Accordingly, the

domestic relations court determined that the value of the Gas Stations would be

considered marital property for purposes of its distributive award. The court

explained that determining value was difficult due to the incomplete and

contradictory evidence submitted, which included tax and other financial

documents that appeared to have been falsified by Tareq.

               In the divorce decree, the domestic relations court awarded Raida the

871 Rocky River Dr. real estate and the marital home, in addition to other assets. It

also ordered Tareq to pay nearly $550,000 in spousal support, child support,

arrearages, and attorney fees to Raida.

               Tareq appealed the domestic relations court’s judgment.            The

judgment and divorce decree were upheld on appeal. Allan v. Allan, 2019-Ohio-

2111 (8th Dist.).
      B. The Fraudulent-Transfer Action

               On November 28, 2018, Raida filed the lawsuit from which this

appeal derives, against Tareq, Qais, and the Gas Stations. In it she alleged that Tareq

fraudulently transferred the Gas Stations to Qais, without consideration, in an

attempt to make himself insolvent with the knowledge of a likely impending

financial judgment against him in the upcoming divorce proceeding. Raida further

alleged that Qais received the transfers with knowledge of their illegality. Raida

sought rescission of the Gas Station transfers so as to collect on the money judgment

she had obtained against Tareq in their divorce, punitive damages, and other

remedies including the appointment of a receiver over the Gas Stations,

garnishment of the Gas Stations’ accounts, and an injunction against the further

disposition of the Gas Stations.

               Qais and the Gas Stations answered the complaint. Tareq, however,

did not file an answer. In their answer, Qais and the Gas Stations asserted the

statute of limitations as a bar to Raida’s fraudulent-transfer claims.

               On February 5, 2019, Raida filed an amended complaint in which she

made the same assertions and requests for relief as the original complaint but

additionally alleged that the Gas Station transfers had not been completed under

Ohio law. Raida’s amended complaint asserted that because the transfers were not

complete, the transfers should be deemed to have occurred immediately before the

filing of the lawsuit for statute of limitations purposes pursuant to

R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a).
               Qais and the Gas Stations filed a motion for summary judgment

arguing that Raida’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the

claims were barred by res judicata. With respect to the statute of limitations, Qais

and the Gas Stations argued that pursuant to R.C. 1336.09, a claim for fraudulent

transfer must be brought within four years of the transfer or within one year of

discovery of the transfer and that in this case the transfers of the Gas Stations

occurred more than four years prior to Raida filing her fraudulent-transfer action

against them on November 28, 2018. Regarding res judicata, Qais and the Gas

Stations argued that the divorce decree determined the issue of whether there had

been a fraudulent transfer in light of the court determining that title to the Gas

Stations was in Qais’s name and the fact that it decided not to divest Qais of title, but

rather to consider the value of the assets in its determination of the equitable

division of property. Qais and the Gas Stations argued the domestic relations court’s

judgment prevented Raida from attempting to claw-back the transfer through a

separate, subsequent fraudulent-transfer claim.

               Raida opposed Qais and the Gas Stations’ motion for summary

judgment. She also filed a motion for default judgment against Tareq in light of his

failure to appear in the lawsuit.

               The trial court granted Qais and the Gas Stations summary judgment

against Raida, concluding that Raida had failed to set forth a genuine issue of

material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court did not articulate its reasons, nor did it indicate whether its ruling was
based on the statute of limitations, res judicata, or both. In the same judgment, the

trial court denied Raida’s motion for default judgment against Tareq, again without

explanation. Raida appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of

her motion for default judgment to this court.

      C. This Court’s Resolution of the First Appeal

               In the first appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations and remanded the matter

for further proceedings. See Allan v. Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488 (8th Dist.). This court

recognized that the reason the trial court granted summary judgment was unclear

from the summary nature of the court’s order. Therefore, this court analyzed the

applicability of both the statute of limitations and res judicata to the case.

               Concerning the statute of limitations, this court found that a genuine

issue of material fact remained regarding whether Raida filed her claims for

fraudulent transfer within the applicable statute of limitations. The court pointed

out that under R.C. 1336.09(A), defining when a transfer is deemed to have

occurred,

      (2)(a) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided
      in division (A) of this section and the transfer is not so perfected before
      the commencement of an action for relief arising out of a transfer that
      is fraudulent under section 1336.04 or 1336.05 of the Revised Code, the
      transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the
      action.

After reviewing both parties’ evidence, this court concluded that “there exists

disputed evidence as to whether, and when, the transfers of the gas stations were

made and, if so, when those transfers were perfected.” Allan at ¶ 34.
               Further, this court determined that res judicata did not bar Raida’s

fraudulent-transfer action because Qais and the Gas Stations were not parties to the

domestic relations court’s judgment. This court further noted:

       Whether or not the transfers actually took place was not necessary for
       the domestic relations court to fashion an equitable distribution of the
       marital property. Accordingly, we cannot say that a final determination
       of whether the transfers were legitimate, whether they consisted of
       fraud on Tareq’s part, or whether they consisted of fraud on Qais’s part
       was an issue that was material and necessary to the final judgment in
       the divorce decree in order to distribute marital property.[1]

Id. at ¶ 41.

               Additionally, in the first appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s

denial of Raida’s motion for default judgment against Tareq, where Tareq had not

appeared in the case by way of filing an answer or otherwise, and thus had not raised

any affirmative defenses, as Qais and the Gas Stations had done. This court ordered

the trial court, upon remand, to grant Raida’s motion for default judgment.

       D. Trial Court Proceedings Following Remand

               On remand, in its judgment entry finding Tareq in default, the trial

court stated, “[A] hearing on damages will be set by a separate order.” The trial

court, however, never held a hearing to determine damages as to Tareq. Instead, it




       1 Although the domestic relations court ultimately determined, for purposes of

equitable distribution, that Tareq had transferred the Gas Stations to Qais to avoid
equitable division of the marital property, that determination was made within the
context of classifying and distributing assets in a divorce proceeding rather than
adjudicating a claim under the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
instructed the parties to prepare for trial. A jury trial commenced on March 15,

2024.

              After the parties presented their evidence and testimony over the

course of seven days, the jury was instructed. These instructions did not ask the jury

to decide whether the Gas Stations transfers had been perfected for purposes of

determining the transfer date under R.C. 1336.06. Over Raida’s counsel’s repeated

objections, and Qais and the Gas Stations’ counsel’s repeated insistence, the trial

court determined that no instruction on perfection was necessary because

corporate-stock transfers were not capable of perfection under Ohio law and,

therefore, R.C. 1336.06 would not apply. Additionally, while the jury was instructed

that it would determine damages against Tareq, as a defaulting party, the trial court

granted Qais and the Gas Stations’ request to leave Tareq off the jury-verdict forms

as to damages. This, too, was done over Raida’s counsel’s repeated objection.

              Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict concluding that

Tareq did fraudulently transfer the Gas Stations to Qais, that Qais did not receive

the Gas Stations in good faith, and that Qais did not pay reasonably equivalent value

for them. The jury awarded Raida $598,191.51 in damages representing the unpaid

divorce judgment, $1,715,175.00 in economic damages, $250,000.00 in

noneconomic damages, and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages. The jury also

awarded Raida her attorney fees.

              After the verdict was read, the trial court excused the jury and then

read aloud the jury’s answers to the parties’ interrogatories.          Pursuant to
interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2, the jury found that the Gas Stations had, in fact, been

transferred. Pursuant to interrogatory Nos. 4 and 6, the jury found that the Gas

Stations were transferred before November 28, 2014. The jury also answered

interrogatory Nos. 3 and 5 finding that, as relates to each of the transfers, Raida did

not discover the transfers and could not have reasonably discovered the transfers

before November 28, 2017—one year before she filed her lawsuit

           1. JNOV Motions

               After dismissing the jury and then reading the answers to the jury

interrogatories in open court, the court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file briefs

on why a JNOV should or should not be entered. Specifically, the court stated:

      At this point, I would ask the — the jury has spoken, the jury has spoken
      through its verdict and has spoken through its interrogatories. I don’t
      have to tell anybody in this room that the answers to certain questions
      raise a statute of limitations issue, okay?            Specifically, jury
      interrogatory numbers 4 and 6. There is also an issue in jury
      interrogatory number 3 and another one about her knowledge, okay?
      I’m a going to ask the parties to brief — I understand the statute of
      limitations, but I want — I’m going to ask the parties to brief the Court
      as it relates to Raida’s knowledge, because the Court wants to become
      more aware of that. I understand the general 4-year statute of
      limitations, but I also want the parties to brief the Court on the issue
      [Raida’s counsel] has raised throughout, that the failure to perfect
      deems the statute of limitations to occur immediately before the filing
      of the action.

               In their motion for JNOV, Qais and the Gas Stations argued that while

the jury correctly determined the transfers of the Gas Stations occurred before

November 28, 2014, it incorrectly concluded that Raida did not know of and could

not reasonably have discovered the transfers before November 28, 2017. Qais and

the Gas Stations asserted that reasonable minds could only conclude Raida
discovered the transfers on June 19, 2015, at the latest, because Raida set forth the

details of each transfer in a pleading she filed in the second divorce case, in which

she alleged counterclaims for fraud against Tareq and cross-claims for fraud against

Qais and the Gas Stations, whom she joined as third-party defendants.2

               In opposing Qais and the Gas Stations’ JNOV motion, Raida

advanced several arguments in support of upholding the jury’s verdict in her favor.

Among them, she contended that the record contained evidence showing she did not

discover, and could not reasonably have discovered, the transfers before the

domestic relations court’s judgment entry of divorce issued on April 20, 2018, and

that the jury was entitled to weigh and credit this evidence.

               Raida also filed a separate JNOV motion requesting that the court

amend the jury-verdict forms to include Tareq’s name on the damages awards. She

argued that this amendment was necessary because, although the court had entered

a default against Tareq before trial, it never entered judgment for damages against

him and instead had indicated it would leave that determination to the jury.

However, when it came time to instruct the jury on damages as to Tareq, the court

refused to do so over repeated objections by Raida’s counsel, resulting in no

damages award against Tareq despite the existence of a finding of default against

him.




       2 Raida’s claims against Qais and the Gas Stations were dismissed by the trial court

before trial. The court kept Qais and the Gas Stations on as parties to the divorce in a
limited capacity as stakeholders in the business properties.
           2. The Trial Court’s Ruling on JNOV

              On July 3, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment granting Qais and

the Gas Stations’ motion for JNOV, finding that “the record does not contain

sufficient evidence that [Raida] did not or could not have reasonably discovered the

transfers before November 28, 2017.” In support of its judgment, the trial court

focused on Raida’s testimony at trial that Tareq had told her in November 2014,

when she phoned him about support payments having stopped, that he had sold “the

gas station” and that she was aware of statements in Tareq’s February 2015 divorce

complaint that asserted that the Gas Stations were no longer part of the marital

estate. The court also highlighted Raida’s statements on cross-examination when

confronted with her June 19, 2015 filing of counterclaims for fraud against Tareq,

and cross-claims for fraud against Qais and the Gas Stations in the divorce

proceeding in which Raida averred that Tareq “purportedly” transferred his

interests in the Gas Stations to his brother for a “purported” sum of money.

              The trial court recognized that the domestic relations court’s

judgment entry of April 20, 2018, could be argued to be evidence in support of the

jury’s finding that Raida had not discovered or could not reasonably have discovered

the transfers sooner.   The domestic-relations judgment identified inconsistent

evidence presented in the divorce trial regarding the ownership of the Gas Stations,

as well as inconsistent and highly questionable testimony as to whether the Gas

Stations had been transferred and if so, whether they were legally transferred.

However, the trial court stated in his judgment entry on JNOV that, although Raida
testified that the domestic-relations journal entry was the “basis or grounds of why”

Raida was before the trial court in her fraudulent-conveyance action, there had been

no testimony that this entry led to her discovery of the transfers. According to the

trial court, Raida’s testimony was, therefore, not sufficient evidence that she was

unaware of the transfers before November 28, 2017.

               Finally, the trial court determined that R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a) —

regarding when a transfer occurs where an asset is capable of perfection — was

inapplicable. According to the trial court, R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a) applies only to

secured transactions and stock transfers are not secured transactions. Therefore,

the court determined that, because the statute did not apply, the statute of

limitations could not be deemed to have begun running the day before the filing of

the fraudulent-transfer action as would happen if the transfer of the asset was

capable of perfection but had not been perfected.

               The court noted that the jury found that the transfers were made over

four years prior to Raida filing her fraudulent-transfer action and, therefore, Raida’s

claims were not filed within the four-year statute of limitations found in

R.C. 1336.09. The court further concluded that Raida failed to present sufficient

evidence demonstrating that she did not discover and could not have reasonably

discovered the fraudulent transfer prior to one year before filing her claims on

November 28, 2018. Consequently, under R.C. 1336.09 the trial court concluded

the statute of limitations barred Raida’s claims.
      E. Filing of the Second Appeal

              Raida appealed the trial court’s decision granting Qais and the Gas

Stations’ JNOV. We sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable

order, noting that the court had not ruled on Raida’s separate motion for JNOV. On

remand, the trial court issued a judgment on April 25, 2025, concluding that Raida’s

claims against Tareq were barred by the statute of limitations for a fraudulent-

transfer claim, because she did discover or reasonably could have discovered the

transfers before November 28, 2017 — one year prior to filing suit.

              Raida’s appeal was reinstated.       Raida now raises the following

assignments of error:

      I. The court erred in granting Qais Allan, 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc.
      and Pearl Road Inc.’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
      verdict.

      II. The court erred and violated the law of the case established by this
      court in Allan I.

      III. The court erred in not granting Raida Allan’s motion for judgment
      notwithstanding the verdict.

      IV. The court erred and abused its discretion when it denied Raida
      Allan leave to file a motion for partial summary judgment.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

      A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting JNOV

              In her first assignment of error, Raida asserts that the trial court erred

in granting JNOV in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations. We agree.

              Civ.R. 50(B)(1), which governs post-trial motions for JNOV, allows a

party to “serve a motion to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set
aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the party’s motion . . . .” The

standard for granting a motion for JNOV is identical to that for granting a motion

for a directed verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A). See Texler v. D.O. Summers

Cleaners & Shirt Laundry Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 679 (1998). Civ.R. 50(A)(4)

provides:

      When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the
      trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
      party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any
      determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one
      conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse
      to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for
      the moving party as to that issue.

              “‘[A] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not

present factual issues, but a question of law, even though in deciding such a motion,

it is necessary to review and consider the evidence.’” Environmental Network Corp.

v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 2008-Ohio-3833, ¶ 22, quoting O’Day v. Webb,

29 Ohio St.2d 215 (1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. The single salient

question of law in a motion for JNOV is “whether the evidence, construed most

strongly in favor of [nonmoving party], is legally sufficient to sustain the verdict.”

Id. at ¶ 23, citing Osler v. Lorain, 28 Ohio St.3d 345, 347 (1986). To be legally

sufficient to sustain the verdict, the prevailing party must have “presented some

evidence going to every element of the claim.” (Emphasis added.) Black v. Hicks,

2020-Ohio-3976, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.), citing Vega v. Tomas, 2017-Ohio-298, ¶ 9 (8th

Dist.). A court may not consider the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses when ruling on a motion for JNOV. Civ.R. 50(B)(3); see also Texler at

679.

               As a question of law, appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a

JNOV motion de novo. See Environmental Network Corp. at ¶ 23. “‘De novo review

encompasses an independent examination of the record and law without deference

to the underlying decision.’” Torres v. Concrete Designs, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1342, ¶ 48

(8th Dist.), quoting Gateway Consultants Group, Inc. v. Premier Physicians Ctrs.,

Inc., 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

               Raida’s     fraudulent-transfer     claim     was     brought       under

R.C. 1336.04(A)(1).      The applicable statute of limitations for such claims is

articulated in R.C. 1336.09(A), which states:

       A claim for relief with respect to a transfer or an obligation that is
       fraudulent under section 1336.04 or 1336.05 of the Revised Code is
       extinguished unless an action is brought in accordance with one of the
       following:

       (A) If the transfer or obligation is fraudulent under division (A)(1) of
       section 1336.04 of the Revised Code, within four years after the transfer
       was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year
       after the transfer or obligation was or reasonably could have been
       discovered by the claimant . . . .

               As noted by this court in the first appeal, under R.C. 1336.09, a

transfer “is defined as ‘every direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, and

voluntary or involuntary method of disposing of or parting with an asset or an

interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of

a lien or other encumbrance.’” Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing

R.C. 1336.01(L). Where a transfer involves an asset capable of perfection, but the
transfer has not been perfected before the suit is commenced, the transfer is deemed

to have occurred immediately prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.

R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a).

               The “application of a statute of limitations presents a mixed question

of law and fact.” Schmitz v. NCAA, 2018-Ohio-4391, ¶ 11. When a cause of action

accrues is a question of fact, while application of the limitations period becomes a

question of law where no factual dispute as to the accrual date exists. See id.

               Here, the jury was given numerous interrogatories to answer with the

first six touching on issues pertinent to this appeal. Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2

required the jury to answer whether ownership of the gas stations at 871 Rocky River

Drive and Pearl Road, respectively, had even been transferred. The jury answered

“yes” to each of these. Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 6 asked whether the respective

transfers occurred prior to November 28, 2014 — i.e., more than four years before

Raida filed her lawsuit. The jury answered “yes” to each of these interrogatories.

Finally, with regard to interrogatory Nos. 3 and 5, the jury was asked if Raida

discovered that the Gas Stations were transferred, or if she could have discovered

that they transferred, before November 28, 2017? The jurors responded “no” to both

questions. Accordingly, the legal import of the jury’s answers to the interrogatories

is that Raida’s fraudulent-conveyance lawsuit was not barred by the statute of

limitations.

               In granting JNOV to Qais and the Gas Stations, the trial court

concluded that the jury’s answers to interrogatories were not supported by sufficient
evidence. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, we find that the jury’s finding was

supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court engaged in impermissible

weighing of the evidence.

               To understand why the jury’s finding is supported by sufficient

evidence it is important to understand how the posture of this case affects the

analysis. Fraudulent-transfer cases commonly present in a posture where the

parties agree that a transfer of some asset or property occurred, but dispute whether

the transfer was fraudulent. See, e.g., Saez Assocs. v. Global Reader Servs., 2011-

Ohio-5185, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.) (no dispute between the parties that a transfer of funds

occurred); Yoo v. Ahn, 2018-Ohio-1291, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.) (no dispute between the

parties that a transfer of property took place); Magnum Steel & Trading, L.L.C. v.

Roderick Linton Belfance, L.L.P., 2015-Ohio-3450, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.) (no disagreement

among parties that transfers took place).

               Here, by contrast, a threshold question that the jury had to resolve

was whether any transfer occurred at all. This distinction is important because the

four-year and one-year statute of limitations found in R.C. 1336.09 assumes that a

transfer can be identified and did in fact occur. Accord Bash v. Textron Fin. Corp.

(In re Fair Fin. Co.), 834 F.3d 651, 673 (6th Cir. 2016) (observing, “Ohio precedent

weighs in favor of our conclusion that § 1336.09(A)’s one-year discovery period

begins to run when a plaintiff discovers or, upon the exercise of reasonable diligence,

could have discovered the transfer and its fraudulent nature”). (Emphasis added.)

When the existence of the transfer itself is contested and hinges on disputed facts,
determining when the transfer could reasonably have been discovered naturally

becomes more complicated. This was the exact situation facing the jury when it was

tasked with deciding whether the information available to Raida prior to one year

before filing her lawsuit would have allowed her to discover both the transfers and

their allegedly fraudulent nature. Thus, any analysis of the statute-of-limitations

question must keep this distinction in mind.

               Raida testified that above and beyond the original purchase prices,

she and Tareq had invested hundreds of thousands of dollars into the Gas Stations

between 2011 and 2014 and that the businesses were profitable “money makers.”

She further testified that Tareq never indicated that the businesses were financially

distressed or that he intended to sell them. According to Raida, after she filed the

first divorce action, Tareq cut off her access to the businesses’ financial records.

               Raida also testified that she was familiar with Qais’s financial

situation and did not believe he had the financial resources necessary to purchase

the Gas Stations. Qais’s testimony and other documentary evidence as to his

financial situation during the time period of the alleged transfers corroborated

Raida’s testimony. For instance, Qais testified that from 2001 to 2009, he lived in a

one-bedroom apartment while supporting a family of four on his income alone.

Evidence in the form of Qais’s reported income on his social-security statements,

showed that from 2001 through 2008, Qais’s taxable wages ranged from $2,835 to

$33,583. A 2009 mortgage-loan application introduced at trial additionally showed

that Qais had reported income of $2,955 per month and a total of $40,000 in liquid
assets. Qais’s 2010 tax return — the year he asserted he had purchased the 871

Rocky River Drive business — reported a total income of $60,431, and Qais’s 2011

tax return reported income of $44,388. Lastly, in a 2012 bank application to

refinance the mortgage on his home, Qais did not report the 871 Rocky River Drive

business as an asset under the section asking him to declare his assets.

               Raida further testified that despite extensive discovery during the

divorce proceedings, neither Tareq nor Qais produced stock certificates showing

that ownership of either of the businesses had actually been transferred.

Additionally, Raida also testified that she had consistently maintained throughout

the divorce proceedings that no transfer had occurred and that the businesses

remained marital assets.

               Raida presented an expert in the fraudulent-transfer case who

testified regarding the formalities required to complete a corporate stock transfer of

certificated shares like those related to the 871 Rocky River Drive and the Pearl Road

businesses. The expert opined that to complete — or perfect — a transfer of

certificated shares in a company, the transferor must take their stock certificates “to

the company, with their signature on the back, telling the corporation who they

transferred it to.” Once the transferor has endorsed the stock certificate and

surrendered it to the corporation, the corporation can then issue new stock

certificates to the transferee.    Here, the expert explained that Tareq never

surrendered endorsed stock certificates back to the corporations such that the

corporations could issue new stock certificates to Qais.
               The jury was also provided with the domestic relations court’s

April 20, 2018 judgment entry in the divorce case in which the domestic relations

court explained that one of the questions it sought to resolve was whether the gas

stations had been transferred. That judgment expressed a high level of skepticism

regarding Tareq and Qais’s testimony and the documentary evidence they offered

purporting to show that the transfers of the businesses took place.

               The domestic relations court repeatedly noted inconsistencies in the

brothers’ testimony and deficiencies in the documents they presented. The court

explained that many of the documents appeared not to have been created or

executed at, or near, the time the brothers claimed the transfers occurred. The court

also pointed out problems with the purchase agreements for the Pearl Road gas

station, including missing essential terms such as the effective date and

consideration, conflicting dates, and either untraceable or unexplained payment

records.

               The domestic relations court further noted that Tareq frequently

repudiated documents during his testimony, including denying signatures on

documents produced by his own counsel. Ultimately, the domestic relations court

concluded that the testimony of both Tareq and Qais lacked credibility and that the

documentary evidence surrounding the alleged transfers was confusing and

unreliable.

               Given the domestic relations court’s uncertainty regarding the

validity of the alleged transfers and its criticism of the supporting evidence, the jury
could reasonably conclude that Raida lacked information confirming that any

transfer had actually occurred prior to the issuance of the domestic relations court’s

judgment. Again, that judgment was issued on April 20, 2018; Raida filed her

lawsuit asserting claims for fraudulent transfer within one year of that judgment, on

November 28, 2018.

                  We acknowledge that other evidence presented at trial could have

supported a different jury finding that Raida did discover or had been in a position

of reasonably discovering the transfers prior to one year before filing her lawsuit.

This evidence includes documents filed with the Ohio Division of Liquor Control

between 2011 and 2014 reflecting that Qais owned 871 Rocky River Drive business,

Raida’s testimony that Tareq told her in November 2014 during an argument over

missed support payments that he had “sold the gas station,” and Raida’s June 19,

2015 filing in the divorce action alleging that Tareq had purportedly transferred the

businesses to Qais. However, none of this evidence, as a matter of law, definitively

shows that Raida knew of the transfers or reasonably could have discovered them

based on the documents and other evidence within her possession within one year

of filing suit.

                  Indeed, the evidence described above was before this court in the first

appeal, where this court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on

statute-of-limitations grounds. As noted, this court concluded that questions of

material fact existed and remanded the case for a jury determination on when the

statute of limitations started to run. See Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 27 (8th Dist.).
This court pointed out with regard to the liquor-control filings that “public filings

asserting ownership of a business are evidence that, but not determinative of, a

transfer of a business took place.” Id. at ¶ 34. Additionally, as already explained

above, there were reasons for Raida to be distrustful of Tareq’s statement that he

had “sold the gas station.”

              Lastly, regarding Raida’s June 19, 2015 pleading containing cross-

claims and counterclaims for fraud against Tareq and Qais, we note that that

pleading is particularly cautious regarding Raida’s knowledge. It repeatedly uses

the terms “purportedly” and “purported” when discussing whether Tareq

transferred his interests in the Gas Stations to his brother. The use of “purport” and

“purportedly” indicates uncertainty and suggests that Raida herself did not know of

the transfers, even if she may have had some suspicion.

              Again, this touches on the core question in this case, which is: To

have known about or to have reasonably been able to discover that the fraudulent

transfer occurred, a transfer must first have occurred and that transfer must have

been fraudulent. Here, until the domestic relations court stated in the journal entry

of divorce that it concluded transfer of both Gas Stations had occurred, it was

reasonable for Raida not to have discovered the transfers, given the Tareq’s

obfuscation and deception.

              The trial court, in granting JNOV, determined that the April 20, 2018

judgment was insufficient evidence of Raida’s lack of knowledge because she never
expressly testified that she could not have reasonably discovered the transfers prior

to that judgment. However, that is not the correct analysis.

              In Ohio, “a jury has the right to make any logical and immediate

inferences from facts which have been established by the evidence.” Hodory v.

Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9764, *8 (1st Dist. Dec. 26,

1979); see also State v. Knight, 2016-Ohio-8134, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (“A jury can make

reasonable inferences from the evidence.”). “An inference is a deduction logically

following from all of the facts established by the evidence which a jury may but is

not required to make.” Hodory at *8.

              As explained above, evidence was presented to the jury in support of

Raida’s position that she did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the

transfers, and evidence was presented in opposition to Raida’s position. We find

that, in granting JNOV in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-

limitations grounds, the trial court improperly engaged in a manifest-weight-of-the-

evidence analysis. Such weighing of evidence is not permitted under Civ.R. 50(B)

for granting JNOV. Civ.R. 50(B)(3); see also Texler, 81 Ohio St.3d at 679. Under

the JNOV standard, the court was required to determine whether the evidence,

when construed in the light most favorable to Raida, supported the jury’s finding

that she did not know and reasonably could not have known of the fraudulent

transfer more than one year before November 28, 2018, when she filed suit. See

Environmental Network Corp., 2008-Ohio-3833, at ¶ 23. For these reasons, we
sustain the first assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s judgment granting

JNOV to Qais and the Gas Stations.

      B. Raida’s Remaining Assignments of Error

                 In light of our resolution of Raida’s first assignment of error, we

conclude that her second and fourth assignments of error are moot. The second

assignment of error challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on

perfection under R.C. 1336.06, which, if applicable, could have extended the statute

of limitations for filing her fraudulent-transfer claim if the jury had found that the

Gas Station transfers were not yet perfected. The fourth assignment of error asserts

that the trial court erred in denying Raida leave to file a motion for partial summary

judgment concerning expert testimony related to the issue of perfection. However,

because we uphold the jury’s determination that Raida filed her fraudulent-transfer

claims within one year of when they were or reasonably could have been discovered,

and thus within the statute of limitations prescribed by R.C. 1336.09 — we need not

address whether the transfers were subject to R.C. 1336.06 regarding assets capable

of perfection.

                 In her third assignment of error, Raida argues that the trial court

erred in denying her motion for JNOV, in which she requested that the court amend

the jury’s damages verdict forms to include Tareq’s name. We note that the trial

court did not reach the merits of Raida’s motion. Instead, in its April 25, 2025 order,

the court denied Raida’s motion solely on the ground that Raida had failed to file

her claims within the applicable statute of limitations. In light of our reversal of the
trial court’s judgment granting JNOV in favor of Qais and Gas Stations on statute-

of-limitations grounds, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Raida’s JNOV motion.

In doing so, we note that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. See

Civ.R. 8(C). As such, it is required to be pled by the party asserting the defense in

its first responsive pleading, or it is deemed waived. See Black v. Hicks, 2020-Ohio-

3976, ¶ 93 (8th Dist.). We note that Tareq never filed an answer or other responsive

pleading to Raida’s complaint or amended complaint alleging fraudulent transfer of

the Gas Stations. Therefore, Tareq never asserted the statute of limitations as an

affirmative defense. Indeed, this court pointed out this fact in the first appeal. See

Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 45 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, the court’s stated basis for

denying Raida’s JNOV as to Tareq is without merit.

              Accordingly, we sustain Raida’s third assignment of error and

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

including rendering judgment on Raida’s JNOV as to Tareq, and any other

outstanding motions that are not mooted and revived by this court’s reversal of the

trial court’s grant of JNOV. See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397,

418 (1987) (“[U]pon remand from an appellate court the lower court is required to

proceed from the point at which the error occurred.”).

III. CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court

granting JNOV in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-limitations

grounds and denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion for JNOV as to Tareq, on the same
grounds. We remand the matter to the trial court to enter judgment consistent with

the jury’s verdict finding Qais and the Gas Stations liable and awarding damages,

and to reinstate the court’s finding that Tareq is in default. Because the jury was not

instructed on and did not make a finding as to damages owed by Tareq, this matter

is remanded to the trial court to determine these damages and to enter judgment in

favor of Raida reflecting that amount. We also remand to the trial court to rule on

the merits of plaintiff-appellant’s JNOV concerning amendment of the jury-verdict

forms, and to rule on any other outstanding motions that have been revived as a

result of this court’s reversal on appeal.

               Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellees costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


____________________________
LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR