Carrington v. Beverly

[Cite as Carrington v. Beverly, 2026-Ohio-1293.]


                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    HIGHLAND COUNTY


KAYLA CARRINGTON,                                  :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                        :   Case No.   25CA22

        v.                                         :

DERRICK BEVERLY,                                   :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                       :

________________________________________________________________
                           APPEARANCES:

Derrick Beverly, Middletown, Ohio, pro se.

Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and
James Roeder, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.

________________________________________________________________
CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:4-1-26
ABELE, J.

        {¶1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas

Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that affirmed an order that

terminated the child support obligation of Derrick Beverly,

defendant below and appellant herein.                      Appellant assigns the

following errors for review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
                 AND VIOLATED APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL
                 RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
                 AMENDMENT BY OVERRULING APPELLANT’S [SIC]
                 WITHOUT ADDRESSING MATERIAL EVIDENCE SHOWING
                 THAT THE GENETIC TESTING WAS CONDUCTED ON
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                  2


         ANOTHER ALLEGED FATHER, BRADLEE J. WEST, AND
         NOT THE APPELLANT.”

         SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

         “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
         RECOGNIZE THAT THE ORIGINAL JANUARY 23, 2007
         CHILD SUPPORT ORDER WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD
         AND MISREPRESENTATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE
         COURT OF JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER
         AGAINST APPELLANT.”

         THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

         “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING
         APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES,
         INCLUDING CLAIMS OF COERCION, DURESS, AND
         MISREPRESENTATION BY THE HIGHLAND COUNTY
         CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, WITHOUT
         HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR MAKING
         FINDINGS OF FACT.”

         FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

         “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO
         CONSIDER APPELLANT’S OBJECTIONS IN LIGHT OF
         NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE
         RECORD, INCLUDING STOP PROGRAM INTAKE
         DOCUMENTS AND CHAIN OF CUSTODY RECORDS,
         WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT APPELLANT NEVER
         VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO PATERNITY TESTING.”

         FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

         “THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO VACATE OR
         RECONSIDER THE PRIOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDER
         CONSTITUTES PLAIN ERROR AND AN ABUSE OF
         DISCRETION, AS THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON AN
         INVALID AND FRAUDULENT GENETIC TESTING
         RECORD.”

    {¶2} In November 2006, the Highland County Child Support

Enforcement Agency, appellee herein, issued an administrative

order that established appellant as the biological father of a
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                     3


minor child.   The order contained a notice that advised

appellant and the child’s mother, Kayla Carrington, that either

parent may object to the order “by bringing an action pursuant

to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code in the

juvenile court . . . within thirty (30) days of the date of this

administrative order.”   The record does not contain any evidence

that either parent objected to this order.

    {¶3} On January 23, 2007, appellee filed an order to

establish appellant’s duty of support for the child.   The order

directed appellant to pay $189.54 in monthly child support.

This order contained a notice that stated, “[e]ither party may

object to this administrative support order by bringing an

action under section 2151.231 of the Ohio Revised Code no later

than thirty (30) days after the issuance of this order.”      The

notice further stated that “[i]f neither the mother nor the

father brings an action in the juvenile court within the thirty-

day period, this administrative order is final . . . .”     The

record does not contain any evidence that either parent objected

to this order.

    {¶4} On March 5, 2025, appellee submitted a recommendation

to terminate appellant’s child support obligation due to the

minor child attaining the age of majority and graduating high

school.   The order indicated that as of February 28, 2025,

appellant’s child support obligation was $13,620.79 in arrears.
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                    4


    On March 24, 2025, appellee conducted a hearing to

determine whether the March 5, 2025 order contained a mistake.

Appellee concluded that no mistake had occurred and affirmed the

March 5, 2025 recommendation to terminate appellant’s child

support obligation.

    {¶5} On April 7, 2025, appellant objected to the

administrative order by filing an action with the juvenile

court.   He later filed two additional documents that outlined

more specific objections to the administrative order.

    {¶6} In the first document, appellant objected to the court

asserting personal jurisdiction over him and to its subject

matter jurisdiction.   He also requested the court to “provide

tangible evidence” to demonstrate that (1) it had jurisdiction,

(2) appellee had complied with the Child Support Enforcement

Act, (3) “all writs and process issued by the Court comply with

the requirements of 28 U.S. Code § 1691,” and (4) “due process

safeguards were followed.”   Appellant asserted that “the child

support order was entered against [him] without proper notice,

without an opportunity to be heard, and without demonstrating

that the court had the appropriate jurisdiction over the subject

matter.”

    {¶7} In the second document, appellant asserted that “[t]he

circumstances surrounding [his] submission to the child support

process, and the subsequent agreements [he] was compelled to
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                   5


make, violated [his] constitutional rights . . . to due process

and protection against coerced or involuntary contracts.”

Appellant argued that he “was threatened with severe penalties,

including the suspension of [his] driver’s license, income

withholding from [his] employment, and even incarceration if

[he] did not provide [his] private financial information and

consent to forced paternity testing.”   He claimed that “[t]his

conduct constitute[d] unlawful coercion and render[ed] any

subsequent agreements void.”   Appellant further contended that

his attorney and appellee “misled” him “regarding the full

consequences of signing the paternity acknowledgment and

agreeing to child support obligations.”   He argued that he was

given “insufficient and inaccurate” information, which

“depriv[ed him] of the opportunity to make an informed

decision.”

    {¶8} Consequently, appellant requested the following relief:

(1) “[i]mmediate cessation of any and all enforcement actions

related to the child support order”; (2) “[a] formal review and

reversal of the paternity acknowledgment and support order”; (3)

“[r]eimbursement of any and all funds collected under the void

child support orders”; and (4) “[a] written acknowledgment from

your office confirming that the child support order is null and

void and will be set aside and dismissed with prejudice.”
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                    6


    {¶9} On May 20, 2025, the trial court held a hearing to

consider appellant’s objections.    Appellant indicated that he

primarily objected to the amount of arrearages that appellee

stated that he owed.   Appellant explained that he had been

incarcerated for about six years and he believed that he should

be relieved from the duty to pay child support during his

incarceration.

    {¶10} Appellee, however, pointed out that appellant

initially had paid his child support obligation in 2007, then

stopped paying around the middle of 2007 through the middle of

2012.   Appellant indicated that he had been incarcerated during

that time period.   Appellee reported that appellant resumed

paying child support in the middle of 2012, which appellant

stated coincided with his release from prison.    Appellee

asserted that its records showed that appellant had paid a total

of $28,162.61 in child support.

    {¶11} Appellee further stated that, although an agency now

may reduce an incarcerated parent’s child support obligation

during the time of the parent’s incarceration, at the time of

appellant’s incarceration the law did not recognize that an

incarcerated parent is entitled to a child support reduction

during the time of incarceration.

    {¶12} The trial court stated that, if the mother agreed to

waive the arrearages, then the court might consider the matter
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                     7


resolved.   The court explained that it attempted to secure the

mother’s presence for the hearing, but she could not be served

at the address available.    The court thus continued the hearing

to see if the mother could be served.

    {¶13} On July 8, 2025, the trial court reconvened the

hearing.    At the start, appellee stated that it attempted to

serve the mother, and appellee had not received any failure of

service.    Appellee further explained that it attempted to

contact the mother by telephone, but had not been successful.

The court indicated that it had received a certified mail return

and, thus, found that the mother had been properly served.

    {¶14} When the trial court asked appellant whether his

objection primarily involved the amount of arrearages owed,

appellant stated that he believed that the termination order was

void because the child support order “was never created

successfully.”    He did not believe that he should have been

ordered to pay any child support from the start.

    {¶15} The trial court listened to appellant’s argument and

noted that appellant had filed a separate lawsuit against

appellee.   The court decided to continue the hearing so that it

could review the lawsuit before it issued a decision.

    {¶16} On September 9, 2025, the trial court held another

hearing and gave appellant the opportunity to submit evidence.

Appellee indicated that it had received the documents that
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                            8


appellant had filed, and appellant stated that he did not have

“too much more” to present.       Appellant claimed that the

paperwork from appellee (1) did not have correct calculations,

and (2) contained coerced and fraudulent signatures.           He stated

that he did not have any additional evidence to submit beyond

what he already had filed.

     {¶17} On September 10, 2025, the trial court concluded that

appellant’s objections lacked merit.         The court found that

appellant signed the January 23, 2007 support order, understood

the order, and received a copy of it.         The court thus overruled

appellant’s objections to the administrative termination order.

This appeal followed.1

                                     A

     {¶18} We initially note that appellant’s brief does not

comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure or with this

court’s local rules.      App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant’s

brief to contain an argument that sets forth “the contentions of




     1  We observe that, on September 17, 2025, appellant filed a notice of
appeal. The trial court did not, however, affirm the agency’s termination
order until September 18, 2025. Appellant thus prematurely filed his notice
of appeal.
      App.R. 4(C) governs premature notices of appeal and states as follows:
“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision . . . but
before entry of the judgment or order that begins the running of the appeal
time period is treated as filed immediately after the entry.”
      In the case at bar, we therefore treat appellant’s notice of appeal as
being filed immediately after the court entered its September 18, 2025
judgment. See State ex rel. Conrath v. LaRose, 2022-Ohio-3594, ¶ 15 (“when a
party files a premature notice of appeal of a judgment, it is not
ineffective,” but it “becomes effective once the judgment is final”).
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                    9


the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented

for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with

citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record

on which appellant relies.”   Fourth Dist.Loc.R. 16(A)(7)

similarly states that an appellant’s brief must contain an

argument with “the contentions of the appellant with respect to

the assignments of error and the supporting reasons with

citations to the authorities and statutes on which the appellant

relies.”   This rule further commands that “[e]ach assignment of

error shall be separately discussed and shall include the

standard or standards of review applicable to that assignment of

error under a separate heading placed before the discussion of

the issues.”   Fourth Dist.Loc.R. 16(A)(7).

    {¶19} App.R. 16(A)(2) allows us to “disregard an assignment

of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to

identify in the record the error on which the assignment of

error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in

the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).”

    {¶20} In the case at bar, appellant’s argument does not

comply with Fourth Dist.Loc.R. 16(A)(7) or App.R. 16(A)(7).

Appellant’s “Law and Argument” section consists of six

paragraphs that read as follows:

    Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
    Constitution, a person may not be deprived of liberty
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                              10


    or property without due process of law. Fundamental
    fairness requires notice, a meaningful opportunity to
    be heard, and decisions based on competent, reliable
    evidence (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).

    In this case, the evidence relied upon by the Highland
    County CSEA was neither competent nor reliable. The
    LaGene Technologies chain of custody documentation
    plainly identifies Bradlee J. West as the alleged
    father tested, not Appellant. The trial court failed
    to address this material discrepancy or hold an
    evidentiary hearing to determine the authenticity of
    the testing results.

    Fraud on the court occurs when an officer of the
    court, such as a government attorney or agency,
    engages in conduct that defiles the judicial process
    itself (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
    322 U.S. 238 (1944)). The CSEA’s misrepresentation of
    genetic evidence constitutes such fraud, rendering the
    2007 judgment void. A void judgment may be attacked
    at any time.

    Additionally, if the agency used DNA obtained from
    Appellant’s juvenile STOP program intake records
    without consent, such conduct violated Appellant's
    Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search
    and seizure, as well as his due process rights under
    the Fourteenth Amendment. Ohio law provides no
    authority permitting a child support agency to use
    juvenile or detention DNA samples for paternity
    proceedings without a valid court order and notice to
    the individual tested.

    The trial court’s refusal to examine these claims or
    consider newly discovered evidence constitutes an
    abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs
    when a court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
    unconscionable (Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
    217 (1983)). The failure to hold a hearing where
    allegations of fraud and misrepresentation are
    supported by documentary evidence is arbitrary and
    denies fundamental fairness.

    For these reasons, this Court should reverse the
    judgment below and remand for an evidentiary hearing
    on the validity of the genetic testing, the origin of
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                     11


    Appellant’s alleged DNA, and the lawfulness of the
    2007 support order.

    {¶21} Although some of these paragraphs cite authorities,

appellant’s brief does not (1) set forth the applicable standard

of review, (2) identify the reasons that support each

contention, or (3) cite authority to support the reasons for

each contention.

    {¶22} Because appellant’s assignments of error do not comply

with the appellate rules, we would be well within our discretion

to simply disregard them.     However, we prefer to review a case

on its merits rather than dismiss it due to minor

technicalities.    Thus, we generally afford considerable leniency

to pro se litigants.    E.g., Viars v. Ironton, 2016-Ohio-4912, ¶

25 (4th Dist.); State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate, 83 Ohio App.3d

199, 206 (4th Dist.1992).   “Limits do exist, however.    Leniency

does not mean that we are required ‘to find substance where none

exists, to advance an argument for a pro se litigant or to

address issues not properly raised.’”     State v. Headlee, 2009-

Ohio-873, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Nayar, 2007-Ohio-

6092, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.); accord In re Estate of Pallay, 2006-

Ohio-3528, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.); Karmasu v. Tate, 1994 WL 521235, *4

(4th Dist. Sept. 15, 1994).    Furthermore, we will not “conjure

up questions never squarely asked or construct full-blown claims

from convoluted reasoning.”    Karmasu, 83 Ohio App.3d at 206.
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                    12


    {¶23} Additionally, appellate courts “are not obligated to

search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the

parties.”   State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19; see State

v. Clark, 2025-Ohio-4410, ¶ 23 (appellate courts will not

“cobble together an argument for an appellant”); see In re

Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2011-Ohio-2638, ¶ 19

(appellate courts should not “develop a party’s arguments”).

Moreover, “[a]ppellate courts should not perform independent

research to create an argument for a litigant.”    State v. Sims,

2023-Ohio-1179, ¶ 109 (4th Dist.); Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034,

at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78

(O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),

quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983)

(“‘“appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal

inquiry and research”’”).    “[W]e cannot write a party’s brief,

pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s

favor.    That’s not how an adversarial system of adjudication

works.”   Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.

2013).    Instead, “‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues

for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of

matters the parties present.’”    Snyder v. Old World Classics,

L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4, quoting Greenlaw v. United States,

554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                     13


       {¶24} In the case sub judice, appellant’s brief does not

contain fully developed arguments for each assignment of error.

Addressing each assignment of error would require us to create

arguments on appellant’s behalf and to conduct independent

research to support those arguments.    Because our role is to act

as a neutral arbiter of the legal issues presented, we will not

create appellant’s arguments or conduct research to support his

arguments.    Instead, we will consider the essential substance of

the arguments contained within appellant’s assignments of error.

                                  B

       {¶25} The essential point of appellant’s assignments of

error appears to be that the trial court erred by failing to

declare the 2007 child support order void.    Appellant does not,

however, cite any authority that allows a trial court that is

reviewing objections to a child support termination order to

declare as void a child support order entered almost two decades

ago.    We therefore overrule appellant’s assignments of error

relating to the validity of the 2007 child support order.     See

generally Pannell v. McCall, 2025-Ohio-915, ¶¶ 11-12 (10th

Dist.) (parent waived any objection to an administrative support

order when the parent did not timely object to the order); In re

I.L.J., 2019-Ohio-5241, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.) (if neither parent

objects to an administrative order establishing child support

within 30 days of that order, “the administrative support order
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                   14


is final and enforceable by a court and may be modified only as

provided in R.C. Chapters 3119, 3121, and 3123”); In re J.M.G.,

2013-Ohio-2693, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.) (rejecting a parent’s

assertion that the parent was denied a “meaningful opportunity

to be heard” concerning the parent’s objections to an

administrative child support order when the parent failed to

timely object to the administrative order).

    {¶26} Moreover, to the extent that appellant claims that the

trial court failed to afford him an evidentiary hearing to

consider his claims of fraud and misrepresentation, we observe

that the trial court held three separate hearings to consider

appellant’s objections.   Appellant appeared at each hearing, and

the trial court allowed him to submit any evidence that he had.

Appellant informed the court that he had filed all of the

evidence that he intended to submit in support of his objections

to the termination order.   The record thus does not support

appellant’s contention that the trial court failed to hold a

hearing or failed to allow him to submit evidence.

    {¶27} In sum, nothing in the record suggests that the trial

court erred by overruling appellant’s objections to the

administrative order terminating his child support obligation.

    {¶28} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s assignments of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.
HIGHLAND 25CA22                        15


                  JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
HIGHLAND 25CA22                                                   16




                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee
shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile
Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court




                                   BY:__________________________
                                      Peter B. Abele, Judge




                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.