Citywide RX, L.L.C. v. Providence Healthcare Mgt., Inc.

[Cite as Citywide RX, L.L.C. v. Providence Healthcare Mgt., Inc., 2026-Ohio-1377.]




                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITYWIDE RX, LLC,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                                                            No. 115352
                 v.                                    :

PROVIDENCE HEALTHCARE
MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL.,                              :

                 Defendants.                           :

[Appeal by Selfridge Leasing, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant]                                   :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 16, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-23-975447


                                            Appearances:

                 Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP and Michael
                 J. Meyer, for appellee.

                 The Coey Law Firm, LLC, and G. Brenda Coey, for
                 appellant Selfridge Leasing, LLC.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Selfridge Leasing, LLC d.b.a Valley Oaks Care

Center (“Selfridge”) appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas awarding plaintiff-appellee Citywide RX, LLC (“Citywide”) attorney fees.

Selfridge argues that the attorney fees were unreasonable. After careful review of

the record, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

              In February 2023, Citywide filed a complaint for account stated,

unjust enrichment and breach of contract against 11 nursing homes (hereafter

“defendants”), including Selfridge, based on the Pharmacy Services Provider

Agreement (the “Agreement”) that was entered into between Citywide and each of

the 11 defendants in November 2018.1 The complaint alleged that the defendants,

who were all owned and controlled by the same operator, failed to pay for goods

and services rendered. The total amount unpaid exceeded $300,000. Citywide

also requested reasonable attorney fees based on the Agreement.

              In the trial court, Citywide was represented by the New York firm

Morrison Cohen, LLC, appearing pro hac vice, as well as local counsel Benesch,

Friedlander, Coplan & Arnoff LLP in Cleveland. The defendants were represented

by shared counsel.

              Over the course of discovery, Citywide responded to 13 sets of

requests for documents, interrogatories, and requests for admissions, producing

over 5,000 pages of discovery. In addition, Citywide was forced to file two motions

to compel discovery against the defendants, which were granted by the trial court.




      1 We note that Selfridge is the only defendant on appeal.
Despite being ordered to comply with discovery, twice, the defendants failed to

provide discovery, forcing Citywide to file a motion to show cause, which was set

for hearing but ultimately held in abeyance.

              In June 2024, Citywide filed a motion for partial summary judgment

on the issue of liability against 10 defendants, including Selfridge.2 Although the

defendants requested and were granted an extension to respond to Citywide’s

motion, the defendants did not file a brief in opposition. In August 2024, the trial

court granted Citywide’s motion, finding defendants liable and awarding money

judgments against 10 defendants, including Selfridge.            The judgment entry

included the Civ.R. 54(B) language that “there is no just reason for delay,” thereby

creating a final judgment.

              Subsequently, Citywide filed a motion for partial summary

judgment requesting attorney fees totaling $434,252.95 against the same 10

defendants. This amount encompassed $383,976.60 for work performed by the

New York firm, as well as $50,276.45 for work performed by local counsel in

Cleveland. Citywide’s motion set forth the Agreement’s provisions that allowed for

the recovery of court costs and reasonable attorney fees for enforcement of the

Agreement.     The motion attached evidence, including affidavits, numerous

exhibits detailing the hours worked and the hourly rate, as well as the people

performing the work.




      2 Citywide is still pursuing judgment against the 11th defendant.
               The defendants opposed the motion contending that (1) the attorney

fees for the New York firm were excessive for the locale in which the case was

litigated and requesting a two-thirds reduction in fees; (2) the defendants should

not have to pay for local counsel fees; (3) the attorney fees were excessive when

compared to the limited activity in the litigation; and (4) the Agreement did not

contemplate recovery of fees charged for support staff. Much of the brief argued

against joint and several liability.     Neither party requested a hearing on the

matter.3

               After briefing, the court awarded Citywide the requested amount of

attorney fees. Each of the 10 defendants were ordered to pay $39,477.54, which

equated to $34,906.95 to the New York firm and $4,570.58 to local counsel.4

               In the written opinion, the trial court found that Citywide was the

prevailing party and that the Agreements between Citywide and the defendants

contained a provision that allowed for the recovery of attorney fees, which stated:

      Attorneys’ Fees: If either party brings an action against the other party
      to enforce any condition or covenant of the Agreement, the
      substantially prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its court costs
      and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in such action.

(Complaint, Exhibit A, Selfridge Agreement § 7.11.) In addition, the trial court

specifically noted the Agreement provided a provision that should the Agreement


      3 Selfridge alleges in its reply brief to this court that the defendants requested a

hearing on the motion for attorney fees; however, the record does not support Selfridge’s
assertion.

      4 Citywide is still pursuing a judgment against the 11th nursing home defendant,

which would account for the remaining $39,477.54.
terminate because of the defendants’ “failure to remit payment . . . then [Citywide]

shall be compensated for the cost of enforcing this Agreement and [Citywide’s]

other losses including reasonable attorney and court costs.” (Opinion, July 21,

2025.)

               In addition, the trial court addressed the defendants’ arguments as

set forth in their brief in opposition, stating:

      Defendants argue the Court should reduce the requested award by 2/3
      to account for . . . the amount of $289,501.97 to “bring[…] the hourly
      rate in-line with Ohio rates,” and eliminate local counsel’s fees charged,
      as well as cap the hours reimbursed at 300 hours. However, the Court
      finds that [Citywide] has demonstrated that the rates charged by all
      counsel are reasonable, inclusive of law firm personnel as provided
      under Ohio law, and that the hours expended were likewise reasonable
      in light of the delay in responsive discovery from the Defendants.

(Opinion July 21, 2025.) The court again included the Civ.R. 54(B) language that

there is no just cause for delay.5

               It is from this order that Selfridge appeals, raising the following

assignment of error for our review:

      The trial court erred in granting Citywide’s motion for attorney fees
      when the hourly rates and hours billed were unreasonable.

II. Law and Analysis

                                Standard of Review

               Although both parties suggest that the standard of review is an abuse

of discretion, we disagree because Citywide requested attorney fees by way of a

motion for partial summary judgment after prevailing on its breach-of-contract


      5 Court costs were not requested or ordered at the time of this appeal.
claim. An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo standard.

Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 2020-Ohio-4469, ¶ 13-15 (8th Dist.), citing

Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 10 (8th Dist. 2000); see e.g. Bolek v. Miller-

McNeal, 2016-Ohio-1383 (8th Dist.) (reviewing de novo a motion for summary

judgment granting attorney fees after prevailing on a breach-of-contract claim).

Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision and independently

review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Id.,

citing N.E. Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 121 Ohio App.3d 188,

192 (8th Dist. 1997).

                              Summary Judgment

              Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted,

a court must determine that

      (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2)
      the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it
      appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
      conclusion and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
      nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.

              Civ.R. 56(C) also provides an exclusive list of materials that parties

may use to support a motion for summary judgment:

      Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
      depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
      transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely
      filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
      fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
      law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in
      this rule.
                The moving party carries the initial burden of setting forth specific

facts that demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v.

Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). If the movant meets this burden, the

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to provide evidence showing that a

genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 293. The nonmoving party cannot simply

rest on its pleadings. Id.

                                   Attorney Fees

                On appeal, Selfridge does not contest liability or that Citywide is

entitled to reasonable attorney fees according to the Agreement. Rather, Selfridge

asserts that the amount awarded was unreasonable.

                “The party seeking an award of attorney fees bears the burden of

demonstrating the reasonableness of the requested fees.” Alcorso v. Correll, 2021-

Ohio-3351, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.). “Evidence of reasonableness ‘may take the form of

testimony, affidavits, answers or other forms of sworn evidence.         As long as

sufficient evidence is presented to allow the trial court to arrive at a reasonable

attorney fee award[.]’” Bales v. Forest River, Inc., 2019-Ohio-4160, ¶ 7, fn. 2 (8th

Dist.), quoting R.C.H. Co. v. 3-J Machining Serv., 2004-Ohio-57, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).

Thus, in the absence of conflicting evidence, an attorney’s affidavit alone may be

sufficient to support an award of attorney fees. Metron Nutraceuticals v. Thomas,

2022-Ohio-79, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), citing Manninen v. Alvarez, 2014-Ohio-75, ¶ 24

(12th Dist.).
              In the instant case, Citywide’s motion for summary judgment

included affidavits from an attorney at the New York law firm, as well as local

counsel, in accordance with Civ.R. 56(C). Both affidavits attested to the work

performed by each firm and the reasonableness of their fees. In addition, attached

to the New York attorney’s affidavit were the numerous filings from the case, the

contracts, as well as the invoices sent to Citywide and a detailed breakdown of who

performed the tasks, the time spent, and the hourly wage. Similarly, attached to

local counsel’s affidavit was a breakdown of the dates Citywide was billed, as well as

the amount billed for each month. This type of billing is commonly known as block

billing.

