Davis, Pike Cty. Treasurer v. Damron

[Cite as Davis, Pike Cty. Treasurer v. Damron, 2026-Ohio-1469.]




                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        PIKE COUNTY


                                                       :
DONALD E. DAVIS,
TREASURER OF PIKE COUNTY, OHIO,                         :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                             : CASE NO. 25CA941

        v.                                              :

THE UNKNOWN HEIRS…                                      : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
OF CHADWICK DAMRON, ET AL.,
                                                        :
        Defendants-Appellants.
                                 :
_________________________________________________________________

                                              APPEARANCES:

Gary Damron, pro se.

Ed Rhoads, Waverly, Ohio, for appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:4-16-26
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from a Pike County Common Pleas Court

judgment on a motion to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real

property.         Gary Damron, defendant below and appellant herein,

assigns two errors for review:

                FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                “THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE STANDARD LEGAL
                NOTIFICATION THROUGH REGULAR MAIL REPRESENTS A
                FUNDAMENTAL BREACH OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS,
                POTENTIALLY RENDERING SUBSEQUENT LEGAL
                PROCEEDINGS INVALID.”
PIKE, 25CA941                                                      2




           SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

           “TRANSMITTING LEGAL COMMUNICATIONS VIA EMAIL
           DURING A HOLIDAY WEEKEND FAILS TO MEET
           ESTABLISHED LEGAL COMMUNICATION STANDARDS AND
           POTENTIALLY COMPROMISES THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT
           TO TIMELY AND PROPER LEGAL NOTICE.”


    {¶2}   On June 13, 2024, Pike County filed a R.C. 5721.18(A)

complaint in foreclosure of real property located at 1793 Hickson

Run Road, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601, permanent parcel number 5-

025500.0000, for delinquent property taxes, assessments, and

penalties against unknown heirs, devisees, personal

representatives, successors and assigns of Chad Wick Damron, aka

Chadwick “Chad” Damron, including appellant, Gary Damron.

    {¶3}   On July 22, 2024, appellant, represented by counsel Jim

Cutright, answered and admitted the allegations contained in the

complaint and further admitted that he, Jeannie Humphrey, and

Colleen Rutherford are the sole next of kin of Chadwick Damron,

and, to appellant’s knowledge, Chadwick Damron did not have a last

will and testament.   Appellant further stated that if the premises

described in the complaint is sold, any sale proceeds after the

payment of real estate taxes, assessments, penalties, interest and

liens held to be valid by the court should be paid to him and his

siblings as next of kin.
PIKE, 25CA941                                                      3


     {¶4}   On September 10, 2024, the trial court granted appellee’s

motion for an order finding publication necessary on the

defendants.     On November 12, 2024, appellee moved the court for a

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment.     After a non-oral hearing on December

9, 2024, on December 12, 2024 the court granted summary judgment to

appellee.    The court then issued an Order of Sale on December 19,

2024 and the sheriff’s sale occurred on January 31, 2025.

     {¶5}   On April 4, 2025, appellant filed a motion to set aside

the sheriff’s sale.    Appellant alleged that “[i]t was noted in

certain pleadings by Plaintiff that Defendant Damron was served

with notice of the sheriff’s sale but no notice was ever given to

Defendant Damron (or Defendant Humphrey and Defendant Rutherford).”

Appellant argued that Notice by Publication for “unknown heirs” was

not sufficient service for known heirs.    As such, appellant

requested that the January 31, 2025 sheriff’s sale be set aside.

     {¶6}   At the May 7, 2025 hearing on the motion to set aside the

sheriff’s sale, appellant’s counsel, Jason Miller, indicated that

Attorney Jim Cutright, appellant’s previous counsel, had died.     The

following exchange occurred:

     MR. MILLER: Your Honor, uh, I just want to make a record
     of the proceedings. Uh, we understand what’s going on. I
     want to make it clear that we filed a motion to set aside
     the sheriff’s sale based on some notice provisions that my
     client and I, uh, really firmly believed had not been
     satisfied. He did answer the complaint in this case -

     BY THE COURT: Yes.
PIKE, 25CA941                                                     4


    MR. MILLER - - through Attorney Jim Cutright, who is now
    deceased -

    BY THE COURT: Yes.

    MR. MILLER - - back on July 22nd of last year. And so, he
    would have been required to receive notice of the pending
    sale.

    Uh, I - - when I came in on this at the 11th hour, uh, I
    believed, Gary had believed, the office staff of Mr.
    Cutright had believed that that notice had never arrived.

    Mr. Roads showed me today a print off of an email that was
    sent on December 26th of 2024 to Jim Cutright’s, uh, office
    account that is directed directly to Jim not to the main
    hub of the receipt of emails. And I was able to confirm
    through the office staff at Jim’s office when they got into
    his personal computer that that did appear to be there. I
    don’t know if it was delivered into the main box. I don’t
    know if it was delivered into the junk mail, but that it
    was delivered.

    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: However, the office had not seen that.

    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: That was a week, uh, there was about a ten-day
    period of time during the holidays when Jim Cutright’s
    office was not open. And no one ever laid eyes on that
    email from that point clear up until we stand here today.
    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: When Ed handed me that today, I saw it for
    the very first time not more than 20 minutes ago. So, we
    understand that. But I wanted to just make it clear to
    the Court that on that notice, on the certificate of
    service, it does indicate that it was delivered by U.S.
    Mail.   Uh, it was not delivered by U.S. Mail, it was
    delivered by email. Uh, I don’t know if that impacts the
    finding of the Court that the certificate of service was
    not accurate in its delivery. And, you know, had it been
    delivered by regular mail, um, Mr. Cutright’s office would
    have very readily seen that –

    BY THE COURT: Okay.
PIKE, 25CA941                                                     5



    MR. MILLER: - - and would have readily responded to it,
    let my client know exactly that it had come in. Uh, that
    had not been done. And so, we are contending to the Court
    that there is deficiencies in that notice.

    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: I want the Court to take that into
    consideration.   And again, if it had indicated an email
    delivery on - - on the notice, I’m not saying that Jim
    would have seen it more readily. However, it would have
    been, uh, more clear that if it had been delivered on
    regular U.S. mail, that he - - he would have gotten it.

    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: That’s what it was - - that’s what the
    certificate states.   So, we’re asking the Court to take
    that into consideration. Mr. Damron did not have notice
    of it. Um, Mr. Cutright did not see notice of it. The
    office did not see notice of it, nor did I.

    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: Uh, when we finally did get the notice, we
    pulled it off the internet. In fact, Jim’s office pulled
    it off of the internet for the very first time a day before
    I met with Gary Damron.

    BY THE COURT: Okay.

    MR. MILLER: Uh, did not have it in any other form. So,
    we’re asking the Court to take that into consideration and
    find that the notice was insufficient.

    . . .

    BY THE COURT: Okay. You know, looking at this, and Mr.
    Rhoads is right as far as how the foreclosure process works
    to get that minimum bid.       A one - - one for each.
    Basically, like you get what you get, and you know, that’s
    pretty much it. Yeah, in this case we, uh, both sides do
    agree that there was an email sent from Mr. Rhoads’ office
    to Mr. Cutright’s office. Uh, both sides have a - - have
    a copy of that. And that’s what I really have to go by as
    well, too. There was a notice sent to Mr. Cutright. I
    don’t know if we’ll ever know why that, uh, Mr. Damron
PIKE, 25CA941                                                       6


    wasn’t contacted on that. You know, I can’t say. Nobody
    can say. And Mr. Cutright is not here to tell us. I will
    say, I did know him, you know, for years. I know he was
    very, very conscientious. That, but still we just don’t
    know, but what we do have is copies of that email. And
    that being the case, I will deny the motion. Okay.

    {¶7}    On May 16, 2025, the trial court issued an entry on the

motion to set aside the sale, that stated, “[u]pon the statements

of counsel presented to this Court, the Court finds that service of

the Notice of Sale was made upon James K. Cutright, who was at the

time attorney for Defendant Gary Damron, by email on December 26,

2024, and this was confirmed by Attorney Cutright’s office.”    Thus,

the court held, “[s]ince it appears to this Court’s satisfaction

that Defendant Gary Damron, through his attorney, was timely served

with a Notice of Sale, said defendant’s Motion to Set Aside the

Sale is not well taken and is hereby denied.”     This appeal

followed.

                                  I.

    {¶8}    In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the failure to provide notification through regular mail represents

a fundamental breach of procedural due process, potentially

rendering subsequent legal proceedings invalid.

    {¶9}    Whether a trial court complied with the Ohio Rules of

Civil Procedure presents a question of law we review de novo.

Franklin Univ. v. Sharpe, 2024-Ohio-4881, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.), citing

Anderson v. Bright Horizons Children's Ctrs., LLC, 2022-Ohio-1031,
PIKE, 25CA941                                                        7


¶ 89 (10th Dist.).     Compliance with the civil rules of procedure is

mandatory.    LaNeve v. Atlas Recycling, Inc., 2008-Ohio-3921, ¶ 23.

“[T]he Civil Rules are not just a technicality, and we may not

ignore the plain language of a rule in order to assist a party who

has failed to comply with a rule’s specific requirements.”     Id.

“Proper service under the civil rules is mandatory even if a party

represented by counsel might otherwise learn of the action taken by

the court.”   Parallel Homes, L.L.C. v. Stephens, 2014-Ohio-840, ¶

13 (1st Dist.); Yost v. McNea, 2021-Ohio-2145, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.).

    {¶10} Generally, service of process that is reasonably

calculated to reach the interested parties is “constitutionally

sound.”    Akron-Canton Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio

St.2d 403, 406 (1980).    The presumption of proper service in cases

where the civil rules regarding service are followed is rebuttable.

Kapszukiewicz v. Samuel, 2007-Ohio-2152, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.).    The

complaining party bears the burden to rebut the presumption.     Id.

at ¶ 15.

    {¶11} Civ.R. 5 governs the service and filing of pleadings and

other papers subsequent to the original complaint.    Civ.R. 5(A)

provides as follows:

    Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order
    required by its terms to be served, every pleading
    subsequent to the original complaint unless the court
    otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every
    paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
    party unless the court otherwise orders, every written
    motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
PIKE, 25CA941                                                     8


    every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of
    judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of
    the parties.


Civ.R. 5(B) instructs how service is made:

    (1) Serving a party; serving an attorney

    Whenever a party is not represented by an attorney, service
    under this rule shall be made upon the party. If a party
    is represented by an attorney, service under this rule
    shall be made on the attorney unless the court orders
    service on the party. . .

    (2) Service in general

     A document is served under this rule by:

    (a) Handing it to the person;

    (b) Leaving it:

         (i) At the person’s office with a clerk or other
         person in charge or, if no one is in charge, in
         a conspicuous place in the office; or

         (ii) If the person has no office or the office
         is closed, at the person’s dwelling or usual
         place of abode with someone of suitable age and
         discretion who resides there;

    (c) Mailing it to the person’s last known address by United
    States mail, in which event service is complete upon
    mailing;

    (d) Delivering it to a commercial carrier service for
    delivery to the person’s last known address within three
    calendar days, in which event service is complete upon
    delivery to the carrier;

    (e) Leaving it with the clerk of court if the person has
    no known address; or

    (f) Sending it by electronic means to a fascimile number
    or e-mail address provided in accordance with Civ.R. 11 by
    the attorney or party to be served, or, if mutually agreed
    in writing by all counsel and unrepresented parties, any
PIKE, 25CA941                                                      9


     other electronic media platform(s), in which event service
     is complete upon transmission, but is not effective if the
     serving party learns that it did not reach the person
     served.


     {¶12} As set forth above, Civ.R. 5(B)(1) requires that when a

party is represented by counsel, service must be made on that

party's attorney.     Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association v.

Cleveland, 2024-Ohio-2651, ¶ 13, citing Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent

Association v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-1403, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.).

Appellant contends that service of the notice of the sheriff’s sale

must always be made through regular mail.    However, the clear

language of Civ.R. 5(B) establishes that, although service may be

perfected by personal delivery or by mailing a document to a

person's last known address, these are not the only permissible

methods.     Notably, Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(f) authorizes electronic service

by e-mail.    Columbus State Community College v. Chanthunya, 2025-

Ohio-4967, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).

     In Parallel Homes, supra, 2014-Ohio-840, the court observed:

     Civ.R. 5(A) states that every pleading subsequent to the
     original complaint “shall be served upon each of the
     parties[.]”   Civ.R. 5(B)(1) further requires service on
     the attorney of record if a party is represented by an
     attorney.   The rational for this rule is that a party
     represented by counsel usually speaks through counsel, and
     counsel “is in a better position to understand the legal
     import of any documents required to be served on his or
     her client and the nature of the action to be taken.”
     Swander Ditch Landowners' Assn. v. Joint Bd. of Huron &
     Seneca Cty. Commrs., 51 Ohio St.3d 131, 134, 554 N.E.2d
     1324 (1990), syllabus; Roberts v. Skaggs, 176 Ohio App.3d
     251, 2008–Ohio–1954, 891 N.E.2d 827, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).
PIKE, 25CA941                                                    10




See also Patel v. Lambrecht, 2014-Ohio-2953, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.),

citing Parallel at ¶ 12; Treas. of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Fitzgerald,

2022-Ohio-4386, ¶ 24 (“Because Fitzgerald was represented by

counsel, Civ.R. 5(B)(1) required the county to serve written notice

of the sale on counsel, and since Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(f) provides that a

document may be served by sending it to counsel’s email, service is

proper by requesting email service through the court’s electronic

filing system.”).

     {¶13} Although appellant does not raise the issue here, at the

hearing he also challenged the fact that the service certificate

inaccurately stated that the notice of the sheriff’s sale had been

sent via U.S. mail, when it had been sent via e-mail.    The trial

court appeared to have concluded that this fact did not affect the

outcome of this case.   We agree.   See Akron-Canton Regional Airport

Auth., supra, 62 Ohio St.2d at 406( “So long as service is

‘reasonably calculated’ to reach interested parties, then the

service is constitutionally sound. Accordingly, it is not necessary

that service be attempted through the most likely means of success

ordinarily residence service; it is sufficient that the method

adopted be ‘reasonably calculated’ to reach its intended

recipient.”).

     {¶14} In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court

correctly concluded that appellee emailed notice of the sheriff’s
PIKE, 25CA941                                                      11


sale on December 26, 2024 to appellant’s then-counsel, Attorney

Cutright.    Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of

error.

                                  II.

     {¶15} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that

transmitting legal communications via e-mail during a holiday

weekend fails to meet established legal communication standards and

potentially compromises a defendant’s right to timely and proper

legal notice.    Appellant, however, sets forth no legal authority to

support of his claim and we find none.

     {¶16} Appellee points out that at the May 7, 2025 hearing,

appellant’s counsel confirmed that the notice of sale had been

served by e-mail upon appellant’s attorney at the time service was

made.    The trial court referred to a copy of the e-mail service as

proof of service in the case at bar.    Pursuant to Civ.R.

5(B)(2)(f), e-mail service is complete upon transmission.    Thus,

the service was complete upon transmission of the e-mail.    See

Columbus State, supra, 2025-Ohio-4967, at ¶ 10 (“under Civ.R.

5(B)(2)(f), service was complete upon transmission and remained

effective provided CSCC did not learn that e-mail service failed to

reach him.    The record contains no evidence that CSCC's e-mail

never reached Chanthunya or that CSCC discovered such a fact.

Contrary to Chanthunya's argument, nothing in Civ.R. 5(B) obligated

CSCC to serve him either by personal delivery or by mailing a
PIKE, 25CA941                                                     12


document to his last known address.”).

    {¶17} Thus, we believe that the trial court properly concluded

that (1) Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(f) permits e-mail service, and (2) e-mail

service occurred in this case upon transmission on December 26,

2024.

    {¶18} Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s second assignment of error and affirm the

trial court's judgment.

                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
PIKE, 25CA941                                                     13




                          JUDGMENT ENTRY



     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed.   Appellee shall
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Pike County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment
into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court




                                   BY:_____________________________
                                      Peter B. Abele, Judge




                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.