Bahorek v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

[Cite as Bahorek v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2026-Ohio-1523.]


                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Stanley J. Bahorek,                                     :

                 Appellant-Appellant,                   :                  No. 25AP-164
                                                                         (BTA No. 2024-234)
v.                                                      :
                                                                      (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Franklin County Board of Revision et al.,               :

                 Appellees-Appellees.                   :



                                            D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on April 28, 2026


                 On brief: Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC, and Mark H. Gillis,
                 for appellant.

                           APPEAL from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals

LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Stanley J. Bahorek, appeals a decision and order of the Board of
Tax Appeals (“BTA”) that affirmed the decision of the Franklin County Board of Revision
(“BOR”) dismissing Bahorek’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. For the following reasons,
we reverse the BTA’s decision and order, and we remand this matter to the BTA so that it
can remand it to the BOR.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 2}     In Ohio, real property taxes are levied on the true value of land and
improvements.1 R.C. 5709.01 and 5713.03. “True value” is market value, or the amount for
which property would sell on the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer. Rover
Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-2806, ¶ 29. The taxable value of real property is 35
percent of its true value. Adm.Code 5703-25-05(B).



1 The exception to this true value requirement is agriculture property, which is not at issue in this appeal.
No. 25AP-164                                                                                 2


       {¶ 3} Each taxing district may levy up to ten mills of tax, equal to one percent of a
property’s assessed value, without voter approval. All subsequent additional levies, called
outside or voted millage, require a majority vote. Voted millage consists of fixed-rate levies,
which are taxes of a specific rate, and fixed-sum levies, which are taxes of a specific amount
of money.
       {¶ 4} A tax reduction factor applies to fixed-rate levies to reduce property tax
increases resulting from rising property values. R.C. 319.301. The tax reduction factor is a
percentage by which a levy’s collections are reduced to ensure that “carryover property”—
property that was taxable in the prior year in the same class of property—generates the
same amount of tax revenue as it did the prior year. R.C. 319.301(B)(2). In short, through
use of the tax reduction factor, the same number of dollars are produced each year from the
same amount of properties. Due to the application of the tax reduction factor, an effective
tax rate must be calculated for each fixed-rate levy every tax year.
       {¶ 5} For each tax year, the tax rates for fixed-rate and fixed-sum levies are
calculated based on the property values of the entire taxing district. R.C. 319.301 (fixed-
rate levies), 5705.34 (fixed-sum levies). Importantly, if the total property values in the
taxing district increase, then the tax rates will decrease. If the total property values of the
taxing district decrease, then the tax rates will increase, although the tax rate cannot exceed
the voted amount (for fixed-rate levies).
       {¶ 6} Given this relationship between property values and tax rates, if major
properties are undervalued, then smaller property owners will shoulder a higher tax
burden. Thus, property owners have a powerful incentive to ensure none of their neighbors’
properties are undervalued. Taking advantage of this incentive, the General Assembly gave
property owners the right to challenge the valuation of their neighbors’ real property over
a hundred years ago, in 1917. See G.C. 5609 (predecessor to R.C. 5715.19), enacted in
S.B. No. 177, 107 Ohio Laws 29, 43 (“Complaint against any valuation or assessment made
within a current year, may be filed on or before the time limited for payment of taxes for
the first half year. Any taxpayer may file such complaint as to the valuation or assessment
of his own or another’s property[.]”). Although the text of the statute changed somewhat
over the ensuing decades, the General Assembly consistently preserved a property owner’s
right to file a complaint contesting the valuation of another’s real property. Prior to the
No. 25AP-164                                                                             3


legislative change at issue in this case, R.C. 5715.19—the statute granting property owners
the right to challenge another property’s valuation—provided:
             (1) Subject to division (A)(2) of this section, a complaint against
             any of the following determinations for the current tax year
             shall be filed with the county auditor on or before the thirty-
             first day of March of the ensuing tax year or the date of closing
             of the collection for the first half of real and public utility
             property taxes for the current tax year, whichever is later:

             ...

             (d) The determination of the total valuation or assessment of
             any parcel that appears on the tax list, except parcels assessed
             by the tax commissioner pursuant to section 5727.06 of the
             Revised Code[.]

             ...

             Any person owning taxable real property in the county or in a
             taxing district with territory in the county . . . may file such a
             complaint regarding any such determination affecting any real
             property in the county, except that a person owning taxable real
             property in another county may file such a complaint only with
             regard to any such determination affecting real property in the
             county that is located in the same taxing district as that
             person’s real property is located. The county auditor shall
             present to the county board of revision all complaints filed with
             the auditor.

Former R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), (d), and (f), modified by 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126.
      {¶ 7} The General Assembly imposed substantive restrictions on property owners’
ability to challenge the undervaluation of other properties in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, which
became effective on July 21, 2022. Subsequent to the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126,
R.C. 5715.19 included the following additional language:
             (6) The legislative authority of a subdivision, the mayor of a
             municipal corporation, or a third party complainant shall not
             file an original complaint with respect to property the
             subdivision or complainant does not own or lease unless both
             of the following conditions are met:

             (a) If the complaint is based on a determination described in
             division (A)(1)(d) or (e) of this section, the property was (i) sold
             in an arm’s length transaction, as described in section 5713.03
             of the Revised Code, before, but not after, the tax lien date for
No. 25AP-164                                                                                            4


                the tax year for which the complaint is to be filed, and (ii) the
                sale price exceeds the true value of the property appearing on
                the tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount
                of the filing threshold determined under division (J) of this
                section;

                (b) If the complaint is filed by a legislative authority or mayor,
                the legislative authority or, in the case of a mayor, the
                legislative authority of the municipal corporation, first adopts
                a resolution authorizing the filing of the original complaint at a
                public meeting of the legislative authority.

R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) and (b).2 As used in R.C. 5715.19, “third party complainant” means
“a complainant other than the property owner, the owner’s spouse, a tenant authorized to
file an original complaint, or any person acting on behalf of a property owner.”
R.C. 5715.19(A).       The General Assembly set the filing threshold referenced in
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a)(ii) at $500,000 for 2022. R.C. 5715.19(J).
        {¶ 8} The Ohio Legislative Service Commission warned the General Assembly that
the changes to R.C. 5715.19 would result in lower property values and higher tax rates. The
Final Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement regarding Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 stated:
                The effect on tax revenue of these lower valuations with the bill
                would be partly offset by smaller tax reduction factors,
                resulting in higher effective tax rates. . . . The tax rates on levies
                to raise fixed amounts of money, such as bond levies, would be
                adjusted higher than under current law to offset the effect of
                the lower values with the bill.

Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement to
Am.Sub.H.B.            No.          126,         at        1-2         (Apr.          22,         2022),
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=18963                  (accessed     Apr.     23,   2026)
[https://perma.cc/3U7B-XMLX]. Crucially, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission then
reported to the General Assembly, “These adjustments will tend to shift tax payment
obligations to taxpayers other than those whose taxes could go up as a result of complaints
by school districts and other[s] . . . under current law.” Id. at 2; accord BTA Hearing Record
Tr. at 60-62 (explaining how undervaluation of a property for a particular tax year


2 We recognize that the General Assembly has amended R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) since Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126. See

2025 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 96. Those amendments, however, are not at issue in this appeal, so we do not refer to
them.
No. 25AP-164                                                                                5


irreversibly shifts the tax burden to other properties in the same taxing district). Under the
then current law, businesses’ property taxes went up when school districts and other
property owners complained about property valuations. (Stipulations of Fact & Exs., Ex.
22 (recognizing that the “vast majority” of the undervaluation complaints filed with county
boards of revision “are made against businesses owning or leasing commercial and
industrial real property”).) Thus, once in operation, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 would decrease
commercial property owners’ taxes at the expense of ordinary Ohioans.
       {¶ 9} In March 2023, Bahorek, an owner of real property in Franklin County, filed
complaints with the BOR against appellee, Buckeye Property Holdings, L.L.C. (“Buckeye”).
The Board of Education for the Columbus City Schools filed a counter-complaint.
       {¶ 10} In the complaint, Bahorek alleged that Buckeye owned property in Franklin
County that sold in a recent, arm’s length transaction before the January 1, 2022 tax lien
date for $19,320,000, which was $1,308,000 more than the $18,012,000 assessed value
for tax year 2022. The complaint sought to increase the auditor’s valuation of Buckeye’s
property for tax year 2022.      The complaint also asserted that the requirements of
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) violated the uniform rule requirement of Article XII, Section 2 of the
Ohio Constitution, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
Constitution, and the Due Course of Law and Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio
Constitution.
       {¶ 11} The BOR issued a decision dismissing Bahorek’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.   The BOR concluded that Bahorek failed to meet the requirements of
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) because the sale on which Bahorek based his complaint occurred
after the tax lien date.
       {¶ 12} Bahorek appealed the dismissal to the BTA. On appeal, the BTA allowed the
parties to introduce evidence relevant to determining the constitutionality of
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The BTA then issued a decision and order affirming the BOR’s
decision.
       {¶ 13} Bahorek moved for reconsideration of the BTA’s decision and order, pointing
out that the BOR had incorrectly found that the sale of the property took place after the
January 1, 2022 tax lien date. Bahorek presented evidence that the sale occurred on
November 24, 2021—approximately a month before the tax lien date. In response, Buckeye
No. 25AP-164                                                                               6


did not contest the date of sale. Buckeye, instead, asserted that Bahorek failed to establish
that the sale price exceed the true value of the property by ten percent. Bahorek’s evidence
showed the property sold for $19,320,000 and the 2022 true value of the property was
$18,012,000. Thus, the sale price only exceeded the true value by $1,308,000, or 7.26
percent. In an order dated January 24, 2025, the BTA denied Bahorek’s motion for
reconsideration.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
       {¶ 14} Bahorek now appeals the BTA’s decision and order to this court, and he
assigns the following errors:
              1. The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA
              relied upon revisions to R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) through 2022
              Am. Sub. H.B. 126 (“H.B. 126”) that violate both the U.S.
              Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.

              2. Facially, and as applied to Appellant, the revision to
              R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) to limit the filing of a board of revision
              complaint only upon property subject to an arm’s-length sale
              (the “Arm’s-Length Sale Restriction”) violates the Uniform
              Rule mandated by Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio
              Constitution.

              3. Facially, and as applied to Appellant, the revision to
              R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) to limit the filing of a board of revision
              complaint upon an arm’s-length sale occurring prior to the tax
              lien date only if the sale price exceeds ten percent (10%) of the
              current value and the specific value threshold determined for
              the tax year (the “Value Threshold Restriction”) violates the
              Uniform Rule mandated by Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio
              Constitution.

              4. Facially, and as applied to Appellant, the Arm’s-Length Sale
              Restriction violates Appellant’s right to equal protection of the
              laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the United
              States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio
              Constitution.

              5. Facially, and as applied to Appellant, the Value Threshold
              Restriction violates Appellant's right to equal protection of the
              laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the United States
              Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.

              6. Facially, and as applied to Appellant, the Arm’s-Length Sale
              Restriction violates Appellant’s right to due process guaranteed
No. 25AP-164                                                                               7


              by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and
              his right to due course of law guaranteed by Article I, Section
              16 of the Ohio Constitution.

              7. Facially, and as applied to Appellant, the Value Threshold
              Restriction violates Appellant's right to due process guaranteed
              by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and
              his right to due course of law guaranteed by Article I, Section
              16 of the Ohio Constitution.

III. ANALYSIS
   A. CONSTITUTIONALITY              OF     R.C.     5715.19(A)(6)(a)      UNDER       THE
      UNIFORM RULE
       {¶ 15} By his first, second, and third assignments of error, Bahorek argues that
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) violates the constitutional guarantee of taxation uniformity in Article
XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. We agree.
       {¶ 16} A court reviews the constitutionality of a statute under the de novo standard
of review. Kennedy v. W. Reserve Senior Care, 2024-Ohio-5565, ¶ 8. The review of a
statute’s constitutionality begins with the presumption that the statute is constitutional.
Id.; Wilson v. Kasich, 2012-Ohio-5367, ¶ 18. This presumption, however, is rebuttable.
Kennedy at ¶ 8; Wilson at ¶ 18. The party contesting the validity of the statute rebuts the
presumption by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and
constitutional provisions are incompatible. Zeigler v. Zumbar, 2011-Ohio-2939, ¶ 24.
When incompatibility is clear, it is the duty of the court to declare the statute
unconstitutional. State v. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, ¶ 11 (plurality).
       {¶ 17} Since 1851, Ohio’s Constitution has mandated the taxation of real property by
“uniform rule.” Ohio Const., art. XII, § 2 (1851) (“Laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform
rule all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stock, joint stock companies, or otherwise;
and also all real and personal property according to its true value in money[.]”). As
amended in 1929, Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution now reads, “Land and
improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value.”
       {¶ 18} The Supreme Court of Ohio first addressed what taxation by uniform rule
meant in 1853, stating:
              No language in the constitution, perhaps, is more important
              than [“taxing by uniform rule”]; and to accomplish the
              beneficial purposes intended, it is essential that [these words]
No. 25AP-164                                                                               8


              should be truly interpreted, and correctly applied. “Taxing” is
              required to be “by a uniform rule;” that is, by one and the same
              unvarying standard. Taxing by a uniform rule requires
              uniformity, not only in the rate of taxation, but also uniformity
              in the mode of the assessment upon the taxable valuation.
              Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation;
              and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in
              the mode of the assessment, as well as in the rate of taxation.

(Emphasis in original.) Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 15 (1853). Thus, in Hines,
the Supreme Court joined other states that have uniform rules in their state constitutions
in interpreting the Ohio’s uniform rule to require equal treatment in the taxation process.
As the Supreme Court of Virginia held, “[u]niformity is . . . the promise of equality of
treatment among members of a tax class during the taxation process[.]” Internatl. Paper
Co. v. Isle of Wright, 299 Va. 150, 178 (2020). Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
concluded:
              “The rule of taxation shall be uniform,” that is to say, the course
              or mode of proceeding in levying or laying taxes shall be
              uniform; it shall in all cases be alike. The act of laying a tax on
              property consists of several distinct steps, such as the
              assessment or fixing of its value, the establishing of the rate,
              etc.; and in order to have the rule or course of proceeding
              uniform, each step taken must be uniform. The valuation must
              be uniform, the rate must be uniform. Thus uniformity in such
              a proceeding becomes equality; and there can be no uniform
              rule which is not at the same time an equal rule, operating alike
              upon all the taxable property throughout the territorial limits
              of the state, municipality or local subdivision of the
              government, within and for which the tax is to be raised.

Knowlton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 410, 420-421 (1859).
       {¶ 19} The Supreme Court of Ohio later considered the uniform rule in the Park
Investment cases, a series of mandamus cases in which the Supreme Court held that
uniform rule requires equal and uniform standards for the determination of the taxable
value and assessment of real property. State ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals,
175 Ohio St. 410 (1964); State ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 16 Ohio St.2d
85 (1968); State ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 26 Ohio St.2d 161 (1971);
State ex rel. Park Invest. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 32 Ohio St.2d 28 (1972). Echoing Hines,
the Supreme Court stated that taxation by uniform rule mandates uniformity in the mode
No. 25AP-164                                                                                  9


of assessment. Park Invest. Co., 26 Ohio St.2d at 164. Moreover, under the uniform rule,
real property must be taxed on the basis of the same percentage of true value. Id. at 167.
The Supreme Court was not satisfied that the General Assembly met the requirement of the
uniform rule until it passed legislation in 1972 approving a six-year cycle to reappraise all
property in Ohio based on true value. Park Invest. Co., 32 Ohio St.2d at 32. As shown by
the Supreme Court’s holding in the final Park Investment case, compliance with the
uniform rule requires regular, accurate appraisals because such appraisals ensure that all
property is appraised at its true value and assessed at a uniform percentage of that value.
       {¶ 20} The six-year cycle adopted in the 1972 bill mirrors Ohio’s current sexennial
reappraisal, the statutorily mandated practice wherein each county auditor appraises the
real property in the county every six years to ensure that property is being assessed at 35
percent of its fair market value. R.C. 5713.01(B), 5713.03, 5715.24, and 5715.33; Adm.Code
5703-25-06 and 5703-25-16(A). In the third year of that cycle, the auditor conducts a
reassessment, known as the triennial update. R.C. 5713.01(B), 5715.24, and 5715.33;
Adm.Code 5703-25-06 and 5703-25-16(B). Additionally, the auditor may revalue any real
property in the county “at any time” when the auditor finds the true or taxable value of the
property has changed. R.C. 5713.01(B).
       {¶ 21} Therefore, under Ohio’s tax system, the duty to value real property primarily
falls on county auditors. However, Ohio’s tax system has historically also relied on owners
of other properties within the same taxing district and other governmental entities, such as
boards of education, to police real property values.        R.C. 5715.19(A).    Pursuant to
R.C. 5715.19(A)(1), those entities may file complaints challenging the undervaluation of a
parcel with the auditor, who then must present the complaint to the county board of
revision. The county board of revision may then determine a new true and taxable value
for the property at issue. R.C. 5715.11.
       {¶ 22} Ohio courts have concluded that the current system of sexennial appraisals
and triennial updates, supplemented by periodic auditor and board of revision
revaluations, complies with the constitutional mandate of taxation by uniform rule.
Reynoldsburg Bd. of Edn. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 1997-Ohio-185; Meyer v.
Cuyahoga Bd. of Revision, 58 Ohio St.2d 328 (1979); Spirit Realty, L.P. v. Warren Cty. Bd.
of Revision, 2024-Ohio-4734 (12th Dist.); J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd.
No. 25AP-164                                                                              10


of Revision, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4583 (10th Dist. Aug. 27, 1992). The Supreme Court of
Ohio has held:
              The system of taxation unfortunately will always have some
              inequality and nonuniformity attendant with such
              governmental function. It seems that perfect equality in
              taxation would be utopian, but yet, as a practicality,
              unattainable. We must satisfy ourselves with a principle of
              reason that practical equality is the standard to be applied in
              these matters, and this standard is satisfied when the tax
              system is free of systematic and intentional departures from
              this principle.

Meyer at 335. In other words, courts accept that perfect uniformity and equality in property
valuation processes is not an obtainable standard. Consequently, property assessment
practices must clear a lower bar to satisfy the uniform rule: they cannot systematically and
intentionally treat properties differently.
       {¶ 23} We, therefore, review the constitutionality of R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) mindful that
“[t]he ‘uniform rule’ requirement of Section 2, Article XII, operates to assure uniformity in
valuation of real property[.]” State ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney, 62 Ohio St.2d 23, 29 (1980).
But we must also remain cognizant that the uniform rule’s standards are met “when the tax
system is free of systematic and intentional departures” from uniform treatment of real
property. Meyer at 335.
       {¶ 24} R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) places two conditions on the filing of a valuation
complaint. At issue in this appeal is the first condition, which prohibits “the legislative
authority of a subdivision, the mayor of a municipal corporation, or a third party
complainant” from filing “an original complaint” regarding property the complainant does
not own unless:
              (a) If the complaint is based on a determination described in
              division (A)(1)(d) or (e) of this section, the property was (i) sold
              in an arm’s length transaction, as described in section 5713.03
              of the Revised Code, before, but not after, the tax lien date for
              the tax year for which the complaint is to filed, and (ii) the sale
              price exceeds the true value of the property appearing on the
              tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount of
              the filing threshold determined under division (J) of this
              section[.]
No. 25AP-164                                                                                 11


Thus, this condition—which, actually, amounts to three conditions—precludes the filing of
an undervaluation complaint unless (1) the property is sold in an arm’s length transaction,
(2) the arm’s length transaction occurs before the relevant tax lien date, and (3) the sale
price exceeds the true value of the property on the tax list by both 10 percent and, for tax
year 2022, $500,000.
       {¶ 25} Quite unescapably, these conditions discriminate between the type of real
properties subject to undervaluation complaints. R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) precludes the filing
of an undervaluation complaint unless the property meets certain criteria. Depending on
characteristics intrinsic to the particular property, some real properties obtain a safe harbor
from undervaluation complaints, some do not. Only those properties that fit the criteria
are at jeopardy for an increase in valuation.
       {¶ 26} As the Supreme Court of Ohio warned in Hines, when valuation rules do not
operate uniformly, the result is inequality in the burden in taxation. Hines, 3 Ohio St. at 15.
Discrimination amongst property subject to BOR complaints will allow certain properties
to remain undervalued, resulting in overall lower taxable values. Ohio Legislative Service
Commission, Final Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, at 1-2
(Apr. 22, 2022), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=18963 (accessed
Apr. 23, 2026) [https://perma.cc/3U7B-XMLX].            Lower taxable values cause higher
effective tax rates for fixed-rate levies and higher tax rates for fixed-sum levies. These
higher rates will be especially onerous for average Ohioans. The conditions on filing BOR
complaints “will tend to shift tax payment obligations to taxpayers other than those whose
taxes could go up as a result of complaints by school districts and other[s] . . . under current
law.” Id. at 2. Consequently, ordinary Ohioans—who generally were not the subject of BOR
complaints—will bear the burden of paying the taxes that commercial property owners will
avoid by keeping their properties undervalued.
       {¶ 27} Imposing the R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) conditions on the filing of an
undervaluation complaint blatantly treats properties differently; it exposes some properties
to a correction in valuation but allows others to remain undervalued. R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a),
therefore, is a systematic and intentional departure from the uniform valuation of real
property.    As a result, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) violates the uniform rule and is
No. 25AP-164                                                                               12


unconstitutional under Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, we
sustain Bahorek’s first, second, and third assignments of error.
       {¶ 28} Our resolution of Bahorek’s first, second, and third assignments of error
renders his fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error moot. Consequently, we
do not address those assignments of error.
   B. REMEDY
       {¶ 29} Having found R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) unconstitutional, we now must
determine the appropriate remedy. Bahorek argues that we should sever the
unconstitutional portion of R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) from the remainder of the statute. We agree.
       {¶ 30} When only a portion of a statute is invalid, a court may sever that portion if
“the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the section or related
sections which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application[.]” R.C. 1.50.
Consistent with this law, a court must apply a three-part test to determine whether it can
sever an invalid portion of a statute, or it must strike down the entire law:
              “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts
              capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand
              by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the
              general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give
              effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause
              or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms
              necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the
              unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?’ ”

State v. Noling, 2016-Ohio-8252, ¶ 34, quoting Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466
(1927), quoting State v. Bickford, 28 N.D. 36 (1913). A court may sever the unconstitutional
portion of the statute when the answer to the first question is “yes,” and the answer to the
second and third questions is “no.” Id.
       {¶ 31} As we stated above, the entirety of R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) states:
              (6) The legislative authority of a subdivision, the mayor of a
              municipal corporation, or a third party complainant shall not
              file an original complaint with respect to property the
              subdivision or complainant does not own or lease unless both
              of the following conditions are met:

              (a) If the complaint is based on a determination described in
              division (A)(1)(d) or (e) of this section, the property was (i) sold
              in an arm’s length transaction, as described in section 5713.03
No. 25AP-164                                                                                13


              of the Revised Code, before, but not after, the tax lien date for
              the tax year for which the complaint is to be filed, and (ii) the
              sale price exceeds the true value of the property appearing on
              the tax list for that tax year by both ten per cent and the amount
              of the filing threshold determined under division (J) of this
              section;

              (b) If the complaint is filed by a legislative authority or mayor,
              the legislative authority or, in the case of a mayor, the
              legislative authority of the municipal corporation, first adopts
              a resolution authorizing the filing of the original complaint at a
              public meeting of the legislative authority.

       {¶ 32} If we remove subdivision R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) and the words “both of” from
subdivision R.C. 5715.19(A)(6), we excise the unconstitutional portion of the statute. We
leave standing subdivision R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(b), the condition requiring a resolution by a
legislative authority prior to the filing of a complaint. Our revision of this language results
in a comprehensible statute. We, consequently, determine that the answer to the first
Geiger question is “yes.”
       {¶ 33} As to the second question, we conclude that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) is not so
connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the
apparent intent of the General Assembly if that subdivision is severed. The intent of
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, as emphasized by the testimony of the special interest groups in favor
of it and the General Assembly debate, is to achieve transparency and accountability in the
valuation complaint process. (Stipulations of Fact & Exs., Exs. 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18,
20.) As the County Auditors’ Association of Ohio testified to the Ohio Senate Ways and
Means Committee, “The purpose of this legislation is to require notice and passage of a
resolution before the filing of a Board of Revision complaint by a school district or other
legislative authority. This bill will create an extra layer of transparency and accountability
in the property value complaint process[.]” (Stipulations of Fact & Exs., Ex. 19.) The
General Assembly included the notification and resolution requirements so property
owners could communicate with legislative authorities prior to the filing of a complaint,
and legislative authorities could then debate the wisdom of filing the complaint.
       {¶ 34} The portions we sever from R.C. 5715.19(A)(6) do not affect the provisions of
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 that require notification and adoption of a resolution before the filing
of a valuation complaint. School districts and other legislative authorities must still provide
No. 25AP-164                                                                               14


property owners with the transparency and accountability the General Assembly intended
them to receive under the statute. Therefore, we determine the answer to the second Geiger
question is “no.”
       {¶ 35} The third question asks whether it is necessary to insert any words or terms
to give effect to the constitutional part of the statute. We recognize that the severance here
does not result in a perfectly drafted statute, but it does not require the addition of any
words. We thus determine that the answer to the third Geiger question is “no.”
       {¶ 36} Having     found    the    Geiger    test   met,    we    excise    subdivision
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) in its entirety and the words “both of” from subdivision
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6). With this severance, R.C. 5715.19 is rendered constitutional.
   C. CERTIFICATION OF CONFLICT
       {¶ 37} As a final matter, we certify to the Supreme Court of Ohio a conflict between
our decision and the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Gillis v. Delaware
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-5669 (5th Dist.), regarding the constitutionality of
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). Article IV, Section 3(B)(4) of the Ohio Constitution vests in the
courts of appeals the power to “certify the record of [a] case to the supreme court for review
and final determination” whenever “the judges . . . find that a judgment upon which they
have agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by any other
court of appeals of the state[.]” We thus certify to the Supreme Court of Ohio:
              Does R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) as adopted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126
              violate the uniform rule requirement of Article XII, Section 2 of
              the Ohio Constitution?

IV. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Bahorek’s first, second, and third
assignments of error, which moots Bahorek’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments
of error. We reverse the BTA’s decision and order, and we remand this case to the BTA so
that it can remand it to the BOR for it to consider and rule on Bahorek’s complaint and the
counter-complaint.
                                                                     Judgment reversed;
                                             cause remanded to the Board of Tax Appeals.

                           JAMISON and DINGUS, JJ., concur.