              By contrast, Selfridge filed a seven-page brief in opposition citing an

Ohio Bar Association publication stating that the average hourly rate for an attorney

in private practice with more than 26 years of experience was $250 per hour in 2018.

Based on this information, Selfridge requested that the trial court reduce the New

York firm’s hourly rate by two-thirds. Next, Selfridge asserted that the defendants

should not be responsible for local counsel’s fees because the Agreement did not

contemplate defendants would be responsible for two separate law firms. No

caselaw or Civ.R. 56(C) evidence was cited for this argument. Finally, Selfridge

argued that the hours worked were excessive in light of the effort required for the

case and that the Agreement did not contemplate recovery for litigation support

personnel. No caselaw was cited for this argument nor was there any evidence

provided that the hours were excessive.
               On appeal, Selfridge now argues that (1) the hourly rates charged by

the New York firm are significantly higher than the rates charged by attorneys in the

locale where the case was litigated; (2) the hours billed included time that was

duplicative and/or administrative; and (3) that the attorney fees awarded to local

counsel were unreasonable because the local attorney did not provide detailed

billing and the Agreement did not contemplate multiple law firms.

               Citywide contends, and we agree, that Selfridge raises new arguments

on appeal, specifically, Selfridge’s contention that the hours billed were duplicative

or administrative and that local counsel did not provide detailed billing.6 We also

note that Selfridge did not point to anything in the record that suggests duplicative

billing.

               Indeed, it is well-settled that a party cannot raise new arguments and

legal issues for the first time on appeal and that failure to raise an issue before the

trial court waives that issue for appellate purposes. Cleveland Town Ctr., L.L.C. v.

Fin. Exchange Co. of Ohio, Inc., 2017 Ohio-384, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.); Kalish v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 73, 79 (1977) (Appellate courts “will not consider

a question not presented, considered, or decided by a lower court.”). Furthermore,

App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an appellant’s brief include “[a]n argument containing

the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented

for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the



       6 This court has held that block billing does not automatically preclude an award

of attorney fees. Christen v. Continental Ents., 2020-Ohio-3665 ¶ 46-47 (8th Dist.).
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” Moreover,

App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that “[t]he court may disregard an assignment of error

presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on

which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in

the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” The burden is on the appellant, not the

appellate court, to construct the legal arguments necessary to support an appellant’s

assignment of error. Doe v. Cuyahoga Cty. Community College, 2022-Ohio-527,

¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing Taylor-Stephens v. Rite Aid of Ohio, 2018-Ohio-4714, ¶ 121

(8th Dist.). Appellate courts are not advocates. Id. Thus, we will not consider these

arguments.

               We now turn to Selfridge’s argument that the hourly rates charged by

the New York firm are significantly higher than the rates charged by attorneys in

Cuyahoga County; therefore, Selfridge concludes that the rates are unreasonable.

We disagree.

               “Before granting summary judgment, a trial court must determine

whether attorney fees are reasonable based upon the actual value of the necessary

services performed by the attorney and evidence must exist in support of the court’s

determination.” Bolek, 2016-Ohio-1383, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Koblentz &

Koblentz v. Summers, 2011-Ohio-1064, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing In re Hinko, 84 Ohio

App.3d 89, 95 (8th Dist. 1992). In making that determination, some factors to be

considered include the time and labor involved in maintaining the litigation, the

novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, the professional skill required to
perform the necessary legal services, the reputation of the attorney, and the results

obtained. Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 145-146 (1991).

Additional factors to consider are “the fee customarily charged in the locality for

similar legal services” and “the amount involved and the results obtained.” Auber

v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2749, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).

              “When ruling on a request for attorney fees, a trial court must

determine the ‘lodestar,’ which is the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate multiplied

by the number of hours reasonably worked on the litigation.” Scott v. First Choice

Auto Clinic, Inc., 2023-Ohio-3855, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.), citing Bittner at 145. “There is

a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is the proper amount for an attorney-

fee award.” Id., citing Phoenix Lighting Group L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group,

L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-1056, ¶ 19. Furthermore, “the prevailing market rate can often

be calculated based on a firm’s normal billing rate because, in most cases, billing

rates reflect market rates, and they provide an efficient and fair short cut for

determining the market rate.” Phoenix Lighting Group at ¶ 11, quoting Gulfstream

III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414, 422 (3d Cir. 1993).

              Selfridge asserts that the hourly rate for attorneys in Cuyahoga

County is one-third the rate of the New York attorneys whose rate ranged from $560

per hour in 2023 for an associate to $1,950 per hour in 2025 for a partner. Selfridges

cites State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 2018-Ohio-5109, and Northeast Ohio Coalition

for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2016), for the proposition that
attorneys in Cuyahoga County charge two-thirds less than the New York firm. We

find Selfridge’s reliance on these two cases misplaced.

              In Rubino, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed an application for

attorney fees in a case involving a successful petition for a writ of mandamus in a

zoning case originating in Cuyahoga County. The Rubino Court accepted attorney

fees ranging from $200 per hour up to $550 per hour to be reasonable based on an

affidavit of an independent attorney attesting that the fees were reasonable. Id. at

¶ 4. Ultimately, the Court reduced the total amount awarded because some of the

tasks were billed twice. Importantly, Rubino was litigated prior to September 2018;

therefore, the attorney fee rates were prior to September 2018.

              Likewise in Northeast Ohio Coalition, the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals reviewed attorney fees in an election-law case finding that attorney rates

from $300 per hour up to $600 per hour to be reasonable. Id. at 715. In addition,

the Court stated that “[m]ultiple-lawyer litigation is common and not inherently

unreasonable.” Id. at 704. The Circuit Court also affirmed the District Court’s

decision declining to use the Ohio State Bar Association’s survey regarding attorney

fee rates because the report specifically stated that it was not intended for use in

setting attorney fees or salaries and the report understates rates because many

attorneys failed to respond to the survey. Id. at 719. Importantly, Northeast Ohio

Coalition was litigated in 2012 and 2013; therefore, the attorney fee rates were

nearly a decade old compared to the instant case.
               Here, Citywide presented a current affidavit from the associate

attorney who completed a majority of the work on the case, as well as itemized billing

statements for the work performed. A review of the evidence submitted reveals that

most of the attorney hours billed by the New York firm were at the associate rate of

$750 per hour at the beginning of litigation and $850 per hour at the end of litigation

after the associate received a promotion. This case was litigated in 2023, 2024, and

2025; therefore, we find that Selfridge’s reliance on attorney rates charged in 2012,

2013, and 2018 is unreasonable. Moreover, taking into consideration that the $600

per hour rate was a reasonable rate in Ohio in 2012, we can hardly say that the rates

charged by the New York firm are unreasonable more than a decade later.

               Additionally, Selfridge argues that Citywide failed to submit expert

testimony regarding whether the rates charged by the New York firm were similar

to the rates charged in Cuyahoga County and, thus, the trial court could not find that

the rates charged by the New York firm’s attorneys were reasonable. We find this

argument unpersuasive because there is no steadfast rule in Ohio that the

“reasonableness” of attorney’s hours or hourly rate must be established by expert

testimony. Brantley, Inc. v. Tornstrom, 2024-Ohio-2908, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing

Alcorso, 2021-Ohio-3351, at ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). “While the presentation of testimony

from a ‘disinterested person’ or expert may be the ‘better practice’ when establishing

the reasonableness of attorney fees, it is not required to support a finding that

attorney fees are reasonable.” Bales, 2019-Ohio-4160, at ¶ 7, fn. 2 (8th Dist.).
                Here, Citywide presented Civ.R. 56(C) evidence including affidavits,

itemized billing, numerous filings, and the contracts to establish that the hours

worked and rates charged were reasonable considering the over two years of

litigation that ensued in this case. Whereas, Selfridge relied on the rates suggested

in an Ohio State Bar Association article from 2018 and caselaw describing

reasonable rates from a decade ago. Selfridge provided no evidence, as set forth in

Civ.R. 56(C), to show that a genuine issue of material fact remained to be litigated

as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees. Therefore, when viewing the evidence

in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we cannot say that a genuine issue

of material fact remains to be litigated.

                Citywide was the prevailing party in this litigation and thus, according

to the Agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, we agree

with the trial court’s finding that Citywide demonstrated that the rates charged as

well as the hours expended were reasonable considering the length of the litigation

and the amount of discovery and motions filed, as well as the delay in responsive

discovery that was solely attributed to the defendants.

                Accordingly, Selfridge’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

                Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee Citywide recover from appellant Selfridge the costs

herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


___________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR