Bradley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C.

[Cite as Bradley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-1188.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOSHUA BRADLEY, SR.,                                   :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                   :
                                                                              No. 115092
                v.                                     :

CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL                              :
COMPANY LLC, ET AL.,
                                                       :
                Defendants-Appellees.



                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-24-105945


                                            Appearances:

                Joshua Bradley, Sr., pro se.

                Gallagher Sharp LLP, James T. Tyminski, Jr., and
                Kathleen M. Kennedy, for appellee Apex Security Group,
                Inc.


MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J.:

                Plaintiff-appellant Joshua Bradley, Sr., pro se, appeals the trial court’s

decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Apex Security Group, Inc. (“Apex”).

After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
             This case stems from an altercation that occurred between appellant

and another man at the Cleveland Browns Stadium during the October 31, 2022

Cleveland Browns v. Cincinnati Bengals game.1

             Appellant was employed by Minutemen and working the game that

night. Appellant was taking out the trash when he and a group of male fans began

exchanging words. At deposition, appellant stated that he did not feel threatened by

the fans at that time because they were “just cracking jokes.” During this exchange,

appellant acknowledged that four security guards walked past the group. According

to appellant, he did not alert the security guards or anyone else at this time because

he did not feel threatened. One of the men, Tarelle Wilson, subsequently punched

appellant in the face.2    At deposition, appellant stated that he felt physically

threatened by Wilson only when Wilson got in his face, right before he was punched.

             On October 23, 2024, appellant filed suit alleging negligence against

the Cleveland Browns Football Company, Cleveland Browns Stadium Company,

LLC, Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc., Apex Security Group, Inc., Cleveland

Browns Holdings, LLC, and the City of Cleveland in Cuyahoga County Common

Pleas Court.    Appellant amended his complaint to add Aramark Sports and




      1 The Browns beat the Bengals 32 – 13.


      2 Wilson was charged with felonious assault and eventually pled guilty to a lesser

offense, attempted felonious assault. He was sentenced to nine months in prison.
See State v. Wilson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-679160-A.
Entertainment Services, LLC, and to include punitive damages against all

defendants.3

               Apex moved for summary judgment. On May 1, 2025, the trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of Apex.4 Appellant now appeals, raising the

following assignments of error for our review:

       I. The trial court committed reversible error by misinterpreting and
       misapplying Ohio personal injury, Dram Shop and negligence law. The
       trial court erred by misinterpreting and misapplying Ohio law
       concerning personal injury, premises liability, and negligence. The
       trial court erred in granting Apex Security’s motion to dismiss the
       complaint.

       II. The trial court erred in improperly excluding or discrediting key
       evidence critical to Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims. The trial court
       improperly excluded critical evidence, including affidavits,
       photographs, videos, and discovery responses.

       III. The trial court engaged in judicial misconduct, including bias and
       failure to apply the law neutrally. The conduct of the trial judge showed
       judicial bias and disregard for the pro se litigant’s rights, amounting to
       misconduct.

       IV. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
       overruling his motion for a default judgment. Accordingly, when a
       responsive pleading is late, but filed before a motion for a default
       judgment, a trial court is within its discretion in accepting the late filing
       where there is no showing of prejudice. The Appellant filed his default
       motion first. The Appellant was prejudiced by this delay and notified
       the court in a timely manner.



       3 Throughout the course of litigation and this appeal, appellant has dismissed the

complaint against all defendants, except for Apex.

       4 Despite appellant filing a notice of appeal in this case, the parties have continued

to file numerous motions in the trial court, all of which the trial court has held in abeyance
pending the outcome of this appeal. Of note, Apex filed a motion to have appellant
declared a vexatious litigator. Although the trial court has jurisdiction to decide that
motion, it has also been held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal.
      V. The trial court committed procedural errors that compromised the
      fairness of the proceedings. The trial court never acknowledged and
      basically ignored the Appellants’ [sic] motions for mediation and
      motions for sanctions.

Summary Judgment

             In the first assignment of error, appellant claims that the trial court

erred in granting Apex’s motion to dismiss.

             We must first address two initial matters. First, the trial court did not

grant Apex’s motion to dismiss — Apex never filed a motion to dismiss. The trial

court did, however, grant Apex’s motion for summary judgment; therefore, we will

presume that appellant is challenging the court’s decision granting summary

judgment to Apex.

             Next, appellant fails to point to the places in the record that support his

general claim that the trial court erred in rendering its decision. Rather, appellant

makes a general statement that his evidence established a prima facie case of

negligence. App.R. 12(A)(2) provides, in part, that this court “may disregard an

assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the

record the error on which the assignment of error is based.” App.R. 16(A)(3)

provides that an appellant shall include in the appellant’s brief “[a] statement of the

assignments of error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record

where each error is reflected.”

               This court is authorized to summarily overrule this assignment of

error because appellant has failed to comply with App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(3) by
failing to make specific references to the record substantiating his claim and

identifying portions of the record where the alleged errors are reflected. See In re

M.K.L., 2023-Ohio-79 (8th Dist.) (overruling appellant’s argument for failure to

comply with App.R. 12 and 16).

               The Ohio Supreme Court has “repeatedly declared that ‘pro se

litigants . . . must follow the same procedures as litigants represented by counsel.’”

Rasheed v. Robinson, 2025-Ohio-3284, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Neil v.

French, 2018-Ohio-2692, ¶ 10. “‘[I]t is not for this court to assume the role of

advocate for the pro se litigant . . . . Nor is it this court’s duty to search for authority

or to root out an argument to support an appellant’s assignment of error.’” Rasheed

at id., quoting Djurin v. Ginley, 2023-Ohio-1041, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).              Although

appellant’s brief fails to comply with App.R. 12 and 16, we exercise our discretion to

address the assignment on the merits.

               Summary judgment is governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.

Argabrite v. Neer, 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 14. Summary judgment is appropriate only

when “[1] no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, [2] the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and [3] viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach a

conclusion only in favor of the moving party.” Id., citing M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls,

2012-Ohio-5336, ¶ 12.

               We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo

standard.    Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 2020-Ohio-4469, ¶ 13-15
(8th Dist.), citing Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 10 (8th Dist. 2000). As such,

we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision and independently review the

record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Cleveland Elec.

Illum. Co. at id., citing N.E. Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,

121 Ohio App.3d 188, 192 (8th Dist. 1997).

               “In order to establish negligence, one must show the existence of a

duty, a breach of that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of an

injury.” Nelson v. Cleveland, 2013-Ohio-493, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing Menifee v. Ohio

Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75 (1984).

               “Under Ohio law, there generally is no duty to prevent a third person

from causing harm to another absent a special relation between the parties.” Mosby

v. Sanders, 2009-Ohio-6459, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co.,

73 Ohio St.3d 130 (1995). The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “a business

owner has a duty to warn or protect its business invitees from criminal acts of third

parties when the business owner knows or should know that there is a substantial

risk of harm to its invitees on the premises in the possession and control of the

business owner.” Simpson at 135.5

               “The foreseeability of criminal acts of third parties depends upon the

knowledge of the business owner and any duty imposed is based upon the business

owner’s superior knowledge of a danger relative to that of his invitee.” Mosby at



       5 As an employee of Minutemen, appellant was a business invitee at the time of the

assault.
¶ 13, citing Haddad v. Kan Zaman Restaurant, 2007-Ohio-6808 (8th Dist.). The

totality of the circumstances must be “somewhat overwhelming” before a business

owner will be held to be on notice of and under a duty to protect against the criminal

acts of third parties. Mosby at id., citing Haddad.

              It is undisputed that Apex did not own or control the Browns

Stadium. Apex’s role at the Browns Stadium emanated from the security agreement

contract between Apex and the Cleveland Browns Stadium Company, LLC.

