Allen v. Marre

[Cite as Allen v. Marre, 2026-Ohio-1186.]


                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


John D. Allen,                                     :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,               :              No. 25AP-717
                                                                (C.P.C. No. 24CV-206)
v.                                                 :
                                                              (REGULAR CALENDAR)
John A. Marre,                                     :

                Defendant-Appellee.                :



                                            D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on April 2, 2026


                On brief: John D. Allen, pro se.

                On brief: Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Thomas H. Kaczkowski,
                for appellee.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DINGUS, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, John D. Allen, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas awarding summary judgment in favor of defendant-
appellee, John A. Marre. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} In January 2024, Allen initiated an action against Marre seeking to foreclose
on a lien against his property based on his alleged nonpayment of an amount due to Allen.
Allen claimed that Marre refused to pay him $365,000 as agreed upon. Based on this
nonpayment, Allen filed a lien against Marre’s property with the Ohio Secretary of State,
and he requested a foreclosure sale to pay the debt.
        {¶ 3} After conducting discovery, Marre filed a motion for summary judgment,
attaching evidentiary materials in support. Allen did not file a response to Marre’s
No. 25AP-717                                                                               2


summary judgment motion. In December 2024, the trial court granted Marre’s summary
judgment motion. Before terminating the case, however, the trial court provided Marre
with an opportunity to file a motion relating to the costs of the judgment. Marre did not
file such a motion, and, in August 2025, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of
Marre.
         {¶ 4} Allen timely appeals.
II. Assignment of Error
         {¶ 5} Allen assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
               The trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting
               summary judgment in favor of Appellee.
III. Discussion
         {¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, Allen contends the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Marre. This assignment of error is not well-taken.
         {¶ 7} An appellate court reviews summary judgment under the de novo standard.
Estate of Sample v. Xenos Christian Fellowship, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3898, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). De
novo review means the reviewing court independently analyzes the record while giving no
deference to the trial court’s decision. Johnson v. Am. Italian Golf Assn. of Columbus,
2018-Ohio-2100, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). Thus, we review de novo the trial court’s granting of
summary judgment in favor of Marre.
         {¶ 8} Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party
demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion
and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment
is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor.
Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 1997-Ohio-221.
         {¶ 9} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the
record demonstrating the absence of a material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107.
However, the moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule with a
conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the
moving party must specifically point to evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C)
affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the
No. 25AP-717                                                                                    3


nonmoving party’s claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 1997-Ohio-259. Once the moving party
discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party
does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts
showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. Dresher at ¶ 17; Vahila at ¶ 19; Civ.R. 56(E).
       {¶ 10} Here, Marre moved for summary judgment and submitted evidence in
support of his motion. Conversely, Allen did not respond to Marre’s summary judgment
motion. Nonetheless, “even where the nonmoving party fails completely to respond to the
motion, summary judgment is improper unless reasonable minds can come to only one
conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.” Morris v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 45, 47 (1988). This means “[t]here is no default summary
judgment.” Phelps v. Ohio Parole Bd., 2023-Ohio-284, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Thus, “[a] trial
court must examine all appropriate materials filed by the parties before ruling on a motion
for summary judgment.” Owensby v. Fresenius Dialysis Unit, 2005-Ohio-6467, ¶ 17 (10th
Dist.); see Civ.R. 56(E) (“If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the party.”). In reviewing the filed materials, the trial
court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate in favor of Marre. We agree.
       {¶ 11} Allen’s action against Marre is premised on there being an enforceable
contract between the two requiring Marre to pay Allen $365,000. “ ‘A contract is generally
defined as a promise, or a set of promises, actionable upon breach. Essential elements of a
contract include an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for
legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and
of consideration.’ ” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16, quoting Perlmuter Printing
Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio 1976). “A meeting of the minds as to
the essential terms of the contract is a requirement to enforcing the contract.” Id., citing
Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Indus. Relations, 61 Ohio St.3d 366,
369 (1991). To be enforceable, a contract’s terms “must be definite and certain.” Episcopal
Retirement Homes at 369, citing James Ward & Co. v. Wick Bros. & Co., 17 Ohio St. 159,
164 (1867). Further, although generally a party’s silence after receiving an offer does not
constitute acceptance of an offer, it may constitute an acceptance when “the relation
between the parties justifies the offeror’s expectation of a reply to reject the offer.” State v.
Gibson, 2011-Ohio-5614, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).
No. 25AP-717                                                                                4


       {¶ 12} In support of his motion for summary judgment, Marre submitted his own
affidavit, with exhibits, wherein he averred to the following facts. On April 27, 2022, Allen,
a member of the Moose Lodge in Worthington, was advised that written charges had been
filed against him for his alleged violation of the General Laws of the Moose Lodge for having
used inappropriate language concerning women. Allen denied the allegations, but, on
May 25, 2022, his membership with the Moose Lodge was suspended for one year. On
August 5, 2022, Allen sent a letter to Marre, also a member of the Worthington Moose
Lodge, indicating that, if his suspension from the Moose Lodge was not lifted within 30
days, Marre would be responsible for $365,000 in damages payable to him.                  On
September 1, 2022, Allen sent to Marre a “Final True Bill for Damages” for $365,000, and
Allen indicated that he would commence foreclosure proceedings on Marre’s property if his
demands were not met. (Aff. of Marre at ¶ 16.) Marre did not agree to Allen’s demands.
Allen then filed a U.C.C. Financing Statement with the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office,
naming Marre as the debtor and citing their “Tacit Agreement of August 5, 2022 for
$365,000.” (Aff. of Marre at ¶ 17.) According to Marre, “this $365,000 is based upon a
false and imaginary agreement John Allen claims to have made, wherein he was afforded
$1,000 a day for his one-year suspension from the Moose Lodge.” (Aff. of Marre at ¶ 18.)
Marre further testified that he had never entered into any agreements with Allen, and that
Allen has no security interest in any property he owns. Thus, Marre submitted evidence
demonstrating that there was neither a contract between him and Allen nor a valid lien
against any property he owned.
       {¶ 13} As noted above, Allen did not file a response to Marre’s summary judgment
motion. In his appeal, however, he contends that, because Marre did not respond to his
demands regarding his Moose Lodge suspension, Marre should be treated as agreeing to
those demands. Allen also argues that Marre had a duty to respond, and Marre’s silence
estopped him from asserting any defense to Allen’s claim because that silence misled Allen.
These arguments are unpersuasive. Although Allen asserts that Marre’s silence constituted
an acceptance of his demands, that is, his offer, he does not cite to any record evidence
showing circumstances, such as prior dealings, that reasonably would create an expectation
that silence manifested an assent to an offer. Similarly, in the absence of facts that
reasonably demonstrate otherwise, a party has no duty to respond to an offer. “Any other
No. 25AP-717                                                                                5


rule would be absurd since otherwise an offeree would have an affirmative obligation to
manifest a rejection of the offer, flipping contract law on its head. An offeror should not be
allowed to thrust a duty to speak on an offeree. An offeree certainly has the right to ignore
any offer.” 1 Corbin on Ohio Contracts § 3.06. Therefore, we reject Allen’s contentions that
Marre’s silence manifested his acceptance of an offer, that Marre had a duty to respond to
Allen’s demands, and that Marre’s violation of that purported duty should preclude him
from now challenging Allen’s pending action to foreclose on his property.
         {¶ 14} Because Marre submitted undisputed evidence demonstrating that no
genuine issue of material fact exists as to Allen’s claims and that Marre is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as to those claims, the trial court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of Marre. Accordingly, we overrule Allen’s sole assignment of
error.
IV. Disposition
         {¶ 15} Having overruled Allen’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                        Judgment affirmed.
                         BOGGS, P.J., and EDELSTEIN, J., concur.