Hornbeck Home Renovations, Inc. v. Crain

[Cite as Hornbeck Home Renovations, Inc. v. Crain, 2026-Ohio-1515.]


                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                          TRUMBULL COUNTY

HORNBECK HOME RENOVATIONS,                           CASE NO. 2025-T-0091
INC.,

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 Civil Appeal from the
                                                     Court of Common Pleas
        - vs -

THOMAS CRAIN,                                        Trial Court No. 2023 CV 01428

                 Defendant-Appellant.


               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

                                     Decided: April 27, 2026
                                   Judgment: Appeal dismissed


Jason M. Rebraca, Johnson & Johnson Law Firm, 12 West Main Street, Canfield, OH
44406 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Kevin P. Daley, 1451 East Market Street, Warren, OH 44483 (For Defendant-Appellant).


JOHN J. EKLUND, J.

        {¶1}     On December 19, 2025, Appellant, Thomas Crain, filed a notice of appeal

from an order of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. On January 8, 2026,

Hornbeck Home Renovations, Inc. (“Hornbeck”), filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal arguing

that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. On January 29, 2026, Appellant filed a

Response in opposition. For the reasons that follow, we grant Hornbeck’s motion and

dismiss this appeal for lack of a final order.

        {¶2}     On December 19, 2025, Appellant filed his notice of appeal and attached

two documents, which we describe in reverse order. The second document is identified
as a “Magistrate’s Order.” This “Order” was signed by the magistrate, was filed on

September 19, 2025, and provides that the underlying civil matter was tried to the

magistrate on September 15, 2025. Within this “Order,” the magistrate summarized the

parties’ respective positions, entered judgment in favor of Hornbeck and against

Appellant, and awarded monetary damages to Hornbeck. The final portion of this “Order”

refers to a “Magistrate’s Decision” and contains the notice set forth in Civ.R.

53(D)(3)(a)(iii) for filing objections.

       {¶3}    The first document is also identified as a “Magistrate’s Order.” This “Order”

was signed by the trial court judge, was filed on November 19, 2025, and provides that

the matter “came before the Court on the Objections to the Magistrate’s Decision filed by”

Appellant.    Within this “Order,” the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and

“adopt[ed] and incorporate[d] the Magistrate’s Decision in its entirety.”

       {¶4}    On January 8, 2026, Hornbeck filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal based on

this Court’s alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hornbeck argues that Appellant

raised two issues in his objections to the magistrate’s decision but did not preserve them

for purposes of appeal. In particular, Appellant objected on the basis that the magistrate

should have granted him additional time to retain an “alternate expert”; however,

Appellant had never filed a motion for a continuance. In addition, Appellant objected on

the basis that the record did not support the magistrate’s decision; however, Appellant

had never filed a transcript of the evidence submitted to the magistrate pursuant to Civ.R.

53.




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Case No. 2025-T-0091
          {¶5}   On January 29, 2026, Appellant filed a Response in opposition. Appellant

counters that this Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction and that Hornbeck’s Motion

to Dismiss involves the merits of his appeal.

          {¶6}   Upon review, we agree with Hornbeck that this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, although for different reasons.

          {¶7}   Article IV, § 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[c]ourts of

appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm,

modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of

appeals within the district . . . .” If the trial court’s order is not a final order, then this Court

does not have jurisdiction to review the case, and the appeal must be dismissed. Gen.

Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989).

          {¶8}   While not discussed by the parties, the documents attached to Appellant’s

notice of appeal contain irregularities, including one that is fatal to this Court’s jurisdiction.

Despite the second document’s caption, its substance indicates that it is actually a

“magistrate’s decision.”      A magistrate “may enter orders without judicial approval if

necessary to regulate the proceedings and if not dispositive of a claim or defense of a

party.”     Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(a)(i).    By contrast, a “magistrate’s decision” is prepared

“respecting any matter referred under Civ.R. 53(D)(1),” i.e., “a particular case or matter.”

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(i) and (D)(1). The second document indicates that it was prepared

following a trial on the merits; therefore, it was dispositive of the parties’ claims and

defenses.

          {¶9}   Further, despite the first document’s caption, its substance indicates that it

is actually a “judgment” issued by the trial court judge. See Civ.R. 54(A) (“‘Judgment’ as



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Case No. 2025-T-0091
used in these rules means a written entry ordering or declining to order a form of relief,

signed by a judge, and journalized on the docket of the court.”).

       {¶10} Most importantly, even if the documents are construed in the above manner,

there is no final order in this case. This Court has held that “[a] magistrate’s decision is

not final until a trial court reviews the decision and (1) rules on any objections, (2) adopts,

modifies, or rejects the decision, and (3) enters a judgment that determines all of the

claims for relief in the matter.” (Emphasis added.) Perkins v. Perkins, 2024-Ohio-5162, ¶

15 (11th Dist.). See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e) (“A court that adopts, rejects, or modifies a

magistrate’s decision shall also enter a judgment or interim order.”) Thus, “there is no

final judgment where a trial court fails to . . . enter judgment stating the relief to be afforded

. . . .” (Emphasis added.) In re M.M., 2021-Ohio-1695, ¶ 4 (11th Dist.). This is because

“[o]nly judges, not magistrates, may terminate claims or actions by entering judgment.”

Ledet v. Ledet, 2023-Ohio-2926, ¶ 4 (11th Dist.).

       {¶11} The trial court expressly overruled Appellant’s objections and adopted and

incorporated the magistrate’s decision. However, the trial court failed to expressly enter

judgment in Hornbeck’s favor and award monetary damages. This Court has held that “it

is not sufficient for a final appealable order that a trial court merely incorporate by

reference the recommendations of a magistrate’s decision.” Walsh v. Walsh, 2022-Ohio-

1101, ¶ 4 (11th Dist.). “Rather, the decision and the trial court’s judgment must be

‘separate and distinct instruments which are complete and independent of each other.’”

Id., quoting In re Castrovince, 1996 WL 1056815, *1 (11th Dist. Aug. 16, 1996).

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is not a final order.




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Case No. 2025-T-0091
       {¶12} Contrary to Hornbeck’s assertion, Appellant’s alleged failure to file a

transcript in support of his objections to the magistrate’s decision would not deprive this

Court of jurisdiction; rather, it would limit our standard of appellate review. See, e.g.,

Smith v. Treadwell, 2010-Ohio-2682, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.) (when no transcript is provided to

the trial court, “an appellate court will only reverse if it finds the trial court adopted the

magistrate’s decision when there was clear error of law or other defect on its face”).

Regarding Appellant’s alleged failure to file a motion for a continuance below, Hornbeck

cites no authority indicating that such a circumstance creates a jurisdictional defect (nor

have we located any such authority).

       {¶13} For the foregoing reasons, Hornbeck’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal is granted

based on different reasoning, and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.



MATT LYNCH, P.J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.




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Case No. 2025-T-0091
                                 JUDGMENT ENTRY



       For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion of this Court, it is ordered that

Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal is granted based on different reasoning, and that

this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

       Costs to be taxed against Appellant.




                                                     JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND



                                              PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
                                                         concurs



                                                 JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
                                                         concurs


           THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

     A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
               pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.




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Case No. 2025-T-0091