(“Browns Stadium Co.”). “Whether a security company owes a duty to a person

injured by criminal activity on the premises depends on the terms of the security

company’s contract with the premises owner.” Maier v. Serv-All Maintenance, 124

Ohio App.3d 215, 221 (8th Dist. 1997), citing Hill v. Sonitrol of Southwestern Ohio,

Inc., 36 Ohio St.3d 3 (1998). In Ohio, there is no basis, “either by statute or under

common law, for imposing a higher duty on the part of a privately retained security

guard to protect members of the general public from offenses of third persons.”

Deeds v. Am. Sec., 39 Ohio App.3d 31 (1st Dist. 1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.

              In this case, the contract between Apex and Browns Stadium Co. did

not specify Apex’s duties or whether it had a duty to protect both persons and

property at Browns Stadium. The security agreement provided that Apex would

provide Browns Stadium Co. with “security services and certain off duty police

officers.” Under “Event Staff Responsibilities” the contract stated that Apex’s

“personnel shall be responsible for the carrying out of the written Job Site rules,

regulations and policies.” Those rules, regulations, and policies are not set forth in
the contract and do not otherwise appear in the record. The contract further stated

that Apex

      shall require staff to provide reports of all ejections and other incidents
      involving significant fan misbehavior and potentially criminal conduct
      on the 24/7 Software system or such other system adopted by
      [Cleveland Browns Co.]. [Apex] shall develop a plan for reporting and
      interacting with law enforcement authorities in the handling of
      ejections and arrests . . . .

               Although the contract does not specify Apex’s specific duties or

responsibilities, if we were to find that a special relationship exists for the security

company to provide protection for an individual, the security company is only liable

if the criminal actions of the third party were foreseeable. Maier at id. The test for

foreseeability is “‘[w]hether a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated

that an injury was likely to result from the performance or nonperformance of an

act.’” Maier at id., quoting Fed. Steel & Wire Corp. v. Ruhlin Constr. Co., 45 Ohio

St.3d 171, 173 (1989). “No one is bound to prevent consequences which are beyond

the range of probability.” Maier at id., citing Feichtner v. Cleveland, 95 Ohio App.3d

388 (8th Dist. 1994).

               During his deposition, appellant admitted that it was not likely that

someone would punch him in the face while he was performing his duties:

      Q.: So in your role you were taking out the trash at the Browns game.
      It was possible that someone could punch you in the face, but it was not
      probable?

      A: Yes. It’s not highly probable, but it’s not impossible.

               Additionally, appellant testified that he did not anticipate the assault

until just before it occurred, when he was engaged in conversation with Wilson.
Based on this, even if Apex somehow had a duty to protect appellant, Wilson’s acts

were unforeseeable.

               In light of the above, appellant is unable to show a triable issue of fact

showing that Apex was negligent. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment in favor of Apex.

Appellant’s Evidence

               In the second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial

court erred when it improperly disregarded or excluded his evidence. According to

appellant, the trial court ignored his request for production of documents,

photographs, and medical records, and ignored material evidence “without hearings

or findings.” Appellant argues that the trial court should not have granted summary

judgment without issuing findings or holding a hearing on the matter. We disagree.

               Appellant once again fails to direct this court to places in the record

that support his claim that the trial court unjustly excluded or ignored his evidence,

and this court will not attempt to search out evidence in the record to support

appellant’s claim.

               A trial court is not required to make findings of fact before ruling on

a motion for summary judgment. Civ.R. 52 provides that “[f]indings of fact and

conclusions of law required by this rule and Rule 41(B)(2) are unnecessary upon all

other motions including those pursuant to . . . Rule 56.” “This language makes it

clear that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary when a trial court
rules on a party’s motion for summary judgment.” Burdette v. Stevens, 2007-Ohio-

4604, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.).

               The court was also not required to hold a hearing on the motion. This

court has long held that a trial court is not required to hold a hearing prior to ruling

on a motion for summary judgment. Capital One Bank (U.S.A.), N.A. v. McCladdie,

2022-Ohio-4082, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing Greenberg v. Markowitz, 2010-Ohio-2228,

(8th Dist.). “Even if a hearing is requested, holding a hearing is wholly within the

trial court’s discretion.” Capital One Bank at id.

               Here, there is no indication that appellant requested a hearing on the

motion. Even if he had, the trial court was within its discretion to deny the request.

               The second assignment of error is overruled.

Claim of Judicial Bias

               In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial

court was biased against him.

               Appellant’s exclusive remedy if he believed that the trial judge was

biased or prejudiced against him at any stage of his case was to file an affidavit of

disqualification pursuant to R.C. 2701.03. “The Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme

Court, or his or her designee, has exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claim that a

common pleas judge is biased or prejudiced.” State v. Bacon, 2005-Ohio-6238, ¶ 66

(8th Dist.), citing Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(C).

               In general, therefore, “appellate courts have ‘no authority to

determine a claim that a trial judge is biased or prejudiced against a defendant and
no authority to void a trial court’s judgment based on a claim that the trial judge is

biased or prejudiced.’” Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Bastawros, 2024-Ohio-2809, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). We note, however,

that “‘[a]lleged due-process violations . . . may be addressed on appeal.’” Bertalan

at id., quoting State v. Hunt (In re Thomakos), 2020-Ohio-6874, ¶ 4.

              In that regard, however, this court has previously held:

      Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events
      occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
      proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
      unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
      make fair judgment impossible. Importantly, judicial remarks during
      the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile
      to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias
      or partiality challenge. Typically, [a party] must demonstrate the bias
      through linking the impermissible commentary to the decisions
      rendered at trial. If the [party] demonstrates that the trial was infected
      with judicial bias, the remedy is a new trial.

(Cleaned up.) Bertalan at id., quoting Bastawros at ¶ 19.

              Viewing the record as a whole, “we see nothing to suggest that the trial

court harbored a hostile feeling of ill will toward” appellant. State v. LaMar, 2002-

Ohio-2128, ¶ 36. The record instead suggests that the trial court acted with restraint

in dealing with appellant. Nothing here suggests a due-process violation.

              Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.

Appellant’s Motion for Default Judgment

              In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

erred in denying his motion for default judgment. The record reflects that appellant

filed a motion for default judgment against the Cleveland Browns Football
Company, Cleveland Browns Stadium Company, and Cleveland Browns Holdings,

LLC. These defendants have been dismissed from the suit and are not parties to this

appeal.   Appellant never filed a motion for default judgment against Apex.

Therefore, his argument is not properly before the court.

              The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Cumulative Error

              In the fifth assignment of error, appellant contends that cumulative

error deprived him of due process.

              Under the cumulative-error doctrine, a trial court’s judgment may be

reversed if the cumulative effect of multiple errors prevents a fair trial even though

each of the individual errors, standing alone, would not constitute grounds for

reversal. State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 (1995). See also Edge v. Fairview

Hosp., 2011-Ohio-2148, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.) (noting that Ohio courts have found that the

extension of the cumulative-error doctrine to civil cases is warranted where the

court is confronted with several errors, which either are harmless individually or

have marginally prejudicial effects, but combine to require a new trial). The

cumulative-error doctrine does not apply in cases where there are not multiple

errors. Marrs v. Mickel, 2023-Ohio-4528, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).

              Appellant argues that the trial court committed cumulative errors

including denying his motion to refer the matter to mediation and his motion for

sanctions. Appellant’s motion for sanctions was filed against parties that are no

longer parties to this case and are not parties to this appeal; therefore, we will not
consider his argument. As to appellant’s motion to refer the case to mediation,

Cuyahoga C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 21.1(A)(2) gives the trial court discretion on

whether to refer a case to mediation. We do not find that the trial court in this case

erred when it did not refer this case to mediation.

              We have not found any errors, let alone multiple errors, in the

proceedings of this case. Therefore, the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply.

              The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


                            ______
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR